

Papers of the
British Association for Korean Studies

Volume 6

**NATIONALITY
AND
NATIONALISM
IN
EAST ASIA**

edited by

Alan J.K. Sanders

Papers of the British Association for Korean Studies

Series Editor: KEITH HOWARD

The editorial office of the *Papers of the British Association for Korean Studies* is at the Centre for Korean Studies, School of Oriental and African Studies, Thornhaugh Street, Russell Square, London WC1H 0XG.

Publication of the *Papers of the British Association for Korean Studies* is made possible with financial support from the Korea Research Foundation.

Volumes of the *Papers* appear at approximately annual intervals and are distributed to members of the British Association for Korean Studies. Institutions and individuals wishing to subscribe or purchase back issues should write to the editorial office for current rates.

Contributor's Notes:

Articles for future volumes of *Papers* should be submitted in both hard and soft copy wherever possible. State format and word processing package used on your disc. Manuscripts should be typed, double-spaced throughout, on one side of the paper only, with ample margins and sequential page numbers. Although we have no strict rules about length, authors should remember that most papers are derived from conference presentations.

References should be clearly cited in the text and set out in full at the end. Footnotes should be indicated in the text with a raised number. For style, follow the pattern of articles in this volume.

Standard romanisation for Asian languages should be adopted: McCune-Reischauer for Korean, *pinyin* for Chinese, and Hepburn for Japanese. Use diacriticals for Korean and Japanese. Enclose separate character glossaries where necessary, in camera-ready form. Do not insert characters in the main body of your text. Proper names should follow preferred spellings only when affixed to an article or book written in English; in such cases, McCune-Reischauer romanisations of Korean names should be appended in square brackets, or non-standard given in parentheses. Names should be given without hyphens—for example Kim Hyenam. In references romanise Asian titles in the above systems and give, where appropriate, a translation. Use standard translations whenever available.

Copyright © 1996 by the British Association for Korean Studies.

Contents

Plenary Papers

- Marilyn B. Young (New York University)
"Splendid China": Virtual reality 1
- Kosaku Yoshino (Sophia University Tokyo)
Cultural nationalism in contemporary Japan: the
role of the state and the role of the market 13
- Michael Robinson (University of South California)
Narrative politics, nationalism and Korean history 26

Papers

- Peter Lowe (University of Manchester)
Nationalism in East Asia 1948-1953: British
reactions to events in China, Korea and Japan 41
- Hilary Chung (University of Edinburgh)
Nationalism and internationalism in
20th century Chinese literature 56
- Susan Daruvala (University of Cambridge)
Nation and locality in the writing of Zhou Zuoren 71
- Ching May-bo (University of Oxford)
The place of vernacular in a national movement: Cantonese
literature in the late Qing and the early Republic 83
- Li Ruru (University of Leeds)
Shakespeare adaptation in China 89
- Chen-main Wang (National Chung-cheng University)
The Chinese YMCA and the anti-Christian
movement in China in the 1920s 101
- Caroline Rose (University of Leeds)
Issues in Sino-Japanese relations in the 1980s 116

Contents (cont'd)

Morris F. Low (Australian National University) Mapping the Japanese Empire: Colonial science in Shanghai and Manchuria	134
Susan Newman (University of Sheffield) Yanaihara Tadao and the question of nationalism and colonialism in the Japanese Empire (1926-1945)	150
Noboru Koyama (Cambridge University Library) Marriages between Japanese and foreigners Meiji 6 - Meiji 30 (1873-1897)	158
Jane Robbins (University of Sheffield) Japanese overseas broadcasting: The Manchurian crisis and after (1931-1937)	164
Stephen Creigh-Tyte (University of Warwick) Vocational education and training in the Republic of Korea: Trends and contrasts	173
Alan J.K. Sanders (School of Oriental and African Studies) The ethnic and political borders of Mongolia and the resurgence of Mongol nationalism	183

Book Reviews

Keith Howard & Hyun-key Kim Hogarth	213
-------------------------------------	-----

Maps

East Asia	vii
Mongolia	189

Editor's Preface

The Joint East Asian Studies Conference on the theme "Nationality and Nationalism in East Asia" was held at the University of Leeds in April 1994. Papers were presented in four main fields - history and international relations, social sciences, language and literature, and protohistoric studies. The three main contributions to the plenary sessions of the conference and 14 other papers were selected for publication at a meeting of the Joint East Asian Studies Committee in March 1995. Initial co-ordination was by Lynn Baird, to whom I am grateful for organizing the collection of papers. Substitutes were chosen for two of the selected papers published elsewhere - Robert Bickers's "Shanghaianders" and Chinese nationalism in republican China: Colonist opposition to treaty port reform" and John Crump's "Nationalism and anarchism in East Asia". The committee reviewed progress in November, when the preparation of maps and the editing of papers began. Presentation was standardized, some headings were changed, and footnotes were moved to the end of papers.


The plenary sessions pictured contrasting aspects of national self-perception: China's anodyne projection of itself as "peaceful, unified, ancient, capable" is disturbed by Maoist nostalgia and defiant pride, reflecting a lack of confidence; Japan's "cross-cultural manuals" so sensitize the Japanese to their distinctiveness that they have the unintended consequence of creating new obstacles to international communication rather than overcoming old ones; and Korea's national history is split into northern and southern narratives "predicated on aligning historical experience with antagonistic political positions on the peninsula".

British attitudes to nationalism in post-war China, Japan and Korea are examined in UK government records. Investigation of the Japanese "Textbook Issue" casts light on decision-making processes in China and Japan in the 1980s. Other papers discuss features of nationalism in Chinese language and literature. Scientific research in Shanghai and Manchuria is promoted by Japanese colonialism, which Tokyo radio supports while Japanese pacifists search for ways round censorship. The selection of papers ends with a survey of Mongol nationalism, which stands on the border between East Asian studies and Russian and Eurasian affairs.

The committee hopes that the next Joint East Asian Studies Conference will be held in April 1997 at the University of Durham on the theme "East Asia: Looking Forward, Looking Back".

Alan J.K. Sanders

Reading, February 1996



"Splendid China": Virtual reality

Marilyn B. Young

At the close of the 20th century we find ourselves absorbed in a topic that also absorbed commentators at the close of the 19th - nationalism. Like poverty, nationalism seems always to be with us, and perhaps for similar reasons: enduring structures of inequality of wealth and position, both individual and national. The current fashion, as Seamus Deane remarks in a recent essay on Irish nationalism, is to deconstruct nationalism in the interests of demythologizing a deliberately romanticized and thus distorted version of the past. The effect, he argues, is to erase the history of colonialism as well, since nationalism in the colonized world is precisely the product of the dialogue of colonized and colonizer. Since imperial nations assume a universalizing position, any insurgent is necessarily cast in a provincial role. The result is that insurgents

attempt to create a version of history for themselves in which their intrinsic essence has always manifested itself, thereby producing readings of the past that are as monolithic as that which they are trying to supplant.¹

The Chinese case is an interesting variant. Since 1978 the leadership has been engaged in replacing one monolithic version of the past - Mao's revolutionary nationalism - with another. There are many differences between the two, but perhaps the most important is that the Maoist myth of China's past was universalizing, whereas the reformers appeal only to a local, indeed a parochial audience. All nationalisms, Deane notes, involve a "metaphysical essentialism". From 1949 to 1978 at the heart of these metaphysics lay China as the Revolutionary Redeemer Nation. (This was of course quite apart from its actual behaviour in the world; Chinese foreign policy compromised revolutionary internationalism repeatedly.) Having "stood up" in 1949, China would serve as the Middle Kingdom of third world revolutionary nationalism, a shining beacon, a model and an advocate. State and society were firmly wedded and, if there were strains in

¹ Papers of the British Association for Korean Studies, vol.6 (1996), pp.1-12.

the marriage, they were resolved by force or persuasion. In post-Mao China, most observers would agree, the disjunction between party-state and society has steadily grown, requiring massive efforts on the part of the state to heal the divisions.

The essence of Maoist nationalism lay in its claim, however contradictory, to national greatness and international purity. The version of nationalism being actively propagated today makes no claim either to internationalism or universalism. The government, desperately seeking re-legitimation, Lowell Dittmer and Samuel Kim have recently written, has become "the self-styled defender of the national identity and symbol system of the old China".² Deng's China presents itself as the heir to China's long and glorious achievements in art and architecture, to its geographical scale and the diversity of its many nationalities. Chinese political history is not simply ignored, it is actively extirpated. This national myth has no politics, or rather, its politics are explicitly anti-political. The terms of this new-old identity are still being forged. My paper today examines this process as manifested in the representation of China at a series of national and international exhibitions, culminating in the opening this year of "Splendid China" in Orlando, Florida.

Access to Orlando's newest theme park is along an elevated highway. There are no overpasses, few underpasses and a limited number of exits. The traffic flows swiftly, the city skyline to one side, the ghetto to the other, carrying the traveller towards endless ranks of huge hotels and a rich choice of promised pleasures: Sea World, Universal Studios, Disney-MGM Studios, Epcot Center, Disney's Magic Kingdom and now, "Splendid China". Orlando's history of citrus groves and small farms has been erased entirely. This is a world of malls and highways. Its previous social reality has been bulldozed and its present social reality of racial conflict concealed, to make way for its planned, antiseptic and hermetic re-creation. It is a logical setting for China's new definition of itself.

There are two "Splendid Chinas", and probably more at the planning stage. The original occupies 74 acres in the middle of China's newest and fastest-growing city, Shenzhen. The other, in Orlando - recently proclaimed the fastest-growing city in the United States - was built on 76 acres of cleared land in the midst of competing theme parks. This is not the first time a Chinese government has sought to package and export its version of the nation while simultaneously attempting to persuade the Chinese to accept it. All displays of nationalism address both a domestic and an international audience and "Splendid China", like China's participation in world affairs in the early decades of the 20th century, is no different.

For example, the version of nationalism materialized in Nanjing in 1910 was a late Qing effort to demonstrate to Chinese and Westerners alike that the increasingly besieged dynasty was in fact the best representative of

dynamic Chinese nationalism. After a tour of Europe and the United States in 1906-07 Governor-General Tuan Fang was convinced that an international trade fair would demonstrate how much progress China had made and further encourage the forces of modernization. He may also have been influenced by China's humiliation at the 1903 Osaka Trade and Industrial Exposition, which included pavilions of the races of man. Seven Asian races were depicted - the Ainu, Ryukyuan, Formosan aborigines, Korean, Chinese, Hindu and Javanese. "Natives" displayed their handicrafts and ceremonies in "typical" thatched dwellings. The Chinese were represented by their best-known customs - footbinding and opium smoking.³

The symbolism of the 1910 fair was fairly straightforward: the visitor entered through a great Chinese-style gate and left through a gate of Western design. The Hall of Agriculture had a European façade, the roof decorated at its four corners with pagodas and a Chinese interior - the embodiment of *ti-yong* (Chinese learning as the essence, Western learning for use). The Hall of Chihli Province featured a traditional Chinese courtyard, where visitors were greeted by a marching band in Western uniform. For the most part the fair emphasized China's modern accomplishments: there were Halls of Machinery and Transport, Education, Industry and Public Health. Exhibitions of handicrafts were flanked by displays of arms and ammunition.

Similarly, five years later in San Francisco, the new Republic of China announced itself to the world through an even more elaborate mix of "tradition" and modernity. The most striking Chinese contribution (some said it was the highlight of the fair) was a scale model - not a miniature - of the "Forbidden City". Designed in Beijing, built in Shanghai and then shipped for re-assembly at the fair by Shanghai workmen, the model included the Imperial Audience Hall "whence", Frank Morton Todd, the official historian of the fair, noted "issued those intolerant and tyrannous edicts that led to the downfall of the dynasty". A crenellated wall, reminiscent of the Great Wall, set off the Chinese Pavilion from the rest of the fair and within it, Morton observed, one could experience the "Asiatic atmosphere unmistakably, without a taint of occidental sophistication".

All the same, Chinese modernity was on display in almost every hall. The Palace of Transport featured a map of projected railway development, in particular a proposed rail route across China to Constantinople. Pictures and models of existing lines showed goods trains running alongside the Great Wall and the Ming Tombs. To be sure, there were actually only 3,500 miles of railway lines in China but, Todd insisted, China "showed quite remarkable evidence of her modern progress". Besides railways, Chinese products, both modern and traditional, were on display in a variety of venues from the Palace of Fine Arts to the Palace of Liberal Arts, and from the Palace of Industries to the Palaces of Mines and Metallurgy, Agriculture and Food Products. The Palace of Education bore witness to the thousands of

Western-style schools that had been opened, as well as featuring 100 tons of wood carvings and handicrafts produced by the new vocational schools. Moreover, Todd pointed out, this was not the "China of the treaty ports, but the vast domain back of them, the land of 1,500,000 square miles and 4,000 walled cities and towns, and the genius of its ancient family". Overall he concluded, although the Chinese had brought evidence of their antiquity to San Francisco, their participation was that of a "modernized country".⁴

The Nanjing fair did not go unchallenged. Anti-Manchu protestors demonstrated outside, the more aggressive wielding pigtail-cutting scissors. Foreign gunboats gathered in the river to make sure the disturbances did not get out of hand, and a large force of government troops was brought in to prevent a confrontation. In San Francisco local Chinese protested against a private concession featuring an opium den.⁵

Orlando's "Splendid China" has also been subjected to criticism. Just as Nanjing revolutionaries disputed the dynasty's appropriation of Chinese nationalism, Tibetans and their supporters protested against "Splendid China's" inclusive vision of the Chinese nation-state:

"It is offensive," an American spokeswoman for the protestors told an American reporter, "that they could take a holy religious site of the Tibetan people for many centuries, shell it, bomb it, desecrate it, run people out and murder people in there, and then try to portray it as part of Chinese history."⁶

The Florida Chamber of Commerce responded laconically: "Attractions always reflect the positive. That's kind of the nature of their existence. It is not our role to take a position on the human rights issue." Bowing to pressure, however, the owners of "Splendid China" removed a plaque identifying the Potala Palace. The result, ironically, is that visitors think it is the most magnificent thing the Chinese ever built. There are other ironies: originally the project was jointly owned by the China Travel Service (CTS) and Taiwan-born George Chen, president of the Los Angeles-based corporation American Eastern International. CTS bought out Chen in an amicable settlement of unspecified disagreements, but Chen still owns the 513 acres surrounding "Splendid China" which will feature a 256-room hotel and an upmarket shopping centre. The name of Chen's development is "Formosa Gardens".⁷

Shenzhen's "Splendid China", Ann Anagnost has argued, "speaks to the totality of the nation".⁸ It appears as a "surreal simultaneity" of monuments spanning five millenia and in its compression of time and space the intensity of the ideological effect is doubled. "Splendid China", she writes, embodies a "transcendental perspective" which assumes the "eternal verity of the idea of 'China' as a bounded entity". Outside that boundary is modern Shenzhen, its history only a decade old. Together "Splendid China" and Shenzhen represent the "ambivalent temporality of the nation-state",

caught "between its simultaneous desire for being both deeply historical and undeniably modern".⁹

Shenzhen surrounds "Splendid China" in much the same way as the Western exterior of the Hall of Agriculture in Nanjing surrounded its "traditional" interior 80 years earlier. In its very stillness, its reassurance that somewhere outside an original of the finely wrought miniature really exists, the reality of the turbulent changes taking place in the city of Shenzhen and in China itself can be contained and controlled, as the Hall of Agriculture insisted that inside modernity lay a still Chinese core. ("Splendid China" is not unique in this effect. The whole of Epcot Center represents a history in miniature, washed clean of suffering and ambiguity.)

In San Francisco in 1915 the past and the future were separated, the past set in the "Forbidden City", the firm core of ancient China although, or perhaps especially because, it was no longer forbidden. The Forbidden City asserted cultural difference; exhibits in other halls and palaces affirmed modern capacities. The skill of Chinese workmanship was enthusiastically appreciated by foreign observers (as it was in Orlando more recently), and the commercial prospects for the future explicitly welcomed. The workers from Shanghai were not the average Cantonese of San Francisco's Chinatown, but "tall, dark, silent, competent men... dressed in peculiar costume at first but later, with unexpected adaptability, adopting Western overalls and jumpers". They were praised, too, for their excellent workmanship and for the implicit vision of skilled cheap labour combined with Chinese natural resources and Western industrial organization.¹⁰ In Orlando the skill of Chinese artisans received favourable comment and Representative Alzo Reddick took the long view: "This is a monumental day for tourism in Florida," he proclaimed on opening day. "I'm hoping this signals future trade, exchange and tourism. It marks a new degree of maturity between us."¹¹

As Anagnost notes, "Splendid China" has no narrative. The visitor does not move through a national story culminating in the present. There is only the nation itself, offered as an inanimate object for comfortable and comforting contemplation by citizens and foreigners. There is reassurance, too, in the representation of minority nationalities, safely domesticated and, in the words of the park's guidebook, all living lives which have changed for the better without spoiling their customary pleasures. At night in the Dong village, for example, "you can hear the continuous love songs accompanied by... melodious music... filling the atmosphere with joy and love".¹² The Bouyei are also good at singing and dancing and their life "is rich and colourful. After dark, with the lively fast rhythm of bronze drumbeats, people sing and dance merrily far into the night."¹³ The Miao delight in singing love songs far into the night and the Bai, you will not be surprised to learn, are "good at singing and dancing and they live a rich and colourful life". The Hakka circular houses are a "world wonder", while the Dai are

"civilized, courteous and hospitable" and have developed the welcome habit of cleanliness so that "it is really a pleasure to be the guest of the Dai people".¹⁴

It should be noted that, in the section of "Splendid China" devoted to folk-ways, the people of Beijing also appear. For a brief moment the incautious critic might suppose that what we see is a genuine effort at China's version of multiculturalism. However, Beijing is represented by a magnificent mansion in which large numbers of porcelain figures are celebrating the birthday of a member of the imperial household on the 19th of the ninth month of the lunar year in 1922, hardly the equivalent of the simple village dwellings of minorities, however merrily they sing their love songs. (For a "folk", Beijing appears in a remarkably sophisticated mode.) Minority people also appear in theatrical events, both in Shenzhen and Orlando. The ones I watched featured women in tight satin trousers and blouses dancing to the ferocious beat of drums and cymbals played by half-naked young men with very long hair.

In her essay *Anagnost* comments on the striking lack of any reference to modern Chinese history, but this is not completely accurate. True, the birthplace of Confucius is featured, but the lovely miniature "water village" is Shaoxing, birthplace of Lu Xun, including the school at which he studied and the restaurant, theatre and ancestral hall mentioned in his writings. These, the guidebook tells us, "add a great romantic feeling to this modern village". Indeed, whatever you've read about unrest elsewhere in rural China, Shaoxing presents a "view of serene and peaceful rural scenery which makes one feel relaxed and happy".¹⁵ Mao's mausoleum is missing (as is contemporary Tiananmen altogether) but Sun Yat-sen's is not. Indeed, it is one of the larger exhibits and from the promontory on which it is set, in Orlando, at least, one can have a wonderful view of the surrounding models. It is the small plaque in front of the mausoleum which arrests the visitor familiar with Chinese history. Sun is described as the "son of a simple farmer" who studied Western ideas, lectured Chinese Americans in San Francisco on the need to change the government and then forced the last emperor of the Qing to abdicate, after which he became the first President of the Republic. Sun's short tenure in this position is not discussed. Instead, as in American versions of Chinese history written during the early Republic itself, he is the one and only Chinese revolutionary, the George Washington of his country.

The Shenzhen guidebook describes Sun as a "revolutionary forerunner" whose abiding commitment was to the "lofty ideal of unity". There is no mention of what exactly he foreran. In Orlando each plaque in addition to a brief description of the site has a time-line so that the visitor can place Chinese events in context. It is here that the only mention anywhere in the park of the revolution of 1949 occurs. Sun's time-line begins with the founding of the League of Nations, proceeds to the stock

market crash in 1929 and concludes without comment in 1949 and the establishment of the People's Republic of China. Other time-lines plot ancient monuments, such as the 3rd century Yellow Crane Tower against the contemporary persecution of Christians in Rome; the 15th century Temple of Heaven against the burning of Joan of Arc; the 14th century temple to Zhuge Liang - whose fame, by the way, the Shenzhen guidebook tells us, is "known even to women and children" - against the Black Death, etc.

The "lofty ideal of unity" is expressed as well in one or two other references to modern Chinese history. The Lugou Bridge, in addition to its magnificent 12th century marble arches, marks the beginning of China's war against the Japanese, "because it was here the Chinese army took its stand against Japanese soldiers on 7 July 1937". Which Chinese army? The plaque is blank.

The only other nod to modern Chinese history appears in the descriptive information given in front of the model of the Summer Palace, "rebuilt in 1888". "The original Summer Palace," we are told, "was destroyed in a war" - the identity of the combatants goes unmentioned - and the Empress Dowager, showing "great wisdom in her sense of priorities, misappropriated funds for the navy and used the money instead to rebuild". Thus is to be remembered the self-indulgence of the court, whose failure to protect China from foreign powers has been excoriated by Chinese nationalists from the late 19th century on. The political scientist Edward Friedman has insisted that the "anti-imperialist nationalism embodied in Maoism" has at last been "discarded", but I think even he might be surprised by the form its disposal takes here.¹⁶

The Great Wall meanders for half a mile through the park. This is a friendly Great Wall, lushly planted with bonsai trees. It does not enclose so much as accompany one. It is also the mythic wall, as Arthur Waldron's recent book describes it, the ultimate (if multivalent) symbol of the nation, "an object of pride to Chinese" who "revel in its size and are delighted at the reverent awe with which most foreigners approach it". In the Shenzhen guidebook it is the "symbol of Splendid China", "one of the eight wonders of the world", "the biggest defensive military structure in the world" built, in both China and Florida, of six million tiny hand-crafted bricks.¹⁷

In the miniaturized world of "Splendid China" it is possible to see Ben Anderson's "imagined community" made visible, to take a walking tour through the Chinese leadership's determined effort to repudiate the idea of the nation it had participated in building and now seeks to replace. The New China is peaceful, unified, ancient, capable. It has no political history to speak of, no abiding conflicts, no ruptures. The teachings of Confucius, according to the descriptive note in front of the temple dedicated to him, "were faithfully followed by most of China's sovereigns", and it is he who gave the world the Golden Rule. Before Socrates was born, when Europeans

were dying in the Black Death, and in periods when Christians burned each other at the stake or Crusaders fought the Turks, the Chinese had been peacefully, splendidly, building great monuments. Such wars as are mentioned were defensive, and the funds others might use for arms the Chinese put to the arts of peace, the creation of beauty.

Some distance from Orlando, but of a piece with the effort it represents, there is another realm in which the current Chinese government seeks certainty, stability and transcendent self-definition. A 19-member research team is currently hard at work, dedicated to the task of isolating the "quintessentially Chinese genes among the 100,000 terms of genetic code borne by human DNA". The researchers will "analyse the meaning of heredity [and] supply a biological basis to discern the dissemination and distribution of the Chinese race". According to the *People's Daily*, a beneficial side effect will be "national consciousness-raising". An article in the *Far Eastern Economic Review* observes with concern that the project could "turn into a potentially useful exercise to bolster Beijing's sovereignty over minority populations and their lands".¹⁸ China, then, can be defined racially, its identity essential, material, literally and unchallengeably in the genes.

Edward Friedman argues that, once upon a Maoist time, nationalism "seemed presuppositional to the identity of proud Chinese responding to the Communist Party's proclaimed mission of helping the people 'stand up' to foreign exploiters, domestic traitors and imperialism in any form". Rather than a "permanent national truth" this was "merely passing national myths".¹⁹ Certainly "Splendid China" supports this observation. Neither in Orlando nor in Shenzhen can the visitor find any reference to foreign exploiters or imperialism, but the picture grows murky if we turn to official responses to perceived slights. When a Chinese skater failed to receive the gold medal to which she felt she was entitled, the *People's Daily* explained the decision in terms which make one wonder if the anti-imperialist "national mythos" has really passed. "Certain foreigners have deep prejudices against Chinese," the editorial stated angrily, "and this certainly contains aspects of a colonialist mentality." Unnamed foreigners are accused of wishing to hold China back. "In the opinion of some, China is not even worth mentioning but is poor, backward and uncivilized. Chinese people are weak, shabby, dirty-faced peasants. In the big international family Chinese people can only obey." However, China is changing, the *People's Daily* insisted:

Only a strong, stable and prosperous China can win the respect of the world. We are not begging those who are prejudiced against China to change their opinions [but] will use our strength to prove that China is strong and the Chinese race is admirable. The facts will bear us out. The Chinese people are now on the road to prosperity, moving towards a glorious 21st century. This might make you happy, or it might make you unhappy, but none of you can stop it.²⁰

The terms have changed since Mao, when China's backwardness and poverty, its shabby and "dirty-faced peasants" were celebrated, but standing up to the foreigner remains an issue.

A similar note of defiance marks current exchanges with the US government on the issue of human rights and MFN. As demonstrated by their treatment of Secretary of State Warren Christopher on his recent visit, the Chinese have suspended efforts at piecemeal pacification of the Clinton administration and chosen instead to assert their right to control their internal affairs. By symbolic gesture and overt statement alike, the Chinese government has resisted American efforts to reform its treatment of political prisoners, arguing that human rights, as defined by the US, arrogantly ignore the fundamental right to a more comfortable life, which the government feels it is finally providing. This international assertion is also a domestic one. Dissent is division; the centre must hold. By contrast, the government has arrested Chinese who want China to stand up to the Japanese on the issue of compensation for victims of the Pacific war.

At a popular level, as I'm sure you are aware, the cult of Mao seems to grow exponentially as nostalgia and commodity. The tables at the "Black Earth" restaurant in Beijing are packed with people dining on peasant fare and the walls are covered with photographs of sent-down youth in their prime. A report estimates that about a quarter of the customers are veterans of the Cultural Revolution who take pride in their past.²¹ The "Remembering Bitterness, Thinking of Sweet Things" restaurant is crowded with middle-aged former sent-down youth, although here the message is more ambivalent: there are two menus, one offering simple northern home cooking at low prices, the other devoted to the luxury foods Deng's reforms have made available to a growing number of urban Chinese.

The "Mao Family Restaurant", which conducts a booming business in Shaoshan, has just opened a branch in Beijing. The facade is made of wooden logs and the internal decor is dominated by a 30-year-old photograph of Mao and a group of Shaoshan villagers, including the owner, Mrs Tang. On the other hand there are also disco lights, a karaoke room, an illuminated dance floor and softly lit "drinking booths". Mrs Tang's purpose is educational: "There are lots of veteran revolutionaries and their children who haven't been to Shaoshan. They don't know whether the food Chairman Mao ate was good, or whether the wine he drank was good, so I've brought them to Beijing."²² She told another reporter that her purpose was to "spread Mao Zedong thought". After all, his goal was to make China "rich and strong", and making money is an obvious way to do so. Her karaoke videos feature golden oldies, and one reporter has described a young policeman crooning "Chairman Mao, like the sun, leads the people forward", while a disco ball "flashed orange and green beams on his earnest face". When he had finished singing he defended the karaoke bar: "If Mao were

alive now, his thinking might be even more daring than that of Deng Xiaoping. He was not a backward person."²³

The regime's early efforts to contain Mao's image, limiting its relevance to the days of glory of the war against Japan, have yielded more recently to movements from below which recall a different Mao. Beyond the kitsch of Mao lighters (mine plays a particularly shrill version of "The East is Red"), clocks, T-shirts and genuine artefacts of the Cultural Revolution, now expensive antiques, Mao is being put to very different purposes. The Mao the regime wishes to sell (sometimes literally - a painting of Mao and some of his close friends celebrating the first anniversary of the revolution was recently removed from the mausoleum and auctioned off in Hong Kong), the popular singer Zhang Guangtian observes, is "the young firebrand or the wily field commander. Or else they stress the international statesman, the Mao who met Nixon." What inspires Zhang, who was born in 1967, is the Mao "who tried to give China what it has lacked for 5,000 years - a spiritual basis. That was the Mao of the Cultural Revolution." When Zhang tried to sing "Long Live the People" on a Beijing radio programme featuring his music, he was censored. Sample lyrics:

Look at us, in our tens of thousands. Now look at them, standing all alone.
See the justice on our side. Watch how soon they will be done for.

The explanation offered for censoring the song, that its setting, to the tune of "John Brown's Body", might "offend Christians", is most unlikely, especially in the light of recent efforts to ban the celebration of Christmas among college students.²⁴ Arrested in 1986 for his dissenting views, after his release in 1989 Zhang wandered around south-western China. According to an article by Matei Mihalca, that was where "he became aware of the charisma of Mao".²⁵ Had he travelled in the hinterland at a somewhat later date, Zhang might have seen a popular version of that charisma: Mao Mountain, a renamed mountain range in Xinjiang whose shape is said to reflect that of the recumbent Mao. Miniatures for the state; gigantism for the people.²⁶

In the virtual reality of "Splendid China" unity is doubly represented: seen from its perimeter, all of Chinese history and all of its peoples are collected so as to be represented by the centre. Yet the leadership is nowhere near as confident as these naturalizing moves suggest. Or rather, the moves themselves express the regime's unease. The leadership has reason to worry. Gerald Segal, in a recent report for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, says that Beijing only "pretends" to rule. Provincial power is steadily growing. Indeed - and this must be especially threatening to Beijing - the West is urged to deal directly with the provinces. Some trade disputes, Segal says, have become veritable trade wars, "including the use of 'some form of military force' to guarantee access to resources".²⁷ There have been serious anti-government movements in Ningxia, where 49 people were killed last May in fighting outside a mosque.

In October government forces stormed a mosque in Xining, Qinghai, and arrested Muslim leaders who were charged with having "assaulted local party and government offices, smashed police vehicles and besieged and attacked... men of the security and armed police".²⁸ Not forgetting, of course, that there is always Tibet.

The government's effort to produce, in Seamus Deane's words, a "monolithic" version of the past is clearly besieged. Perhaps this is because the history it attempts to erase is so very recent. More important I suspect is the fact that it has abandoned any effort to tell a story. A monolithic version of the past that has oddly refused to replace the deposed narrative with one of its own may tax a people's capacity to forget. Like the fairs earlier this century, "Splendid China" claims for the present the glories of a timeless past. It is hard not to see this particular exercise in miniaturization as real decline.

Notes

1 Seamus Deane, "Introduction", in Terry Eagleton, Fredric Jameson and Edward W. Said, *Nationalism, Colonialism and Literature*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1990, p. 9.

2 Lowell Dittmer and Samuel S. Kim, "Whither China's quest for national identity?", in *China's Quest for National Identity*, Ithaca: Cornell University, 1992, p. 268.

3 Yukiko Koshiro, *Trans-Pacific Racism: The US Occupation of Japan*, dissertation for Columbia University, 1992, p. 14, quoted by permission of the author. The Koreans, Ryukyuan and Chinese all protested vigorously and the Ryukyuan and Chinese exhibits were indeed cancelled, but not the Korean one.

4 Michael Godley, "China's World's Fair of 1910: Lessons from a forgotten event", in *Modern Asian Studies*, 12:3, 1978, pp. 503-522. I am grateful to Jim Hevia for this reference. On the San Francisco fair - and others in which China figured before the First World War - see Robert Rydell, *All the World's a Fair*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984. Rydell's book led me to the official account of the fair by Frank Morton Todd, *The Story of the Exposition: Being the Official History of the International Celebration Held at San Francisco in 1915 to Commemorate the Discovery of the Pacific Ocean and Construction of the Panama Canal*, New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1921, Vol. 3, pp. 288, 290, 292, Vol. 4, p. 251.

5 Rydell, *All the World's a Fair*, p. 228.

6 *St. Petersburg Times*, 12 December 1993. *China News Digest*. My thanks to Ann Anagnost for sending me her file on this.

7 *Orlando Sentinel*, 12 December 1993. My thanks to Arthur Meltz for the clipping.

8 Ann Anagnost, "The Nationscape: Movement in the field of vision", *Positions*, 1:3, p. 586.

- 9 *ibid*, pp. 586, 589.
- 10 Todd, *The Story of the Exposition*, Vol. 3, p. 289.
- 11 *Orlando Sentinel*, 19 December 1993.
- 12 *Shenzhen: Splendid China, Miniature Scenic Spot*, p. 106. I am grateful to Ann Anagnost for lending me her copy of the guidebook.
- 13 *ibid*, p. 108.
- 14 *ibid*, p. 109-112.
- 15 *ibid*, p. 114.
- 16 See Edward Friedman, "A failed Chinese modernity", *Daedalus*, 122:2, Spring 1993, p. 2.
- 17 Arthur Waldron, *The Great Wall of China: From History to Myth*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990, p. 220; guidebook, p. 11. This view of the Great Wall is not unchallenged. You will be familiar with the controversy over the documentary "River Elegy", whose sombre narration mourns precisely the China "Splendid China" celebrates. To its authors the Great Wall was not a symbol of China's splendours but rather a "monument to tragedy", representing not strength but "impotent defence and timidity in the face of invasion". Its legacy is "self-deception [imprinted] on the very soul of China". Translated by Geremie Barme and Linda Jaivin in *New Ghosts, Old Dreams*, New York: Times Books, 1992, p. 151. At the same time, public response to Deng Xiaoping's patriotic campaign ("Let us love our country and restore our Great Wall") seems to have been greeted with considerable popular enthusiasm. Waldron, pp. 1, 225.
- 18 Lincoln Kaye, "Quality control", in *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 13 January 1994, p. 22.
- 19 Friedman, "Failed modernity", p. 2.
- 20 Report by Chen Huxiong, based on dispatches from *China News Digest*, Reuters and AP, 28 February 1994.
- 21 AP dispatch of 7 January 1994, quoted in *China News Digest*, 4 February 1994.
- 22 Catherine Samson, *Wall Street Journal*, 2 January, 1994, quoted in *China News Digest*, 4 February 1994.
- 23 Kathy Wilhelm, AP, 19 December 1993, quoted in *China News Digest*, 21 December 1993.
- 24 Not just Christmas, but Valentine's Day and April Fool's Day as well. The purpose of the ban is to "achieve a relatively stable cultural tradition on college campuses and promote our country's fine national culture", *China News Digest*, 9 December 1993.
- 25 Matei Mihalca, "The Pied Piper of Peking", in *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 30 September, 1993, p. 55.
- 26 See Anagnost, "The nationscape", *Positions*, 1:3, p. 601.
- 27 Report on Segal study by Ming Zhang and Chuck Lin, *China News Digest*, 15 March, 1994.
- 28 Rone Tempest, *China News Digest*, 23 February 1994.

Cultural nationalism in contemporary Japan: The role of the state and the role of the market

Kosaku Yoshino

It was in the early 1980s that I began my study of cultural nationalism. At that time, very few people were studying this subject or even using the term cultural nationalism.¹ The increase in the literature on this topic over the past few years shows something of the increasing recognition of the importance of culture in what was once regarded as the realm of the political state. One of the points raised in my book, *Cultural Nationalism in Contemporary Japan*, published in 1992, is the importance of the hitherto neglected perspective of the "market" in the study of nationalism. Whilst it is certainly important to examine how the state "produces" and disseminates national myth and ideology, as previous studies have done, it is equally essential to draw attention to the market process whereby nationalism is "reproduced" and "consumed" irrespective of the intention of the state. In this paper I wish to show, with reference to the contemporary Japanese case, the importance of the perspective of the "market" in the development of cultural nationalism.

Some key terms should first be defined. By nationalism I mean both the sentiment among a people that they constitute a community with distinctive characteristics, and the project of maintaining and enhancing that distinctiveness within an autonomous state. Whereas political nationalism emphasizes the nation's collective experience as a political reality by achieving a representative state for its community, cultural nationalism serves to regenerate the national community by creating, preserving or strengthening a people's cultural identity when it is felt to be lacking or threatened. In short, cultural nationalism is concerned with the distinctiveness of the nation as a cultural and historical community. Another distinction that I wish to propose is the one between what I call "primary" and "secondary" nationalism. By primary nationalism I mean original nationalism, concerned with inventing national identity, in contrast to

secondary nationalism which preserves, recreates and enhances national identity in an already established nation.² Boundaries between the two cannot be drawn with any precision, except possibly in the case of Japan, whose defeat of Japan marks the end of one kind of nationalism and the start of another. As Maruyama Masao (1969: 137) put it, Japan "completed one full circle of nationalism: birth, maturity and decline" in 1945.

The state and nationalism

Primary nationalism, or the initial phase of nationalism, is usually the realm of myth-makers who formulate the ideology of the nation's identity by articulating its ancestral myth. In nationalist thinking, invention of a nation's ancestral "history" and tradition enables its members to share a sense of communal uniqueness and historical continuity. Such a historicist vision is usually taught "from above" to the masses through the medium of state-controlled education. The state injects its historicist views and inculcates national values through formal education. In Japan the invention of the tradition of the emperor system (*tennōsei*) in the late 1890s was intended to serve this purpose. The emperor system was created out of the combination of a familistic notion of the state and state Shinto. As an effective means of ideological manipulation, analogy was drawn between state and family and thus between loyalty to the emperor and filial piety. The state had firm control over education, the Ministry of Education compiling school textbooks from 1903 (see e.g. Tsurumi 1970: ch.3).

In the post-war period since 1945 nationalistic elements and ideas have been muted in Japanese society, especially those associated with the pre-1945 state. Reforms conducted under the occupation included separation of religion and state, adoption of a new constitution, change of the constitutional status of the emperor, a new education system, elimination of the feudalistic *ie* (household/family) system, land reform, and so on (see e.g. Morris 1960). Criticism of feudalistic social legacies and state-initiated nationalism came from among Japanese thinkers themselves. Particular caution has been exercised in the post-war era to prevent a revival of those symbols and practices reminiscent of pre-war and war-time ultra-nationalism, such as display of the Rising Sun flag and the singing of the *Kimigayo* anthem at school ceremonies, introduction of elements of national pride into school curricula and so on (Yoshino 1992: 32-36, 203-208).

What kind of nationalism could emerge in these circumstances? What realms of society and what social processes should one study to enquire into the nature of contemporary nationalism? At present it is questionable whether the state can effectively enhance national sentiment. This is because until recently restraints on explicit expression of state-initiated nationalism

have been very strong among significant numbers of the general public in Japan. Furthermore, we should consider the point that, although some of the symbolic rituals of "old" nationalism may enhance national solidarity, nationalistic rituals also work in the opposite way. This point is underscored by Robert Bocock (1974: 98) when he remarks that rituals "may also make some groups feel less part of the national group in that they are made conscious of the fact that they do not share some of the values which seem to lie behind the group's ritual". Indeed, there have always been and still are significant numbers of people whose opposition to nationalistic values are reinforced precisely because of the existence of "nationalistic" rituals, such as the display of the "national" flag and the singing of the "national" anthem at school ceremonies, "National Foundation Day", Cabinet Ministers' visits to the Yasukuni Shrine (where war dead including war criminals are enshrined), and so on.³ Such rituals are for them a continuous reminder of their opposition to nationalism.

State-initiated nationalism often fails to elicit voluntary and active support from large sections of the general public precisely because it bases itself upon obviously nationalistic symbols and ideas. Most Japanese still adhere to anti-war and anti-nationalist sentiments and reject personal sacrifice for the sake of the nationalistic agenda of the state. This suggests that strict adherence to the classic, state-oriented perspective on nationalism may result in failure to grasp some of the interesting issues of nationalism in contemporary society. Nationalism may arise in realms where the state is absent.

The *nihonjinron*: Discourse on cultural differences

Cultural nationalism, primary or secondary, often involves the process by which cultural and political élites formulate the discourse on national distinctiveness and by which other social groups respond to it. Let us now highlight the characteristic features of Japan's secondary nationalism as (opposed to its primary nationalism) with respect to the manners of production, distribution and consumption of the discourse on national identity.

In secondary nationalism a sense of belonging to a historical nation is already taken for granted. Thus ancestral myth or historicist vision becomes less relevant. Of course, history continues to be reinterpreted and represented but the nation's origin becomes less relevant as a source of national identity. Those who in the 1970s and 1980s formulated the discourse on the peculiarities or uniqueness of Japanese patterns of behaviour were, in a sense, "pop sociologists" or "pop anthropologists". The literature they produced is generally referred to as *nihonjinron* (discourse of the Japanese).

Thinking élites of diverse backgrounds, including not only academics, journalists and writers but also diplomats and the business élite, produced the vast amount of literature on Japanese distinctiveness during this period.

Since *nihonjinron* has already been discussed extensively in Japanese studies, it serves our purpose to provide a brief summary of its three main propositions (see e.g. Mouer and Sugimoto 1986; Befu 1987; Dale 1986). First, the patterns of communication of the Japanese are characterized in the *nihonjinron* by taciturnity, disregard for logic, emotionality and situational ethics. These contrast with Western patterns, which are characterized by eloquence, dichotomous logic, rigid principles and rationality. One popular theme in the *nihonjinron* is that essential communication is performed non-logically, non-verbally and empathetically. Because of the mutual sensitivity found in the social interaction of the Japanese, explicit verbal communication is not considered necessary (e.g. Matsumoto 1984).

Second, Japanese society is characterized by groupism or "interpersonalism", vertical stratification and dependence (other-directedness), as opposed to Western society which is characterized by individualism, horizontal (class-based) stratification and independence (self-autonomy) (Nakane 1967, 1970). This group-oriented tendency is usually derived from the child-rearing practices in Japan, where the attitude of dependence (*amae*) is encouraged and prolonged into adulthood (Doi 1971). Third, Japanese society is taken as uni-racial and homogeneous. Again, this is in contrast to Western society, which is defined as multi-racial and heterogeneous in its composition. The three themes are closely interrelated: the Japanese patterns of communication which discourage dichotomous logic and verbal confrontation are strongly related to the high value placed on consensus and harmony in interpersonal relations, while empathetic, affective and non-logical communication is taken to be the product of the homogeneous make-up of society.

The *nihonjinron* had already become a dominant perspective on Japanese society in the early 1980s. Criticism of the *nihonjinron* emerged in various forms around the same time. I became interested in examining the roles the *nihonjinron* have played in the development of cultural nationalism in contemporary Japan. One common critique of the *nihonjinron* then current was to identify such writings as a nationalist ideology that economic, political and cultural élites invented to foment nationalism among the Japanese by attributing Japan's economic success and apparent social stability to its unique cultural virtues (e.g. Crawcour 1980: 186; Mouer and Sugimoto 1980: 7).⁴ This seems an understandable assertion as there is clearly some kind of relationship between the *nihonjinron* and nationalism. I argue, however, that the view that simplistically assumes ideological manipulation "from above" is unsound as a perspective on contemporary cultural nationalism of this type. In order to enquire into the workings of contemporary Japanese nationalism in relation to the *nihonjinron*, I shall

show in the remainder of this paper the relevance of analysis of a "market" process whereby the discourse on cultural differences is "distributed" and "consumed" in the popular marketplace of ideas.

Who consumed the *nihonjinron*, how, and with what in mind?⁵ The *nihonjinron* found a market among ordinary Japanese - ordinary in the sense of not being professional thinkers. They found the "products" of the *nihonjinron* attractive and "consumed" them because they felt such products could help them in dealing with practical problems in their own immediate surroundings. The realm of contemporary social culture dealt with in the *nihonjinron* is already thoroughly familiar to ordinary people. The role of thinking élites here is to provide ordinary people with perspectives from which to think more systematically about their society and behaviour. In particular the *nihonjinron* provided people interested in or involved in cross-cultural contacts with supposedly useful ideas on cultural differences. Such a concern is especially relevant to those concerned with intercultural communication such as international businessmen, students, tourists, overseas volunteers, cross-cultural social workers and so on.

Reproducing discourse of cultural differences

What is of particular importance here is that, even though sizeable sections of the educated population were influenced by the *nihonjinron*, they were not necessarily exposed directly to academics' *nihonjinron* as such. For example, many have heard of theories such as Nakane Chie's (1967) vertical society theory and Doi Takeo's (1971) theory of *amae* (dependence), but have not actually read their books. Here we should take note of the role of intermediaries who stand between intellectuals and the masses and who transmit intellectuals' ideas to a wider audience. In the special edition of *Daedalus* (1972) on intellectuals and tradition, Edward Shils and S.N. Eisenstadt pointed out the important role of "reproductive intellectuals" and "secondary intellectuals", as they called this type of intellectual, respectively. Eisenstadt remarked that, although secondary intellectuals who serve as channels of institutionalization of traditions and cultural identity have an important place in society, few if any of this group had been studied. There has been little if any progress in this field since then. In a more recent analysis of the contemporary cultural situation, Bourdieu (1984: 370) drew attention to "new intellectuals" as a social category playing an increasingly crucial role in the cultural realm. They are the transmitters and intermediaries for the popularization of intellectuals' ideas in contemporary society.

"Cultural intermediaries" have had a crucial role in the dissemination of the *nihonjinron*: they have interpreted academics' theories of Japanese

society and culture and rephrased them to suit more practical concerns, or reproduced them in a form that can be consumed by "ordinary" people. In fact this has been an important channel through which academics' *nihonjinron* have been disseminated amongst a wider readership. Interestingly, the business élite constitutes one main group of cultural intermediaries in contemporary Japan partly because the company is regarded as the microcosm of Japanese society. In the minds of the majority of middle-class Japanese the mode of thinking and behaviour of ordinary white-collar "salarymen" is the most typical representation of "Japanese culture". Moreover, compared to other secondary intellectuals such as school teachers, who hardly attract attention abroad, the business élite are aware through their international contacts that they are the subject of conversation abroad and they generally know how to present themselves to the rest of the world.

Here attention should be paid to what may be called "cross-cultural manuals" as a means by which cultural intermediaries have been used in popularizing the discourse on cultural differences in contemporary Japan. By cross-cultural manuals we mean handbooks on Japanese culture, practical guidebooks on life in Japan, glossaries which deal in one way or another with the distinctiveness of Japanese society in the contexts of business and management practices, company employees' everyday lifestyle, "untranslatable" Japanese expressions and so forth. Various cross-cultural manuals are on sale in Japanese bookshops, in the sections for reference books or books on Japan. Major Japanese companies have published "cross-cultural manuals", thereby becoming important agents in disseminating the discourse on cultural differences. These manuals include *Japanese Business Glossary* by Mitsubishi Corporation (1983), *The Scrutable Japanese* by Taiyo Kobe Bank (now Sakura Bank) (1988), *Skills in Cross-Cultural Negotiation* by Nissho Iwai (1987), and *Toshiba's Practical Cross-Cultural Dialogs* (1985). Nippon Steel Corporation's *Nippon: The Land and its People* (1982) is a best-seller in the genre of cross-cultural manuals. Of course, cross-cultural manuals are not merely produced by companies. In fact, stimulated by company publications, major commercial publishers have also set their sights on the cross-cultural manual market.

The content of these cross-cultural manuals is popularized *nihonjinron*; the aim is to provide consumers with insights into cultural differences that can be put to practical use. Most of these cross-cultural manuals are presented in a dual-language format, as it is thought that, in the "age of internationalization", in addition to the ability to speak English, knowledge of cultural differences is indispensable. For example, the then President of Taiyo Kobe Bank explains the aim of their handbook, which is to contribute to "the promotion of an understanding of Japan and the Japanese people at a time when comprehension is badly needed to ease mounting trade tensions

(and also to) help Japanese students who are destined to live in an era of internationalization, by providing hints as to how things Japanese may be expressed in good English" (1988: 4).

This point is well illustrated by the type of handbook which combines spoken English study and perspectives on cultural differences. Both of these are considered necessary tools by many educated Japanese for achievement of the desired status of a *kokusaijin* (international person). For instance, in the following excerpt from English study material published by Nippon Steel Human Resources Development Co., Ltd. (1987), we can see the three main propositions of the *nihonjinron*, discussed above, neatly summarized and presented in the form of English dialogues:

Mr Jones [an American]: ...I don't think I could ever learn to make the subtle distinctions you need in Japanese.

Mr Suzuki [a Japanese businessman]: It's so tied in with the whole culture. It's difficult to master for someone who grew up in another country. Also, most Japanese tend to avoid doing anything that sets them off from others. They worry about what others think and change their behaviour accordingly.

Mr Jones: That's probably one of the reasons why people talk about Japanese groupism.

Mr Suzuki: It's a factor. It's also why Japanese are poor at asserting themselves. We tend to speak and act only after considering the other person's feelings and point of view.

Mr Jones: You can't say that for most Westerners. In America we try to teach our children to be independent, take individual responsibility, develop their imaginations and creativity, develop their personality... This starts from a very young age, from babyhood practically. We also try to train them to think logically, and learn how to express their thoughts and opinions.

Mr Suzuki: Yes, I know... Foreigners often criticize us Japanese for not giving clear-cut "yes" or "no" answers. This is probably connected to our being basically a homogeneous society and our traditional tendency to try to avoid conflicts...

Cassette tapes and now even compact disks are also available for this material. Needless to say, handbooks, practice tapes and compact disks like these provide prepackaged ideas about Japanese society and ways of expressing them.

It is important to note that many of the cultural intermediaries who have published cross-cultural manuals should not be called nationalists. Rather they might best be described as well-intentioned "internationalists" whose aim was to facilitate communication between Japanese and non-Japanese and to help bring about the emergence of large numbers of internationally minded Japanese with knowledge about cultural differences and the ability to communicate well in intercultural settings. The main concern behind the publication of cross-cultural manuals is to remove what are regarded as cultural obstacles in communication between Japanese and

non-Japanese, as is illustrated typically by the remark of the General Manager of the Corporate Communications Office of Mitsubishi Corporation. He says that their handbook is intended to "help smooth the way for better international communication" (1983: 6). Such intentions explain why the *nihonjinron* (perspectives on cultural differences) are popularized in such a way as to provide practical hints for social interaction between the Japanese and non-Japanese. In a best-selling handbook entitled *Japan As It Is: A Bilingual Guide* (1990), the key propositions of the *nihonjinron* are summarized in a chapter entitled "Getting along with the Japanese". Here are a couple of paragraphs:

The fact that Japan does have such a high-density homogeneous population governs many of the social customs and personal mannerisms and makes them different from the way people relate in more heterogeneous societies... Japanese society has developed numerous groups each with its own common consciousness and numerous tacit understandings that are reached or conveyed without a word being said...

If the individual is the basic unit of Euro-American society, in Japan it is the group. This is not a society constituted by autonomous individuals but one made up of people who are constantly interacting with society and constantly aware of this interaction. If you ask a Japanese what he thinks, he is very likely to answer by asking what everybody else thinks (Gakken 1990: 63).

Ironically, however, the basic assumption held by Japanese, that intercultural communication is impeded by the unique peculiarities of Japanese patterns of behaviour and thought, has tended to produce the end result of cultural nationalism, not improved intercultural understanding. It would appear that excessive emphasis on Japanese difference has in fact had the unintended consequence of strengthening cultural nationalism, since such emphasis neglects those aspects of life held in common by different peoples. In short, what started as a well-intentioned activity to facilitate intercultural communication thus had the unintended and ironic consequence of sensitizing the Japanese excessively to their distinctiveness and thereby creating another obstacle to communication. The resultant assumption, that foreigners cannot understand Japanese people because of the latter's supposedly unique mode of thinking, actually raised a barrier to foreign residents' adaptation to social life in Japan. In this ironic sense an interest in intercultural communication and cultural nationalism are two sides of the same coin.

It may be argued that, whereas schools are the chief agency of ideological transmission in state-initiated primary nationalism, the "cross-cultural industry" like that illustrated above has become an important institution through which to reproduce the discourse on cultural differences in secondary cultural nationalism. It may also be argued that, whereas school textbooks are a means of childhood socialization, cross-cultural manuals are used for adult socialization to reconstruct and reinforce Japanese identity. Calling to mind Norbert Elias (1978, 1982) and his

original analysis of manuals and books of manners in *The Civilizing Process*, we may say that cross-cultural manuals are intended to be used in the "civilizing process" by which elites adopt correct manners and behaviour as "internationalized persons" in the increasingly globalizing world.

The state and the market

In this paper I have been primarily concerned with the process whereby the discourse on cultural differences is "reproduced" and "consumed" in the "market". I have argued that this perspective, hitherto neglected in studies of nationalism, is necessary for the analysis of contemporary Japan where people's participation in cultural nationalism is no longer explicitly supervised by the state. I am not suggesting, however, that the state no longer plays an important role in cultural nationalism. One should not totally neglect the role of the state. There is little question that the state is still a powerful agent of cultural nationalism in contemporary Japan. The state influences, and is influenced by, agencies of cultural production and reproduction (television, newspapers, advertizing agencies, etc). Moreover, formal education is a state enterprise. The state now *requires* the *Hinomaru* flag to be displayed and the *Kimigayo* anthem to be sung at school ceremonies as a way of restoring national pride that was long suppressed in the post-war period. The Ministry of Education also controls the content of the curriculum through the system of authorizing school textbooks. The state's interest in nationalism can be seen in its selection of historical figures in the primary school history curriculum, which includes 42 historical figures with the emphasis on national heroes such as Admiral Tōgō Heihachirō, whose exploits in the Russo-Japanese War (1904-05) were used to promote militarism in textbooks during the Second World War. (I should hasten to add that in 1995 the Ministry showed more flexibility than previously in screening school textbooks. Tōgō does not appear in the majority of textbooks, and much more space is now given to Japan's wartime aggression in Asia.)

Some critics also draw attention to the role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Mouer and Sugimoto (1986: 177-181) argued that the Japanese state had for a long time taken an interest in promoting certain images of Japan. (It should be noted that foreigners' perceptions of "our" culture are closely associated with "our" discourse on "our" identity, as illustrated in the dialogue between Orientalism and counter-Orientalism.) The two critics take note of the fact that the Foreign Ministry translated a number of books on Japanese distinctiveness for distribution overseas. For example, the Foreign Ministry produced its own translation of Nakane's *Human Relations in Vertical Society* in 1972 and distributed thousands of copies in Europe and South-East Asia. Does this suggest that the state intentionally promotes a

particular type of discourse on Japanese distinctiveness? It is difficult to draw firm conclusions about something that happened over 20 years ago. Mouer and Sugimoto may be right in supposing that the Japanese state was interested in promoting the holistic and consensus image of Japanese society (as opposed to the conflict image), considering that the Foreign Ministry translated and distributed yet another volume, Yakabe's *Labor Relations in Japan* (1977), which discusses the secrets of industrial harmony in Japan more explicitly.

How then is one to explain the Foreign Ministry's distribution in recent years of a cross-cultural handbook, *Japan As It Is*, to European youth groups invited to Japan each year by the ministry for short-term study visits? This handbook, as mentioned earlier, contains a number of *nihonjinron* perspectives including some very controversial ones. One chapter, entitled "The Japanese Brain", introduces Tsunoda Tadanobu's socio-biological theory (1978) that the cultural uniqueness of the Japanese can be traced to the unique structure of their brain. Should this example be taken as suggesting that the Japanese state actively endorses and promotes nationalistic and racial ideas? In fact such a conclusion would be difficult to reach, considering how this handbook came to be chosen. A ministry official in charge of this programme remarked that they had come across this particular one while looking for handbooks useful for someone coming to Japan for the first time and staying there for a short while. It was, they found, both compact and comprehensive. Indeed, *Japan As It Is* is comprehensive in its treatment of subjects which cover nearly all main aspects of Japanese society, economy, polity, history, religion, life-style, art, literature and so on. We may say that, as a powerful state institution, the Foreign Ministry should be more careful in its selection, but one cannot put the ministry's choice down to narrow adherence to the classic view of the state's role in the discourse on culture. It seems too simplistic to suppose on the basis of this example that the state has a nationalistic agenda. The market perspective would prove more useful here. One could argue that in this instance the state is "just another" consumer and distributor of a cross-cultural manual in the cultural market.

As discussed earlier, the state also promotes its own version of cultural nationalism. An analytical distinction, however, should be made between the state-initiated process and the market-generated process. When the state imposes particular views on history and culture through the Education Ministry and other state agencies, it has its own agenda and is acting on its own initiatives. This does not mean however that every similar act by the state can be explained in terms of the state-initiated process. In the above example the state plays a part in disseminating the *nihonjinron* discourse, but should be seen as simply acting within the framework of the market. The two processes (i.e. the state-initiated process and the market-generated process) should be clearly distinguished in order to understand the nature of

cultural nationalism in contemporary Japan. Simplistic focus on the role of the state would result in failure to recognize a number of relevant issues in contemporary nationalism.

Our argument in this paper has pointed to the informal process whereby nationalism is generated in the market place. Bauman (1992: 17) makes a relevant point:

As the interest of the state in culture faded (i.e. the relevance of culture to the reproduction of political power diminished), culture was coming within the orbit of another power the intellectuals could not measure up to - the market... More and more the culture of consumer society was subordinated to the function of producing and reproducing skilful and eager consumers rather than obedient and willing subjects of the state...

Previous studies of nationalism merely looked at the ways in which élites produce nationalist myth and ideology and disseminate them throughout the population. I have criticized this "statist" and "productivist" bias and attempted to introduce a "market" perspective. Who consumes nationalism, why and how? What are the social uses of nationalism? The classic analysis of cultural nationalism has tended to be confined to the political process of ideological manipulation and mobilization. Broadening the scope of enquiry, our Japanese case throws light upon ways in which cultural nationalism can be generated without explicit or intended ideological manipulation. Having recognized the importance of the "market" in present-day cultural nationalism, it is incumbent upon us to enquire into the relationship between it and the roles (past and present) of the state, but this topic is too big to be covered here and requires separate treatment elsewhere.

Notes

- 1 A few exceptions include Hutchinson (1987) and Robinson (1988).
- 2 For more discussion of primary and secondary nationalism see Yoshino (1992).
- 3 At its annual convention in September 1995 the Japan Teachers' Union officially abandoned its decades-old opposition to the state-led promotion of the use of the Rising Sun flag and the *Kimigayo* anthem, symbols associated with pre-war nationalism. The union also accepted some of the Education Ministry's course guidelines and stated that it would agree to give up its confrontational attitude towards the ministry. The union's new policy of compromise with the Education Ministry met with strong opposition from many members at the convention until it was finally approved.
- 4 The "economic success" perspective probably applies to some members of the business, political and cultural élites, but questions have to be raised as to its validity as a way of thinking of the more "ordinary" members of society; see Yoshino 1992: 188-191.
- 5 In order to enquire into this question, I conducted field research from October 1986 to September 1988 in a fairly large provincial city of several hundred thousand inhabitants in central Japan, in addition to frequent visits to and extended stays in this city

before and after this period. (For the methods and findings of this research see Yoshino 1992: chs 6-10).

References

- Bauman, Z., *Intimations of Postmodernity*, London and New York: Routledge, 1992.
- Befu, H., *Ideogogii toshite no nihonbunkaron* (The Theory of Japanese Culture as an Ideology), Tokyo: Shisō no Kagakusha, 1987.
- Bocock, R., *Ritual in Industrial Society: A Sociological Analysis of Ritualism in Modern England*, London: Allen & Unwin, 1974.
- Bourdieu, P., *Distinction*, London: Routledge, 1984.
- Crawcour, S., "Alternative models of Japanese society: An overview" in R. Mouer and Y. Sugimoto.
- Dale, P., *The Myth of Japanese Uniqueness*, London: Routledge, 1986.
- Doi, T., *Amae no kōzō* (Structure of Dependence), Tokyo: Kōbundō, 1971, translated as *The Anatomy of Dependence* by J. Bester, Tokyo: Kodansha International, 1973.
- Eisenstadt, S.N., "Intellectuals and tradition", *Daedalus* (Spring): 1-19, 1972.
- Elias, N., *The Civilizing Process* Vol.1, *The History of Manners*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1978.
- , *The Civilizing Process* Vol.2, *State Formation and Civilization*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1982.
- Gakken Co., *Japan As It is: A Bilingual Guide* (revised edn.), Tokyo: Gakken Co. Ltd., 1990.
- Hamaguchi, E., *Kanjinshugi no shakai nihon* (Japan: The Interpersonalistic Society), Tokyo: Tōyō Keizai Shinpō sha, 1982.
- Hutchinson, J., *The Dynamics of Cultural Nationalism: The Gaelic Revival and the Creation of the Irish Nation State*, London: Allen & Unwin, 1987.
- Maruyama, M., "Nationalism in Japan: Its theoretical background and prospects", trans. D. Titus, in Maruyama, M. *Thought and Behaviour in Modern Japanese Politics* (expanded edn.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969.
- Matsumoto, M., *Haragei*, Tokyo: Kōdansha, 1984.
- Mitsubishi Corp., *Japanese Business Glossary/Nihonjingo*, Tokyo: Kōdansha, 1983.
- Morris, I., *Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan: A Study of Post-War Trends*, London: Oxford University Press, 1960.
- Mouer, R. and Sugimoto, Y. (eds.), *Japanese Society: Reappraisals and New Directions, Social Analysis*, No. 5/6, 1980.
- , *Images of Japanese Society*, London: Kegan Paul International, 1986.
- Nakane, C., *Tate shakai no ningen kankei: tan'itsu shakai no riron* (Human Relations in Vertical Society: A Theory of a Unitary Society), Tokyo: Kōdansha, 1967.
- , *Japanese Society*, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1970.
- Nippon Steel Corp., *Nippon: The Land and Its People* (2nd edn.), Tokyo: Gakuseisha, 1984.
- Nippon Steel Human Resources Development Co.Ltd., *Talking About Japan/Nihon o kataru*, Tokyo: ALC, 1987.

Nissho Iwai Corp., *Ibunka kōshō jutsu: kokusai bijinesu no genba kara* (Skills in Cross-Cultural Negotiation: From the Scene of International Business), Tokyo: Kōbunsha, 1987.

Robinson, Michael, *Cultural Nationalism in Colonial Korea 1920-1925*, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1988.

Shils, E., "Intellectuals, tradition and the traditions of intellectuals: Some preliminary considerations", *Daedalus*, Spring, 21-33, 1972.

Taiyō Kōbe Bank, *The Nipponjin/The Scrutable Japanese*, Tokyo: Gakuseisha, 1988.

Toshiba Co., *Toshiba's Practical Cross-Cultural Dialogs*, Tokyo: Toshiba Co., 1985.

Tsurumi, K., *Social Change and the Individual: Japan Before and After Defeat in World War II*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970.

Yakabe, K. (ed), *Labor Relations in Japan: Fundamental Characteristics*, Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1977.

Yoshino, K., *Cultural Nationalism in Contemporary Japan: A Sociological Enquiry*, London and New York: Routledge, 1992.

Narrative politics, nationalism and Korean history

Michael Robinson

Narratives of nation

This paper considers how narratives of nation effect politics and intellectual enquiry in Korea but present various problems for outsiders who try to write about contemporary or historical Korea. Concurrently, it engages the issue of representation, which has become an important issue for historians and area studies scholars. At the root of this discussion is the narrative of nation. Creating, transforming and maintaining narratives of nation is at the core of what nationalists and, quite often, historians do. Moreover, both understand our world generally as a community of sovereign, bounded entities called nation-states. For those who create and sustain (indirectly and directly) the stories of the 160 or so nation-states which form the world system, these are often immutable, natural entities, variously legitimated by any of a number of distinct variables including a distinct culture, language, historical memory, race, religion or territory.

Yet there really is nothing "natural" at all about these nation-states. They have come into being along diverse paths. They support the stories of their emergence with a bewildering combination of variables to demonstrate collective solidarity and the rightful claim of a people, however defined, to be the subject of their own sovereignty, a sovereignty equal to that of other nation-states. In spite of the accepted formal universality of nationality as a socio-cultural concept, Benedict Anderson reminds us that the "paradoxical fact of their irremediable particular concrete manifestations remains".¹ There are thousands of potential nations. Why, then, is the world divided into fewer than 160 nation-states? Certainly practical political considerations delineate optimum characteristics for sustaining a nation-state.² Practicality aside, the fact is that this relatively small group of nation-states artificially limits and restrains the world's vast ethnic and cultural diversity. To create and maintain identities requires that other identities be submerged, if not effaced, in the making of national collective identity.

Within nations, the imperative to create and mobilize collective identity leads to the submersion of other identities. Even in rare cases of ethnically, linguistically and culturally homogeneous societies, the imperatives of nationalism can repress alternative concepts of collective identity. National identity is a totalizing idea, its peculiar logic impels it in the realm of politics to subordinate alternative identities related to class, gender, social status, region and kin. Therefore there are several different concepts of what constitutes national identity, even within groups. However, when they are brought to the level of a nation-state, the state constructs and maintains a "master narrative" of nation which acts as an official story of the nation.³ This master narrative legitimates the existence of the state and nation internally; it is also projected externally, to legitimate a nation's existence in the world community. Moreover, the master narrative is merely a construction, although it is usually couched in terms of naturalness and immutability, and as the product of a chronological historical logic. It is a construction because it necessarily minimalizes internal contradictions, omits alternative versions and effaces differences in order to support and maintain national solidarity.⁴

Master narratives are particularly successful when they engender a broad consensus in a society, but even if there is broad consensus the process of constructing and maintaining a master national narrative is riddled with anxieties. It is part of a dynamic process in which the story is told again and again, changed, attacked and re-formed.⁵ Its logic is to bound and strengthen the collective identity, but the diversity of the group in non-national terms or external assaults act to destabilize the narrative continually. Richard Handler, in his perceptive study *Nationalism and the Politics of Culture in Quebec*, posits that the metaphoric basis of the master narrative, "the nation", is inherently unstable because nationalist rhetoric transforms nations into collective individuals whose existence depends on things they appropriate, on their collective objectified cultural property.⁶ The problem is that such collective individuation must be continually defined and defended and its culture appropriated and reappropriated to maintain identity. In this view nationalist discourse is a dynamic relationship between speakers and interpreters all haunted by the "dark vision of national disintegration" or galvanized by a desire for the preservation of national integrity.⁷

In a nation-state where the master narrative is contested, what would seem to be harmless "academic" analysis (archaeology, historical research, linguistics, literary criticism, etc.) can become political dynamite. Indeed, to provide material with which to revise the master narrative is to attack the legitimacy of the state and the socio-political formation upon which it rests. This brings me to nationalism's second anxiety, the problems faced by outside observers of nationalism.

Nationalism and academic discourse

Until recently social scientists, historians and political scientists wrestled with nationalism as a phenomenon which, if understood, could teach us more about how the world came to assume its modern political form, as well as how the imperatives of capitalist development seemed to require nation-states.⁸ Nations have become the standard unit of world politics and the subject of political history. In such history the nation-state becomes the endpoint in a narrative of modernity. This narrative, in turn, usually creates a picture of a nation coming to self-awareness (either the awakening of a primordial collective identity or the invention of some new group identity). In terms of progress, the nation moves towards a new collective identity in concert with economic and social development which requires a new concept of citizenship in the nation-state. The new nation-state sets rigorous standards for inclusiveness or exclusiveness with regard to the polity and bounds itself culturally, politically and territorially.⁹ The concept of a nation's emergence and its association with modernity breed a descriptive lexicon of dichotomies which have become the hallmark of liberal political history: traditional/modern, developed/undeveloped, backward/progressive, old/new, unenlightened/enlightened.

Indeed, the very notion of nation is employed as an allegory. As in fiction, historians give abstractions (nation, city, class, etc.) the character of individuated beings, setting them out on a narrative grid that is assumed to be adequately suited to the world it proposes to represent.¹⁰ The goal is to create an understanding that is controlled, one that gives an effect of totality, unity, continuity and coherence - a goal, by the way, that nationalist ideologues also embrace.

As an historian I will not give up my metaphorical use of nation soon. Our historical narratives play a role in our understanding of how our world was and came to be. However, as an historian I must be mindful that my narratives are not objective in the sense of a recovered truth or certainty about the past. Moreover, I must be aware that my use of nation and analysis of nationalism is linked to the core Western doctrine of progressive development as a universal pathway, fundamental to much historical and social science analysis done today. This is important because to link nation to a Western concept of world history and to impose these ideas and analytic categories on the non-Western world can mire us in a crude Orientalism that obscures more than it reveals.¹¹ This realization is further compounded by the fact that non-Western nationalists have appropriated the same universalist concept as well. The current debates about decolonization, neocolonialism and subaltern identities in the non-Western world which challenge this earlier appropriation must also be taken into account in our narratives of non-Western history, as will be considered below.

With the above in mind I would like to consider the problem of writing Korean history and the necessity of manoeuvring between contradictory and hostile master narratives of the Koreans themselves. In doing so, I will consider the elasticity of nationalism as a concept and its many uses, its essentially constructed nature and its linkages to a Western universalist concept of world history. In addition, I must be mindful that my historical narratives, whether related to the emergence of nationalism in Korea or not, will be appropriated, understood or rejected in relation to other competing narratives of Korean history. In modern Korea, historical narratives can also be political weapons in a highly charged and emotional discourse about the political and cultural legitimacy of competing states.

Three master narratives of modern Korea

I would like to shift now to the master narratives of Korean nationalism, to show how they are interrelated and how they skew our understanding of Korean history. Two states claim sovereignty over the Korean people. Each holds a seat in the UN. While the Republic of Korea (South Korea) is "recognized" by more members of the world community, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) has still managed to maintain a network of supporting nation-states. While at present (July 1994) it is in economic crisis and the focus of world approbation over its nuclear programme, it shows no sign of disappearing from the world stage no matter how many people might wish it would.¹² Each Korean state has woven a version of its ancient and modern memory into a master narrative which justifies its claim to legitimacy. In both cases the state has used considerable force to repress counter-narratives, to police the writing of history and shape public opinion around a general common understanding of why its system should be recognized as the true expression of Korean collective identity. In North Korea there is no visible dissent, and in the South until recently challenges to the master narrative were highly circumscribed. Partial democratization in the South since 1987 and the collapse of communism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in 1989 have broadened the debate over the suitability of the South Korean narrative, but it endures today essentially unchanged from the 1960s.

According to South Korea's master narrative, the Korean nation-state came into being in 1948, three years after liberation from Japanese colonial rule. Due to the intransigence of the Soviet Union, a UN-sponsored plebiscite was limited to the southern, US-occupied zone of Korea which legitimated a new democratic republic. Following the founding of the nation-state, the communist puppet state in the North precipitated a war of aggression against the legitimate, democratic South and was beaten back by a combined South Korean and UN army. Tragically, the externally imposed

national division remained, and South Koreans had to build the nation isolated from their northern brethren. Subsequently, successful economic development further legitimated South Korea as the true inheritor of the nationalist mantle as it successfully guided the Korean people onto the world stage, insinuated the nation-state into the world system and brought capitalist prosperity to the majority of its people.

The key elements in this narrative (a narrative which constitutes the "common understanding" of how the true Korean nation-state emerged) are that the South Korean state was the inheritor of the successful bourgeois nationalist resistance movement against the Japanese, it defended the nation against an international communist conspiracy and it successfully developed capitalist prosperity for its people.

For its part, North Korea constructs a diametrically opposed understanding of emergence. Its master narrative credits its anti-Japanese partisan guerrilla leadership with a successful anti-imperialist struggle against Japan which awakened and channelled the revolutionary power of the Korean labouring masses. It organized a democratic people's republic, purged pro-Japanese elements, inaugurated self-reliant economic development and set the nation on a truly democratic and autonomous basis. Only the counter-revolutionary actions of the US during the 1945-48 occupation prevented the certain destruction of the comprador and collaborationist bourgeois leadership which dominated the South and, later, saved this leadership by intervening in the Great Patriotic War (Korean War 1950-53). Unhappily, Western imperialism continues to support its puppet state in the South while North Korea has successfully constructed an autonomous socialist state representative of the true historical Korean nation, the masses.

The key elements in the North's story are its successful struggle against colonial and neocolonial forces, the mass base of its politics, its autonomous economic and political development and its victimization by the intrusion of Western imperialism.

Both of these master narratives forget much, remember selectively and have vigilantly repressed alternative versions. They also accomplish what master narratives must, they legitimate the state's politics, bound the nation and link it in linear fashion to a historical memory. The fierce enmity between the two Koreas, the militarized nature of each regime, the lack of a formal "peace", the presence of US troops under the UN flag in the South, differential recognition from the outside world and the memory of a catastrophic and fratricidal war ensure continuing tension between these two narratives as long as each state perpetuates itself.

In such a situation, to write a narrative which challenges the essential elements of either official story can be a hazardous undertaking. In the North it is simply not possible, given the strength of centralized power, the state's

control over research and information and the corporatist merging of the master narrative with the actual brain impulses of an omnipotent leader.¹³ In the South intellectual life has been relatively more open, but until the 1980s to write a counter-narrative or to challenge any essential fact within the master narrative risked indictment for a political crime.¹⁴

A third master narrative, that of the cold war, compounds the competition between the national stories of North and South Korea. Essentially this is a narrative created by the US which fits the problematic of the Korean peninsula into its own concept of the post-Second World War era. This narrative links with the South Korean master narrative in interesting ways. South Korea loses its subject status and becomes a fledgling democratic, anti-communist front-line state allied with the US in its containment of communism. Thus South Korea is historically legitimated as a product of the post-1945 period and survivor of a defeated international communist plot. Moreover, the cold war narrative celebrates the successful economic development of South Korea as a "miracle" and "model" for other third world nations. As far as North Korea is concerned, it delegitimizes the North by demonizing its regime, repeatedly stigmatizing it as irrational, bizarre, dangerous and isolated in the world system. Since 1989 this representation has gained added weight with the apparently victorious emergence of democratic capitalist forces in the aftermath of the cold war.¹⁵

The "system of division": Ensuring narrative tension

In combination, the three master narratives of Korea discussed above support what one South Korean intellectual, Paik Nak-chung, calls the "system of division".¹⁶ The system of division is a creature born of the cold war and which now survives it. The system defies labels, being neither purely colonial, semicolonial or neocolonial. It resonates with former power alignments of the bipolar cold war system within the newly "decentred" world of multilateralism. The division of North and South Korea curiously serves the interests of each Korean state as well as the great power interests around them. For North Korea to merge with the South would be ultimate annihilation in a world which has abandoned socialism. South Korea frets that successful unification, even on its own terms, would destabilize its polity and economy. Even more ironically, the continuation of national division is seen by Korean capitalists as a peculiar national advantage - the prospect of cheap "northern", ethnically and linguistically compatible labour for "off-shore" sourcing of manufacturing. For China an independent DPRK serves as a security buffer, in spite of the North's intransigently "independent" foreign policy. Russia supports the *status quo*, fearing any destabilization as more chaos it cannot afford. Japan sees economic opportunity, yet is threatened militarily by the prospect of a united and

hostile Korea. Finally the US is mired in a contradictory policy that wants to "finish off" a last stronghold of the communist system yet is restrained by the economic and political consequences of any precipitous realignment.

The contradictions which abound within the geopolitical forces impinging on the system of division ensure the continued instability of the master narratives that were produced to explain and legitimate this preposterous situation. Therefore the two competing master narratives of Korea remain incomplete. Each remains a narrative of the whole which lacks half of the nation. The system of division perpetuates a cognitive dissonance, particularly in the South, where the events of the last ten years have led to more open intellectual dialogue and escalating attacks on the core nationalist narrative. I turn here to speak more concretely of South Korean society, because it is simply impossible to observe any dialogue in the North on these matters.

I spoke earlier of the key elements of the South Korean master narrative - a bourgeois struggle against Japanese colonialism, its anti-communism and partnership in democracy with the US and its linkage of nationalist legitimacy with successful capitalist development and integration with the world system. Anti-communism and economic development worked to mobilize national unity through the 1970s but, ironically, the very success of anti-communism and capitalist development has created contradictions within South Korean society. These contradictions are particularly acute in the realm of nationalist discourse. Its strongly accidental narrative, which so massively legitimates itself in terms of anti-communism and economic development, no longer resonates in a post-industrial South Korean society.

Thinking backwards and totalizing practices

Before considering recent counter-narratives of nation in South Korea, I need to return to the dilemma of the historian (irrespective of ethnicity) working in the field of Korean history. Historians usually think backwards.¹⁷ That is, their vantage point in the present inevitably informs their analysis of the past. Moreover, since most of us write in linear, narrative form, however careful we are our narratives tend to align with other, larger understandings of how the present came to be. Even if we avoid enmeshment with other master narratives, we cannot foreclose the appropriation of our work by others.

Our own understanding of the world provides us with the intellectual baggage of social science concepts, the long tradition of thinking in metaphors of collective units such as nation, class, society, culture, etc. When aligned to master narratives which are themselves linked to universal

paths, such as progress, development, modernity and nation-building, we are led into a world of familiar binary relationships: traditional/modern, foreign/indigenous, national/international, developed/undeveloped. These categories have helped us to understand a number of phenomena in history and the social sciences, but they also obscure phenomena which are indeterminate.

Such totalizing practices are part of our analytical arsenal as historians or social scientists, and they are shared and deployed by nationalist ideologues. In the case of Korea our histories will invariably either contradict or conform to the larger master narratives. The fact that narratives which contradict the legitimizing master narrative are dangerous has inhibited open enquiry in Korean historical studies. In South Korea it was dangerous to question the "fact" that a bourgeois leadership successfully overthrew Japanese colonial rule. It was dangerous to acknowledge the contributions of Leftists, let alone communists, to the anti-Japanese struggle. The Korean War was not a civil war but an international conflict imposed on the peninsula. A number of other historical "silences" have also been encouraged by the dominance of the South Korean master narrative. Agrarian movements, labour history, the women's movement, studies in early Korean popular culture and the colonial origins of Korean capitalism were all topics until recently highly circumscribed by the political dominance of the South Korean master narrative.

If we examine writings about Korea in the West, there is a similar phenomenon of selectivity. The two most developed areas of foreign expertise on Korea are linked to the obsessions of the cold war master narrative mentioned above. US security interests and military participation in the Korean War spawned an enormous literature on the conduct of the Korean War, general security problems and North-East Asian regional politics. The dramatic economic growth since the 1960s gave birth to a similarly large development literature. However, the hundreds of books on these topics tell us very little about the Korean people, their culture, ideas and historical memory.

My point here is obvious. The politicization of history was a product of the contested origins of the Korean nation-state. The narratives of the South, the North and the cold war were predicated on aligning historical experience with antagonistic political positions on the peninsula which led to the emergence of the division system. Each master narrative asserts the fact of national sovereignty; in each story the history of the nation-state pivots on the 1945 defeat of the Japanese. The importance and decisiveness of the 1945 break's effect on the writing of Korean history cannot be overemphasized. It has worked to foreclose the study of continuity between colonial Korea and its post-colonial aftermath.

The emergence of counter-narratives in South Korea

In contemporary South Korea, recent liberalization of the intellectual climate together with the deepening anachronism of the cold war view have combined to generate three interlocking debates which have challenged the post-war master narrative: the discourse on the post-colony or decolonization, the debate over an "authentic" modern Korean identity and, finally, the rise of a more militant feminist critique of Korean sexual inequality. Each debate challenges the political repression that was supported by the South Korean master narrative.

The discourse on decolonization rejects the master narrative's assertion that South Korea became truly independent after forming its republic in 1948. In doing so, it rejects the privileged position of the 1945 historical break from the colonial past. The debate over decolonization raises the following fundamental question: to what extent were the social formations of the colonial period carried forward by the domestic and foreign political alignments which spawned the South Korean state? The answer is that outside interests (the US) supported the remnants of a collaborationist elite who sustained the repressive social conditions of the colonial period. Thus the South Korean master narrative obscures the historical continuities of the continuing repression of peasants, workers, women and thought perpetrated first by the Japanese overlords and later by bourgeois forces in the name of the nation. Moreover, they decisively attack the dependence of the South Korean state on US-Japanese economic ties and US security arrangements as further proof of the regime's illegitimacy in core nationalist terms.¹⁸

This was heresy before 1987, but is now common currency among certain intellectual circles in the South. While still a minority view, it has challenged and destabilized important elements in the master narrative of South Korea, namely its alliance with the US, its repressive labour policies and its hypocritical assertions of political and economic autonomy in the world system. To overcome this neocolonialist position the state and society must confront its colonial past and recapture a subject position for the masses as the core of the nation. Not only should both Koreas decolonize relatively, but there must be complete decolonization by overcoming political division on the peninsula.¹⁹

Concurrently, there is a wide-ranging debate about developing a modern yet uniquely Korean national identity. Critics of present-day social and cultural trends point to the overwhelming and corrosive influences of Western-Japanese commercial culture in Korea. The state itself is ambiguous on this issue. On one hand development has become a national priority; on the other Koreans are enjoined to resist decadent Western-Japanese popular culture, excessive consumption and commodity values.

Critics charge that state development priorities have caused the current cultural crisis - a crisis which was the ultimate result of the logic of dependence on the West and the anti-nationalist cosmopolitanism of a Western-educated, developmentalist élite.

The search for a truly Korean identity has stimulated a renewed interest in Korean folk culture and indigenous religion. Students adopt mask dance, story telling and shamanistic ritual in order to turn such practices into living traditions and political weapons. Use of folk practices is both instrumental and spiritual. The belief is that folk practices embody the spirit of the true nation and become an antidote to foreign cultural imperialism. In the 1970s student radicals adopted shamanistic ritual and folk theatre as means to both express dissent and address the issue of healing the fundamental national wound, the division of the peninsula. Since the 1980s there have been several grass-roots movements which attempted to revive and re-establish traditional rituals and practices (drawn from both popular and élite traditions) in order to Koreanize modern life.²⁰

Finally, the new women's movement has challenged nationalist orthodoxy by linking the continued repression of women by Korean patriarchy with the colonial past, thus further destabilizing the belief in an historical break in 1945. In the late 1980s survivors of the *chǒngshindae* (*wianbu*) or comfort women emerged to tell their stories publicly. In doing so they exposed major contradictions in South Korean society. The horrifying story of conscription for prostitution during the Pacific war was not new. That it was not used by the state as a propaganda weapon to stir anti-Japanese sentiment in the entire history of South Korea seems surprising. Yet very quickly the survivors' stories merged with a devastating critique of the South Korean state's complicity in supporting and organizing the present-day sex industry, major portions of which serve not only Japanese tourists and US servicemen in a seamless recapitulation of colonial sexual slavery, but Korean men as well.²¹ This issue undermines the South Korean master narrative of nationhood as a nationalism which not only supports the sexual interests of foreigners but the bottom line of foreign exchange accounts as well, all at the expense of powerless Korean women.

New questions of history: Against the grain of nationalism

I refer to these current debates in South Korea because it is within the tensions of these issues that historians should be searching for questions to ask about the pre-1945 historical record. Until recently the history of modern Korea, as enunciated in Korea and the West, has been driven by questions about the emergence and perpetuation of the system of division. In turn, the master narratives of the system of division have prevented open

historical enquiry. We have continued to enquire, but the white noise of master narratives, inability to gain access to the record, nationalist passions and our own ethnocentrism have clouded our narratives.

I have decided to write against the grain of nationalism, de-emphasizing the process of national emergence and refocusing on Korea's early experience with modernity as a way to make sense of the present social and cultural conditions of South Korea. Again, I return to the significance of the 1945 break in our common understanding of contemporary Korea. The problem here is that the successful modernization of South Korea and the failure of socialist construction in the North have legitimated an implicit belief that modernity arrived in Korea after 1945, that Korea was successfully decolonized. The decisive truth of this matter, however, is that modernity arrived in Korea during the Japanese colonial period, but the record of this modernism has been silenced by the post-war master narratives of the North, South and the cold war.

Recovering the experience of this colonial modernity helps explain much of the intellectual and cultural tension within present-day South Korea. In terms of popular culture, Koreans have yet to acknowledge that they developed a modern popular culture in the 1930s. Because of the fact of colonial rule and their need to dissociate themselves from collaboration or accommodation to it, cultural formation before 1945 can only be analysed in a nationalist logic as oppositional or accommodationist. Such a view splits culture into "authentic" Korean and anti-national cosmopolitan or still worse, Japanese, culture. The fact that early Korean popular culture was a cosmopolitan construction is lost; this muddles the story and silences the memory of Korean artists, musicians and writers who struggled during this formative movement of admittedly skewed cultural development.

The fact remains that Korean society has been in the process of constructing its own modernity for over half a century. That this process occurred in the context of repeated external repression cannot negate it. Indeed, the colonial origins of Korea's modernity explains many of the continuing tensions in its politics and cultural life. Principle among these tensions is the very ahistorical nature of the current debate over the effects of Western-Japanese popular culture in Korea. The silence on Korea's own early construction of a modern popular culture focuses the "blame" once again on "outside" forces and perpetuates a victim mentality within present-day Korea. Moreover, the almost exclusive focus on the foreign threat to Korean culture diverts Koreans from examining their own role in the development of their modernity, a process which began over 70 years ago.

Conclusion: Confronting the past

No nationalist master narrative can undo previous events, but it can disconnect people from the memory of that past and, in so doing, perpetuate the oppression, disconnection, cognitive dissonance and pain caused by that experience. Denial is a powerful force which protects us from pain in our personal lives; collective denial can ensure a similar protection. In constructing and enforcing a master narrative which obscures portions of the collective memory in order to mobilize national unity artificially the South Korean polity has perpetuated a break with its own past. Changes within South Korea and internationally have exposed the repressive aspects of what had been accepted as common understanding. This situation will lead to the ultimate reconstruction of a new master narrative in the South; reunification of the peninsula will require yet another story.

At the level of popular memory, this process will most probably take a path such as that suggested by the prominent South Korean writer Cho Chŏngnae. He explained to a group of young critics what kind of historical function a literary work such as his own might perform as follows:

Looking at history, there seems to be validity in saying that the injuries and conflicts of history cannot be resolved unless they go through the filtering processes of stories and novels. Take the Nazis and the Israelis. There had to be innumerable novels, movies and plays before there could be forgiveness, before there could be acceptance. Only after all the tragic facts were brought to light and emotions and feelings were filtered to an equilibrium there was acceptance... What we ought to do is to restore tragedies that have been made emotionally uniform and ideologically fixed, for political purposes, and reflect upon them anew. This must be done through literature, not by political slogans or political movements alone.²²

Such reflections are also worthy of consideration by outsiders who presume to write about Korea. As an organizing device for our narratives, nationalism has taught us much but we must remember that it is a mercurial tutor. The malleability, instability, politicized character and constructed nature of nationalism make obvious the danger of assuming that our own historical narratives are contributing to clarity and certainty. The historian who hazards into the murky waters of Korean history must accept greater uncertainty and also be willing to be guided by a number of different paradigms. If we are to move towards a more detailed understanding of the Koreans' story we must contribute to a more inclusive memory which is supportive of a diversity of experiences. In this way we will not deliberately or inadvertently contribute to continued denial of the past nor support a rigid and repressive common understanding of how Korea or the world ought to be.

Notes

- 1 Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, New York: Verso, 1983, p. 16.
- 2 Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983. Chapter Three. An important keystone to Gellner's concept of nationalism is a society's size and socio-economic integration. He sees nationalism as a necessary organizing device to integrate and organize state power of large, internally homogeneous societies. Thus there is an implicit size and power requirement for sustaining nation-states, at least in Gellner's eyes.
- 3 Prasenjit Duara, "Bifurcating linear history: Nation and histories in China and India", *Positions* 1:3 Winter 1993, pp. 779-804.
- 4 Harumi Befu (ed.), *Cultural Nationalism in East Asia: Representation and Identity*, Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 1993. This volume explores the constructed nature of nationalism in East Asia. In essence, nationalism becomes cultural politics divided internally by nationalists' struggles over how varying concepts of the "national" cultural logic translate into the politics of the nation-state.
- 5 Michael Robinson, "Enduring anxieties: Cultural nationalism and modern East Asia", Befu (ed.) *Cultural Nationalism in East Asia*, pp. 167-186.
- 6 Richard Handler, *Nationalism and the Politics of Culture in Quebec*, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1988, p.7.
- 7 *ibid.*, p. 194.
- 8 Theorising about nationalism came of age when historians and social scientists were in the thrall of modernization studies in the 1960s and 1970s. The sociological theories of people like Karl Deutsch, Ernest Gellner and Anthony Smith explicitly linked nationalism to capitalist development. In the 1980s a more subjectivist view began to predominate. Views pioneered by Anderson's crystallizing metaphor of "imagined communities" and Hobsbawm's "invention of tradition" now dominate academic discourse on nationalism.
- 9 Ernest Gellner's *Nations and Nationalism* cited above is the most explicit statement of this idealized process. This book represents Gellner's final word on the subject and is the culmination of his attempt over several decades to integrate the macroforces guiding the development of the modern world with the political, economic and intellectual properties of nationalism.
- 10 Rudy Koshar, "Playing the cerebral savage: Notes on writing German history before the linguistic turn", *Central European History*, 22:3/4 1990, pp. 343-359. Koshar draws from Hans Kellner's *Language and Historical Representation*, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1989. I am indebted to Professor Koshar for his insights into the problem of the "linguistic" turn in history writing.
- 11 Partha Chatterjee, *Nationalist Thought in the Colonial world: A Derivative Discourse*, London: Zed Books Ltd., 1986, p. 2.
- 12 While I was preparing this paper North Korea's "Great Leader" died of a heart attack on 8 July 1994. His death certainly will necessitate the rewriting of the North Korean master narrative. The device of centring the history of the Korean state on the person of the "Great Leader" in a personality cult of unprecedented depth and pervasiveness unified North Korea and mobilized its people for 30 years. Yet the sudden demise of society's "great brain" leaves a very large gap to fill in the record. While the succession of power to Kim's son, Kim Jong il, has been in preparation for ten years, it is not clear whether Kim Jong Il can maintain a similar cult around his own person.

Certainly his accomplishments and character will not automatically provide the foundation for a position similar to his father's in any subsequent rewriting of history. What is clear, at the time of writing, is that North Korea's leadership crisis is severe. Not since the Korean War has the North Korean state been faced with such acute internal and external pressures.

13 I observed this at first hand on a visit to the DPRK in November 1991. It took us over a week to meet working "academics", even though the purported reason for our visit was to establish academic exchanges with the North Korean Academy of Social Sciences. In discussion with North Korean historians and social scientists it was clear that no one authors anything. With the exception of Kim Il Sung (The Great Leader) and his son, Kim Jong Il (The Dear Leader), most books on history or social development are written by committees. The party ideology drives the construction of all representations of the state, society and its historical memory. This situation does not mean intellectuals have totally surrendered pride of authorship to the collective. In one meeting with social scientists a researcher coyly winked at me while holding up a committee-authored history and said, "I was responsible for the last two chapters."

14 The main mechanism of intellectual repression in the South has been the National Security Law (NSL). Under this law a number of people have been arrested for intellectual crimes, professors dismissed from posts at universities, and publications closed, banned or censored. See Henry Em, "Overcoming Korea's division: Narrative strategies in recent South Korean historiography", *Positions* 1:2 Fall 1993, pp. 450-485.

15 Such demonization has been readily observable in the US news coverage of the current (summer 1994) "crisis" over North Korea's alleged possession of nuclear bombs and the US efforts to denuclearize the Korean peninsula. In most coverage North Korea has been presented as "irrational, bizarre and unlawful", a true "renegade" state. The representations of North Korea are often accompanied by anachronistic film footage of North Korean tanks attacking UN positions in the 1950-53 Korean War. The media coverage supports the "common understanding" of where North Korea fits in the US master narrative of the cold war.

16 Paik Nak-chung, "South Korea: Unification and the democratic challenge", *New Left Review*, 197 January-February 1993. See also Paik Nak-chung, "The idea of Korean national literature then and now", *Positions* 1:3 Winter 1993, pp. 574-575.

17 Hans Kellner, *Language and Historical Representation: Getting the Story Crooked*, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1988, p. 269.

18 For one analysis of the discourse on decolonization see Chungmoo Choi, "The discourse of decolonization and popular memory: South Korea", *Positions* 1:1 Spring 1993, pp. 77-102.

20 There are several interesting examples. Laurel Kendall's forthcoming book on marriage practices in modern Korea shows how the revived "traditional" marriage customs are absorbed into the "new marriage" practices which emerged in the post-war era. Middle class housewives attend folk dance classes which function as "aerobics" classes. A revivalist movement of folk songs attempts to wed the politically inscribed folk music (of Western derivation) of the 1960s-70s to Korean folk music genres. These examples are drawn from private initiatives, they are now no longer exclusively political in their orientation. Student folk theatre (*madangguk*) and revived shamanistic rituals of the 1970s were explicitly opposed to official state revival programmes.

21 For discussion of the *chongshindae* see Chungmoo Choi, "Korean women in a culture of inequality", in Donald N. Clark (ed.), *Korean Briefing 1992*, New York: The Asia Society, 1992, pp. 97-116; Chungmoo Choi, "The discourse of decolonization and popular memory: South Korea", *Positions* 1:1 Spring 1993, pp. 77-102. For a discussion of prostitution and the US military see Sandra Pollock Sturdevant and Brenda

Stoltzfus (eds.), *Let the Good Times Roll: Prostitution and the US Military in Asia*, New York: The New Press, 1992. Two articles in this volume are devoted to South Korea: Bruce Cummings, "Silent but deadly: Sexual subordination in the US-Korean relationship", pp. 169-175; and Sandra Sturdevant and Brenda Stoltzfus, "Tong Du Chun: The bar system", pp. 176-179.

22 "Cho Chŏngnae: sangchŏbadŭn shidae, kuhan kwa pulkkot ŭi munhak" (Cho Chŏngnae: The literature of resentment and flame), *Munhak Chŏngshin*, December 1989, p. 52. Quoted in Uchang Kim, "The agony of cultural construction", in Hagen Koo (ed.), *State and Society in Contemporary Korea*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993, p. 193.

Nationalism in East Asia 1948-53: British reactions to events in China, Japan and Korea

Peter Lowe

The aim of this paper is to provide a concise comparison between British responses to manifestations of nationalism in East Asia between 1948 and 1953. British policy in China was shaped by the nature of British economic interests and by the manner in which Britain reacted to the growth of nationalism in the 1920s and after. While Britain's economic position declined relative to that of other powers from the late 19th century, sizeable investments remained and long established British firms like Jardine and Matheson, Butterfield and Swire and the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank continued to pursue their activities, as did multinationals like Shell and Unilever.¹

In 1945 attempts were made to restore the former pre-eminence of Shanghai as the great metropolis in East Asia. The treaty port era ended formally in 1943, as the culmination to acceptance of legitimacy of the case advanced by China since the May Fourth movement.² Yet the treaty port mentality lived on among expatriates, and this helps to explain their failure to grasp the full potential of Chinese communism when the CCP assumed power in Mainland China in 1949. Hong Kong was restored to crown colony status in 1945. The British Foreign Office had long viewed the Kuomintang regime of Chiang Kai-shek cynically: the KMT was seen as corrupt, incompetent and brutal. Chiang was perceived as preoccupied mainly by bolstering his power by any methods deemed suitable. British dislike was fuelled through resentment at the pressures encountered by Britain during the paper unification of China under Chiang's leadership in the late 1920s and early 1930s. Chiang was xenophobic, reactionary and hostile to the arrogance of British imperialism. The US thought quite favourably of the KMT, with Chiang personifying the courage of the Chinese masses when confronted with the savage depredations of the Japanese. The caustic reports of General "Vinegar Joe" Stilwell were

ignored for some time, but eventually Roosevelt joined Churchill in lamenting the failure of the KMT to play a positive role in defeating the Japanese.³ The US, however, was tied to a policy of extending economic aid and political support to the KMT while endeavouring simultaneously to promote a government coalition between the KMT and the CCP.

Neither the British nor the Americans expected the rapid disintegration of the KMT in the latter stages of the civil war.⁴ The events of 1948 and the first half of 1949 came as a shock, but it was all the more traumatic for the Americans, gripped as they were by the growing hysteria over containing communism.⁵ It became clear in the first six months of 1949 that Britain and the US would have to determine reactions, as the mandate of heaven passed from the enfeebled grip of the KMT to the dynamic hold of the CCP. British officials were aware only vaguely of the nature of the CCP. Reports from China were analysed by the Foreign Office's leading expert in Marxism-Leninism, Guy Burgess (who was an even greater expert than his British colleagues believed).⁶ The CCP appeared to be driven by a combination of fervent nationalism, disgust at China's backwardness, and Mao's interpretation of Marxism-Leninism. British ministers and civil servants disliked Chinese communism, yet felt that it was less dangerous than Soviet communism and that it might not prove too difficult to achieve an accommodation with it. Mao's comments on the anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution in 1948 were not encouraging. Mao emphasized:

Imperialism... the enemy of the working peoples of all countries, is still strong. That is why the revolutionary forces in every country must be united and consolidated, why they must daily strengthen the united anti-imperialist front headed by the Soviet Union and why they must pursue a correct internationalist policy, for otherwise they can never be victorious.⁷

This could be regarded as rhetoric, but it could represent Mao's views more firmly than some in the West believed.

At the beginning of 1949 British officials, in exchanges with their American counterparts, began the lengthy process of contemplating recognition. The British intention was to foster candid discussions which would lead, eventually, to the pursuance of an agreed joint approach. Decisions were not urgent and time might allow American animosity towards Chinese communism to diminish. The Labour Cabinet was influenced by three objectives in particular: the wish to protect British economic interests, the hope that China could be separated from the Soviet Union, and the desirability of preserving harmony within the British Commonwealth, where the most important new member, India, harboured leadership aspirations in Asia and favoured early recognition of the communist government proclaimed formally by Mao on 1 October 1949.

In December the Cabinet decided that recognition would be accorded very shortly. *De facto* recognition had been granted in October, amidst

confusion in which the Foreign Office went further than originally intended, through reference to the establishment of the "Central People's Government".⁸ The US was told that it would be futile and dangerous to defer recognition; this would push China further into Moscow's embrace and alienate Chinese communities within the British Commonwealth. Fundamentally recognition was a question of acknowledging reality: whether the fact was palatable or not, the CCP controlled virtually all of Mainland China and the KMT regime was a discredited rump, unlikely to survive in Taiwan for much longer. Dean Acheson, the US Secretary of State, published the China White Paper in August 1949, revealing starkly the extent of the Truman administration's weariness with Chiang's regime.⁹ However, the rising apprehension in the USA over communist expansion, accentuated by the use of the "loss of China" by the Republican Party, rendered it impossible for the US to contemplate recognition.

Britain recognized the People's Republic of China in the first week of January 1950. It is instructive to assess the arguments for and against recognition at this time. The most compelling argument for moving swiftly was that the communists controlled almost all of Mainland China and there was no likelihood, despite the statements by Right-wing Republicans in the US, of the KMT reversing the events of 1948-49. The creation of a more positive relationship between Britain and China would be promoted though prompt recognition. As opposed to this, it could be argued that careful calculation over timing was crucial. The US would disapprove of British recognition and it might be wiser not to face the problems associated with this aspect until Britain was satisfied that China would reciprocate positively.

The expectation on the part of the Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, was that recognition would be greeted warmly in Peking and that improved relations could be accomplished with reasonable speed. He confessed disappointment when he met representatives from the China Association on 16 March: little had emerged from recognition, and Bevin reflected as to whether the Foreign Office had been correct in its recommendation concerning the timing of recognition. It might have been more sensible to defer recognition, but in deciding to recommend recognition he was influenced by awareness of the significance of Mao's visit to Moscow in December 1949, which made it desirable to demonstrate to Mao that there was an alternative to cooperating with Stalin.¹⁰

As to dealing with the Sino-Soviet relationship, the British approach was wiser than the American. Acheson referred undiplomatically to this in his famous speech of 12 January 1950, delivered at the National Press Club in Washington. He stated that the KMT had failed because of its own incompetence and not lack of foreign aid. The CCP secured power by annexing revolutionary nationalism. The Soviet Union pursued a policy of imperialist aggrandisement in the interests of the Soviet state: this was

diametrically opposed to China's interests.¹¹ Mao's aim, during his exchanges with Stalin, was to obtain assistance for China's economy and to secure a promise of Soviet aid in the event of conflict arising from what he perceived to be an aggressive America which was encouraging the economic (and perhaps military) revival of Japan. When he arrived in Moscow Mao underlined his wish for friendship with Russia but stressed that China was a great country and, by implication, conveyed that China could not be treated in the manner of the satellite states of Eastern Europe.¹²

The duration of Mao's stay - seven weeks - and the arrival of Chou En-lai for the concluding phase of negotiations indicated that problems existed and that the talks were not to be bracketed with the customary brief visits by communist leaders from Eastern Europe who arrived in Moscow to be told what they must sign. Mao was conscious of China's great past and that he led a movement at least equal in importance to that led by Lenin and Stalin. However, he had inherited a bankrupt economy amidst a potentially dangerous situation in Asia (and, indeed, the world): thus agreement with Stalin must materialize. Sino-Soviet accords were signed in Moscow on 14 February 1950 - a Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance, and agreements relating to railways, Port Arthur and Dairen. The treaty provided for full cooperation against a revived Japan, for military action if either signatory were attacked and for economic assistance to China. The latter stipulated the basis of Soviet help, with China paying interest and supplying commodities.¹³

The Foreign Office believed that the Soviet Union gained most from the agreement. The signatories emphasized heavily the dangers presented by Japanese revival and extracted as much as they could from the propaganda contest in seeking to influence states and peoples in Asia and the Pacific worried by Japanese recovery. In the event of a Soviet-American war, Japanese bases would probably be used by the Americans and China would become involved. The financial arrangements were far from generous, although the difficulties facing the Soviet economy have to be remembered. While there was no obvious sign of tension in Sino-Soviet relations, the length of Mao's stay and the realities of two powerful communist movements facing one another suggested that friction existed.¹⁴

The principal diplomatic issue in Anglo-Chinese relations before the start of the Korean War concerned Chinese membership of the UN. The UN was dominated by the US in 1950 and there was no likelihood of Communist China gaining admission unless American policy changed. Britain was in a delicate position, having recognized the communist government but not wishing to antagonize the US. British policy rested on supporting Peking's admission to UN agencies but not voting in favour of China taking the seat in the Security Council occupied by the KMT regime. Mao's government regarded British manoeuvrings as another example of British subservience to Washington, and it affords additional evidence of the refusal of the Chinese

to go further in meeting the British. In August 1950 Britain voted in favour of Peking's admission to the Security Council but the fighting in Korea (in which China had not yet intervened) precluded a positive outcome. China had to wait another 20 years before displacing the KMT regime.¹⁵ Therefore, before the outbreak of the Korean War, Britain's attempts to come to terms with revolutionary nationalism had made little progress. Sir John Hutchinson, *chargé d'affaires* in Peking, could not see the principal Chinese leaders and was restricted to discussions with lower-level officials. These discussions were usually courteous but limited. The best that could be hoped for at the beginning of June 1950 was incremental progress, but a hardening of American policy on Taiwan, communicated to the British early in June, represented an ominous stormcloud on the horizon.¹⁶ Difficulties caused by the Korean War will be considered below.

Japanese nationalism caused fewer problems in 1948 than it had in the 15 years preceding August 1945. Japan was governed under allied occupation, which meant essentially American occupation. In 1945 British ministers and officials expected to have influence on the functioning of the occupation, but neither the Truman administration nor General MacArthur wanted Britain (or any other ally) to play a significant role in Japan.¹⁷ The Allied Council for Japan and the Far Eastern Commission formed a basis for allied participation, but MacArthur regarded the ACJ with open contempt and paid as little heed as possible to communications from the FEC.

British ministers and officials took a more critical view of the Japanese than the Americans and feared that Japanese nationalism could again cause concern in the not too distant future. The more jaundiced British attitude was the product of several factors: the traumas resulting from the catastrophic events of 1941-42, symbolized by the surrender of Singapore, the atrocities inflicted by Japanese and Korean guards in the prison camps, a certain resentment at having been displaced by the US as the chief power in dealing with Japan, and a hard bitten cynicism as to whether American reformers could place Japanese society on a stable and non-violent foundation. However, as far as Japan was concerned, the British were closer in approach to the head of the allied occupation, General MacArthur, than they were to the Truman administration.

MacArthur revealed genuine dedication to reform when he became SCAP in 1945.¹⁸ He and his leading colleagues developed a potent sense of mission to purge Japan of such dangerous features as militarism, state Shinto, excessive power for capitalism and an ambiguous constitution placing undue emphasis on an emperor-centred state. Thus, improbably for a senior general whose political sympathies within the US lay with the Right Wing of the Republican Party, MacArthur was the advocate of eradicating the threat from the military and turning Japan into a non-violent society, encouraging the labour movement, purging capitalism and liberating women.

It was all the more ironical that MacArthur was castigated by the "Japan Lobby" in the US in 1948 for implementing "socialistic" policies in Japan.¹⁹

MacArthur harboured political ambitions and wished to succeed resoundingly in Japan so as to strengthen his claim to the Republican presidential candidacy in 1948 or 1952. However, it is misleading to see his work in Japan as a means, simply, of advancing to the White House: he was wholly sincere in his sense of mission in Japan. MacArthur lacked expertise in the economic sphere and it was the weak state of the economy in 1947-48 that rendered him vulnerable to critics in Washington. Congress was conscious of the burden to the American taxpayer of sustaining the occupation, the Japanese people making little contribution themselves. The development of the cold war in Europe cast a deepening shadow over Asia and policy-makers in the State Department and in the Pentagon contemplated the process of strengthening Japan so that it could be a firm bastion in Western defences in East Asia against the Soviet Union.²⁰

British ministers and officials respected MacArthur and came to view him more favourably as time passed. In 1945 he was regarded with reservations because of the way in which he directed the South-West Pacific Command, with the emphasis fully on American control: it was feared that he might prove critical of Britain. In reality MacArthur acted reasonably in the main. Some of his statements or actions were not seen as ideal, but MacArthur's hard work and commitment were appreciated in the British liaison mission in Tokyo and in London. Sir Alvary Gascoigne, who headed the mission from 1946-51, met MacArthur often and established good relations with him down to the outbreak of the Korean War. Naturally, Gascoigne had to adjust to listening to the idiosyncratic general's interminable statements and self-justifications but, despite occasional disputes, Gascoigne appeared to enjoy his encounters with MacArthur.

At the Foreign Office F.S. Tomlinson and Esler Denning commented favourably on MacArthur at the beginning of 1948 and could not see a viable alternative to him as SCAP.²¹ The British agreed that the Japanese economy must be revived but there was anxiety regarding the consequences. Clearly the existing situation was untenable, since the economy was bumping along at a low level and the standard of living was patently inadequate. The Foreign Office held, in March 1948, that living standards should be restored approximately to the levels obtaining in 1930-34. Reparations should be demanded and should embrace industrial assets, shipping, gold deposits and other assets.²²

Considerable reservations existed concerning textiles, shipping and the Staffordshire potteries; it was anticipated that Japanese competition could assume dangerous proportions.²³ This was a reminder of the ferocity of such competition during the 1930s. Anxiety was accentuated because of the Labour government's commitment to maintaining a full employment economy and through representations from the Lancashire textile industry.

A trade agreement concluded with SCAP approval between the Japanese government and members of the British Commonwealth in November 1948 envisaged a substantial, threefold increase in trade between Japan and the sterling group. This agreement was for one year, to extend from July 1949, and would cover exports from Japan ranging from textiles, industrial machinery, raw silk, caustic soda, chemicals and paper to bunker coal. Imports into Japan from the sterling area would include raw materials such as wool, iron ore, salt, cotton, rubber, tin, jute and manganese.²⁴

The British were in agreement with MacArthur that a peace treaty should be concluded sooner rather than later. A prolonged occupation would breed growing resentment in Japan and would render it more difficult to bring the occupation to a satisfactory conclusion. Labour Cabinet ministers did not devote much time to discussing Japan, except in 1951 when the terms of a peace treaty did occupy considerable time. Ernest Benin showed some interest in the process of democratization but his interest was concentrated largely in Europe, although his attendance at the Columbo conference in January 1950 revealed his understanding of issues concerning poverty and development in Asia.²⁵ Herbert Morrison was compelled to spend a good deal of time discussing Japan in the context of a peace treaty, but he had no real interest in Japan. When it did discuss Japan, the Labour Cabinet showed little sympathy for Japan and was less liberal in approach than MacArthur, John Foster Dulles and the Truman administration.

Officials in the Foreign Office and members of the liaison mission in Tokyo were consistently doubtful as to the durability of democratization. Gascoigne, Denning, Tomlinson and their colleagues anticipated a growing trend towards conservatism. At the end of 1948 Gascoigne summarized Japanese aims as wanting an early end to the occupation; to gain economic assistance from the USA; to re-establish armed forces, using the onset of the cold war and the advance of communism in China as the justification; to expand Japanese trade; and to secure access to regions where Japan's surplus population could emigrate. Gascoigne dismissed the effect of democracy on the Japanese mind as "almost nil".²⁶ He conveyed his feelings more diplomatically to MacArthur. The general agreed that exaggerated claims for what had been accomplished should not be made, but he took an optimistic view.²⁷

In June 1950, just before the outbreak of the Korean War, Gascoigne observed that a more truculent attitude could be discerned in Japan. The occupation had lasted nearly five years and there was no sign that it would terminate soon. Japanese officials were showing exasperation as Washington permitted drift to continue.²⁸ However, the mood was changing in Washington with the appointment of Dulles to negotiate a peace treaty. Dulles was ambitious and clear in his objectives: he was determined to secure a treaty in 1951 and the war in Korea increased the importance of his endeavours. He was adamant that a treaty must be magnanimous. Having

been present at the conclusion of the Treaty of Versailles in 1919, Dulles had no desire to preside over a treaty which would stimulate Japanese ire.²⁹ Japan would have to forfeit its colonies in accordance with allied policy as announced during the Pacific war, and this would be an onerous punishment. He opposed inclusion of a war guilt clause, as favoured by the Attlee Cabinet; he believed that limitations should not be imposed on the Japanese economy. Dulles was determined to achieve a defence agreement allowing continued establishment of American bases on Japanese soil. It was imperative to conclude defence agreements with Australia and New Zealand, so as to allay their fears regarding possible Japanese revival. MacArthur was jealous of Dulles's role, for he regarded Dulles as ignorant of Asia and in his mind there was room for only one prominent expert on Asia in the Republican Party. However, MacArthur endorsed Dulles's approach in seeking a liberal treaty and continued to do so after his dismissal by Truman.

British officials favoured a liberal treaty, if one not quite as generous as their American colleagues wanted; they saw it as inevitable, given the strength of the American preference, but they were much less sanguine about the aftermath.³⁰ Dulles was critical of the British approach and feared, at times, that Britain might be prepared to follow an independent policy, as in the recognition of China. Basically Dulles held that the Japanese could be relied on in the future, provided that his line was adhered to, but the British were doubtful.

British reservations were made plain when Dulles visited London in June 1951 for the concluding round of negotiations. Hugh Gaitskell, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, although strongly pro-American, emphasized the presence of vociferous anti-Japanese opinion in Britain, stimulated by the shocking atrocities committed by the Japanese forces during the war. Gaitskell deplored Dulles's wish for Japan to retain gold deposits and thought it would be better for the Americans to keep the gold rather than return it to Japan.³¹ Sir Hartley Shawcross, President of the Board of Trade, pressed for assistance to the textile industry; limited help could be attained through terminating Japanese rights under the Congo Basin treaties.³² Dulles was dismissive initially but later conceded the point, the only real concession (albeit a limited one) that he made to the British. Herbert Morrison told Dulles that the proposed treaty allowed excessive room for Japanese rearmament, and he spoke of the impact on public opinion of past atrocities.³³ Morrison also emphasized anxiety over shipping capacity.³⁴

Dulles reiterated that political realities meant that he had to secure a treaty acceptable to the required majority in the American Senate so as to obtain ratification. This was a real problem, although he exaggerated it for his own purposes. Dulles succeeded. The final treaty reflected American rather than British wishes, was approved at the San Francisco conference in September 1951, and was ratified by the Senate in March 1952 with a small number of reactionary Republicans voting against.

Sir Esler Dening, shortly to be Britain's first post-war ambassador to Japan, reflected the cynicism common among British officials: Japanese nationalism would become a problem once more when the memory of the occupation receded. The likelihood of this happening was increased by the American decision to encourage Japanese rearmament, in direct contrast to the policy followed until 1950. As Dening expressed it, there had been a "change in the American attitude, from an almost missionary and visionary zeal to make Japan into a completely pacifist state, to an equally missionary zeal to encourage her rearmament".³⁵ However, where a possible threat from assertive Japanese nationalism was concerned, MacArthur and Dulles were far more accurate than Gascoigne and Dening. This may have been in part because Japanese economic success was to be far greater than anything deemed feasible in 1951-52.

Before the summer of 1950 Britain showed scant concern with Korea. There were few economic attractions in the peninsula and Korea was divided into American and Soviet spheres of interest. British officials viewed the tergiversations in American policy with even greater cynicism than that displayed in their approach to American endeavours in China. American policy was regarded as muddled and inept; the outcome was likely to be Korea assimilated to communism.³⁶ Korean nationalism was perceived as passionate, released by the defeat of Japan from the sufferings imposed by a colonial power. Communism was believed to have been more successful than conservative forces in harnessing nationalism. It was difficult to assess the precise situation in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) after its establishment in 1948. Kim Il-sung was a mysterious figure and was held to be loyal to the Soviet Union, in the manner of the satellite regimes established in Eastern Europe after 1945.

The War Office informed the Foreign Office in December 1949:

In the past it had always been our view that irrespective of strengths the North Korean forces would have little difficulty in dealing effectively with the forces of South Korea should full scale hostilities break out... On the question of aggression by the North there can be no doubt whatever that their ultimate object is to overrun the South; and I think in the long term there is no doubt that they will do so.³⁷

While the US had set up a relatively large military mission in the Republic of Korea (ROK) after it secured independence, there was no American guarantee protecting the ROK against aggression. Thus the War Office drew the conclusion that after a lengthy period of border incidents along the 38th parallel the ROK would be weakened from within, as had been the experience of Hungary, Romania and Czechoslovakia, and then it would succumb as the DPRK assimilated the ROK amidst futile American lamentation. Britain appreciated the military strength and commitment of the DPRK, but Soviet control was exaggerated. Little was known of Kim Il-sung and he was underestimated.

The Foreign Office was not impressed with the structure or economy of the ROK. While Right-wing conservative nationalism was a genuine force, it lacked strength and was discredited by the extent to which conservative nationalists collaborated with the Japanese. Syngman Rhee was free of the taint of collaboration but was seen as too old, autocratic and reactionary to offer the likelihood of establishing a credible regime. Rhee operated through corruption and brutality and his regime bore more than a passing resemblance to another failed administration, that of Chiang Kai-shek. It was fitting that Chiang and Rhee should discover the merits of each other's regimes in public statements and covert contacts in 1949 and 1950, another of the interesting sub-themes associated with the origins of the Korean War. Admittedly, Chiang's need was greater than Rhee's.³⁸ The ROK economy was weak, inflation was looming as a threat in 1949-50 (a further depressing comparison with KMT China), and Rhee relied on American economic and military aid to survive.

The Foreign Office interpreted the American decision to involve the UN in handling Korean issues in 1947-48 as a sign that the Truman administration was searching for a respectable method of extricating itself from Korea, the UN offering a convenient façade behind which a retreat could be executed. Bruce Cumings has emphasized Dean Acheson's interest in Korea from 1947 and argues that Acheson had no intention of allowing Korea to fall to communism.³⁹ Certainly Acheson, when Assistant Secretary of State in 1947, did manoeuvre to secure an extension of aid to Korea, but American policy was confused and a major question mark hovered over what action the US would take in the event of conflict in Korea. Doubts were not lessened by the ambiguities present in public statements made by Truman and Acheson in January 1950, including Acheson's controversial National Press Club speech.⁴⁰

The start of serious conflict on 25 June 1950 came as a shock to Britain. No indication of impending fighting emanated from the legation in Seoul: the minister, Captain Vyvyan Holt, in appropriate English manner, commented on the weather in his final communication before the DPRK's advance.⁴¹ He was captured, together with MI6 (intelligence) chief George Blake (it is unclear whether Blake was already working for Moscow or whether his conversion resulted from internment).⁴² Rhee's regime had engaged in considerable provocation in inspiring incidents along the 38th parallel between 1948 and 1950: Kim Il-sung's regime bore similar responsibility. The hatred between the competing varieties of Korean nationalism was intense. Rhee and Kim each regarded himself as a super-patriot destined to unite the Korean people under his autocratic, intolerant control and was filled with determination to eliminate the other. As in the Balkans before 1914 (and perhaps contemporaneously) the leaders of the opposing states were willing to risk war on the assumption that the great

powers would act to prevent defeat, since the prestige of each of the two sides was at stake during the cold war.

There was no desire in London to intervene, but no choice remained when the US moved vigorously and swiftly pushed condemnation of North Korean aggression through the UN Security Council in the absence of the Soviet Union - the latter was absent ostensibly in protest at the exclusion of communist China. Britain acted, not out of zeal to defend Rhee's ramshackle regime, but out of the need to preserve close relations with the US and maintain the moral authority of the UN.⁴³ The chiefs of staff were reluctant to commit British troops in Korea but the Attlee Cabinet concluded that there was no alternative.⁴⁴

After the initial shock and the danger of UN forces being expelled from Korea had been averted, attention began to focus on UN objectives, which were ambiguous. Was the UN concerned to restore the *status quo ante* or to unify Korea? MacArthur's bold stroke at Inchon in mid-September 1950 made the subject more urgent. Despite the growing misgivings of the chiefs of staff, the Attlee Cabinet agreed to sponsor a resolution in the UN General Assembly in early October authorizing the advance of UN forces north of the 38th parallel.⁴⁵

Disturbing reports emanated from British representatives and troops and, more embarrassingly, from British journalists, revealing the cruel methods employed by the agents of Rhee's regime to punish those deemed to be of dubious loyalty.⁴⁶ The ringing emphasis on democratic values for which the UN intervened in Korea hardly seemed to square with the brutal actions of Rhee's agents. If Korea were unified, should Rhee control the government? MacArthur's warm praise for Rhee following the liberation of Seoul appeared to reveal no doubt in his mind as to the answer, but the British government wanted to see free elections held and wished to prevent Rhee and reactionary nationalists from manipulating the political situation. Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir John Slessor, Chief of the Air Staff, was scathing in his denunciation of Rhee and MacArthur and wrote that if Korea were unified, it was important that Rhee should not be able to misgovern a united Korea as he had misgoverned the ROK.⁴⁷ China's intervention in October and November 1950 made such considerations academic: the UN was back in the familiar dilemma of ensuring that it was not ejected from the peninsula. Britain was tied to Rhee's government for the duration of the war, invidious as this was.

Neither the Attlee government nor its Conservative successor under Churchill relished the position of supporting Rhee, but the demands of the conflict gave no choice. The prolonged armistice talks from July 1951 to July 1953 were regarded as extremely tedious yet the issue of principle concerning the voluntary return of prisoners-of-war was seen by Churchill as paramount. Rhee's blatant attempts to sabotage an armistice in June-July

1953 incensed Churchill, who dictated incandescent minutes excoriating Rhee.⁴⁸ In this respect the Prime Minister's feelings were similar to those of President Eisenhower, who contemplated a possible coup to remove the obdurate Rhee unless he modified his behaviour.

The armistice was signed on 27 July 1953. Rhee refused to sign, although he agreed not to obstruct it, in return for a security treaty from the US and the extension of further economic assistance. India played a key part in resolving the intractable issue of the disposal of POWs. Hopes of achieving political settlement proved abortive: the gap between the two Koreas was too large to be bridged, and the US was determined that a settlement must uphold Rhee's regime.⁴⁹ The Geneva conference of 1954, intended originally to concentrate on Korea, was hijacked by the more urgent issues of Indo-China.

To conclude, nationalism in East Asia was seen by British ministers and officials as profoundly disturbing. Chinese communism captured nationalism. The hopes that Britain could establish a viable relationship with Mao's regime waned in 1950 and were further undermined after China's entry into the Korean war. Given the extent of American ire at Peking, it would take considerable time for Britain to develop effective diplomatic relations with China. China's wish to encourage trade with the West in 1952-53 offered the possibility of fostering more positive contacts, but these were handicapped by the application of economic sanctions after Chinese intervention in Korea.⁵⁰ Japanese nationalism was not an immediate problem but might become one over the next decade, in the eyes of British officials. In Korea the failure to achieve progress towards a solution based on unification meant that two hostile states would oppose each other with the threat - contemporary note - that this might escalate into another war. The combined nationalism-communism of the DPRK was singularly depressing and the conservative nationalism of the ROK offered little prospect of developing into a democratic system based on respect for civil rights.

To summarize very succinctly, it could be said that British ministers and officials were basically correct in their policy towards China, although arguably they erred in timing; they were wrong in their assessment of Japan; and in the main they were right about Korea.

Notes

1 For discussion of the British role in China in the 19th and 20th centuries in the broader context of Britain's position in East and South-East Asia see Peter Lowe, *Britain in the Far East: A Survey 1819 to the Present*, London, 1981. For developments in the late 1940s and early 1950s see James Tuck-Hong Tang, *Britain's Encounter with Revolutionary China 1949-54*, London, 1992.

2 For discussion of British and American policies towards China during the Pacific war see Christopher Thorne, *Allies of a Kind: The United States, Britain and the War against Japan 1941-45*, London, 1978.

3 See T.H. White (ed.), *The Stilwell Papers*, New York, 1948.

4 See J.K. Fairbank and A. Feuerwerker (eds.), *The Cambridge History of China*, Vol. 13, part 2, Cambridge, 1986.

5 See D.M. Borg and W. Heinrichs (eds.), *Uncertain Years: Chinese-American Relations 1947-1950*, Guildford, 1980, and N.B. Tucker, *Patterns in the Dust: Chinese-American Relations and the Recognition Controversy 1949-1950*, New York, 1983.

6 Burgess contributed numerous memoranda and minutes to assessments of the evolution of Chinese communism in the later 1940s and these may be found in the relevant China files in FO 371 files for China in the Public Record Office, Kew. Transcripts/translations of Crown Copyright records in the Public Office appear by permission of the Controller of H.M. Stationary Office.

7 "Revolutionary forces of the world rally to combat imperialist aggression", October, 1948, enclosed in FO 371/75816/14878.

8 FO to Paris (and other capitals), 5 October 1949, FO 371/75816/14782 and 10 October 1949, FO 371/75816/14878.

9 Memorandum by Acheson 17 November 1949, folder, memorandum of conversations, November 1949, box 64, Acheson papers, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri, for Acheson's thinking regarding the chances of separating communist China from the Soviet Union, in a paper submitted to Truman.

10 Record of meeting between Bevin and representatives of the China Association, 16 March 1950, FO 371/83344/30.

11 See Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department*, London, 1970, pp. 356-357.

12 *Foreign Relations of the United States* Vol. 8, 1949, p. 642, Kirck to Acheson, 21 December 1949.

13 "Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance between the USSR and the People's Republic of China", 14 February 1950, included in FO 371/83315/88.

14 Analysis of treaty and agreements, Far Eastern Department, 13 March 1950, *ibid.*

15 See Evan Luard, *A History of the United Nations*, Vol. 1, *The Years of Western Domination 1945-1955*, London, 1982, pp. 313-316.

16 Letter from Sir Oliver Franks to Esler Dening, 7 June 1950, FO 371/83320/9.

17 For a discussion of British policy towards Japan after 1945 see R.W. Buckley, *Occupation Diplomacy: Britain, The United States and Japan 1945-1952*, Cambridge, 1982, and Peter Lowe, "The British Liaison Mission and SCAP 1948-1952: Exchanges during the latter part of the occupation", *Japan Forum*, Vol. 5, No. 2, October 1993, pp. 245-256.

18 For comprehensive accounts of MacArthur's work in Japan see D. Clayton James, *The Years of MacArthur* Vol. 3 *Triumph and Disaster 1945-64*, Boston, 1985, and R.D. Finn, *Winners in Peace: MacArthur, Yoshida and Postwar Japan*, Oxford, 1992.

19 The "Japan Lobby" consisted of a mixture of officials and businessmen critical of MacArthur for carrying reform too far. They wished to see emphasis put on rebuilding the economy and bolstering Japan's defences against the Soviet Union; see H.B.

- Schonberger, *Aftermath of War: Americans and the Remaking of Japan 1945-1952*, London, 1989.
- 20 See G.G. Kennan, *Memoirs 1925-50*, London, 1968, pp. 384-394, for a valuable overview of Kennan's contribution as a key planner in the State Department and why he recommended that policies in Japan should be changed, with the reforming impetus being curtailed.
- 21 Minutes by F.S. Tomlinson, 8 January 1948, and Dening, 29 January 1948, FO 371/69885/368.
- 22 FO to Tokyo, 18 March 1948, FO 371/69885/4213.
- 23 See Peter Lowe, *The Origins of the Korean War*, London, 1986, pp. 74-76.
- 24 *The Economist*, 1 May 1948, p. 706.
- 25 See Alan Bullock, *The Life and Times of Ernest Bevin Vol. 3 Foreign Secretary 1945-1951*, London, 1983, pp. 743-750.
- 26 Despatch from Gascoigne to Bevin, 18 December 1948, FO 371/76178/7527.
- 27 *ibid.*
- 28 Despatch from Gascoigne to Younger, 12 June 1950, FO 371/93.
- 29 For a detailed discussion of Anglo-American exchanges over a peace treaty, see Peter Lowe, *Great Britain and the Japanese Peace Treaty 1951*, Peter Lowe and Herman Moeshart (eds.), *Western Interactions with Japan: Expansion, the Armed Forces and Readjustment, 1859-1956*, Folkestone, 1990, pp. 91-104.
- 30 *ibid.*
- 31 Treasury memorandum by A.J. Phelps, 6 June 1951, FO 371/92557/564A.
- 32 Record of meeting in House of Commons, 8 June 1951, FO 271/92554/516.
- 33 Record of Morrison-Dulles meeting, 4 June 1951, FO 371/92554/498.
- 34 Record of Morrison-Dulles meeting, 6 June 1951, FO 371/92554/515.
- 35 Despatch from Dening to Eden, 28 April 1952, FO 371/99472/4.
- 36 Minute by D.F. MacDermot, February 1948, cited by Lowe, *Origins of Korean War*, p. 46.
- 37 Letter from Major J.R. Ferguson Innes to E.J.F. Scott, 30 December 1949, FO 371/69542/16032.
- 38 Despatch from Stevenson to Bevin, 3 November 1948, enclosing text of press interview given by Chiang Kai-shek, *New York Tribune*, 31 October 1948, FO 371/69542/16032. In the interview Chiang linked the fate of China with that of Korea, each menaced by the machinations of international communism; see Lowe, *Origins of Korean War*, pp. 150-2.
- 39 See Bruce Cumings, *The Origins of the Korean War Vol. 2, The Roaring of the Cataract 1947-1950*, Princeton, 1990, pp. 45-54.
- 40 Cumings offers a more subtle explanation of Acheson's speech and denies that it gave a "green light" to DPRK action in June 1950: Cumings Vol. 2, pp. 420-435.
- 41 Letter from Holt to Tomlinson, 22 June 1950, FO 371/84077/23.

- 42 For Blake's bland reminiscences see George Blake, *No Other Choice: An Autobiography*, London, 1990.
- 43 FO memorandum, 26 June 1950, drafted for Bevin (then recuperating in hospital), FO 371/84058/62.
- 44 See Cabinet minutes, 27 June 1950, Cab 128/17, CM39(50)4 and CM42(50)3, 4 July 1950.
- 45 For text see *Foreign Relations of the United States Vol.7*, pp. 904-906, resolution adopted by the UN General Assembly, 7 October 1950.
- 46 James Cameron sent graphic reports to *Picture Post*, accompanied by equally graphic photographs by Bert Hardy revealing the brutal repression enforced by the ROK authorities. The proprietor of *Picture Post*, Sir Edward Hulton, disapproved of the frankness of Cameron's reports and this led to Cameron's departure from the illustrated weekly. See also minute by Dening, 14 September 1950, FO 371/84101/434.
- 47 See memorandum by Slessor, 14 September 1950, COS(50)152(8), confidential annex, Defe 4/36.
- 48 For example, see minute by Churchill, 2 July 1953, FO 371/105508/626.
- 49 See Peter Lowe, "The settlement of the Korean War", in J.W. Young (ed.), *The Foreign Policy of Churchill's Peacetime Administration 1951-1955*, Leicester, 1988, p. 228.
- 50 See Peter Lowe, "Hopes frustrated: The impact of the Korean War upon Britain's relations with communist China 1950-1953", in T.G. Graser and Keith Jeffery (eds.), *Men, Women and War: Papers from the XXth Irish Conference of Historians*, Dublin, 1993, pp. 211-226, especially pp. 219-225.

Nationalism and internationalism in 20th century Chinese literature

Hilary Chung

Introduction

The question of how to engage with the literary currents of the Western tradition is not a new preoccupation for cultures outside this tradition. Yet it is particularly in the 20th century, with the growth of a "world arena" for war and international politics, that the perception of a world stage for cultural endeavour also evolved. In an era which saw the establishment of both the League of Nations and the Nobel Prize, questions of national identity acquired both political and cultural significance, especially for peoples who perceived themselves as disempowered within the world arena.

This paper shows how, in the case of Chinese literature, the overriding motivation to legitimize its place on the world stage had the effect of conjoining aspirations towards nation-building with literary and artistic practice. The Chinese quest for artistic legitimation found expression in currents of thought which so contradicted each other that their coexistence endangered the quest itself. The paper goes on to discuss how the dominant critical discourse which emerged from this conflict has since shaped and undermined this quest.

Encounters between unequal consciousnesses

Fredric Jameson expresses his concept of the relationship of Western literature and culture to minority literature and culture in terms of the Hegelian master-slave relationship.¹ Two conscious beings struggle as equals for recognition by the other. Each needs recognition by the other to establish his own awareness of himself and each is willing to sacrifice life for this supreme affirmation. However, the death of the other would destroy

the source of recognition essential to the victor, so he spares his adversary.² Now in this new unequal relationship the master proceeds to enjoy the recognition and subservience of the slave. Ironically, recognition by this subhuman form of life, which is not an independent consciousness, evaporates at the moment of attainment and offers no true recognition at all. Nor is the situation of the slave as it first appears. Although he lacks adequate acknowledgement, through his labour he is in direct contact with the material world. Through this process, the slave becomes aware of his own consciousness, for he sees it objectified before him in the results of his labour. Meanwhile, there is no coherence to the being of the master, who becomes increasingly cut off from the material world, a state described by Jameson as "a placeless freedom in which any consciousness of his own concrete situation flies like a dream".³

This is where Jameson leaves the minority literature - in a subservient relationship with the Western literary and critical mainstream, yet with its own situational consciousness.

In the case of China, the initial diplomatic contacts between the emissaries of several European royal courts and the dragon throne might well be construed according to the Hegelian analogy. The loose paraphrasing and sinecization of the story lines of many popular novels by authors such as Charles Dickens, Dumas *films*, Walter Scott *et al.* at the end of the imperial era by the prolific "translators" Lin Shu and Su Manshu may also be understood in terms of the unquestioned and innate assumptions of cultural superiority by the Chinese, which are now commonly ascribed to Western culture. However, in the post-imperial era the encounters between the youthful aspiring modernizers of Chinese literature and culture and the Western mainstream was not one between equals seeking recognition from one another. The dominant culture of the imperialists hardly needed the affirmation of a generation in China whose iconoclasm towards the old order had left them culturally insecure. Yet faced with the economic, political and cultural encroachment of the Western powers, this generation was all the more determined that China should take its place as an equal on the world stage. In cultural terms this meant building a New Chinese Literature and Art. Ironically, this generation, known as the May Fourth generation,⁴ was not only seeking recognition from this dominant Other, but sought to build a new literary/cultural consciousness by emulating this Other. The process of self-affirmation was to be carried out in terms of the same entity whose very encroachment had been the catalyst for this process in the first place.

This was a conscious project, trumpeted by various allegiances of modern-educated intellectuals, to create a new national literature by means of translation and critical introduction. It had the express purpose of providing models for emulation in order that China might "catch up with West". The medium of expression for this passionate debate was the rapidly burgeoning journal culture, a central feature of post-imperial Chinese

intellectual life and the main vehicle for the dissemination of new learning and debate.

Within these circles there was remarkable consensus over the need for such a project but, predictably, far less about how it should be realized. Various literary societies were established, each promoting a different ideological approach. The two most prominent were the Creation Society, champions of romanticism in the early years of the literary debate, when they were associated with the slogan "art for art's sake" (*yishu wei yishu*), and the Society for Literary Research, promoters of realism, under the banner "art for life's sake" (*yishu wei rensheng*).⁵ An examination of the professed aims and objectives of the latter society provides a useful focus to consider the way in which the contradictory aspirations of nationalism and universalism in literature could coexist in the minds of China's literary reformers at that time. Indeed, both are contained within the "Announcement of Reform" which announced the Society's assumption of control:

In our attempt to reform literature today, we will not only work at the imitation of Western literature but will in fact create a New Chinese Literature and Art and fulfil our duty of making a contribution to the world.⁶

A major consideration in examining this phenomenon is the intellectual climate of the times, the mood of which, by the early 1920s, had been considerably influenced by ground-breaking articles on literature and culture carried by the journal *New Youth*, founded in 1915. Of particular relevance to this discussion is an article by Chen Duxiu entitled "Discussion of the History of Modern European Literature".⁷ Based on French sources,⁸ this article put forward an evolutionary interpretation of literary development which had universal applicability. Chen attempted to apply to Chinese literature the schema enunciated by his sources, whereby in European literature romanticism had developed from classicism and realism from romanticism. He placed Chinese literature within the same schema, identifying its current stage of development as being that of classicism and romanticism and predicting the development of realism in the new literature. The question of whether such an analysis was appropriate for the Chinese case does not concern us here. The significance of this article is precisely that it suggested both that Chinese literature had a place on the wider literary stage and that it was subject to the same forces of development. It also became the standard interpretation of China's literary predicament and the means of its salvation for the rest of the decade.

The tenor of the ensuing debate fostered the conviction among the May Fourth generation that they were heirs to world literature and that Western literary models were the key to Chinese literary development. Precisely which models and the way that they were to be introduced were at issue. The line taken by individuals and literary societies depended both on

personal literary preferences and on the extent of their faith in the evolutionary path. On its founding the Society for Literary Research adopted a clear evolutionary stance through its publishing organ, the *Fiction Monthly*, in the clear belief that the future development of Chinese literature was mapped out within the universal framework of literary evolution.

Recently realistic literature has already gone into decline, so it seems that from a world perspective it ought not to be promoted so much. However, as far as the situation of the country's internal literary scene is concerned, we have not yet experienced even a minuscule amount of the true spirit of realism and the true masterpieces of realistic literature, so members feel that there is still a definite need for the introduction of realism today. At the same time we must also fulfil our quota of literature which is not realistic, in order that a further level of preparation can be reached.⁹

It was precisely the all-embracing nature of a universal approach to literary development which allowed this new generation of Chinese intellectuals to see themselves as heirs to world literature and thereby to contextualize and legitimize their own efforts in world terms. Writing in 1918, Zhou Zuoren had coined the phrase "human literature" (*ren de wenxue*) to express the values that the new literature should embody.¹⁰ He was an early advocate of realism which he presented as the most appropriate means of placing the real drama of human life at the centre of literary endeavour. These ideas soon became common currency and were developed by other commentators. One such was Mao Dun, who took up Zhou's lead on how to define the relationship between particularism and universalism:

I feel that the mission of literature is to voice the melancholy of modern man and help men rid themselves of the tendencies and weaknesses all inherit from thousands of years of history; to enable the mutual communication of feelings [and] to cause the imperceptible barriers between men to be gradually extinguished. The background of literature should be the background of all mankind, the feelings expressed should be those of all humanity. Only, because men in the world today cannot purely be men of the world but still retain a certain amount of their national character, creative literary works inevitably retain the appeal of that nation, and the background reflected also inevitably tends more towards that nation. The feelings expressed must always be universal, however: this is what today's creative writers should pay attention to.¹¹

Ultimate faith was placed in the evolutionary process to effect the perpetual advancement of literary philosophy and technique. It was for this reason that many were drawn to the latest literary trends from the West despite the logic of the particular need to promote realism. From this grew the idea that China could "advance simultaneously along several paths",¹² which is reflected in the abovementioned "Announcement of Reform". Rather than undermining the evolutionary project, this simply constituted a pragmatic response to the impossibility of evolutionary purism and did not threaten the ideal of universal humanism which, it was held, could be transmitted via a variety of modern literary schools. Far more problematic was the study and introduction of realism itself.

Underpinning the Chinese espousal of literary evolution was the privileging of the universal at the expense of particular identity. Indeed, initially this was interpreted as a positive attraction. However, once literature was discussed in terms of the scientific observation and objective depiction of reality, and as being the product of environment or socio-political background, the focus of debate rapidly focussed on the national context and the importance of the expression of national character. That a strongly nationalistic literature should be created, in order that its depiction of life and the feelings of all mankind would lead to the extinguishing of the barriers between peoples, is clearly unsatisfactory. While directly linked to the aim of engaging universal sympathy, emphasis on the reflection of social background is equally unsatisfactory; whilst concentration on the mutual communication of feelings expressly at the expense of national characteristics is not acceptable to an emerging nation and national literature.

The translation of the literature of the so-called "small nations and oppressed peoples" provided something of a key to these contradictions.¹³ In an era which saw the founding of the League of Nations and the institution of the Nobel Prize, countries like Norway, Hungary and Poland and peoples such as the Jews were producing literature which had been accorded recognition on the world stage. These nations and peoples were able to assert their position as an equal member of the world community by expressing their national identity in literature. At the same time, because of the nature of their specific milieu, the depth of the sentiments expressed represented a genuineness of human feelings which was able to transcend the confines of a national literature to inspire all mankind. For all these reasons such literature was a particular example to China and special attention was given to the translation and introduction of carefully chosen models from "small and oppressed" literature.

Consideration of social background and political circumstances rivalled aesthetic considerations in the selection of models.¹⁴ Examples were chosen whose concerns harmonized with the those of the intellectual climate of May Fourth China. These included nationalism and revolution, national identity, foreign oppression, the ravages of war, the suffering and exploitation of the poor and so on.¹⁵ Poland provides an example of a people with whose plight the Chinese were readily able to identify. The tripartite division of Poland by the three great empires of Russia, Prussia and Austria meant that until the resolution of the First World War, Poland as an entity did not technically exist. The extraterritorial rights of the imperial powers on China's eastern seaboard made Chinese identification with Polish literature all the more poignant. Particularly inspiring was the reassertion of cultural identity through literature in their own language by a people whose political and linguistic identity had been denied by their imperial masters.¹⁶

To the Chinese intellectuals, by entering the literary mainstream these small nations and oppressed peoples seemed to have squared the circle. In their literature they were able both to maintain their national character and identity and to follow the evolutionary developments in world literature, a prerequisite for making a viable contribution to it. The successful formula which appeared to be able to mediate between the conflicting forces of nationalism and universalism was one of inter-nationalism - "particularism within universalism".¹⁷

This was no struggle to the death between equal consciousnesses. From the outset the May Fourth generation of Chinese put itself in a subordinate position *vis à vis* the Western mainstream, and also *vis à vis* the small nations and oppressed peoples. The Chinese already had an acute situational consciousness, being painfully aware of the perceived backwardness and inferiority of their literature. Unfortunately, the generation also placed its hope for overcoming the conflicting forces of nationalism and universalism in an accident of history. May Fourth China overplayed the relationship between the emphatic expressions of national identity in 19th century "oppressed literature" with the emergence of independent states as the century progressed; whereas more significant in the emergence of such states was the crumbling of the great European empires, which were previously the organs of oppression of these peoples, and the machinations of their successors. Poland well illustrates this, emerging as an independent state at the end of the First World War almost by default. The changed milieu engendered new literary trends within Poland, which now the Chinese found less concordant with their needs. Writing in 1929, Mao Dun expresses regret at the reorientation of Polish literature:

In terms of the thought tide of the literary background, before the war it was nationalism* [*minzu zhuyi*], after the war it is universalism [*shijie zhuyi*]. The structure of a new independent Polish state - even if it is a flimsy structure - has, it seems, already caused young writers to lose the ardent nationalistic sentiment of the previous generation; indeed, they feel they ought to study the broad vision of the world and now do not deserve to be called people of a "free" country... After the blood bath of the First World War, under the diplomatic manoeuvres of the great powers, Poland became an independent state with self respect ... But because Poland has already become an "independent state" its younger writers feel the pre-war poets' esteem of nationalism to be no longer in tune with the times... Polish people, who are already free, ought to broaden their horizons and better fulfil their contribution to world culture.¹⁸

The irony of these sentiments is that, by rights, Poland had been too exemplary in its role as model, achieving both statehood and integration into the literary mainstream. The issue of national identity was seen to have been downplayed in literature as a result of Poland's changed political fortunes, although the latter could not justifiably be interpreted as a result of the former.

A further accident of history also complicates the situation still further. In the West, post-realistic literary and artistic trends reacted against the positivism of the 19th century and notions of the social responsibility of art at precisely the time when these values were being affirmed in China. This was a significant factor in the gradual loss of faith in evolution as a positive force for change in China. Although in the article quoted above Mao Dun blames a new generation of Polish writers for failing China as a model, the real object of disaffection was the direction in which the newest trends in literature were moving. The evolutionary process, which previously had been perceived as one of continual advancement, was now seen as unreliable. As the Chinese equation of a national literary profile with a national political profile gradually became more entrenched with the Leftist radicalization of the literary scene, it necessarily undermined the naive idealism from which the new culture movement had grown.

The analogy of enslavement

If Jameson's analogy has an application in the relationship of modern Chinese literature to the Western literary mainstream, it might arguably be applied to the question of derivativeness.

Since the builders of the new Chinese literature sought to define their endeavours in Western terms and to appropriate Western forms and techniques as the tools of their trade, the results of their labours inevitably attracted the charge of being derivative. So labelled, they were not accorded the affirmation which was sought in order to join the literary mainstream.

The problem lies in the dominance of the "view from the top", in Jameson's phrase.¹⁹ Any appropriation from "the top" is seen as emulation and little recognition is given for independent creativity. This attitude is often perpetuated in scholarship. In sinology there are numerous examples of the "reception and influence study" whereby the standards set, as it were, by a prominent figure from the Western literary mainstream are used as a yardstick against which to evaluate what are construed as Chinese efforts at emulation. Often such "Western" elements as do exist are taken as evidence of a wholesale adoption of Western assumptions and ways of thought. In the investigation of Western influence there is a lurking tendency to impute to the Chinese writer in question a Western interpretation or understanding of the figure whose influence is being investigated. Yet the project in early 20th century China to create a new national literature shows that Chinese writers and critics were not passive recipients of Western influence. Their "influences" were chosen with care, reflecting their own perceived needs. Their interpretation of Western works and ideologies were not necessarily

"orthodox" but often involved adaptation, selectivity and splicing in response to local requirements.²⁰

This leads to the main problematic contained within the enslavement analogy, namely that of the dependence of the minority literature on the mainstream for acceptance. In the project to create a new national literature for China, examples from the literature of small nations and oppressed peoples were appealing precisely because the mainstream had taken them to its breast. They were perceived to have transcended their cultural particularity and thereby to have universal relevance as speaking to the human condition of the age.

What mechanisms were at work in the Chinese case which denied modern Chinese literature the same acceptance? An important factor was the self-consciousness of the Chinese endeavour. This led to a projection of the circumstances of its formulation onto its "small and oppressed" models. In particular, the relationship between socio-political and artistic motivations was inverted: non-literary criteria were used to define an ostensibly literary project. The telescoping of two centuries of political and literary developments in Europe also made the Chinese project a victim of time lag, in that national literary preferences and expectations diverged from those of the mainstream. Moreover, most of the "small and oppressed" literatures emerged from within the Western tradition and were able to build on inherited techniques and modes of expression whilst drawing on the particularity of their own experience. In China, the appropriation by selection and adaptation of an alien tradition and the conscious denial of the native tradition in the quest for a means of expression of national identity is obviously problematic.

C.T. Hsia has described this self-consciousness in terms of an "obsession with China".²¹ A dominant preoccupation with national crisis and national destiny and the conviction that literature and art can and should play a role in alleviating crisis and shaping destiny prevented Chinese literature from transcending its "patriotic provinciality".²² Realism provided an effective tool for the modern Chinese writer to lay bare the ailing and corrupt state of his country but, Hsia argues, he failed to equate this on a broader plane with the condition of man in the modern world, presenting the condition of China as a purely Chinese phenomenon.

This raises the question whether literature which responds to the requirements of a local or "national" audience might be deemed a successful national literature even if it lacks recognition and status on the world stage. Because of their persistent quest for literary solutions to what was at once both an artistic and a socio-political dilemma, May Fourth Chinese writers possibly doomed their project to failure by insisting on the achievement of a national literature by means of universal recognition, while focussing ever more intensively on the national crisis.

Attempts at defining a national literature turn on the divergence of expectations in the local or national arena and the wider international arena. Whereas Hsia addresses this problem from within, Jameson, writing 14 years later, writes from without but comes to similar conclusions. Jameson argues that there is a mechanism at work in the process of writing from within a minority culture which militates against universal affirmation; he identifies it as autoreferentiality. This takes the form of social or national allegory where the story of private individual destiny is an allegory of the public situation of society or culture engendered by circumstances of cultural revolution. Indeed, he identifies this conscious and overt intertwining of individual private destiny and the public sphere as the main point of divergence between expectations of literature without and within the literary mainstream.²³ In the West "[w]e have been trained in a deep cultural conviction that the lived experience of our private existences is somehow incommensurable with the abstractions of economic science and political dynamics."²⁴

Jameson cites the pioneer Chinese writer Lu Xun, and in particular his "Diary of a Madman", the first modern Chinese story in the vernacular, published in 1918. This describes an individual's paranoid delusions about the cannibalism practised by all those around him, but also has allegorical resonance which surpasses the personal destiny of the protagonist, presenting a nightmare vision of Chinese history where the cannibalism the madman envisions is attributed to Chinese society as a whole.

This story is generally recognized as a distinguished example of national literature. It successfully draws on Western models. The title itself is an overt acknowledgement of the debt to Gogol's story of similar title with which it shares the basic diary form, general satirical tone and tragi-comic obsession with the grotesque, but there is no symbolism in the Gogol story and satire remains unfocussed. As Patrick Hanan has suggested, much clearer parallels can be drawn with Andreev's symbolic story *The Red Laugh*, a story about the horrors of war in the form of a fragmented diary which presents the speaker's attempts to retain his sanity in a world which has come to accept war and killing as natural.²⁵ Lu Xun's offers a sophisticated development of these two models, particularly in terms of structure. In *The Red Laugh* an individual fights to remain sane while the mass of men have gone mad and his perceptions are indeed to be taken as sane. In Lu Xun's "Diary" the insights of a madman are to be taken symbolically as the truth even as the nightmarish vision is ironically annulled before it is recounted by reassurances from the madman's brother, providing a second narrative voice, that the madman recovered some time ago and has taken up an official post elsewhere. Thus Lu Xun reworks the opaque symbolism of Andreev²⁶ into clearly referential allegory, the full import of which requires the presence of the second narrator. It is arguable that a story such as this escapes the charge of derivativeness by the

sophistication with which the original sources are reworked to produce a new work which is able to stand independently of its models. At the same time, however, its intensely Chinese character denies it universal resonance, despite its use of the common conceit of the madman speaking the truth.

Occurrences of national allegory are so widespread in May Fourth literature that the impression is given of an overriding sense of mission. An obsession with identity, a heightened situational consciousness are perhaps to be expected at a time of nation-building and cultural reconstruction. However, this dominant, nation-oriented critical discourse, being instrumental in the creation of a new literary canon, marginalizes literary expression at odds with itself or forces interpretations to accord with itself. Western scholarship often perpetuates the myths of the dominant discourse²⁷, thus students of modern Chinese literature are familiar with national allegory as a feature of 20th century Chinese creative expression. Both Fredric Jameson and Benedict Anderson are persuasive in identifying it as a trait of minority cultural expression in general. In his examination of nationalism in terms of imagined communities, Anderson stresses the fundamental importance of the mechanism of social allegory to the growth of national consciousness.²⁸ Reference is made to individual members of that community or events of significance to it such that the whole of the imagined community, of which the reader is a part, is conjured up and reaffirmed. Yet both critics only engage with the dominant critical discourse of the minority culture, which they uphold in their own. This, it is assumed, offers a single, authentic concept of national identity. Alternative narratives of the self which subvert this are displaced.

An example often cited to show the all-pervasive nature of the "obsession with China" is Yu Dafu's "Sinking". This story recounts ironically the personal humiliation of an introspective young Chinese student living in Japan, the detached stance of the narrative serving to show the absurdity of the protagonist's self-indulgent and sentimental view of himself.²⁹ In portraying his relationships with the ordinary Japanese people amongst whom he lives, with his fellow students, with women and so on, the narrative view of his behaviour constantly undermines the protagonist's own interpretation of events. At the end of the story, as he contemplates suicide on the beach, the protagonist equates his personal humiliation with the national humiliation of China:

Oh China, my China, you are the cause of my death! ... I wish you could become rich and strong soon! Many, many of your children are still suffering.³⁰

The reader is unprepared for this unexpected and forced allegorization of the personal. Throughout the story the protagonist's view of himself as a victim of Japanese prejudice against the Chinese is shown to be suspect. All the Japanese people with whom he comes into contact actually treat him kindly. Yet the common assessment of this final episode is that the otherwise

objective narrative slips awkwardly into sentimentality at this point.³¹ It appears that once the solemn issue of national destiny is broached, it cannot be contained within the ironic distance of the narrative. For the first time in the story the protagonist appears to be alluding to a truth that the narrative cannot undermine, namely the plight of China.

The ending of this story can be resolved in two ways, both of which subvert the dominant discourse. The narrative logic of the story demands that the protagonist's perceptions be regarded as unreliable, and therefore the plight of China is ironically re-evaluated in a positive light. The ironic frame of the re-evaluation collapses positive notions of national identity into parody. At the same time, what he is actually saying is that the state of China has brought about his suicidal condition. By taking the intertwining of private and public destiny to its negative extreme, the protagonist's suicide parodies it; and with the action itself being the result of paranoid delusion in the first place, the subversion of the dominant discourse is completed.

Alternative narratives of the self do not have to be gendered but they often are. Lydia H. Liu indicates how the standard critical assessment of the female novelist Xiao Hong marginalized her because of her ambivalent relationship with nationalism.³² Liu shows how, in her novel *Field of Life and Death*, Xiao Hong offers an alternative narrative of the female peasant self which subverts the nationalist discourse ostensibly endorsed by the novel and which dominant critical practice inevitably privileged:

Nationalism comes across as a profoundly patriarchal ideology that grants subject positions to men who fight over territory, possession and the right to dominate.³³

Anderson's analysis suggests that the growth of national consciousness contains a dual process of affirmation, both external and internal. In the case of China the former is rendered problematic by the mechanisms of the latter, whereby the dominant critical discourse creates its canon. It was not the case that Chinese creative writing did not explore the domain of private destiny and privilege the libidinal over the political, but the monolithic enterprise, to create a national literature, subsumed the pursuit of the personal, either marginalizing it or seizing on any perceived resonance of the national allegory and appropriating it. The ideological control of literary production simply intensified the process.

In terms of the master-slave relationship, internal recognition, however problematically derived, might be likened to the slave's attainment of a level of self-conscious awareness through his labour. This coming to awareness of his position as slave breaks the relationship which, in Hegelian terms, must proceed to a higher level of *Geist* or spirit. The more autoreferential a minority literature becomes, the less universal affirmation it requires. A different type of recognition is sought which is derived internally, within the imagined community by the establishment of an

alternative set of artistic criteria. Traditional Chinese literature once offered such a framework in what Anderson might call its "unselfconscious coherence".³⁴

Mao's "Talks at the Yan'an Conference on Literature and Art" provide a further example. In this document, which laid down principles later to be adopted as national literary policy, the life of the people was identified as the inspiration for all art. The responsibilities of the writer were defined not only as being to produce works which were welcomed by the masses but to learn from them and be guided by their incipient forms of literature and art. The main concern of the Yan'an conference was to define the relationship between work in literature and art and revolutionary work.³⁵ By firmly subordinating artistic criteria to political criteria,³⁶ it laid down the conditions for the persistence of the autoreferential paradigm.

During the extremes of the Cultural Revolution the story of private individual destiny was subsumed by the public sphere. The heroes of the model operas, for example, have no inner conflicts or personal ambitions. Their private aspirations are at one with the public sphere. When literature and art become the embodiment of political discourse no place is allowed for personal expression. Collective sentiment and public aspirations become the only permissible content - there is only allegory. Under these circumstances the pursuit of a private subjectivity is not only rendered subversive but it gains an allegorical resonance of its own. The poet Bei Dao's well-known personal railings against a repressive state which became a voice of the movement for change remain representative:

I don't believe the sky is blue;
I don't believe in thunder's echoes;
I don't believe that dreams are false;
I don't believe that death has no revenge.³⁷

Disengagement from the public sphere remains a political act by its eschewing of engagement until engagement is no longer expected.

The difficulty with the Hegelian analogy is that Western cultural consciousness does not require the recognition of the minority literature to affirm its pre-eminence. The need for recognition is unidirectional and the more autoreferential you are, the less universal appeal you have. This quest for legitimation of itself also reinforces the subordinate position of the minority literature. The lifting of the ideological yoke during the 1980s in China provided some cause for optimism as writers began to engage with the current methodological preoccupations of the critical mainstream. At the same time their writing was shaped by their experiences of the previous decades which were both intensely personal and singularly Chinese. The positive international reception of certain dissident writers such as Bei Dao during the 1980s might be construed as a realization of the aims of the May Fourth generation of literary nationalists. To do so would enable the

conclusion that it is, after all, necessary to be disengaged from the public sphere in order to be "nationalist". However, this line of argument ignores forces within the mainstream which brought these writers temporarily to world attention, forcing them into an external construction of the same national allegory.

If integration is deemed desirable, and the quest remains self-affirming, it requires the questioning of the assumptions underlying the conjoining of nation-building with literary practice. However much the dominant critical discourse within the minority culture might be fractured and projections of private subjectivity accorded their own validity, the analogy of enslavement inheres until the dominant discourse of the mainstream is allowed to set the agenda for minority culture.

Notes

- 1 Fredric Jameson, "Third world literature in the era of multinational capitalism", *Social Text*, 15, Fall 1986, p.85. Jameson's interpretation of Hegel is a little idiosyncratic, notably with reference to the vanquishing of the slave. What follows is a standard recapitulation of Hegel's analysis, see Charles Taylor, *Hegel*, Cambridge University Press, 1977, pp. 153-157.
- 2 For Jameson, the slave is an "heroic coward" who "gives in, in order to continue life"; *ibid.*
- 3 *ibid.*
- 4 Named after a spontaneous demonstration of nationalist sentiment in Beijing on 4 May 1919 to protest against the Chinese government's acceptance of the terms of the Versailles treaty after the First World War which assigned former German territorial concessions in China to Japan. The gathering momentum of the series of protests which followed became a rising tide of social ferment and intellectual revolution which rapidly became known as the May Fourth movement. For a thorough examination of the May Fourth phenomenon see Chow Tse-tung, *The May Fourth Movement: Intellectual Revolution in Modern China*, Stanford University Press, 1960.
- 5 For further detail on literary societies see e.g. Bonnie S. McDougall, *The Introduction of Western Literary Theories into Modern China 1919-1925*, Tokyo: Center for East Asian Cultural Studies, 1971, ch. 1.
- 6 "Gaiqe xuanyan", *Xiaoshuo yuebao* (Fiction Monthly), 1921, 12.1, p. 3.
- 7 "Xiandai Ouzhou wenyi shi tan", *Xin Qingnian* (New Youth), 1.3, 1.4, November and December 1915.
- 8 See Bonnie S. McDougall, *op. cit.*, pp. 147-148.
- 9 "Gaiqe xuanyan", p. 3.
- 10 Zhou Zuoren, "Ren de wenxue", *New Youth*, 5.6, December 1918.
- 11 Mao Dun, "Chuangzuo de qiantu" (The way forward for creative writing), *Fiction Monthly*, 1921, 12.7, p. 45.

- 12 Mao Dun, "Women xianzai keyi tichang biaoxiangzhuyi de wenxue me?" (Should we promote symbolistic literature now?) *Fiction Monthly*, 1920, 11.2, p. 6.
- 13 For specialised studies on the translation and dissemination of this literature into China see e.g. Irene Eber, *Voices from Afar: Modern Chinese Writers on Oppressed Peoples and Their Literature*, Michigan Papers in Chinese Studies, 38, 1980, or Hilary Chung, "Mao Dun and the Literature of Small Nations and Oppressed Peoples", MA thesis, University of Durham, 1986.
- 14 Some more experienced critics, e.g. Mao Dun, sought to guard against this. See Chung, *op. cit.*, p. 85.
- 15 See Irene Eber, *Voices from Afar*, p. 45.
- 16 Further detail in Eber, *ibid.* and Chung, *op. cit.* See also Irene Eber, "Poland and Polish author in modern Chinese literature and translation", *Monumenta Serica*, 1974-5, Vol. 31, pp. 407-445.
- 17 Eber, *Voices from Afar*, p. 17.
- 18 *Ershi nian lai de Bolan wenxue* (The last twenty years of Polish literature), *Fiction Monthly*, 1929, 20.7, p. 1097. *English supplied in original.
- 19 Fredric Jameson, *op. cit.*, p. 85.
- 20 For further discussion see the introductory chapter of Hilary Chung, *The Portrayal of Women in Mao Dun's Early Fiction 1927-1932*, Ph.D thesis, University of Durham, 1992.
- 21 C.T. Hsia, *A History of Modern Chinese Literature*, Yale University Press, 1971, Appendix 1, "Obsession with China: The moral burden of modern Chinese literature", pp. 533-554.
- 22 *ibid.*, p. 536.
- 23 *op. cit.*, pp. 69, 76.
- 24 *ibid.*, p. 69.
- 25 Patrick Hanan, "The technique of Lu Hsun's fiction," *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, Vol. 34, 1974, pp. 66-68.
- 26 "The red laugh issues from the earth when the earth itself goes mad, infecting people who participate in war or who are contaminated by it in any way ..." *ibid.*, p. 66.
- 27 For a discussion of this with regard to the representation of women see the introductory chapter of Hilary Chung, *op. cit.*
- 28 Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, chapter 2.
- 29 See Michael Egan, "Yu Dafu and the transition to modern Chinese literature" in Merle Goldman (ed.), *Modern Chinese Literature in the May Fourth Era*, Harvard University Press, 1977, p. 312.
- 30 Yu Dafu, "Sinking", Joseph S.M. Lau and C.T. Hsia (tr.), in Joseph S.M. Lau et al. (eds.), *Modern Chinese Stories and Novellas 1919-1949*, Columbia University Press, 1981, p. 141.
- 31 Michael Egan, *op. cit.*
- 32 Lydia H. Liu, "The female body and nationalist discourse: Manchuria in Xiao Hong's *Field of Life and Death*" in Angel Zito and Tani E. Barlow (eds.), *Body, Subject and Power in China*, University of Chicago Press, 1994, pp. 157-177.

33 *ibid.*, p.174.

34 *ibid.*

35 Bonnie S. McDougall, *Mao Zedong's "Talks at the Yan'an Conference on Literature and Art": A Translation of the 1943 Text with Commentary*, University of Michigan, 1980, p. 57.

36 *ibid.*, p.78.

37 From "The answer" in Bei Dao, *The August Sleepwalker*, trans. by Bonnie S. McDougall, London: Anvil Press, 1988, p. 33.

Nation and locality in the writing of Zhou Zuoren

Susan Daruvala

Chinese literature this century has been virtually inextricable from the project of nation-building, in other words, the construction in discourse of an imagined or desired ideal vision of the nation. Although writers over the last decade have turned their backs on an explicit concern with the nation, cultural anxieties, as displayed in the TV series *Heshang*, run deep and are of course inseparable from questions of national identity.

The Chinese discourse on the nation had its origins in the late Qing with Yan Fu's discovery of the people as the raw material of nationhood.¹ As W.K Cheng has argued, this discovery was predicated on a refusal to believe in the continued viability of the Chinese tradition in solving China's problems. One result of the turn to the people was the reformers' promotion of the idea of a new fiction which would inculcate in the people the requisite qualities and knowledge for modern citizenship. The dominant discourse of the May Fourth New Culture movement built on and enlarged this project, making explicit the inferiority of Chinese civilization, which it rejected with harsh iconoclasm. At the same time it made enlightenment the precondition for national salvation and linked both to the demand for a literary revolution.

The paradigmatic May Fourth intellectual is, of course, Lu Xun, whose fiction and prose brilliantly expressed anger and despair at China's condition. Lu Xun depicted Chinese culture as a cannibal banquet and the Chinese as a nation of Ah Qs devoid of self-knowledge, but bravely implicated himself in his castigations. Lu Xun's Nietzschean insistence on "self-overcoming" gave him his moral authority. In the end, he saw it as his duty to support the possibility for change represented by social revolution and the Soviet Union, winning Mao's accolade as modern China's greatest revolutionary intellectual.² In this respect too Lu Xun was paradigmatic, for the logical outcome of the discourse on the nation was to choose whichever

force would be most capable of imposing a "self-overcoming" on the people, thus enabling the new China to be constituted and a new Chinese subjectivity, totally unlike that of Ah Q, to come into being.

The strength of this dominant discourse does not signify the complete absence of attempts to articulate alternatives. Zhou Zuoren, who was Lu Xun's younger brother, arrived at a construction of the nation radically at odds with the one I have just described. One unfortunate biographical fact about Zhou has always confounded assessments of him, and that is that he collaborated with the Japanese occupiers of Peking from 1939, eventually serving in Wang Jingwei's puppet government. There is not the time to go into the issue very thoroughly. I do not believe that collaboration represented the logical outcome of Zhou's thinking. Zhou never hid his admiration for many aspects of Japanese culture, particularly those that could be identified with Tang and pre-Tang China. He held that Chinese and Japanese literature and art had, in their separate ways, drawn on a shared Confucian-Buddhist heritage. This heritage he posited against the Neo-Confucian Cheng-Zhu orthodoxy which, in his view, had blighted Chinese intellectual and cultural life in later centuries. Zhou's writing, however, never served Japanese imperial ambitions, and in fact during the occupation his attempt to construct a Confucian identity which could not be co-opted led to his being publicly attacked by the Japanese authorities.³ If his collaboration does point to one thing, it is perhaps his resistance to the demands of a modern national identity.

Lu Xun and Zhou Zuoren had both studied in Japan and were both working at National Beijing University at the time of the May Fourth movement. Zhou never wrote fiction, but he contributed theoretical articles about the direction literature should take. He shared the general perception that China was sick and in need of some fundamental changes, and he was one of the first to begin publishing translations in vernacular Chinese. His starting point however differed significantly from that of Chen Duxiu or Hu Shi. Rather than being preoccupied with the intrinsic inferiority of Chinese culture which was supposedly reflected in the literary language, *guwen*, he thought writing in the vernacular was important as a way of bringing in new ideas, particularly as the favoured Tongcheng style of *guwen* in use at that time was very ideological.⁴ On the other hand, Zhou did share the idea that people could be shaped by literature and his prescription was for a Literature of Man that would promote humanistic values.⁵ At the time he was deeply influenced by the Tolstoy-inspired utopian-socialist New Village movement in Japan.⁶ However, the didacticism of this stance conflicted with that of respect for the individual and led Zhou to an intellectual crisis.

In 1921 Zhou concluded that it was impossible to synthesize all the different ideas he found attractive into an all-inclusive programme. There was no one formula or 'ism' that would be the solution to everything.⁷ At around the same time he wrote an article promoting the essay form. "There

are many thoughts which, since they cannot be turned into fiction and are not easy to put into poetry, can be put into the essay form," he wrote. The only thing a writer needed, was "genuine simplicity and clarity".⁸ With these two ideas he was moving away from the May Fourth dominant discourse, rejecting the search for one way that would save China and choosing a different literary form from the realist short story or the emotion-laden romantic poem.

In 1922 Zhou started his own weekly column in a newspaper under the title "In My Own Garden". From then on, he announced, his garden was literature and he was going to grow what he liked in it, regardless of whether or not it benefited anyone else. He was not going to put literature in the service of any cause but preferred to write only about what interested him.⁹ This Zhou proceeded to do, drawing on his wide-ranging interests in ancient Greece, Japanese culture, mythology, anthropology and writers like Havelock Ellis. He did not withdraw from current debates. His essays laid the groundwork for his reputation as an outspoken critic and supporter of individual rights, including the rights of women and children.

Through the 1920s and 1930s Zhou consolidated his position as one of the foremost essayists of his time. He claimed to orient himself by values which he put into the context of a broadminded Confucianism quite remote from traditional orthodoxy. In fact Zhou drew a lot on the late Ming Neo-Confucian counter-tradition associated with thinkers like Li Zhi (1527-1602) and Jiao Hong (1540-1620) which stressed that the individual had an innate capacity for making moral judgements and need not depend on received opinion to know what was right and wrong.¹⁰

An important event which throws some light on Zhou's mode of thinking was his opposition to the nation-wide anti-religion movement which sprang up in 1922 after the World Students' Christian Federation announced plans to hold a conference in Peking. Many public figures and intellectuals came out in support of the anti-religionists' manifesto, which swore to eradicate the "poison of religion" from human society. To Zhou the manifesto sounded just like a traditional imperial decree condemning heterodoxy. He publicly opposed the movement and advocated complete freedom of religious belief within the limits of the constitution, and he was severely attacked for this. Prophetically Zhou warned that even if the interference with religious belief had taken place only on paper, in days to come "thought would be banned".¹¹ This incident was one of many which reinforced his belief that the 20th century was not qualitatively different from earlier times.¹² He was tireless in pointing to the similarities between the new orthodox discourse on the nation and the supposedly discredited Cheng-Zhu Neo-Confucian one.

Zhou arrived at his alternative construction of the nation in three more or less related ways. First, by drawing on and promoting certain

traditional aesthetic categories which valorized the individual; secondly by making the locality, not the nation, the salient part of a writer's self-representation; and thirdly by formulating a literary history in which periods of openness and individualism are equated with cultural confidence and periods of strong central control over art and ideology are seen as disastrous for creativity.

Zhou's uses of the multivalent aesthetic term *quwei*, which suggests flavour, piquancy or interest, and *bense*, literally the "true colours" or inherent qualities of a writer which show in the writer's work, are crucial to his attempt to distance literature from the domain of the state. In invoking them Zhou was also drawing on a debate over the relationship of the artist to tradition which went back at least to the Song and which continued into the Qing.¹³ It did not require a very great shift in the frame of reference to be able to draw conclusions from them about the relationship of the individual to the state. *Quwei* referred originally to the intangible something that remains with a reader after the words of a poem have been left behind. It shares in Buddhist and Daoist ideas that words can only express part of reality. However, it also depends on the image that sparks the insight in the writer in the first place and the skill of the writer in getting both the image and insight across in words.

With time, as poetry came to be seen as a repository of cultural models, the emphasis slipped away from the individual writer's personal insight and meaning, to which the reader responded, to studying the poetry of the past and emulating it as a way of self-improvement. With the late Ming counter-tradition I referred to earlier the sphere of *quwei*, flavour, was widened again away from texts and into the material world. *Quwei* came to mean "the ineffable essence at the heart of things" in keeping with the philosophical position that the Way existed everywhere in ordinary life and was to be found in what was called "the daily uses of the people".¹⁴ These included food, drink and human relationships. In other words, human society and material culture became capable of triggering insight. As Chaves notes, another point to be made about *quwei* or flavour is that, like many Chinese aesthetic terms, it operates on two levels, referring to a quality in the external world and to the same quality in the mind of the perceiver. A writer had "flavour" to the extent that he could perceive "flavour".

For Zhou the locus of *quwei* was the locality, and the writer was worthy of respect to the extent that he was able to perceive and manifest the intrinsic value of human life and its "daily uses". In his writing, local customs and material culture are often vividly evoked and highly valued. One of Zhou's most famous lyrical essays is about the sweetmeats available in his hometown.¹⁵ Another was about customs marking the different seasons, which Zhou claimed were interesting because they "make up the tiny changes in our ordinary lives", and that in fact the history of peoples was just "the succession of daily human activities".¹⁶ What Zhou called

"daily human activities" is synonymous with the "daily uses of the people". So he was giving the artefacts and customs of everyday life a significance which went beyond their material use or their ideological value.

Another aesthetic concept which was very important in Zhou's work was *bense*, which can be translated as "native hue" or "true colours" and refers to the authentic, inherent quality of the writer which shows in the writer's work.¹⁷ Particularly since the Ming it was related to the idea of independence of style or viewpoint, which was manifested in simplicity of language.¹⁸ Everybody had, at least potentially, his own "imperishable native hue". In the 17th century it became closely linked to the notion of self-attainment, which referred to the ideas one had attained for oneself.¹⁹ It depended on perception, but this type of perception was not as diffuse or passive and intuitive as "flavour". *Bense* refers more to intellectual perception and use of language. It depends on a critical attitude, an active use of judgement in how we read and write. As Zhou discussed it, this extended to never being tied down by one school of thinking or tradition.

What is crucial about this concept is that everybody's attainment is different, and this makes diversity of thought inevitable and desirable. In this sense *bense* becomes a peculiarly democratic concept. Because it is related to ideas of critical judgement and attainment, Zhou's concept of *bense* serves to arm the writer against the demands of the nation-building project. The practice of simplicity and clarity of language becomes a method of maintaining one's integrity and intellectual alertness.

If the locality is the space in which *quwei* can operate, what is the relationship between the writer and the locality? Zhou assumed that writers, like everybody else, are shaped in some way by their environment. The word he uses for environment in this context, *fengtu*, includes the idea of both social customs and natural geographical conditions. Zhou further assumed that this relationship between a writer and his environment will manifest itself in literature, both at the national and the sub-national levels, and that this accounted for regional variations in literature. He invoked the idea of *fengtu* in ways which were sometimes quite abstract, for instance by referring to intellectual styles and aesthetic traditions as characteristic of a place.²⁰

At other times he provided a much more concrete list of requirements: an author writing about his hometown should have included more about his dreams, the colour of the lake and the noise of the markets, he once commented.²¹ With dreams we enter the subconscious life of a community, including its myths, while the lake and the noise of the markets suggest both the natural and social world. The most celebrated writer whose work reflects Zhou's prescriptions is undoubtedly Shen Congwen, whose mentor Zhou was.

In a major article written in the early 1920s Zhou complained that Chinese literature as it was developing then was unsatisfactory because it was "too abstract, worked to a prescribed concept and did not express the writer's individuality". The remedy was to "get rid of these self-imposed shackles and freely express the individuality which has grown from the soil".²² Although Zhou relates the writer's individuality to the soil, to place, he took pains to ensure that the individual should in no way be subordinate to a collectivist local identity. He stressed that creativity depended on the individual being able to "sing out the emotions and write whatever he pleased in whatever mode". Locality was not be something static which constrained the individual but rather something supporting individuality.

Zhou made it clear that he was not referring to locality in provincial terms or political terms, and he didn't just mean writing that described local life. Neither did he mean that one could only write about one's place of origin. *Fengtu* was not meant to stand for what the cultural conservatives called "national essence", which included traditional beliefs and practices they felt should be sacrosanct. Zhou denied that there was any national essence that could be quantified or preserved or got rid of. The living part of the national essence that no one had to worry about doing anything about because it was just there was the "flavour" or *quwei*, expressed in everyone's speech and actions which bore the imprint of local culture and environment.

Under these circumstances the locality could not function as the place for discovering some emanation of the folk or of a particular class. It became what mediated the writer and the nation and served to connect them in a meaningful way. Genuine literature could be produced only by writing as someone connected to a place, not by relying on the empty, doctrinaire dreams centred on the nation. Thus locality becomes, in effect, a buffer both for the writer and literature against the nation-state's demands that literature should serve its interests. At the same time the local identity changes the individual's relation to the state. The individual is not conceptualized as a monad bereft of all other ties and now ready to be inscribed with meanings by the state.

Locality served Zhou not only as a source of inspiration but as a repository of intellectual and cultural resources. The conviction that he had been shaped by and was rooted in a specific cultural tradition played an important part in his self-representation and led him to focus much of his research on his own east Zhejiang area. He quoted extensively from the writings of Qing literati in his own work. In his thinking the intellectual seems to be embedded in the locality rather than becoming the alienated outsider of much May Fourth writing (for example Lu Xun), for whom the locality marks the rupture between past and present. Here I think Zhou may have owed something to the view of the people in history of the anti-Manchu revolutionary Zhang Binglin. For Zhang the people embodied a national past which could come into full cultural flower once the Manchus were removed,

and this past was to be apprehended in the localities through the study of customs and institutions.²³ Intellectual and common people were both contained in the locality. By contrast, for those for whom tradition had failed the localities contained nothing of interest, for the nation could only come into being when the people realized their modernity through the outside agency of either state or intellectuals. I am not suggesting that Zhou shared Zhang's view of the people, but that he shared the conviction that Chinese civilization was still viable.

As to the relationship between the locality and the nation, the locality was articulated within the wider area of China, not in opposition to it. Rather than seeing Chinese identity as formed into a homogenous whole at the national level out of lots of disparate pieces, like the patches on a patchwork quilt, Zhou saw it as the irreducible shared minimum, a "plain background" against which the localities produce infinite variation and difference.²⁴ The irreducible minimum boiled down to two things: intersubjective relationships - that is, the ways people in the localities related to each other in the cultural and environmental matrix of *fengtu*, and also, language. The living part of the language (which he also identified with a heritage of "flavour" or *quwei*) included linguistic features such as the visual aspects of the written characters and the tone system, or the freight of associations which went with words and images.

These features served as a shared resource for users of the language and in themselves were beyond good and bad. For example, the tone system and visual aspects of the characters were exploited in the eight-legged essay, universally condemned this century for epitomizing a cultural habit of substituting word-play for creative thinking. As Zhou pointed out, however, the same features of the language could also be found in folk riddles, opera and in elite poetry.²⁵ It was not those features themselves which were bad but the uses to which they were put. These uses, in the modern age, ought to depend on the individual. This brings us again to the concept of *bense*. Having represented language also as beyond good and bad and so beyond the reach of language reformers, Zhou welcomed foreign influence on Chinese. The key question was not whether an idea or a style was Chinese or foreign but whether its use involved imitation or influence. Imitation of anyone, ancient or modern, Chinese or foreign, was slavery, but influence was beneficial.

Zhou's view of Chinese literary history undergirded his aesthetic choices. He rejected the May Fourth idea that Chinese literature had been moving gradually towards the use of the vernacular but this movement had always been suppressed by reactionary feudal tradition. For Zhou there was no historical, linear progression towards the use of the vernacular but a very complex, organic relationship between elite and popular uses of both the literary language and the vernacular.²⁶

Zhou saw literature as historically oscillating between two poles: didacticism and individual expressionism. When the pendulum swung to didacticism, literature became hypocritical and boring. When it swung the other way, the premium was on the writer being able to express not just "feelings" but the thrust of his being, to the benefit of culture.²⁷ Zhou correlated didacticism with times when the imperial government had been strong and able to push orthodoxy, and individual expressionism with times when the government had been weak.²⁸ A high point in Chinese cultural history, according to him, had been in the Wei-Jin period (220-419) which was a time of political chaos but also of the massive influx of Buddhism. He hoped that Western knowledge would prove similarly stimulating.²⁹

In the cycle between didacticism and self-expression Zhou identified two great didactic "moments". One occurred in the 8th century, towards the end of the Tang dynasty when Han Yu and likeminded thinkers undertook to redefine Chinese cultural identity in exclusivist terms and advocated the creation of a powerful, new, didactic literary style.³⁰ Zhou's criticism of Han Yu was aimed among other things at the notion that there is a homogeneous definition of what it means to be Chinese. The second "moment" occurred in the 18th and 19th centuries with the emergence of the Tongcheng literary school. Tongcheng theorists wanted to combine philosophical orthodoxy and literary style in all writing, the goal being to ensure that whatever the content of a work, the ideas and feelings a writer expressed in it would not go against Confucian and Neo-Confucian principles. In other words, the medium would become the message. These ideas were given a new lease of life in the 19th century when various reformers followed the Tongcheng School style in their translations introducing Western science and thinking.

In Zhou's view, the May Fourth movement itself had inherited the super-didacticism of the Tongcheng school through Chen Duxiu and Hu Shi and this contradicted the demand for individual expression which was also made during the May Fourth.³¹ Clearly, with this assertion Zhou was criticizing the nation-building project in modern Chinese literature. To sum up, the ideal vision of China which emerges from his writing depends on the diversity of individuals and localities and is not threatened by outside influences but welcomes them. Moreover, Zhou's literary practice, through his aesthetics, fostered the construction of a space free from dogma.

Over the last decade Zhou's work has been re-examined in China and is now seen as important for its position on human sexuality and individual freedom.³² However, for both Chinese and Western scholars, it still seems impossible to fit him into the narrative of modern Chinese history except as an anachronism and a failure. Even if we agree that the construction of national identity involves negotiation between many competing visions and narratives of the nation, Zhou's attitude to the nation-state undercuts the attempt to picture his as an alternative nationalism.

I have suggested that the nation-building project started from the premise of Chinese inferiority to the West. This perception of inferiority was undoubtedly responsible for the intensity of the rejection of tradition, the totalistic iconoclasm, of the May Fourth. In the narratives of modern Chinese history most familiar to us, as in most of the social science literature on nation-building, these inherently problematical beginnings and their consequences are glossed over and subordinated to the ultimate goal of a strong, united, modern China. Recently however, Liah Greenfeld has asserted that feelings of inferiority and status anxiety among elites are the catalysts of nationalism and further that nationalism is constitutive of modernity.³³

On these grounds, Chinese nationalism would seem to be right on course. Greenfeld's arguments implicating modernity are certainly an advance over previous accounts which blamed the irrational, pathological face of nationalism on unenlightened remnants of a pre-modern cultural era surviving into the present. But she is not forced to reject nationalism or modernity as ultimate goods because she manages to separate a benign, Anglo-Saxon civic nationalism from the pernicious European versions. Also, because it is sociological, her account does not take colonialism or imperialism into account. Consequently it does not address the relations of power involved in the spread of the concept of the nation-state which discourse theorists like Edward Said and Partha Chatterjee have made commonplace.³⁴ We are all familiar with the idea that the construction of national identity is doubly problematic in the non-West because of the burden of orientalist frameworks of knowledge.

I would argue, however, that we cannot account for the work of Zhou Zuoren even in this framework, for discourse theory accepts as the bottom line that other civilizations were unable to compete with the superior cultural vitality of the modern West. What made Zhou Zuoren such an unusual and seminal thinker is that he did not accept the premise of Chinese civilizational inferiority and throw the baby out with the bathwater. Instead he demonstrated that Chinese culture did have the resources to critique itself. Not only that, he showed it had the philosophical resources for dealing with the modern condition. Perhaps most importantly, he maintained a view of the individual as a moral agent against modernity's propensity to negate and foreclose all other philosophical options and to see moral consequences as secondary to rational ones.

My reading of Zhou has been enabled by the insight of the Indian scholar Ashis Nandy, that all civilizations possess the resources for self-criticism and for producing alternative visions of themselves. Despite modernity's tremendous capacity to displace other civilizations, this displacement has not been complete or irrevocable. Nor, of course, does modernity represent the sum total of Western civilization.³⁵

For Chinese cultural criticism today the problem is still seen as how to synthesize Chinese and Western culture, how to transform Chinese culture creatively by understanding it and sorting out the good from the bad.³⁶ However, this scenario is still built on the premise of inferiority and needs some watch-dog mechanism to do the sorting. Zhou's assertion that the enduring parts of civilization are beyond good and bad shifts the exercise of judgement about what is acceptable away from pre-assigned categories to concrete instances and thus valorizes the individual, not as a building block for a nation but as a moral being. It seems clear to me that Zhou's example opens up many fruitful ways of looking at the issue of nation and nationality both in China and in the modern world.

Notes

- 1 Cheng Wah-kwan, "Vox Populi: Language, Literature and Ideology in Modern China", Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1989, pp. 69-100.
- 2 Leo Ou-fan Lee, *Voices from the Iron House: A Study of Lu Xun*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987, pp. 151-172.
- 3 Edward M. Gunn, *Unwelcome Muse: Chinese Literature in Shanghai and Peking 1937-1945*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1980, pp. 151-171.
- 4 Zhou Zuoren, "Cai Juemin: er" (Cai Juemin [Yuanpei]: two), *Zhitang huixianglu* (Zhitang's Memoirs), Hong Kong: San Yu Stationery and Publishing Co., 1970, 1:332-335.
- 5 Zhou Zuoren, "Ren de wenxue" (A literature of man), *Yishu yu shenghuo* in *Zhou Zuoren Quanji* (Complete Works), 5 vols., Taipei: Landeng wenhua chuban shiye fuwu youxian gongsi, 1982, 3:564-571.
- 6 Cheng Ch'ing-mao, "Zhou Zuoren di Riben jingyan" (Zhou Zuoren's Japanese Experience), in *Zhongyang yanjiu yuan di'erjie guoji hanxue huiyi lunwen ji* (Proceedings of the Second International Conference on Sinology, Taipei, 29-31 December, 1986), by the Academia Sinica, Taipei: Zhongyang yanjiu yuan, 1989, pp. 878-884.
- 7 Zhou Zuoren, "Shan zhong za xin" (Miscellaneous letters from the mountains), *Yu tian di shu* (The Rainy Day Book), *Zhou Zuoren Quanji*, 2:348.
- 8 Zhou Zuoren, "Meiwen" (Belles-Lettres), *Tan hu ji* (Talking of Tigers), *Zhou Zuoren Quanji*, 1:201.
- 9 Zhou Zuoren, "Ziji de yuandi" (In my own garden), *Zhou Zuoren Quanji*, 2:5-6.
- 10 Susan Daruvala, "Zhou Zuoren (1885-1967) and an Alternative Chinese Response to Modernity", Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1993, pp. 164-243.
- 11 Shu Wu, "Ziwo, kuanrong, youhuan: liangtiao lu" (Self, tolerance, suffering: Two roads), *Dushu*, 1989, 3:65-73.
- 12 Zhou Zuoren, "Bihu dushu lun" (Reading behind closed doors), *Yongri ji* (Everlasting Days Collection), *Zhou Zuoren Quanji*, 1:524.
- 13 Richard John Lynn, "Orthodoxy and enlightenment: Wang Shih-chen's theory of poetry and its antecedents", in Wm Theodore de Bary et al. (eds), *The Unfolding of Neo-Confucianism*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1975, p. 219.
- 14 Jonathan Chaves, "The panoply of images: A reconsideration of the literary theories of the Kung-an school", in Susan Bush and Christian Murck (eds), *Theories of the Arts in China*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983, p. 345; Edward Ch'ien, *Chiao Hung and the Restructuring of Neo-Confucianism in the Late Ming*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1986, p. 77.
- 15 Zhou Zuoren, "Mai tang" (Selling sweets), *Yao wei ji* (Taste of Medicine Collection), *Zhou Zuoren Quanji*, 4:319-321.
- 16 Zhou Zuoren, "Qing jia lu" (Qing Jia records), *Ye du chao* (Notes from Night Reading), *Zhou Zuoren Quanji*, 2:524-525.
- 17 Zhou Zuoren, "Bense", *Feng yu tan* (Talks in wind and rain), *Zhou Zuoren Quanji*, 3:277-279. I am citing Pollard's translation of the term. See David E. Pollard, *A Chinese Look at Literature: The Literary Values of Chou Tso-jen in Relation to the Tradition*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973, p. 62.
- 18 Gong Pengcheng, *Shixue bense yu miaowu* (Bense and Marvellous Enlightenment in Poetics), Taipei: Xuesheng shuju, 1986, p. 110-111.
- 19 Daruvala, "Zhou Zuoren", p. 224-237; Ch'ien, *Chiao Hung*, pp. 180-194.
- 20 Zhou Zuoren, "Difang yu wenyi" (Place and literature), *Tan long ji* (Talking about Dragons), *Zhou Zuoren Quanji*, 1:9.
- 21 Zhou Zuoren, "Jiu Meng" (Old dreams), *Ziji de yuandi*, *Zhou Zuoren Quanji* 2:83-85.
- 22 Zhou Zuoren, "Difang yu wenyi", p. 10.
- 23 Shimada Kenji, *Pioneer of the Chinese Revolution: Zhang Binglin and Confucianism*, Joshua Vogel (trans), Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990, p. 61.
- 24 Zhou Zuoren, "Guocui yu ouhua" (National essence and Europeanization), *Ziji de yuandi*, *Zhou Zuoren Quanji*, 2:9.
- 25 Zhou Zuoren, "Fulu yi: Lun bagu wen" (Appendix One: On Bagu Wen), *Zhongguo xin wenxue de yuanliu*, (The Origins of China's New Literature), *Zhou Zuoren Quanji*, 5:362-364.
- 26 Zhou Zuoren, "Guizudi yu pingmindi" (Élite and popular), *Ziji de yuandi*, *Zhou Zuoren Quanji*, 2:11-12.
- 27 For the idea that the classical expressionist formulation "shi yan zhi" refers to "the whole thrust of one's being," see Steven Van Zoeran, *Poetry and Personality: Reading, Exegesis and Hermeneutics in Traditional China*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991, 7-8.
- 28 Zhou Zuoren, "Di'er jiang: Zhongguo wenxue de bianqian" (Second lecture: Changes in Chinese literature), *Yuanliu*, pp. 327-330.
- 29 Zhou Zuoren, "Zhongguo xin wenxue daxi: sanwen yi ji' daoyan" (Preface to Compendium of New Chinese Literature: Essays - first collection) in Yu Shusen (ed.), *Xiandai zuojiatan sanwen* (Modern Writers on the Essay), Tianjin: Baihua wenyi chubanshe, 1986, p. 252.
- 30 Zhou Zuoren, "Di'er jiang", p. 330.

- 31 Zhou Zuoren, "Disi jiang: Qingdai wenxue de fandong (xia): Tongcheng pai" (Fourth lecture: The Qing literary reaction: Part two - the Tongcheng school), *Yuanliu*, p. 345.
- 32 See for example, Shu Wu, "Zhou Zuoren gaiguan" (Survey of Zhou Zuoren), two-part series, *Zhongguo shehui kexue*, 1986, 4:89-115 and 5:187-214.
- 33 Liah Greenfeld, *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992.
- 34 Edward Said, *Orientalism*, New York: Vintage Books, 1979; Partha Chatterjee, *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse?* London: Zed Books, 1986.
- 35 Ashis Nandy, *The Intimate Enemy: Loss and Recovery of Self Under Colonialism*, Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1983.
- 36 Mu Ling, "From social criticism to cultural criticism: A study of Chinese 'culture craze' and Li Zehou", paper presented at the annual general meeting of the Association for Asian Studies in Los Angeles, 25-28 April 1993.

The place of vernacular in a national movement: Cantonese literature in the late Qing and early Republic

Ching May-bo

Introduction

Did vernacular have a place in the national movement in modern China? Vernacular had a place, or at least its promoters saw an opportunity to win it greater prominence, in the late Qing national movement. Vernacular was regarded as an effective means of mass education, and mass education was considered an important part of strengthening the nation. Vernacular did not have a place, or was able to achieve only secondary importance, in the early Republican national movement. The emergence of the new standard national language displaced all regional vernaculars for the sake of national unity.

I shall elaborate on this by reviewing the history of Cantonese vernacular literature from the late Ming to the early Republic. First, I shall demonstrate how a vernacular like Cantonese was able to develop into a written language; this will be illustrated with slides, as I would like to show you what written Cantonese looks like, and how different it is from written standard Chinese. Second, I shall indicate how by the end of the Qing dynasty promoters of vernacular literature saw an opportunity, even if limited, to give it greater prominence. Finally, I shall describe how any possible further development of regional vernaculars was thwarted by the emergence of the new national language, and what status regional vernaculars subsequently were able to attain in early Republican China.

Cantonese as a written language

There are plenty of indications that written Cantonese vernacular first appeared as isolated lines blended into classical texts rather than in the form of independent compositions. Such texts would have been read aloud on

social and ritual occasions, and colloquial speech would have complemented the classical language embodied in the texts. As much of this early literature appeared only in manuscript form, the surviving examples are inevitably difficult to date. Typically, classical texts would have been read aloud with adaptation to the Cantonese dialect at village ceremonies involving the local priests. The ritual texts owned by village priests, as may be seen from examples collected in the New Territories of Hong Kong, include songs recorded directly in Cantonese vernacular, usually to be sung to the melodies of *nanyin* (southern tone).

Another category of Cantonese vernacular text, in which colloquial language appeared within the domain of the seven-character sentence pattern of classical Chinese, was the *muyu shu* ("wooden fish book"). While the books of vernacular songs belonging to village priests were handwritten copies, probably circulated in limited numbers only amongst the priests, the *muyu shu* were mass-produced song books which were widely circulated in the Pearl River delta area. Their contents vary, from historical narratives and love songs to descriptions of local rituals and customs. The first edition of one "wooden fish book", *Huajian ji*, dates to 1713. Other evidence suggests, however, that "wooden fish books" like *Huajian ji* may have existed since the late Ming.

Two more large categories of song texts are the *nanyin* (southern tone) and *longzhou* (dragon boat). In some cases the three terms *muyu*, *nanyin* and *longzhou* appear together on the cover of a single text, which seems to imply that *nanyin* and *longzhou* were inserted into a longer *muyu* text. This somewhat blurred the distinction, but the existence of such mixtures also reveals that *nanyin* and *longzhou*, like the *muyu shu*, probably date from the late Ming.

Another kind of Cantonese songs, shorter than the *muyu*, *nanyin* and *longzhou*, were the *xianshui ge* (saltwater songs) and *danshui ge* (freshwater songs), mostly lovers' duets sung by boat people, or in some cases by prostitutes and their customers.

Yet another category, the Cantonese songs called *yueou*, were usually short, single pieces to broaden the singer's repertoire. Unlike the *muyu shu*, the texts of the *yueou* seem to be much less limited to the seven-character sentence pattern. This allowed more Cantonese interjections to be inserted. While many of the authors of Cantonese vernacular songs were anonymous, Zhao Ziyong, who compiled a volume of *yueou* in 1828, received much acclaim among the contemporary Guangdong literati. It was said that when Zhao Ziyong compiled the *yueou* he "examined the local usages and special characters used in Guangdong". The rhetoric, metaphors and homophones he employed enhanced the literary merit of the *yueou*.

Zhao Ziyong's work, however, was obviously an exception. The many *yueou* composed later by other, anonymous, authors never won them the

respect that Zhao earned because most of them were just funny or pornographic. Examples of these were compiled in the *Lingnan jishi*, which was probably the best-selling example of late Qing and early Republican Cantonese vernacular literature. The *Yuehai chunqiu* (Spring and Autumn in the Sea of Guangdong) and *Xiao citu* (Laughing Fit to Bust) are two further examples of collections of jokes and funny stories in Cantonese vernacular.

In songs and poems Cantonese was usually restricted to sentence patterns in a fixed number of characters and thus very often only complemented classical Chinese. The full use of Cantonese can only be seen in independent compositions reproducing everyday speech. Interestingly, such forms were probably first created by foreign missionaries rather than Cantonese. Missionaries realized it was no good preaching in the official language to the uneducated Cantonese, Chaozhou and Hakka people of Guangdong, so they translated the Bible and missionary pamphlets into vernacular speech. The *Shengxun sujie* (Vernacular Translation of the Scriptures), published in 1847 in Hong Kong, was probably one of the earliest Bible translations into Cantonese. Occasionally the Cantonese spoken in a particular region was employed, for example, in the Christian textbook entitled *You yinghua qianxue qimengshu yi* (Translated from an English Primer), published in 1873.

Like the foreign missionaries, some Cantonese writers also believed that vernacular was useful for instructing the illiterate. Morality texts in vernacular were written and distributed to win merit. They were also used as sermons by morality instructors, employed by local government or benevolent societies to give public lectures on morality. However, unlike foreign missionary texts, morality books in vernacular written by Cantonese were more of a mixture of classical Chinese, northern vernacular (or the official language) and Cantonese vernacular. Examples of these are the *Suhua qingtian* (Vernacular for Conversation) and *Suhua shuangxin* (Vernacular which Cools our Hearts) compiled by Shao Binrun, a renowned morality instructor in Guangzhou during the Tongzhi period. The text was written in a combination of plain classical Chinese, Cantonese and northern vernacular.

Around the time that the Bibles and missionary pamphlets in Cantonese vernacular were being produced, numerous Cantonese dictionaries, vocabularies and conversation books especially prepared for foreign missionaries emerged. Early examples of these date back to the 1840s. In the 1880s and 1890s a more elaborate series of books for learning Cantonese was compiled by James Ball, a civil servant in the Hong Kong government.

The foreign compilers of these Cantonese dictionaries were very concerned about the proper use of Cantonese characters. Similarly, some dictionaries compiled by Chinese considered the correct use of Cantonese

forms. All the same, the main purpose of all these Chinese-compiled dictionaries or vocabularies containing Cantonese usages was the teaching of the official language. In view of the high standing of the Beijing dialect as the official language, the need to learn it, especially for those who wanted to improve their social status by climbing the national career ladder, was understandable. There must have been a market for books and dictionaries for learning the official language. At the same time, Cantonese vernacular had to be used to explain usages in the official language to the Cantonese people starting to learn it. The earliest example that I have come across is the *Nanbei guanhua zuanbian daquan* (Comprehensive Compilation of the Official Language of North and South), published in 1790. A later example is the *Zhengyin zuihua*, published in 1853.

The fact that all the late Qing Cantonese dictionaries were compiled by or for foreigners but not Cantonese themselves is revealing: no Cantonese would bother to standardize the written form of his own language. The efforts made to standardize vernacular were however crucial to the transformation of the spoken language into a written one with rules.

By the end of the Qing dynasty traditional Cantonese songs like the *nanyin*, *longzhou* and *yueou* had merged with Cantonese opera, performed on stage. Many dialogues which appear in Cantonese opera were also written in Cantonese. The revolutionary propaganda which emerged at the end of the Qing dynasty made the maximum use of most of the abovementioned forms of Cantonese vernacular literature. Vernacular was not only regarded as the best medium for promoting patriotism, it was also seen as an indicator of reform and revolution *vis-à-vis* classical Chinese. Essays, songs and opera in Cantonese were utilized by the revolutionaries to propagate their ideas.

The foregoing illustrates that written Cantonese at first served merely as a supplement to classical Chinese. Thanks to the efforts of such Cantonese literati as Zhao Ziyong in the Daoguang period, Cantonese was proved to possess the potential for development into an eloquent and elegant language. Its capacity for further development into a self-sufficient written language was demonstrated by the foreign missionaries, who strove to turn the vernacular into a language with standards and rules. However, Zhao Ziyong was an exception, and the foreign missionaries' endeavours were also limited in scale and influence. It is after all undeniable that the abovementioned Cantonese literature occupied only a secondary position during the Ming and Qing periods.

Publication of Cantonese books

Cantonese was at its zenith for a brief period at the end of the Qing dynasty. This was the first time that Cantonese scholars accorded theoretical and practical recognition to their colloquial speech. The efforts made by Chen Zibao, though limited and short-term, illustrate this. Chen Zibao (1862-1922) was a Xinhui scholar who had enrolled as Kang Youwei's student in the Wanmu school in 1895. He considered the use of classical Chinese in China to have been disastrous and called for educating the people by replacing classical Chinese with the vernacular.

To promote the use of vernacular, in the 1890s and 1900s he wrote several textbooks in Cantonese. The *Furu san-si-wu zi shu* (The Three-Four-Five Character Book for Women and Children) is an example. The three-four-five character sentence format was not new in a primer, but the language and content were revolutionary. Chen Zibao's textbooks differed from the traditional three-four-five character primers, which contained ambiguous philosophical and moral dogmas. His textbooks were designed to teach women and children basic characters, impart knowledge useful for daily life and spread patriotic ideas. His textbooks were widespread in the private schools (*sishu*) of the Pearl River delta area. After the 1911 revolution his textbooks were modified by others to suit the new political situation and various editions were published in Guangzhou, Hong Kong and even Shanghai.

This brief period when vernacular textbooks came to the fore was followed by a downturn in the fortunes of written Cantonese. The innovations introduced by Chen Zibao were unfortunately a rare exception. The years following the 1911 Revolution saw the retreat of Cantonese to its previous secondary position.

The May Fourth writers, coming from different regions and speaking different dialects, might have been liberal enough to tolerate local usages in literature. However, writing textbooks for the national curriculum designed by the education authorities was a totally different matter. While new-style writers were concerned with *baihua* (vernacular), which allowed local variations, the education authorities were concerned with *guoyu* (national language), which called for models and standardization. In 1920 the Ministry of Education formally adopted standard Chinese based on the Beijing dialect for classroom instruction in elementary schools. In 1922 textbooks in standard vernacular were introduced alongside the existing classical language textbooks. Regional dialects like Cantonese were not to be found in the textbooks authorized by the Ministry of Education. Although the textbooks written by Chen Zibao were used for supplementary teaching in private schools in the Pearl River delta area at least until his death in 1922, they could not compete with the textbooks published by nationwide book-stores like the Commercial Press.

In the shadow of the new national language, what position could Cantonese attain? It existed in the newspaper supplements as popular literature. The writing style called *sanjidi* (the three highest grades of the former third degree), which was prevalent among the tabloid newspapers in early Republican Guangzhou and Hong Kong, reflects the compromise achieved by Cantonese in popular literature. This style, a combination of classical Chinese, new standard Chinese and Cantonese, is illustrated by the novel *Laopo nu* (The Wife's Serf), published in 1926 in Hong Kong.

Thanks to the early Republican historians, philologists and anthropologists, Cantonese was preserved as an "historical relic", marking the passing of local oral tradition. Cantonese literature, oral and written, was collected and reprinted by the Chinese Association for Folklore of the Zhongshan University in Guangzhou. Established in 1927, the association was the centre of the Chinese folk literature movement until 1934, when its role reverted to its predecessor, the National Beijing University. At an exhibition of Guangdong culture, held by a group of Republican scholars and officials in Hong Kong in 1940, Cantonese song books were on display alongside other historical relics. Republican scholars certainly had an antiquarian interest in collecting, preserving and appreciating Cantonese vernacular literature, but none could create his own.

Conclusion

To conclude, I would like to suggest that vernacular played only a transitional role in the national movement in modern China. Whereas in Europe Latin was replaced by written vernaculars like Italian, Spanish and French, in China classical Chinese was replaced by a single vernacular based on Beijing dialect. Cantonese writers seem to have been reluctant to introduce any Cantonese usages into the new national literature. While Lao She was able to reinforce the use of Beijing dialect in the standard written vernacular, and Lu Xun experimented with the use of Wu dialect, no Cantonese writer gained merit through adopting his own vernacular in modern Chinese literature. No wonder the Cantonese writers were unable to produce their own Lao She or Lu Xun, whose names entered the history of the May Fourth movement.

Shakespeare adaptation in China

Li Ruru

Introduction

Although the main stream of Shakespeare performance in China since the first production of the Bard's work in 1913¹ still employs spoken drama,² the modern theatre using straight translation, this paper³ however focuses on three different adaptations. They are *Twelfth Night*, *Macbeth* and *Much Ado About Nothing*, which were all adapted into traditional Chinese operatic styles. The traditional Chinese operatic Shakespeare has been controversial, and the three productions I have chosen to discuss exhibit all the promise and all the problems of cross-cultural theatre adaptation.

These three productions are not only in different operatic styles but also are adapted in differing ways. Nevertheless, all face a common problem: how to bring Shakespeare and traditional Chinese theatre together, because it is self-evident that these are two different dramatic forms stemming from two completely different cultural backgrounds.

Traditional Chinese theatre, with its highly stylized form, has to this day retained its conventions and skills of singing, reciting, acting and dance (including martial arts), and it is therefore regarded as total theatre. Clearly, there is an endless range of problems in accommodating Shakespeare to such a theatre. The first and most obvious difficulty in adapting Shakespeare to Chinese opera style is the need to shape the original into the particular musical or aria form required. More profound are the problems relating to Shakespearean structure and characterization. It is not easy to chop or trim an original text, which usually contains two or three plots, to make it suit a Chinese operatic form which normally has only one story line. Furthermore, how are the adaptors to handle Shakespeare's philosophical speculation, psychological reflection and the inner conflicts of his characters? The very language itself, as well as the images and metaphors, present daunting translation difficulties.

A further complication arises from the influence of modern Chinese drama on the work of the adaptors. As indicated above, most Shakespeare performances are in spoken drama style and the introduction of Shakespeare's plays into China has been closely associated with the modern Chinese drama movement. Inevitably, therefore, some modern drama approaches intrude into the three productions and make them into something more than adaptations directly from Shakespeare to Chinese opera form.

In the first place, the directors of the three productions were all educated in the school of modern drama and had been working in modern drama companies. Second, theatrical circles were still influenced by the idea that modern drama was progressive and traditional theatre backward, and therefore both in the ideological and formal sense many traditional theatre productions have been moving in the direction of modern drama.⁴ Third, there is a tendency in many people's minds to generalize about Western phenomena and ideas, ignoring the specific and essential circumstances. For instance, Shakespeare, (an English playwright of the Elizabethan and Jacobean period), modern Chinese drama (a form based on the realistic and naturalistic features of Western drama) and Stanislavsky (the famous Russian dramatist) are all seen as emanating from "the West" in Chinese thinking. The three experimental productions discussed in this paper are therefore a fascinating mixture of many ingredients: contrasting operatic forms, modern Chinese drama, Stanislavsky and Shakespeare, and in each case a different balance of ingredients was used.

Twelfth Night

The adaptation of *Twelfth Night* was performed by the Third Troupe of the Shanghai *Yueju* Company and presented at China's first Shakespeare Festival in the spring of 1986. *Yueju*, one of the younger genres of traditional Chinese theatre, has been popular in south-eastern China since it first came to Shanghai in 1916. It is now also performed widely in cities of central and northern China.

The *yueju* presentation of *Twelfth Night* is distinctly foreign with its Western costumes, make-up and gestures, all of which are far removed from the standard *yueju*. There is no curtain at the front of the stage and the backdrop is a black velvet curtain; the scenery comprises simple white columns and arches which aim to convey the opulence of the baroque era. The *yueju* version of *Twelfth Night* is divided into prologue and six acts:

Prologue	The Shore of Illyria
Act One	The Duke's Palace
Act Two	Olivia's Home
Act Three	The Duke's Palace
Act Four	Olivia's Garden

Act Five	In the Street, near Olivia's Home
Act Six	In the Street, in front of Olivia's Home

In the original, when Viola appears in man's attire, she already enjoys the favour of the court, as revealed by the dialogue between her and Valentine (I i 1-4). With the help of the imaginary "book" (I vi 14) Orsino gives the audience to understand that he and Cesario/Viola have already become soul-mates. Shakespeare seems to persuade the audience to imagine for themselves how Viola has convinced the Duke that she is a boy, how she has gained his favour and how the two have spent the last three days together.

In the adaptation the Captain is Orsino's friend, who frequently used to tell him stories about the sea. This time, after he and Viola have made their plan, he comes to see the Duke and "asks him to help a young man in distress who came here from a foreign land". He reveals that the young man (Cesario/Viola) was a passenger on his ship, which "was completely wrecked in a storm at sea". As soon as Viola sets eyes on the Duke she feels that she knows him well and she sings in an aside: "Why, why don't I feel that he is a stranger to me?" She supposes that this "is the response to my yearning for love all these years".

Orsino is somewhat surprised at Cesario/Viola's elegant appearance and also feels there is something strange about this "young man".

This addition is presumably based on the adaptors' interpretation of Viola. The motives of Viola in the *yueju* version are made plain from the very beginning. The destination of the voyage of Viola and her twin brother is Illyria; and her aim is to see Orsino, because Viola, having heard stories from her late father about the Duke, has been in love with her unseen hero for a long time.⁵ So, when she finds that she is already in Illyria by chance after the shipwreck, she is immediately delighted, since the outcome accords exactly with her wishes.

This addition is thus very archetypal of *yueju* romance. The two lovers fall in love before they even see one another, or they feel when they first meet that they have known each other well. The situation and libretto are both reminiscent of *yueju* repertoire.

The other character who has undergone a great change is Malvolio. The scene in which Malvolio, full of anguish and torment, is confined to a dark house has been virtually deleted. In the *yueju* version of *Twelfth Night* the character of Malvolio is simplified. Malvolio desires to be Olivia's husband even before the story begins, and his purpose makes him antagonistic towards everybody else. He is no longer a "trout that must be caught with tickling" (II v 22), a feature of the play which J. Maningham, a Shakespeare contemporary, highly praised. In the adaptation people want to make an example of him simply because he has such repulsive desires. Malvolio has lost any character development and simply become a pure

"turkey-cock" (II v, 30) of only one colour. He is complete from the start. Perhaps the famous Russian poet Alexander Pushkin's comparison of Shakespeare with Molière can illustrate Malvolio's case both in the original and the adaptation:

Characters created by Shakespeare are not types of such and such a passion, or such and such a vice, as with Molière, but living beings, filled with many passions, many vices... Molière's miser is miserly and no more; Shakespeare's miser is miserly, keenwitted, vengeful, ambitious, sagacious.⁶

These alterations to the characters of Viola and Malvolio were in fact caused by the adaptors' understanding of what a Shakespeare play should be. Unfortunately they did not view a Shakespeare play as the work of an individual but attempted to generalize it, using their own concepts of "Western drama" and the Stanislavsky Method.⁷ They therefore tried to find a "superobjective" of Viola, which then helped them to shape Viola's "through-line of action". Presumably this also led them to change the purpose of Viola's voyage and her original intention in going to Illyria. Likewise, Malvolio in the adaptation has determined to become the master of this household even before the play starts. The generalization also made the adaptors neglect the smoothly-run-through feature of scenes between the original *Twelfth Night* and a traditional Chinese play, and as a result the structure of the *yueju* adaptation became more or less like a 19th century drawing room play.

The duel scene nonetheless is a good piece of adaptation, as it is a well-constructed episode which, while preserving Shakespeare's ideas, comes off successfully in *yueju* style. In this episode, apart from the excision of Fabian, who has been replaced by Maria, most of the original lines remain. Girlish timidity confronts ludicrous cowardice, with Maria and Toby prompting the fears of the duellists from opposing sides. The non-representational stage and the direct and externalized theatrical conventions of traditional Chinese theatre encourage the Shakespearean concept of "two-fold grouping" and "double-action scene"⁸ and furnish a lively picture to underscore the light-hearted atmosphere of the episode. The comic irony is plain for the audience to see, with the two manipulators, regarded by their victims as their supporters, playing with their victims, and the two duellists struggling to escape from the situation rather than come to grips with their adversaries.

Macbeth

The adaptation of *Macbeth* was staged by the Shanghai *Kunju* Troupe and presented at China's first Shakespeare Festival in the spring of 1986. The production was brought to Britain in 1987 for the Edinburgh Festival and

went on tour to Manchester, Birmingham, Cardiff and London in the same year.

Kunju is one of the oldest theatrical forms still extant in China. Both *kunju* and Shakespeare were popular in the 16th and 17th centuries. Both comprise poetic drama and both employ non-realistic stage effects. Indeed, by an ironic stroke of fortune, Shakespeare's great counterpart in China, a *kunju* playwright, Tang Xianzu (1550-1616), died in the same year as Shakespeare. There is a saying in the Chinese theatre that *kunju* is wet nurse to all other genres. This may be an exaggeration, but it is true to say that *kunju* was the first known theatrical form to combine singing, reciting, acting and dancing (including martial arts) artistically.

Macbeth is an authentic *kunju* production with a wholly Chinese story, characters and costuming and all the techniques and skills typical of the traditional style. Its title, *Bloodstained Hands*, has a sensational flavour typical of Chinese drama. It consists of eight *zhe*, or acts. They are:

Act One	Advancement
Act Two	Conspiracy
Act Three	Shifting the Blame
Act Four	The Murder of Du Ge
Act Five	Turning the Banquet Upside Down
Act Six	Seeking Help from the Witches
Act Seven	Frenzy in the Boudoir
Act Eight	Blood for Blood

It is a rather loose adaptation, but the adaptors have paid particular attention to three parts of the original: the witches, the dagger scene and the banquet.⁹

The roles of the three witches are all performed by actors, who play the *kunju* character type of *wu chou* or martial clown. Two of them employ *aizi bu* or crouching steps all the time,¹⁰ and this facilitates the choreographical arrangement for one tall and two short figures. The three witches walk on the stage as smoothly as clouds floating in the sky and in this way convey an atmosphere of mystery and menace. Furthermore, they have masks on the backs of their heads, so that when they face the audience, they have calm and smiling faces, and as soon as they turn round, vile and hideous visages appear. This idea originates from the lines, "Fair is foul, and foul is fair;/ Hover through the fog and filthy air," (I i 11-12); it also echoes the three witches' lines when they first enter the stage.

The dagger scene, or more precisely, the sword scene in the adaptation, is also most effective. *Macbeth's* long soliloquy has been changed into Ma Pei's 24-line aria. This expresses his desires, hesitancy and fear. Ji Zhenhua, in the role of Ma Pei in the adaptation, brings home to the audience his feelings by means of dashing gestures and vivid and changeable facial expressions. The invisible sword is sometimes in front of him and sometimes behind him and his agile movements, executed with the greatest

skill, demonstrate his eagerness to catch it and his failure to do so. All these externalized movements visually reveal the protagonist's inner conflict.

The banquet scene in *Bloodstained Hands*, especially after the ghost of Du Ge (Banquo) appears, is the scene which remains closest to the original. Ma Pei looks triumphant and is enjoying the fruits of his usurpation, but the ghost reduces him to a nervous wreck. The extension of this scene, during which the adaptors arrange for Du Ge's ghost to stand behind the court officials one after another to represent supernatural possession, makes a powerful impression. As soon as Du Ge's ghost stands behind an official, Ma Pei uses his sword to lunge at the man. Ma tries to calm himself when he is sober, but he cannot help shivering when he sees the ghost; he is at one moment furious, and another suddenly terrified. Tie Shi¹¹ (Lady Macbeth) cannot see the ghost, but she knows that something fateful has happened to her beloved husband. She does her utmost to save him from danger. It is true to say that this section of the performance is a perfect combination of the rich and powerful externalized Chinese stage conventions and the Shakespearean psychological dimension.

A lot of Chinese scholars have discovered parallels between Shakespeare and Chinese drama, such as stories with a strong folk flavour, soliloquies addressed to the audience and flexibility in the use of the stage. Neither pays any attention to the idea of the three unities of time, place and action. The guidelines "Thus time we waste, and longest leagues make short" (*Pericles* IV iv 1) and "That he can hither come so soon,/ Is by your fancies' thankful doom" (*Pericles* V ii 19-20) are also, in fact, principles of the traditional Chinese theatre. Both are theatres of poetry. Indeed, the affinity is extraordinary, and it would be no exaggeration to say that we would be hard put to find such resemblances between traditional Chinese drama and the works of any other Western playwright.

The similarities between Shakespeare and traditional Chinese drama provide inviting opportunities for adapting the former to suit the latter's style. However, if we examine the similarities more closely, we find that they are more or less linked with the stage and presentation. In terms of drama there are more differences than similarities. *Bloodstained Hands* offers us a good example to see the differing concepts. Involved here are story and theme, the role of the protagonist and the concept of tragedy.

No doubt there have been many usurpers in Chinese history, and they have supplied Chinese theatre with much of its repertoire. However, these plays have been narrated, described and interpreted from an angle different from that of *Macbeth*. They always focus on how loyal people unite to fight the usurpers. To protect their emperor, or restore the country to the legitimate heir, these loyal people have often lost their families and sometimes even their lives. They are typical heroes and models for Chinese. Meanwhile, traditional Chinese drama hardly ever employs villains as

protagonists. Evil is always opposed by good, and serves as a foil to it. The concept of tragedy is more complicated. It must be admitted that the terms for tragedy and comedy in China are, strictly speaking, words borrowed from the West. In pre-modern times the terms did not exist in China. The Chinese translation for tragedy is *beiju*, literally "sorrowful play", which means that in most people's minds in China it simply conjures up sorrow, agony, bitterness, tears, etc. It certainly differs from the main concepts of tragedy in the West.

All these differences have made the *kunju* version travel a certain distance from the original *Macbeth*.

The reaction to the production was interesting, since audiences liked it but most critics expressed reservations. Two critics, Cao Shujun and Sun Fuliang, remarked: "Some comrades were shaking their heads after seeing the performance and thought the production had 'eaten up' Shakespeare."¹²

I confess to being a *kunju* fan myself, and I much enjoyed this excellent performance. I did not experience any of the uncomfortable feelings I sensed when watching the *yueju Twelfth Night*. Yet the doubt remains as to whether *Bloodstained Hands* is a true representation of Shakespeare's work. But, on the other hand, is loyalty to the original a fair basis for the assessment of any adaptation?

Much Ado About Nothing

The *huangmeixi* version of *Much Ado About Nothing* was performed by the Anhui *Huangmeixi* Troupe and presented at China's first Shakespeare Festival in the spring of 1986. It was also chosen by the Ministry of Culture to entertain Queen Elizabeth when she visited China in the autumn of that year.

Huangmeixi is a relatively recent style in traditional Chinese theatre. It has been popular in the country generally, and especially among urban youth. Artistically, this production stands somewhere between *Blood-stained Hands (Macbeth)*, a totally Chinese presentation, and *Twelfth Night*, which was staged in a largely Western form, and it can be seen to be a fusion of Chinese and Western styles. The adaptation now consists of seven acts, most of them taking place in or outside Marquis Li's (Leonato's) garden, except for part of Act Five in a wedding hall and Act Six in prison. The story, characters, costumes, music and stage presentation all have a distinctly Chinese flavour. The events take place at an unspecified time in a remote border region of ancient China where Han people live with minority races. In this Chinese setting Bai Lidi (Benedick) wears a pair of plumes to demonstrate his masculine and martial status, and Hailuo (Hero) is carried to her wedding in a sedan chair.

These features and others make the play very Chinese, but in other respects it is distinctly non-Chinese. For instance, in contrast to the normal Chinese single plot structure, the three plots of the original have all been retained: the serious plot (Claudio and Hero), the comic plot (Benedick and Beatrice) and the farcical plot (Dogberry and Verges). Bicui (Beatrice) has the kind of independent personality in a woman that is not usually found on the Chinese stage. Also, all the women in the play use shawls instead of the traditional long silk sleeves in their dance and movements. The musical modes draw on the *huangmeixi* tune patterns, but there are evident innovations in rhythm and accompaniment. The wording of the original text is combined with operatic tune patterns, so that even "Heigh-ho for a husband!" (II i 301) is sung to a traditional Anhui local melody. The stage design is based on the traditional Chinese concept of a simple and symbolic layout, but modern Western abstract patterns and decorations have also been introduced.

However, this production came up against its own problems when it attempted to engage with Shakespeare. These are problems relating to structure, conventions and customs and character portrayal in the original play. The original includes a masked ball, a church wedding and a monument, and the adaptors had to find the Chinese equivalents for these. The personality of Beatrice is distinctly non-Chinese; and as for Dogberry and his men, most of their jokes and puns are incomprehensible if they are translated directly into Chinese.

The first bout of the "merry war" between Bicui (Beatrice) and Bai Lidi (Benedick) can be used as an example to illustrate how the adaptation deals with the characterization of the Chinese Beatrice.

This episode is based on the original dialogue between Beatrice and Messenger about how many foes Benedick has killed and how Beatrice promises to eat all his victims, and also on part of their confrontation in Act One, Scene One, when they first encounter each other on the stage. The adaptation deletes the discussion about love, because according to traditional Chinese etiquette people, especially young men and women, never talk to each other about sex or love.

In addition to the loose translation of the original lines during the verbal duel, the adaptor adds an exchange in song between Bai and Bicui about Lou Di'ao's (Claudio's) looks. This is a duet sung in alternate lines which mostly follows a question and answer pattern. This duet not only reveals Bai Lidi's arrogance towards women and the outside world but also vividly demonstrates how he is defeated by Bicui's "sharp tongue".

The "ball" is a Western convention, and the plot also requires masks. How to transfer a masque into a Chinese context? Although Chinese opera uses masks in the form of painted faces, they are for character typing or identification.¹³ Jiang Weiguo and Sun Huairan, the *huangmeixi* directors,

found the solution in an Anhui local shaman play, a type of religious theatre. They employed a modified form of the shaman play mask in their *Much Ado About Nothing*.

In the *huangmeixi* version the masked ball takes place in Act Two, but the masks are introduced at the beginning of the play. The first duet of Hailuo and Bicui is about the masks; later Bicui puts on a mask to frighten and challenge Bai Lidi. Therefore, by the time Act Two starts, the audience has already grown accustomed to the idea of masks and they accept the masked ball without hesitation.

The monument in the original has had to be replaced by a Chinese tomb. To split open a tomb to rescue one's lover or to die together with one's lover are popular themes in Chinese folk tales and operas. The colour of the set used in this scene in the adaptation is white and silver, which contrasted vividly with the bright red wedding scene. When Hailuo rises from the tomb, accompanied by the other seven girls in white gowns and veils, the spirit of the play has been purified and enhanced.

Conclusion

The reactions of academics and audiences to these adaptations varied. Many academics held that Shakespeare's work reflected the humanism and new thinking of his age and could not be transposed to the traditional Chinese theatre which, with its origins in times going back over a thousand years, they felt, reflected feudal mentality. An inevitable consequence of this, they claimed, was that Shakespeare's standing as a "king" of literature and drama was reduced and that treating his plays in this way amounted almost to blasphemy.

Another school of thought held that, although the performances had some shortcomings, they did introduce the playwright to a wide Chinese audience, some of whom had probably never even heard of Shakespeare. The theatre had a responsibility to raise the cultural level of the people and by presenting adaptation of this kind it could help to broaden the cultural awareness of the general public.

The audiences who came to see the adaptations also reacted in contrasting ways. Some thought that the new approach to an old form was an interesting and intriguing theatrical experiment; others felt that the productions were both strange and awkward and had lost not only the spirit and poetry of Shakespeare but also the beauty and conventions of traditional Chinese drama.

All these questions in fact reflect the obsession of the Chinese critics with authenticity. In China the only criterion used for judging a production

both by critics and those involved in the practical work of adapting, directing and performing was, "Is Shakespeare still Shakespeare?" No matter how superficial in some cases their understanding of Shakespeare was, all the adaptors tried their utmost to produce genuinely "Shakespearean performances". Hu Weiming, the director of *Twelfth Night*, claimed that he wanted to keep the "original soup and juice". Li Jiayao used the image of Shakespeare as "home" and described his method in *Bloodstained Hands* as "keeping the address [referring to the original Shakespeare] in mind all the time in order to make sure you get back home". Jiang Weiguo admitted that during the rehearsal of *Much Ado About Nothing* all his efforts had been devoted to maintaining the balance of "being both Shakespeare and *huangmeixi*".¹⁴ They were all anxious about being accused of manipulating Shakespeare and further losing Shakespeare.

In fact, when any culture enters another, the resulting confrontation will cause certain reactions, because all translators and adaptors take possession of a foreign culture according to their own perspectives.¹⁵ There are inevitably cross-cultural tensions between Shakespeare and traditional Chinese theatre, as we have seen in these adaptations: tensions between ambiguity and explicitness, between complexity and simplicity, between internalization and externalization, and between the differing performing styles. However, this is where the significance lies and this is why people have pursued this experimental work with such painstaking efforts.

I think that although on the surface the criticism of these Shakespeare adaptations as "not Shakespeare and not traditional Chinese theatre" is quite dismissive, it could perhaps in another way offer a positive commentary on this experimental work, because it pointed to the fact that these adaptations had broken through recognized and respected cultural barriers. The truth was indeed that objective laws are independent of man's will, and it has to be recognized that cultural exchange will almost inevitably lead to changes in both cultures involved. In addition, the adaptations also represented a challenge to Chinese thinking, which has always required people to be respectful and obedient. They were not expected to question the value of recognized artistic masterpieces, which up to now have provided the only criteria for judging new work. By these standards, interfering with Shakespeare or with the traditional theatre was unacceptable. Artaud's argument that there should be "no more masterpieces" probably went too far, but it can be claimed that any masterpiece needs to communicate with contemporary society in order to maintain and enhance its value. The saying "things must break up to begin again, to make a fresh start"¹⁶ has great relevance for China today.

Notes

- 1 An adaptation of *The Merchant of Venice* under the title of *The Contract of Flesh* was staged in Shanghai in 1913.
- 2 The term "spoken drama" which came into use in the 1920s identified the spoken language as the basis of the new theatre.
- 3 When this paper was delivered at the conference, it was accompanied by nine extracts from video tapes of the three productions I discussed.
- 4 The fact that these three directors were all "borrowed" from modern theatre by local opera companies to direct Shakespeare productions illustrates such a tendency in China.
- 5 This is another example to illustrate the different cultural backgrounds of East and West. To fall in love with somebody whom one has never even seen before, merely on the basis of his or her name and reputation is typical of the classical Chinese love affair. In the West it is quite different. Even in the source material *GI'ngannati* and *Apolonius and Silla*, on which the main plot of Shakespeare's *Twelfth Night* is based, the heroine meets the young man at home and she loves him secretly. After the young man returns to his home town, the heroine decides to pursue her lover by disguising herself. Moreover, Western love emphasizes the function of the eyes. This is the point Hermia argues in *A Midsummer Night's Dream* (I i, 56-57):

Hermia	I would my father look'd but with my eyes.
Theseus	Rather your eyes must with his judgement look.

This also helps explain why there are so many contradictory elements in the adaptation. Both the adaptor and director, according to their declaration, have tried their best to be loyal to the original Shakespeare and therefore they have employed as many Western dramatic theories and techniques as possible. However, in the way they think and the approach they adopt to realize their purpose they are entirely Chinese. It is regrettable that in spite of their well-meaning motives and the changes they have introduced in Shakespeare's play these have undermined their efforts, since despite their commitment to be loyal to Shakespeare they see Western social and personal attitudes, i.e. romance, through purely Chinese eyes.

- 6 A. S. Pushkin, "Table-talk, No. XVIII" in *Polnoye Sobranie Sochinenii, Tom XII* (A. S. Pushkin, *The Complete Works, Vol XII*), USSR Academy of Sciences, Moscow, 1949, pp. 159-160. The English translation is from *The Oxford Companion to the Theatre*, by Phyllis Hartnoll (ed.), OUP, 1957, p. 651.
- 7 The director and the script adaptor gave a talk at the forum organized by China's first Shakespeare Festival on their work with *Twelfth Night*. They stressed the importance of reading between the lines, and how they successfully found the "super-objective" and "through-line of action" for the main characters. This terminology was used in the Stanislavsky Method.
- 8 J. L. Styan, *Shakespeare's Stagecraft*, CUP, 1981, p. 125.
- 9 "Zhongxi wenhua zai xiju wutaishang de yuhe - guanyu 'zhongguo xiqu yu Shashibiya' de duihua", (The encounter of Western and Chinese culture on the theatre stage - A dialogue about traditional Chinese theatre and Shakespeare) in *Xiju yishu* (The Dramatic Arts), Shanghai, 1988, p. 42.
- 10 Crouching steps are a specific stage convention for the martial clown.
- 11 In China women used to take their husband's family name and drop their own given names when they married. The pattern of the new name would be: husband's family

name, wife's maiden name and *shi*, which means "the person of those two families". In *kunju Macbeth*, Tie is Ma Pei's wife's maiden name and means "iron".

12 Cao Shujun and Sun Fuliang, *Shashibiya zai Zhongguo wutai shang* (Shakespeare on China's Stage), Harbin Chubanshe, 1989, p. 195.

13 There are exceptions. For instance, the Sichuan Opera or *chuanju* has the special feature of *bianlian* or changing faces, which in part is similar to the use of the mask in the West.

14 *Xiju yishu*, pp. 36-48.

15 I am indebted to Patrice Pavis for the ideas in this discussion.

16 Antonin Artaud, *Le Théâtre et Son Double* (The Theatre and Its Double), trans. by Victor Corti, London: Calder & Boyars, 1970, p. 55.

The Chinese YMCA and the Anti-Christian Movement in China in the 1920s

Chen-main Wang

Introduction

The YMCA (Young Men's Christian Association) enjoyed a great popularity in China in the early 20th century. The first YMCA branch was established in Foochow in 1885 and by 1920 the Chinese YMCA had 174 student associations and 31 city branches with a total membership of 60,500. The number of YMCA staff also rose from one foreign secretary to 84 foreign and 42 Chinese secretaries during this period. No matter from which angle it is examined, the Chinese YMCA must be regarded as one of the most prosperous Christian societies in China at the time.

While the YMCA enjoyed this rapid growth in China, its environment became hostile. With the rising tide of nationalism and the growth of disgust with foreign imperialism in the late Ch'ing and early Republican periods, the Anti-Christian Movement gradually gained momentum and burst into action in the 1920s. Because of its outstanding role in society the Chinese YMCA was clearly visible and became a major anti-Christian target. The Chinese YMCA was accused of maintaining close relations with foreign countries and denationalizing Chinese youth through its programmes. The wave of attacks on the Chinese YMCA had a significant impact on YMCA members and thus promoted some action and reform within this Christian institution.

Nationalism and the Anti-Christian Movement of the 1920s forced the Chinese YMCA to redefine its role in national affairs and speak out about its political and cultural identity. This paper will take the example of the Chinese YMCA to examine the cultural and political response as well as the development of indigenization of Chinese Christians at the time of the Anti-Christian Movement. The purpose of this research is to explore how the Chinese YMCA discussed the role of the YMCA in China, how it adjusted to the changing situation in China and how it defined its relationship with

the foreign YMCA secretaries who worked in China. A careful study of the Chinese YMCA during this period will provide a basis for showing how Chinese Christians responded to these turbulent times as well as how the Chinese YMCA was accommodated in modern China.

In this paper I seek to deal with the subject in four main sections. The first summarizes the early development of the YMCA in China. The next introduces the Anti-Christian Movement. The third examines the Chinese YMCA's response to the challenge of the Anti-Christian Movement in the political aspect of indigenization. The fourth discusses the cultural response of the Chinese YMCA. In conclusion I give a general assessment of the response of the YMCA in China in the 1920s.

The early development of the YMCA in China

Forty years after the establishment of the YMCA in England in 1844, the YMCA was introduced into China by foreign missionaries. Because of the fame and programme of the YMCA in Europe and America, George Smyth, a missionary in China, founded the first experimental branch in a Christian school in Foochow in 1885.¹ From then on more and more experimental branches were founded by missionaries in their schools. Luther D. Wishard, a Secretary of the International Committee of YMCAs of North America, was invited to attend the General Missionary Conference in Shanghai in 1890 and introduce the YMCA's ideas and goals. The meeting adopted a resolution "commending the objects of the Association and appealing to the International Committee of YMCAs of North America to send representatives to China to develop activities similar to those which had proved so successful in America".² On the basis of an intensive investigation of China he carried out after the meeting, Luther D. Wishard concluded that the time was ripe for the establishment of the YMCA in China. His report received a favourable response from the International Committee and the Rev. D.W. Lyon was sent to China in 1895 to spread the ideas and programme of the YMCA.³

A year after the Rev. D.W. Lyon started work in Tientsin, Mr. John R. Mott, General Secretary of the International Committee, went to China. He visited many missionary schools and assisted in forming "The College Young Men's Christian Association of China" which eventually, after passing through various stages of evolution, became known as the National Committee of YMCAs of China. From then on the Chinese YMCA held a national meeting regularly every three years, except during war time. The city associations of the YMCA began after Mr. R.E. Lewis organized the first one for businessmen and professionals in Shanghai in 1899.⁴

The first 25 years of the development of the YMCA in China were extremely successful. After John R. Mott helped to set up the national organization of the Chinese YMCA in Shanghai in 1895 the movement soon attracted the interest of Chinese youth. More and more student associations and city associations were established. According to the YMCA's report of 1923, there were 42 city associations and 203 student associations with about half a million members.⁵

The early activities of the YMCA in China could be divided into two main areas. The first consisted of evangelism, which included Bible study classes and evangelical conventions. The YMCA co-sponsored many successful evangelical conventions. For example, in 1911, when a city association organized a series of evangelical meetings at the association building, 1,068 men expressed the wish to become Christians. All of these men were put in touch with the churches, and in addition the association held special classes for them. A pastor testified that, drawing mainly on the new believers won by the association during this series of meetings, he had secured the constituency for a new church in the city centre with a thriving membership.⁶ The YMCA invited Mr. Sherwood Eddy to hold evangelical meetings in China in 1914. The aggregate attendance of Eddy's meetings in 1914 was 117,705; following the meetings 7,960 people were enrolled in Bible classes and many united with the Church.⁷

The second area of YMCA activity was of an educational nature including further education, sport, student summer camps, public lectures, etc. One major educational activity was the social service movement. This expressed itself in such forms of service as free night schools for people from the poorer sections of cities or near-by villages, practical talks on sanitation, hygiene and disease prevention for these and other groups, and the distribution of large quantities of health literature in several Chinese cities.⁸ The Chinese YMCA also paid special attention to the development of volunteer labour. Various city associations held local athletics and sports contests which aroused great interest among Chinese students.

The most popular, or perhaps the most successful, YMCA programme at the time was the science lectures programme, which represented the Chinese YMCA's ideal of social education. When Mott visited China in 1896 he felt the need to introduce science and technology into China to educate the Chinese. Mott later persuaded Clarence H. Robertson, a professor of mechanical engineering at Purdue University, to take on this mission. Robertson's lectures, with modern scientific equipment, encouraged thousands of Chinese to attend science courses.⁹ The Chinese YMCA even established a lecture department in December 1912, to handle the numerous invitations from all over the country.¹⁰ When David Z.T. Yui became the head of the lecture department in 1913, hundreds of lectures a year were being held with several hundred thousand Chinese people attending. The

Peking government and many provincial governments welcomed this programme and even asked the YMCA to train lecturers for them.¹¹

The successful development of the YMCA in China was illustrated by the growth in membership, local financial support and equipment, attendance at religious meetings, enrolment in Bible classes, circulation of periodicals, sales of literature and extension of the church resulting from the association's work in 1900-20. Many national leaders became members or supporters of the YMCA. In 1920, on the occasion of the eighth national convention of the YMCA in Tientsin, both Dr. Sun Yat-sen and President Hsu Shih-ch'ang sent their congratulations, and ex-President Li Yuan-hung even offered his in person.¹² The YMCA was regarded by many Chinese leaders as one of the most popular movements in China.

The Anti-Christian Movement

It was against this promising background that the Anti-Christian Movement emerged. The Chinese YMCA was denounced as a running dog of the imperialists. YMCA property was destroyed or confiscated and YMCA secretaries were harassed and even murdered.¹³ However, nationalism and anti-Christian activity also stimulated various kinds of awakening movements in the YMCA itself. The Chinese secretaries of the YMCA tried to identify themselves with the wave of nationalism and paid attention to social reform and the issue of indigenization of the YMCA in China.

Many scholars of China are aware that the 1920s marked the highest stage of the Anti-Christian Movement in the Republican period.¹⁴ In fact, some scholars have even argued that the Anti-Christian Movement in the late 1920s had a much stronger and wider impact on the Chinese churches than the Boxer Rebellion. The Anti-Christian Movement of the 1920s had its origins in the New Culture and May Fourth Movements of the 1910s. Thereafter Chinese intellectuals tended to approach questions pertaining to national affairs and social reality from the viewpoints of democracy and science.¹⁵ Influenced by democratic ideas, they began to criticize the warlords' obstruction of the development of democracy and attack the foreign powers' imperialist actions in China and help for the warlords. As a result, anti-imperialist and anti-warlord sentiment became widespread in Chinese society. At the same time the spirit of scientism, together with the growing popularity of pragmatism in intellectual circles, promoted the dissemination of ideas attacking superstition and religious belief.¹⁶ Christianity, with all its baggage of Western cultural imperialism, had not yet been criticized seriously, but in these circumstances it was bound to encounter organized anti-Christian sentiment.

The rise of the Anti-Christian Movement was prompted by a meeting of the World Students' Christian Federation at Tsing-hua University in Peking in April 1922.¹⁷ Because of the publicity and wide discussion of the meeting in Christian periodicals in early 1922, some Chinese students in Shanghai were prompted to organize an Anti-Christian Student Federation.¹⁸ A public statement of their objectives was circulated in March 1922, and this encouraged similar action by students in other cities.¹⁹ Much of their criticism of Christianity was based on their perception of the wickedness of capitalism and a close relationship between Christianity and leading capitalist countries. Some critics reflected Bolshevik influence, describing Christianity as "a capitalist transformation, and churches and YMCAs as the capitalists' tools in the exploitation of the proletariat".²⁰ Some touted Marx's statement that "religion is the opium of the masses".²¹ Such verbal assaults were widespread and became typical of the first phase of the Anti-Christian Movement.

The second phase of the Anti-Christian Movement began in 1924 in association with the Educational Rights Recovery Movement and in keeping with the general anti-imperialist sentiment of the time. Christian schools and churches enjoyed the protection of the unequal treaties and placed strong emphasis on religious instruction in the curriculum and school life generally. With the rise of the Anti-Christian Movement in 1922 Chinese educators and scholars began to criticize Christian education from the point of view of national rights and urged the government to rescind the special privileges accorded foreign missionaries and churches.

Under the strong influence of nationalism the Chinese educators were antipathetic to the expansion of Christian education which, they thought, might denationalize the Chinese people.²² Therefore they urged the "recovery" of education rights from foreign control and the Christian schools' conformity with the curriculum regulated by the Ministry of Education.²³ They submitted their proposals to educational organizations on various occasions and asked the government to enact related laws and regulations to "recover" education rights.

Besides education rights, criticism during the second phase of the Anti-Christian Movement focused on the close association between Christianity and the foreign imperialist powers. The authors of this criticism pointed out that the imperialist countries took advantage of anti-missionary riots to expand their claims for special protection under the law. They also noted that many missionaries co-operated with the imperialists so as to expand their activity.²⁴ The climax of the second phase of this movement was the outbreak in many cities of big demonstrations against the Christian churches around Christmas 1924.

The third phase of the Anti-Christian Movement may be divided into three stages. The first stage began with the May 30 incident in 1925, when a

large number of students and workers demonstrated against Japanese ill-treatment of Chinese workers and the unfair treatment of Chinese people by the British-dominated Shanghai Municipal Council. British police fired into the crowd of demonstrators causing heavy casualties, including 11 dead and several dozen wounded. The enraged students, merchants and workers immediately started a series of strikes and boycotts of Japanese and British goods. Nationalist sentiment also led the Chinese to denounce imperialism and the churches as well as their educational institutions, which in Chinese eyes were imperialist-related. The students asked the school authorities and missionaries to make plain their attitude to the matter. Although many missionaries and church associations expressed their sympathy and support for the Chinese side, many other missionaries and church schools were unwilling to become involved in politics and left the matter to the authorities.²⁵ The students did not receive a satisfactory response from the missionaries and the schools, and anti-Christian and anti-imperialist slogans appeared everywhere. Demonstrations took place in many cities throughout the country.

The Chinese Communist Party, which had been persistently anti-Christian, took the opportunity to organize eight specific measures for attacking the churches through the student bodies under its control.²⁶ The measures included declaration of an anti-Christian week, sending students to the countryside and factories to stir up anti-Christian sentiment among the workers and peasants, attacking YMCAs and YWCAs and urging students to join in the anti-Christian movement. From then until the end of 1925 there was an anti-Christian atmosphere on all the major campuses. In these seven months, according to the church statistics, there were at least 43 student riots against the missionaries, churches, church schools and church associations.²⁷ In this unfavourable situation the student numbers of Christian schools declined continuously. Besides the student movements, the Chinese Communist Party also stirred up the workers and peasants to violent action against the church.²⁸ These anti-Christian demonstrations were maintained throughout 1925.

The second stage was the Northern Expedition in 1926 led by the Kuomintang (KMT) army. Because of the spread of anti-Christian ideas in the KMT army the Northern Expedition forces attacked and occupied churches and church property along the way. A pattern of anti-Christian activity emerged in many places. When the expeditionary forces entered a city they occupied the church and were billeted in it; mobs were roused to attack the churches; anti-Christian slogans were pasted up in the city; church leaders and church people were persecuted; and when the forces left, KMT party headquarters were established to organize various kinds of unions for workers, peasants, students, women and teachers. No church people were allowed to join and they could not therefore find employment.²⁹ Many churches, YMCAs and church-sponsored schools and hospitals were forced

to close. The climax of this phase was the killing of six missionaries in Nanking in March 1927.³⁰ After protests by foreign diplomats and a Purification Operation by the KMT which drove the communists out, anti-Christian activity declined immediately.

During the third stage, which started after the Nanking Incident, there were few acts against the church but the authorities tried to place all Christian schools and universities under their control. They required the heads of all schools to be Chinese and demanded strict conformity with the curriculum standards set by the government. In other words, the nationalist government, in an age of surging nationalism, paid attention to church-sponsored schools and wanted to recover education rights which were at this time still in the hands of foreign missionaries.

The political response of the Chinese YMCA

The first action that the Chinese YMCA took was to assume the leadership of the YMCA in China. It claimed that although the American secretaries had come to initiate the work, the movement was now practically controlled and directed by the Chinese leadership, lay and secretarial, and financed by the Chinese people, who indeed had a strong sense of responsibility for and proprietorship in the undertaking.³¹ The next step towards strengthening the Chinese leadership was to run the association on a self-supporting basis. It was decided that "Any city that wishes to have a YMCA earnestly enough ought to be willing adequately to support it by itself."³² Although the International Committee did make financial contributions to the work of the Chinese YMCA, the National Committee of the YMCA in China made it clear that the International Committee:

(a) claims and has no control over this money after it has been remitted to the National Committee; (b) does not desire even joint control over this fund with the National Committee; and (c) has complete confidence in the National Committee, which has as full control of this fund as of any money it receives from any source in China or elsewhere.³³

At the time of the May 30 Incident the British became the chief targets of recrimination, boycott and attacks, and British troops and warships being rushed to the scene were prepared for action. The Chinese YMCA then decided to calm the situation down and bring the two sides to a rational solution. It sent a telegram calling in the strongest possible terms for recruitment of a strong British secretary to the Chinese YMCA staff to help improve relations between the two countries. R.O. Hall accepted the call and on reaching Shanghai soon established contact with the leading Britons in the community. The Chinese YMCA worked quietly to bring the Chinese and British leaders together. The results were "substantial and far-reaching"

in promoting personal and social contact between the leaders in an emergency.³⁴

David Z.T. Yui, the General Secretary of the National Committee of the YMCA, also took this opportunity to admonish the foreign missionaries. Many a missionary life was not what it ought to be and hence hindered rather than helped to witness Christian faith and experience. Besides the ordinary weaknesses of human nature Yui asked the foreign secretaries to avoid the following: (a) a superiority complex and hence a determination to dictate and dominate; (b) a tendency to transfer to and perpetuate in China the practices and experiences of the Christian movements of the West, irrespective of China's need; (c) excessively strong nationalistic attitudes on current issues; and (d) an emphasis on external and material things rather than spiritual life.³⁵ Concerning the problem of future leadership in the Christian movement in China, Yui emphasized that "Christian missions may terminate before long. It is our sincerest hope that the presence of Christian workers from the other lands will never be discontinued in the Christian movement in China."³⁶

The YMCA also adopted a position absolutely in favour of the abolition of the so-called "unequal treaties", which granted foreigners extra-territorial rights, fixed tariffs and special church protection. All of these were now under serious attack by the nationalists. At that time there was still some disagreement over this matter because some missionaries considered that church people should not be involved in state affairs, while the Chinese Christians in the inland areas still needed them in a hostile environment.³⁷ The voices in favour of nullifying the treaties were much stronger than those urging support.³⁸ The YMCA people used various occasions to state their position in favour of the abolition of the treaties. For example, at the Mott Conference in January 1927 a missionary suggested that the Chinese Christians in inner China might need the protection of the treaties. David Z. T. Yui responded, "If Mr. Bugge's question amounts to this, namely, that Chinese Christians who live in the interior of the country do depend on the so-called extraterritorial rights for protection, we see more reason than before why extraterritoriality should be abolished."³⁹ The National Christian Council of China, of which David Z.T. Yui was serving concurrently as General Secretary, passed a resolution which advocated the abolition of the so-called "church protection clause".⁴⁰ *Ch'ing-nien chin-pu*, the official publication of the Chinese YMCA, also urged the abolition all unequal treaties between China and the foreign powers and called for new treaties based on equality and reciprocity.⁴¹

What could the YMCA, an international organization to promote co-operation, friendship and understanding among nations, do in the age of nationalism? Its international ideal was even criticized by contemporaries as "denationalization" of the Chinese. David Z.T. Yui, in a public speech, argued about the true meaning of nationalism. Nationalism, he said, "should

not mean a biased love of one's country at the expense of another country" but:

(1) should clearly and definitely point to a man's national duty to help develop to the fullest extent the special gifts with which his own people are endowed and the natural resources which they have inherited, and this not simply for their own use and enjoyment but as their national contribution to the sum total of the world's civilization. (2) It should inspire and guide each nation walk in the pathway of righteousness, justice and truth, and it should also impel her to go to the assistance of weaker and less advanced nations even though at the time it may seem to be at real sacrifice to herself... It is this type of nationalism which we should develop and spread.⁴²

Yui concluded that "it is not Nationalism versus Internationalism, but Nationalism and Internationalism in which I firmly believe and which our YMCA movement has been trying to inculcate in the minds of our young people".⁴³ Yui's promotion of the concept of a world family won popular applause, although it is not certain to what extent the reader will accept his interpretation of nationalism and internationalism.

The cultural response of the Chinese YMCA

The YMCA was a Christian institution which had tried to spread the Gospel directly or indirectly. All secretaries of the YMCA, native or foreign, were Christians. Facing the severe criticism of the Anti-Christian Movement, the Chinese secretaries had to confirm their Chinese ethnic identity while at the same time being believers in a "Western" religion which differed significantly from Chinese culture and was dominated by foreign missionaries. Besides the clarification of their political standpoint and self-administration as discussed above, they discussed the relationship between Christianity and Chinese culture.

Generally speaking, many YMCA members and secretaries urged the indigenization of Christianity in China and suggested various ways for integrating the two. When they offered their suggestions they seemed to consider Christianity and Western culture to be separable. For example, the writer of an article entitled "Oriental Christianity" said that "original Christianity was Eastern, but it had been tainted by Western culture through its historical development in the West".⁴⁴ Another secretary made a similar statement in which the *tao* (way) and the *chiao* (religion) of Jesus could be distinguished. The *tao* was the essence of Christianity and thus was what China needed, while the *chiao*, which consisted of church creeds and institutions, evolved in the environment of the West.⁴⁵ It must be pointed out that the political connotation of this interpretation seemed to suggest that Christianity was not equal to Western culture and hence was not related to the imperialist countries in the West.

Therefore, in order to have original Christianity, the Chinese needed to undergo a process of de-Westernization of Chinese Christianity. Some YMCA secretaries suggested that real indigenization could be attained in China by removing the Western veneer from Christianity and combining it with the essence of Chinese culture.⁴⁶ Hsieh Fu-ya, a YMCA secretary in Shanghai, suggested connecting these two through "individualization" and "rationalization".⁴⁷ Hsieh used a metaphor to explain how this integration could take place. He suggested the sowing of the seed of Western Christianity in Chinese cultural soil, where its Western modes of thought, habits, rituals and organizational structures would die out. Thereafter, absorbing its nourishment from Chinese culture, Christianity would produce its fruit, which would be the new Christianity.⁴⁸ He thought that Christianity would become truly indigenized in this way.

Most writers of the *Ch'ing-nien chin-pu* believed that there was some common ground between Christianity and Chinese culture, especially Confucianism. For example, T.C. Chao considered that the Confucian concept of *jen* (benevolence) was almost identical with the concept of "love" in Christianity. A harmonious society which could be achieved by the practice of *jen* was like the Kingdom of God which should be realized by "love". The Chinese therefore should have no difficulty in understanding and accepting the love of God.⁴⁹ Hsu Pao-ch'ien also said: "The Sung and Ming philosophers were fully convinced that benevolence [*jen*] must be at the core of the universe... This conviction will inevitably dawn upon a person when he tries to realize his kinship with the universe."⁵⁰ Both David Z.T. Yui, the General Secretary of the Chinese YMCA, and Fan Po-hui, editor of the *Ch'ing-nien chin-pu*, saw the ethical common ground between Christianity and Chinese culture as an area of mutual complementary fulfilment.⁵¹

Various proposals were put forward for integrating Christianity with Chinese culture, but no agreement could be reached among the Chinese. Although there were many articles suggesting the use of Chinese culture to expound and advocate Christianity, they offered only a vague and general direction and lacked a thorough and convincing plan. For example, Chao Tzu-ch'eng considered that Chinese culture was related to Christianity on the points of "closeness to nature", "ethics", "arts" and "mythic experience".⁵²

Wu Yao-tsung was more liberal in this application. Since "the universe is the manifestation of God", Wu suggested, man may come to know God by observing the universe.⁵³ Christianity was only the Jewish people's interpretation of the universe. Other peoples and religions also observed the universe and had their own interpretations. Therefore knowledge of God might be found in other religions.⁵⁴ From 1924 the *Ch'ing-nien chin-pu* gradually published more and more articles on Buddhism, Taoism and Confucianism.

Because of the complexity and plurality of Chinese culture, even Confucian scholars could not reach agreement on many points, not to mention discussing it in relation to Christianity. Thus the suggestions and discussions concerning the integration of Christianity and Chinese culture were unable to inspire the same feelings amongst others, and sometimes even caused disputes about words and ideas.

An assessment

The 1920s marked a turning point in the history of the YMCA in China. Under the impact of the Anti-Christian Movement, Chinese Christians became more nationalistic in outlook and began to re-examine their religion and the issue of indigenization. The example of the Chinese YMCA shows how a Christian organization dealt with the questions of nationalism and indigenization in China.

Generally speaking, the political aspect of indigenization of the Chinese YMCA was successful. The troubled period of the 1920s served as a good opportunity for Chinese Christian leaders to assume the leadership of the association and take responsibility for running it. This peaceful evolution, although it received some complaints from the foreign secretaries, did end the criticism from anti-Christian activists.⁵⁵ In fact only an indigenized Christian institution was able to gain support and acceptance from the Chinese people. The best proof of this is that the membership of the YMCA and the YWCA, criticized in the past as the tools or running dogs of imperialist countries, increased again at the end of the 1920s.⁵⁶

The success or failure of the YMCA's efforts at cultural indigenization may be evaluated from two perspectives. First, from the perspective of failure, the YMCA leaders and publications failed to show a clear way to achieve indigenization and thus failed to gather sufficient support amongst Chinese Christians. Their theories and arguments concerning indigenization of Christianity were not well thought out and they failed to offer indigenous alternatives for Christians to adopt. The articles written by YMCA secretaries and members contained a mix of different suggestions, sometimes contradictory. In this respect we can see they had no chance of winning the war of indigenization and their failure was a foregone conclusion.

However, seen from the other perspective, the YMCA Christians who were able to foresee the future needs of Christianity stepped forward bravely to awaken their fellow Christians and indicate the direction of indigenization. They kept an open mind in suggesting and discussing different methods of indigenization of Christianity in China. While they identified with their fellow countrymen they did not surrender their Christian

position but tried to integrate Chinese culture and Christianity. The perspectives of the indigenization of Christianity in China and the vigorous efforts to reform were unique, so that no scholar studying indigenization in modern Chinese church history can ignore the example of the YMCA.

Notes

- 1 Garrett, Shirley S., *Social Reformers in Urban China: The Chinese YMCA 1895-1926*, Cambridge, 1970, pp. 25-27.
- 2 Yui, David Z.T., *The Indigenization of the YMCA in China*, Shanghai, 1926, p.1.
- 3 Lai Hui-li [D.W. Lyon], *Chung-hua Chi-tu-chiao erh-shih-wu nien hsiao-shih* (An Outline History of the Chinese YMCA in the Past 25 Years), Shanghai, 1920, p.3.
- 4 As for the early development of the Chinese YMCA, see Wang Chih-hsin, *Chung-kuo Chi-tu-chiao shih-k'ang* (History of Christianity in China), Hong Kong, reprint edition, 1979, pp. 4-13.
- 5 Yui, David A.T., "The indigenization of the YMCA in China" in *China Christian Year Book 1925*, Shanghai, 1925, p. 155.
- 6 "The Young Men's Christian Association" in *China Mission Year Book 1912*, Shanghai, 1912, p. 337.
- 7 Wilbur, H. A., "The Young Men's Christian Association" in *China Mission Year Book 1915*, Shanghai, 1915, pp. 337-338.
- 8 *ibid.*, pp. 338-9.
- 9 Garrett, pp. 91-92.
- 10 Lai, p. 11.
- 11 Yüan Fang-lai, *Yü Jih-chang chuan* (Biography of Yü Jih-chang), Hong Kong, reprinted edition, 1970, pp. 34-40, and Garrett, pp. 152-153.
- 12 Kung Ta, "Chung-hua Ch'ing-nien-hui erh-shih-wu nien chi-nien chu-tian ti-pa-ts'u ch'üan-kuo ta-hui chih ching-kuo" (The record of the Eighth Convention of the Chinese YMCA), *Ch'ing-nien chin-pu*, 33, May 1920, pp. 78-100.
- 13 "I-nien nei ch'üan-kuo Ch'ing-nien-hui chuan-k'uan" (The situation of the YMCA in the Past Year), *Chung-hua chi-tu chiao-hui nien-chien*, 10, 1928, 4, pp. 25-28.
- 14 For a discussion of the Anti-Christian Movement of the 1920s see Lutz, Jessie G., *Chinese Politics and Christian Missions: The Anti-Christian Movements of 1920-1928*, Notre Dame, 1988; Yamamoto Tatsuro and Sumiko Yamamoto, "The Anti-Christian Movement in China", *The Far Eastern Quarterly*, 12.2 (1953), pp. 133-147; Yip Ka-che, *Religion, Nationalism and Chinese Students: The Anti-Christian Movement of 1922-1927*, Bellingham, 1980.
- 15 For studies of the May Fourth Movement see Chow, Tse-tzung, *The May Fourth Movement: Intellectual Revolution in Modern China*, Cambridge, 1960; Grieder, Jerome B., *Hu Shih and the Chinese Renaissance: Liberalism in the Chinese Revolution 1917-1937*, Cambridge, 1972; and Schwartz, Benjamin I. (ed.) *Reflections on the May Fourth Movement: A Symposium*, Cambridge, 1972.

16 Chow, pp. 320-327.

17 For the background and organizational process of the World Students' Christian Federation in China see Cha, Shih-chieh, "Min-kuo Chi-tu chiao-hui shih (3)" (History of Protestant Churches in Republican China, part 3), *Kuo-li T'ai-wan ta-hsieh li-shih hsieh-hsi hsueh-pao*, Vol. 16, pp. 379-387; and Lutz, *Chinese Politics and Christian Mission*, pp. 47-54.

18 A few scholars in this field have already discussed the Chinese Communist involvement in the Anti-Christian Student Federation. For example, Professor Jessie G. Lutz has said: "The Shanghai branch of the Socialist Youth Corps apparently was a participant and may well have taken the initiative." (Lutz, *Chinese Politics and Christian Mission*, p. 55.) For similar discussion on this issue see Cha, Shih-chieh, "Min-kuo Chi-tu chiao-hui shih (3)," pp. 387-394; Chao, Jonathan T'ien-en, "The Chinese Indigenous Church Movement 1919-1927: A Protestant Response to the Anti-Christian Movements in Modern China", Ph. D. dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 1986, pp. 136-138; and Yip, Ka-che, *Religion, Nationalism and Chinese Students*, pp. 22-25.

19 For the complete text of this statement see Chang Chin-shih (comp.), *Kuo-nei chin-shih-nien-lai chih tsung-chiao ssu-ch'ao* (The Tide of Religious Thought in China During the Last Decade), Peking, 1927, pp. 187-189.

20 Chang I-ching (ed.), *P'i-p'ing fei Chi-tu-chiao yen-lun hui-k'an* (Complete Edition of the Rebuttal to the Critique of the Anti-Christian Movement), Shanghai, 1927, p. 67.

21 *ibid.*, p. 75.

22 Lutz, *Chinese Politics and Christian Missions*, p. 159.

23 For the most typical and representative essay in this aspect see Yu Chia-chü, "Chiao-hui chiao-yü wen-t'i" (The issue of church education), in Chang Ch'in-shih, pp. 305-309.

24 As for the related activities in this aspect see, Wang Chen-main, "Seeking balance between the Church and the State: A review of Christian higher education in China in the 1920s", *Intercultural Communication Studies*, IV:1, Summer 1994, pp. 88-92.

25 There are many reports on missionary response, such as Hsu Pao-ch'ien, "Pei-ching hsi-chiao-shih lien-ho-hui tui-yü pu-p'ing-teng t'iao-yüeh chih hsüan-yen" (The Announcement of Western Missionaries in Peking on the Unequal Treaties), *Chen-li Chou-k'an*, 6 December, 1925; (Wang) Chih-hsin, "Pei-ching Chung-hsi hsin-t'u i-chih hsiang-yin Hu-an" (Chinese and Western Christians in Peking all give their support to the fight in the May 30 Incident), *Chen-li Chou-k'an*, 14 June, 1925; Chu Yüan-sheng, "Hsi hsüan-chiao-shih ti shih-chin-shih-hu-an" (The touchstone for the Western missionaries - the May 30 Incident), *Chen-li Chou-k'an*, 14 June, 1925; (Wang) Chih-hsin, "I-chou chien Pei-ching chiao-hui kuan-yü hu-an ti wen-chien lü" (What I have seen in the past week about the attitude of Peking people towards the May 30 Incident), *Chen-li Chou-k'an*, 21 June, 1925; Chih-chung, "Ch'uan-chiao-shih tui-yü hu-an chih ching-mo t'an" (Missionary silence on the May 30 Incident), *Chen-li Chou-k'an*, 28 June, 1925; Liu T'ing-fang, "Chi-t'u-chiao yü Chung-kuo min-tsu hsin" (Christianity and the Chinese character), *Sheng-ming yueh-k'an*, Vol. 5, No. 9, pp. 4-23; "Chi-tu-chiao ko t'uan-t'i tui-yü hu-an chih hsüan-yen" (Announcement of various Christian groups on the May 30 Incident), *Sheng-ming yueh-k'an*, Vol. 5, No. 9, pp. 33-35; Ho Ai-hua, "Ai ho hsi-sheng tsai na-li" (Where are the love and sacrifice?), *Chung-hua chi-tu chiao-hui nien-chien*, Vol. 9, p. 26; Latourette, Kenneth Scott., *A History of Christian Missions in China*, New York, 1929, p. 812. For recent studies of missionary attitudes of the period see Varg, Paul A., "The missionary response to the nationalist revolution", in John K Fairbank (ed.), *The Missionary Enterprise in China and America*, Cambridge, 1974, pp. 311-335; Lutz,

Jessie G., *China and Christian Colleges 1850-1950*, Ithaca, 1971, pp. 246-254; and Yip Ka-che, pp. 47-53.

26 For the full text of these measures see Chang Ch'in-shih, pp. 395-400. For an analysis of CCP policy see Chao T'ien-en, *Chung-kung tui Chi-tu-chiao ti cheng-ts'e* (Chinese Communist Policy Towards Christianity), Hong Kong, 1983, pp. 39-60; see also Yip Ka-che, pp. 62-64.

27 Cha Shih-chieh, "Min-kuo Chi-tu-chiao-hui shih (3)", p. 426.

28 Chao, T'ien-an, pp. 61-62.

29 Ni Liang-p'in, "Che-chiang chiao-hui hsien-k'uang: 1927" (The contemporary situation of Chekiang churches, 1927), *Chung-hua chi-tu chiao-hui nien-chien*, Vol. 10, p. 3, 21; Liang Hsi-kao, "Kuang-hsi chiao-hui chuang-k'uang" (The situation of Kwangsi churches), *Chung-hua chi-tu chiao-hui nien-chien*, Vol. 10, p. 2-35; Ch'eng Ching-i, "Ch'uan-kuo chiao-hui kai-kuan" (A general survey of the churches in China), *Chung-hua chi-tu chiao-hui nien-chien*, Vol. 10, p. 1-2; Chang Chun-chun, "Pao-feng chi-yü i-hou ti Hu-nan chiao-hui" (Hunan churches after the storms), *Chung-hua chi-tu chiao-hui nien-chien*, Vol. 10, p. 2; Wu Chi-mu, "Chiang-hsi chiao-hui hsien-k'uang" (The contemporary situation of Kiangsi churches), *Chung-hua chi-tu chiao-hui nien-chien*, Vol. 10, p. 2-36; also see, Chao T'ien-an, p. 61 and Latourette, pp. 819-821.

30 The dead included John E. Williams, the Vice-President of the University of Nanking.

31 Yui, *Indigenization of the YMCA in China*, p. 2.

32 *ibid.*, p. 4.

33 *ibid.*

34 Lutz, Jessie G. (ed), *My Life in China 1910-1936* by Eugene E. Barnett, East Lansing, 1990, p. 185.

35 Yui, David Z. T., *Some Problems Confronting the Christian Movement in China*, Shanghai, 1926, pp. 6-7.

36 *ibid.*, p. 7.

37 (Chang) I-ching, "Chin-jih chiao-hui ssu-ch'ao chih chü-shih", *Chung-hua chi-tu chiao-hui nien-chien*, Vol. 9, pp. 19-25; Lo Yün-yen, "Ch'uan-chiao t'iao-yüeh yü chiao-hui chih kuan-hsi", *Chung-hua chi-tu chiao-hui nien-chien*, Vol. 9, pp. 28-33; Hung Wei-lien, "T'iao-yüeh hsiu-kai yü ch'uan-chiao pao-hui chih wen-t'i", *Sheng-ming yüeh-k'an*, Vol. 6, No. 4, pp. 1-10; Pao Te-hao, "Ch'uan-chiao wei shen mo yao lieh-ju t'iao-yüeh", *Chen-li Chou-k'an*, 21 June 1925. For missionary viewpoints see Latourette, p. 811; *Chinese Recorder*, Vol. 56, pp. 507-517, Vol. 57, pp. 322-328.

38 The great majority of the articles published in Christian papers and magazines opposed the special privileges for the church listed in the unequal treaties. According to opinion polls by the National Christian Council of China in 1926, 150 of 223 respondents favoured annulment of the unequal treaties. Tung Chien-wu, "Chung-hsi chu-mu ti mu-te hui-i" (The Mott conference attracts attention from both Chinese and Westerners), *Chung-hua chi-tu chiao-hui nien-chien*, Vol. 9, p. 155.

39 The Mott Conference was held 3-5 January 1927 in Shanghai to discuss various current problems in Christianity and to decide the future development of the church in China. The conference was named after Dr John R. Mott, Director of the Association of International Missions, who was visiting China at that time. Tung Chien-wu, "Chung-hsi chu-mu ti mu-te hui-i", p. 155. For David Z. T. Yui's response see *Report of Conference on the Church in China Today*, Shanghai, 1926, p. 99.

40 Chen Yun, "Chi-tu-chiao tui-yü tsui-chin shih-chu tang-yü ti t'ai-tu ho ts'o-shih" (The policies and measures churches should have on current affairs), *Wen-she yüeh-k'an*, Vol. 3, No. 3, January 1928, p. 9.

41 Jen Fu, "Shih-nien lai wu-kuo ch'ing-nien-hui chih chung-ta pien-hua" (The major changes in the Chinese YMCA over the past decade), *Ch'ing-nien chin-pu*, 100, February 1927, p. 242.

42 Yui, David Z.T., "Nationalism and Internationalism", address before the Rotary Club of Shanghai, 26 November 1926, Shanghai, 1926, p. 5. The speech was published in *Ch'ing-nien chin-pu* issue 99, January 1927.

43 *ibid.*, pp. 7-8.

44 Fan Po-hui, "Tung-fang ti Chi-tu-chiao" (Oriental Christianity), *Ch'ing-nien chin-pu*, 79, January 1925, pp. 7-8. Here I use the translation in Chao, Jonathan T'ien-en, *The Chinese Indigenous Church Movement 1919-1927*, p. 232.

45 Hsieh Fu-ya, "Chi-tu-chiao hsin-ssu-ch'ao yü Chung-kuo min-tsu ken-pen ssu-hsiang" (New Christian thought and basic Chinese ethnic thought), *Ch'ing-nien chin-pu*, 82, April 1925, pp. 10-11.

46 Chao Tsu-ch'eng, "Chi-tu-chiao tsai chung-kuo ti ch'ien-t'u" (The future of Christianity in China), *CLYSM*, 1.12, November 1926, pp. 340-341.

47 Hsieh Fu-ya, "Chi-tu-chiao ying ju-ho tze yü chung-kuo wen-hua chieh-ho" (How does Christianity integrate with Chinese culture?), *CLYSM*, 2.9, pp. 244-247.

48 Hsieh Fu-ya, "Pen-she chiao-hui wen-ti yü Chi-tu-chiao tsai Chung-kuo chih ch'ien-t'u" (Indigenous Church and the future of Christianity in China), *Wen-she yüeh-k'an*, 1.6, May 1926, p. 3.

49 Ng Lee-ming, "An evaluation of T.C. Chao's Thought", *Ching Feng*, 14.1-2, 1971, p. 32.

50 Ng Lee-ming, "Hsu Po Ch'ien - A Christian model of unification of knowledge and practice", *Ching Feng*, 14.1, 1972, p. 9.

51 Chao, Jonathan T'ien-en, "The Chinese Indigenous Church Movement 1919-1927", pp. 236 and 238.

52 Chao Tsu-ch'eng, "Chi-tu-chiao tsai chung-kuo ti ch'ien-t'u", pp. 340-341.

53 Ng Lee-ming, "A Study of Y. T. Wu", *Ching Feng*, 14.1, 1972, p. 10.

54 *ibid.*, pp. 10-11.

55 Some American secretaries did complain about the leadership of the Chinese YMCA, see Xing, Jun, "Baptized in the Fire Revolution: The American Social Gospel and the YMCA in China 1919-1937", Ph. D. dissertation, University of Minnesota, 1993, pp. 104-109.

56 Before the Northern Expedition the YMCA and YWCA had some 40-50,000 members. During the Northern Expedition the number dropped to about 20,000. However, it rose to 30,000 at the end of the Anti-Christian Movement. At the same time the social volunteers also increased, from 5,100 to 9,400. Yu Jih-chang, "Liang-nien lai chih Chi-tu-chiao Ch'ing-nien-hui shih-yueh" (The Chinese YMCA in the past two years), *Chung-hua chi-tu chiao-hui nien-chien*, Vol. 11(A), pp. 82-86.

Issues in Sino-Japanese relations

Caroline Rose

Sino-Japanese relations were beset by a number of political and economic issues throughout the 1980s. This paper will consider some of the major political controversies, focusing in particular on the 1982 "Textbook Issue". The aim is to determine whether Sino-Japanese relations are different from other bilateral relationships, "unique" because of their historical and cultural experiences and their long history of interaction, or whether on the other hand they conform to general patterns of behaviour between states as put forward in the field of international relations.

After a general overview of some of the issues which have plagued the post-war relationship, the paper then focuses in more detail on the events of 1982 and some of the domestic and external circumstances which influenced Chinese and Japanese decision-making during the "Textbook Issue". The final section of the paper assesses what the "Textbook Issue" indicates about the nature of Sino-Japanese political relations.

Problems in Sino-Japanese relations in the 1980s

Sino-Japanese political relations since 1945 have never really been trouble-free. Prior to diplomatic normalization in 1972, the government of the People's Republic of China (PRC) frequently criticized the Japanese government for one of usually three main reasons: for adopting a "two Chinas policy" (that is, carrying on links with both Taiwan and the Mainland), for insisting on the separation of politics from economics (*seikei bunri*), or for attempting to revive militarism. The criticism ceased temporarily between the signing of the Joint Statement in 1972 and the conclusion of the Peace and Friendship Treaty in 1978. This was probably due to the optimism shared by both governments about the assumed benefits which could accrue from a new era of friendly Sino-Japanese relations, and a

reluctance to "rock the boat". The euphoria which accompanied diplomatic normalization soon faded, however, when problems began to resurface in the late 1970s and continued intermittently throughout the following decade.

The "Baoshan Shock" - a series of postponements and cancellations between 1979 and 1981 of joint Sino-Japanese construction projects - was an early indication that the "mutual complementarity" of Chinese resources and Japanese technology had been overrated. While the "Baoshan shock" was primarily an economic problem between the two countries and revealed economic incompatibilities, problems in the political arena from 1982 onwards brought into question the so-called "special affinity" of the relationship,¹ and saw a return of PRC criticism along the earlier lines of Japanese militarist revival or links with Taiwan.

The 1982 "Textbook Issue" was the first major political problem. It started out as a Japanese domestic matter concerning the content of high school history textbooks, but developed into a diplomatic issue between China and Japan and South Korea and Japan. The issue highlighted conflicting interpretations of wartime history, and although it appeared to be resolved within the space of two months it remained on the agenda for a number of years, flaring up very briefly in 1984 and again in 1986.

The next major political issue after the textbook controversy occurred in August 1985 when Prime Minister Nakasone, in his official capacity, chose to visit Yasukuni Shrine where the spirits of the Japanese war dead, including war criminals, are enshrined. This prompted harsh criticism from the Chinese press which was already commemorating the 40th anniversary of Japan's defeat with a series of articles about Japan's war of invasion in China. Although the Chinese government did not make a formal protest against Nakasone's visit, the issue escalated in September when Chinese students in Beijing held demonstrations protesting not only against Nakasone's action but also against a perceived revival of Japanese militarism and Japan's "second occupation" or "economic invasion" of China. This anti-Japanese movement spread to other cities and demonstrations continued until December, causing political embarrassment to both governments.²

In 1986 there was a renewal of the "Textbook Issue" when a history textbook produced by an ultra-nationalist Japanese group became the object of renewed Chinese and Korean criticism. The situation was exacerbated by Japanese Education Minister Fujio Masayuki, who made a number of insensitive comments about the Nanjing Massacre and about Japanese actions in Korea and was consequently lambasted in the Chinese and Korean press for attempting to defend and "whitewash" Japan's invasion of China and annexation of Korea. Fujio was subsequently dismissed, and the Japanese government apologised for his improper comments, but the Chinese newspaper the *People's Daily* (*Renmin Ribao*) carried a

commentary warning that Fujio's comments represented part of a growing trend towards a resurgence of militarism in Japan.³

A number of events in 1987 added to tension already caused by a trade imbalance and brought Sino-Japanese political relations to a low ebb. A dispute between the Chinese, Taiwanese and Japanese governments concerning the ownership of a Kyoto dormitory for Chinese students was brought to a head in February when a Japanese high court awarded ownership to Taiwan. This was treated as a serious matter by the Chinese government, which regarded the decision as a violation of the Joint Statement (1972) and Peace and Friendship Treaty (1978). Deng Xiaoping himself criticized the decision and reprisals were taken in the form of the expulsion of a Japanese journalist from China. Deng's later criticisms of Japan for reviving militarism and for increasing its defence budget above the 1% ceiling prompted an angry response from some Japanese politicians. Vice Foreign Minister Yanagiya Kensuke implied in a supposedly "off-the-record" response to Chinese criticism that Deng was living above the clouds and did not understand Sino-Japanese relations. This remark in turn incensed the Chinese leadership, which was only pacified after Yanagiya apologised and resigned.⁴

In April 1988 Okuno Seisuke, Director General of the National Land Agency, sparked off another row when, in answer to a question about visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, he remarked that it was time to put the ghosts of the Japanese army occupation to rest and that, because China was a communist country, it had little understanding of religion. When the Chinese Foreign Ministry criticized Okuno for ignoring the facts of history and disregarding diplomatic courtesy, Okuno commented that Japan had not intended to invade China. This resulted in further criticism from the Chinese Foreign Ministry and media, joined by North and South Korea. In May the Japanese government issued a statement saying that this and previous Japanese Cabinets adhered to the line that in the Sino-Japanese war "invasion was a fact". Okuno resigned shortly after.⁵

In February 1989 Prime Minister Takeshita Noboru commented that the question whether or not the Second World War was a war of invasion was a problem for future generations of historians to evaluate. The *People's Daily* criticised the statement, but during talks with Qian Qichen, who was in Tokyo for the funeral of Emperor Hirohito, Takeshita managed to prevent the problem from developing further. Takeshita admitted that the comment was a slip of the tongue and that he regretted that it had become an incident which invited criticism from foreign countries. He added that the fact that Japan's past behaviour was "invasive" could not be denied. The Chinese government took the issue no further, but a speech by Premier Li Peng (7th plenum, 12th People's Congress) in March indicated the Chinese dissatisfaction with the state of affairs. Recalling the disaster brought upon the Chinese and Asian peoples during Japan's war of invasion, he warned

that the nature of the war could not be changed and added the standard maxim of Sino-Japanese relations, that "the past if not forgotten is a guide to the future" (*qianshi buwang, houshi zhishi*).⁶

In the 1990s similar problems persist though not with the same frequency as in previous years, nor with the same reaction from the PRC. In 1990 China expressed "concern" about Japan's plans to despatch men of the Self-Defence Forces overseas to take part in UN peace-keeping operations. This was exacerbated by a conflict over a lighthouse built by the Japanese on one of the Senkaku islands (*Diaoyutai*) - a group of eight islands south-west of Okinawa to which both Japan and China lay claim. Although China lodged a diplomatic protest the issue was resolved quickly and quietly.⁷ In 1991 the politician Ishihara Shintaro - well-known for his co-authorship of the book *The Japan That Can Say NO* - called the Nanjing Massacre a Chinese fantasy. Yet in this case the Chinese government chose not to complain as it had done in the past.⁸ In fact the Chinese government even cancelled two memorial ceremonies planned for August which would have reflected Japan's wartime atrocities, because they would have coincided with Prime Minister Kaifu's visit to China. Moreover, when Kaifu expressed regret for Japan's wartime aggression, the Chinese side remained silent.⁹

The 20th anniversary of diplomatic normalization in 1992 was marked by the Emperor's visit to China. The debate in Japan centred on the question of his official remarks - should the Emperor apologize for Japan's wartime actions?¹⁰ Since the Emperor's role is symbolic rather than political, it was deemed appropriate that his speech should read:

In the long history of the relationship between our two countries there was an unfortunate period in which my country inflicted great sufferings on the people of China. I deeply deplore this.¹¹

The Emperor's visit was generally considered a success and the beginning of a "new stage" of friendly Sino-Japanese relations.¹² In 1993 the fall of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) was followed by the advent of coalition government in Japan. This allowed for a change in the official attitude of the government. Whereas before the LDP would admit to Japan's wartime aggression only when it really had to, post-LDP coalition governments have openly admitted that Japan fought a war of aggression. Furthermore, Prime Ministers Hosokawa, Hata and Murayama have all apologized to the people of Asia for the suffering inflicted by the Japanese army during the war. With the 50th anniversary of the end of the war being marked in 1995, it remains to be seen whether Sino-Japanese relations have genuinely entered a "new stage".¹³

Chinese and Japanese leaders and politicians are always keen to present a very optimistic picture of Sino-Japanese relations. They frequently refer to friendly, neighbourly relations, the product of 2000 years of contact, Chinese and Japanese cultural and racial similarities, geographical

proximity and economic complementarity. Yet the issues described above indicate that the situation is far removed from diplomatic rhetoric. With the exception of the disputes over territory and the Kyoto dormitory issue, the salient feature of all the incidents described above is the "historical" aspect, the legacy of the Sino-Japanese war. So powerful is this legacy that all the issues seem to follow a pattern where, to quote Allen Whiting, "provocative events in Japan associated with the war trigger an automatic response in China that combines anger over the past with apprehension about the future".¹⁴ Much of the literature on Sino-Japanese political relations tends to stress the historical and cultural aspect of the "Chinese" and "Japanese" experiences to explain why Sino-Japanese relations are conducted the way they are. Such literature explains that this is an emotionally charged relationship, dominated by ambivalent attitudes - Japan's flattery of China stemming from the cultural debt, but also its contempt for China's backwardness; China's superiority complex stemming from centuries of cultural influence and "Middle Kingdom" hierarchy, but its inferiority complex based on its relatively slow pace of modernization.¹⁵ Thus we are told Sino-Japanese relations are conditioned by Japan's cultural debt to China, by 2000 years of history and by memories of the atrocities suffered by the Chinese at the hands of the Japanese.

The 1982 "Textbook Issue" appears to be a typical example of this pattern, that is, the Japanese Education Ministry alters history textbooks and this provokes a justifiable outcry from China and other Asian countries, which see in this attempt at historical revisionism an indication that some Japanese are trying to revive militarism. On closer examination, however, this "historical legacy" line of reasoning oversimplifies the complexity of the issue and obscures the fact that the "Textbook Issue" was not simply concerned with interpretation of history, if indeed it was concerned with history at all.

Domestic and external influences on foreign policy-making

Before turning to the events of the "Textbook Issue" it is necessary to suggest an organizational framework which will help to explain how and why the events occurred. Foreign policy decision-making theories that were developed within the field of international relations have shown that a large number of factors or variables influence the way governments arrive at foreign policy decisions. These factors can be grouped into two broad categories, external and domestic.

External variables refer to the effects of the structures of the international system (for example, bipolarity or multi-polarity), and the effect of the policies and actions of other nations on a nation's foreign policy.

Domestic variables refer to a large number of indigenous factors which affect the foreign policy decision-maker to a greater or lesser extent. Included in this category, for example, are a nation's attributes - its topographical characteristics, population attributes, economic and military capabilities and its political, economic and social systems. Less quantifiable but equally important is the influence of a nation's character, culture and history. The structure of a nation's government organization, the operating procedures of its bureaucracy and its decision-making processes must also be considered. Finally, one must take into account the perceptions, personal characteristics and beliefs of individual key leaders and the effect these have on foreign policy decisions.

Ideally then, a case study of any nation's foreign policy process must take into account as many of these factors as possible. This is not to say that all of the factors play a highly influential role in all foreign policy decisions. The relative influence of any of the variables on a particular foreign policy outcome depends largely on the type of issue in question. A study, for example, of a "routine" issue which requires a long deliberation and formulation time and involves many decision-makers would produce different findings to a study, say, of a "crisis" issue which demands a rapid response and involves a small corps of decision-makers.

While a number of studies have utilized this type of framework to examine Chinese and Japanese decision-making separately, the literature on Sino-Japanese political relations remains lacking in systematic, methodological case studies. A standard account of Sino-Japanese political relations gives a description of events and developments over a broad time period, usually from the perspective of either the Chinese or the Japanese side, and a forecast of how the relationship will develop in the future. Overemphasis in the literature on the historical and cultural factors was noted above. Undoubtedly these are indeed factors which contribute to Sino-Japanese foreign policy behaviour but, as the foreign policy-making theories illustrate, they are by no means the only factors, nor are they necessarily the key determinants of foreign policy decisions. It is essential therefore when studying an issue in Sino-Japanese relations to consider the possible effect of all relevant variables and to allow also for variations in behaviour according to issue type, be it routine, political, critical or crisis-level. Applying this type of organizational framework to the "Textbook Issue", in other words considering the effects of external and domestic factors on the decision-making process according to issue type, should provide a clearer picture of how Sino-Japanese interaction works.

The 1982 "Textbook Issue"

Before analysing the events of "Textbook Issue", it is necessary to provide some background to the events of the summer of 1982. At the beginning of June 1982 Premier Zhao Ziyang paid an official visit to Japan. In his meetings with Emperor Hirohito and Prime Minister Suzuki Zenko he talked of "establishing long-standing and stable ties of economic co-operation in the spirit of peace, friendship, equality and mutual benefit". He also commented on the favourable conditions that Sino-Japanese relations enjoyed, namely normalised diplomatic relations, a long-standing traditional friendship and topographical advantages. Zhao and Suzuki both expressed satisfaction over the steady development of political, economic and cultural relations since 1972.¹⁶ By the end of July, however, a bitter dispute over textbooks dominated the Sino-Japanese political agenda. It jeopardized Prime Minister Suzuki's impending visit to China and, according to Japanese Foreign Ministry officials at the time, set back Sino-Japanese relations by ten years.

The content of history textbooks had been a domestic issue in Japanese politics for some years, but it became an international issue following reports in the Japanese media at the end of June which spoke of watered-down accounts of Japanese wartime aggression in China and Korea in the high-school history textbooks that had just been authorized by the Education Ministry.¹⁷ According to the reports (which were by no means consistent), the new batch of textbooks differed from those of previous years not just in their descriptions of Japan's war-time actions but also in the references to the Emperor system, nuclear power plants and citizen's rights and duties. The general tone of these new textbooks was perceived by the media to have reverted to that found in pre-war textbooks, and according to the press this was due to more rigorous textbook authorization carried out by the Education Ministry. The newspapers gave specific examples of how the textbooks had allegedly been altered. On the question of "invasion" the reports said that the Education Ministry had recommended that the phrase "the invasion of China" be changed to "the advance into China". Passages relating to the Nanjing Massacre had also been reworded, with the result that the responsibility for the killings lay with the Chinese army, due to its "tenacious resistance" to the Japanese army. The "18 September (or Manchurian) Incident" was described in the new textbooks merely as "bombing of the South Manchurian Railway by the Japanese army". Ironically, some of these reports were incorrect and it later came to light that the Education Ministry had not recommended that "invasion" be changed to "advance" in connection with descriptions of China in that year's textbook authorization process. By the time the error was discovered (or at least made public¹⁸), the issue had become a diplomatic matter.

The *People's Daily* carried a short article summarizing these Japanese press reports in its 29 June issue, although with no commentary or analysis

attached. Nearly one month later, however, in the last ten days of July, articles and commentaries criticizing Japan's Education Ministry for attempting to distort historical facts began to appear with increasing frequency not only in the *People's Daily* but in all the major Chinese daily newspapers. On 26 July the Chinese government made an official representation to the Japanese government requesting that certain passages in the problem textbooks be corrected, thereby raising the issue to a diplomatic problem. The sections at fault were those reported in the original Japanese press reports of the end of June, that is, the passages which included the change of "invasion" to "advance" and "all-out aggression against China" to "all-round advance into China", the passages which attributed the Nanjing atrocities to the "stubborn resistance of Chinese troops", and the description of the 18 September Incident as "the bombing of the South Manchurian Railway".¹⁹

The Japanese government's preliminary response was to entrust the Education Ministry with the task of explaining the textbook screening system to Chinese embassy officials. These initial explanations were rather vague, stressing the independent role of textbook authors and editors while playing down the role of the Education Ministry in the screening process. The Chinese government saw this explanation as an attempt by the Education Ministry to push the blame onto the private publishing companies which produce the textbooks. Further angered by the comments of some LDP leaders (including Education Minister Ogawa Heiji and the particularly vociferous Director General of the National Land Agency, Matsuno Yukiyasu) who had accused China of interfering in domestic matters, the Chinese government retracted an invitation to the Education Minister to visit China in September. This was followed on 5 August by a reiteration of the demand for the textbooks to be corrected.

The South Korean government had also entered the fray by this stage, having requested through diplomatic channels on 3 August that descriptions, amongst other things, of the Korean independence movement be rewritten in a less negative light.²⁰ The issue was attracting much adverse media attention throughout South-East Asia and the response by the Japanese government in the light of this mounting anti-Japanese movement was to send Education and Foreign Ministry representatives to China and later to Korea to discuss the matter.

In the meantime the Japanese government appeared no closer to resolving the issue internally because of the emergence of a conflict between the Education and Foreign Ministries and within the LDP. The Education Ministry was resolute in its position that the textbooks should not be corrected at the request of a foreign government and that the content of the history books did not, as the Chinese and South Korean governments maintained, violate the spirit of the joint statements and peace treaties signed with those two countries. On the other hand the Foreign Ministry, worried

about the deterioration of relations with China and Korea, urged the Education Ministry to change the textbooks in accordance with Chinese and South Korean requests. The media, public opinion and some LDP members supported the Foreign Ministry view, whereas the Education Ministry gained the support of LDP education-related Dietmen (*bunkyo-zoku*) and hawks like Matsuno Yukiyasu, who in later years would certainly have been forced to resign for some of his comments.²¹

With the second round of explanations failing to solve the "misunderstanding" between Japan and China (and Japan and Korea), the anti-Japanese media campaigns still in full swing in China and Korea and the conflict between the Education and Foreign Ministries worsening, it fell to Prime Minister Suzuki to reach a "political judgement". He instructed the two ministries to "co-ordinate" their views and pledged a solution to the matter before his visit to China in September. The Japanese government finally issued a statement on 26 August which stated that it would make the necessary amendments to the textbooks and that a Textbook Authorization Research Council enquiry would look into the possibility of changing the criteria of the textbook authorization system. Although the statement appeared to accede to the foreign requests, its wording was ambiguous, failing to make clear how and when the corrections would be made. Although the South Korean government accepted the statement in principle, the Chinese government expressed dissatisfaction with its ambiguity. Further talks between the Japanese and Chinese governments took place on 8 September and the Japanese side explained in more detail how and when the corrections would be made. Shortly after this last round of talks Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian announced that the Chinese government accepted the measures put forward by the Japanese government and considered the matter closed - while reserving the right to re-open it if the Japanese government failed to carry out the measures.

When Prime Minister Suzuki visited China in September on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the normalization of Sino-Japanese relations, he expressed the hope that Sino-Japanese economic and technical co-operation would continue to increase. As an oblique apology for the "Textbook Issue" Suzuki quoted a section of the Japan-China Joint Statement of 1972 stating that "Japan is keenly aware of its responsibility for causing enormous damage in the past to the Chinese people through war and deeply reproaches itself".²² In response Zhao Ziyang stated that the Chinese government's policy on the development of Sino-Japanese relations remained unchanged, indicating that the "Textbook Issue" had been resolved.

The events described above suggest nothing more than a conflict over the interpretation of history, but when the actions of the Chinese government and the reactions of the Japanese government are studied in more detail, then it becomes clear that the issue goes far deeper than textbook content.

Chinese decision-making on the "Textbook Issue"

The biggest question surrounding the "Textbook Issue" is why the Chinese government decided to turn a Japanese domestic educational matter into a diplomatic issue, particularly on the eve of Prime Minister Suzuki's visit to China to celebrate ten years of normalization.

The simplest explanation is that the Chinese government was incensed at the distorted facts in the textbooks and perceived a revival of militarism in Japan. After all, as Carol Gluck has pointed out,

When it comes to war, national history is clearly an international affair. Revising one's own history is one thing; revising another country's history is something else altogether. The Rape of Nanking, after all, belongs at least as much to China as to Japan.²³

This is undoubtedly true. Yet if the "Textbook Issue" was a case of the Chinese government responding "automatically" to "a provocative Japanese action" as Whiting might argue, then why was there a three-week gap between the first report in the *People's Daily* at the end of June and the start of the anti-Japanese campaign at the end of July? Furthermore, considering that Japanese textbooks had contained such euphemistic wording as "advance" in previous years (as the Japanese Education Ministry openly admitted), and that a debate over the "truth" about the Nanjing Massacre had been raging within Japan for over ten years, then why had this not triggered an "automatic response" from China before?

Clearly there were factors involved in the "Textbook Issue" other than a mere attempt by the Chinese government to persuade the Japanese to "adopt a correct view of history". Various explanations have been suggested by Japanese and Western commentators to account for the Chinese decision to raise the issue to diplomatic level and all tend to agree that rather than being a spontaneous reaction, the issue was in fact planned and controlled by the top leadership, namely Deng Xiaoping, Zhao Ziyang and Hu Yaobang.

The reasons for this line of thinking are twofold. First, the *People's Daily* campaign showed careful planning - a content analysis by Tanaka Akihiko shows a wave-like pattern where the number of articles relating to the war, Japanese atrocities and revival of militarism increase around the anniversary on 15 August of Japan's surrender in the Second World War and the anniversary on 3 September of the Chinese victory in the anti-Japanese war. Tanaka concludes that the campaign was designed to revolve around these two key dates and similarly was planned to be wound down gradually by 10 September to coincide with the end of the 12th Party Congress.²⁴

The second indication that the issue was centrally planned and controlled was that both the Chinese Foreign Ministry and Education Ministry appeared either reluctant to become involved in the issue or ill-informed about it. For example, the Education Ministry issued its invitation to Japanese Education Minister Ogawa after the *People's Daily* campaign

had already started and when Xiao Xiangqian of the Foreign Ministry had just made his representation to the Japanese embassy. According to Okada Hidehiro, this indicates that the Education Ministry had not expected the issue to escalate to this level and had not been involved in the decision-making process at this stage. A week later the Education Ministry rescinded the invitation, but Okada suggests the wording of the rescission implied that it was not really the wish of the Education Ministry to do so. Similarly, the Chinese Foreign Ministry, by targeting its criticism solely on the Japanese Education Ministry, also indicated that it was not in favour of the anti-Japanese campaign.²⁵

It having been established that the textbook controversy was centrally controlled, the question remains what factors prompted the leadership to launch the campaign. Explanations of the "Textbook Issue" have suggested many reasons relating variously to bilateral issues, domestic factors in Chinese politics and external factors.

In terms of it being a purely bilateral problem, some suggest that the issue was a way to "bring the Japanese government to heel" or to humiliate Prime Minister Suzuki before his impending visit.²⁶ Other explanations suggest it was a means of exacting more economic aid from Japan.²⁷ Such explanations are commonly cited in the literature on Sino-Japanese relations where it is argued that China uses the issue of past aggression as a lever to extract greater economic co-operation and Japan always complies. A third line of explanation relates the issue to another perennial problem in Sino-Japanese relations, that is, Taiwan, suggesting that the "Textbook Issue" was used to indicate the Chinese government's displeasure at the trade talks then in progress between an LDP trade mission and the Taiwanese government.²⁸

Other analyses have accounted for Chinese behaviour in terms of the Chinese domestic situation at the time and not a bilateral problem at all. A number of explanations state that the Chinese leadership saw in the "Textbook Issue" an opportunity to achieve one (or more) domestic objectives. One argument states that the Deng-Hu-Zhao triumvirate used the issue to divert attention away from a power struggle that was going on between them and some elements in the People's Liberation Army (PLA), in particular senior military leaders who didn't really approve of Deng's policies which they saw as moving away from Mao's values. This section of the PLA had criticized the leadership for making too many concessions to the United States in connection with the Sino-American negotiations on reducing arms sales to Taiwan. The leadership therefore mounted the anti-Japanese campaign and adopted a hard line to prove that it could take a strong stand against Japan (a representative of the "West") and thus prevent any further PLA criticism of weakness.²⁹

Another explanation connected with Chinese internal policies is that the "Textbook Issue" was a means of boosting a youth campaign in China

which aimed to raise awareness about Chinese history, show the superiority of "socialist spiritual civilization" and strengthen support for the Party amongst Chinese youth.³⁰ According to Tanaka Akihiko, the youth education campaign began in earnest on 25 July, the day before China's protest, and continued until October. The Communist Youth League instructed all its units to organize a movement urging youth to "Learn history, love your country". Tanaka suggests therefore that the "Textbook Issue" was "developed" after 20 July in order to synchronize it with this youth education campaign and in order to help teach Chinese youth about the Sino-Japanese war.

A third set of arguments links the "Textbook Issue" with China's external relations and changes in China's foreign policy. For example, Nakajima suggests that the anti-Japan campaign was used as a way of signalling a shift in its foreign policy posture away from the "West" in favour of the Soviet Union - there had been increasing speculation that the PRC and the Soviet Union were willing to discuss the possibility of opening talks on normalization.³¹

Other analysts suggest that the "Textbook Issue" provided an opportunity for the Chinese government to illustrate that its foreign policy was not shifting in favour of the USSR necessarily, but was moving towards an "independent foreign policy". Zhao Ziyang had talked in April 1982 of the need for China to follow an independent foreign policy, but the concept was officially articulated by Hu Yaobang at the 12th Party Congress at the beginning of September.³² It is thought that this new foreign policy approach was introduced largely in response to internal criticism (again from the PLA) that China had leaned too much in favour of the capitalist countries. Thus the PRC government's tough stance on Japan over the textbooks was an illustration that this situation was going to change.

Some of the explanations described are more plausible than others, and it seems most likely that the "Textbook Issue" provided the PRC leadership with an opportunity to boost the youth education campaign and divert attention away from the power struggle with the PLA, thereby giving itself time to consolidate its power at the 12th Party Congress. What is certain is that the Chinese government was not merely (perhaps not even) concerned with settling a conflict of interpretations of Sino-Japanese history - there was only a handful of references to Japanese textbook content or Japanese history teaching in the hundreds of paragraphs given over to the "Textbook Issue" in the *People's Daily*.

Japanese policy-making on the "Textbook Issue"

A study of the Japanese government's response to the "Textbook Issue" and the decision-making process involved shows some similarities to the Chinese case in terms of the dominance of domestic factors.

To understand the Japanese response, it is necessary to explain the background of the Japanese domestic "Textbook Issue" which emerged after the occupation but came to the fore in 1980. Education in post-war Japan has been dominated by antagonism between the LDP and the Japan Teachers' Union (JTU). The LDP has constantly tried to limit the influence of the Marxist JTU on the education system and in turn the JTU has consistently tried to block LDP moves to recreate what it perceives to be a pre-war authoritarian education system. When the LDP won an overwhelming majority in the double elections in June 1980 it was in a position to carry through a tougher policy on textbooks. Worried about a Left-wing bias in textbooks apparently due to the influence of the JTU and the Japan Socialist Party (JSP), the LDP recommended that the Education Ministry tighten up its textbook authorization system in order to produce more patriotic textbooks. It was the textbooks authorized under these new guidelines which gave rise to the internationalization of the "Textbook Issue". Furthermore, there had also been a debate in the 1970s about what really happened during the Nanjing Massacre, and from this debate originated the idea that the massacre was a fantasy or fiction. According to Fujiwara Akira, this debate in turn enabled the Education Ministry to allow more vague descriptions of the Nanjing Massacre or the omission of the numbers of Chinese killed or wounded with the excuse that there was no conclusive proof.³³

Against this background then, the Japanese government was suddenly faced with a "critical" diplomatic issue. The term "critical" is used in the same sense as Fukui Haruhiro in his study of Japan's foreign policy-making in the run-up to normalization with China.³⁴ A critical issue is not a crisis because there is no threat to national security, but it shares the three main characteristics of a crisis (though less acute), that is, surprise, short decision time and threats to decision-maker's values or goals.

In the "Textbook Issue" the surprise element was the sudden attack by the PRC media on the Japanese Education Ministry followed swiftly by diplomatic representations by both the PRC and ROK governments. Indeed, the Japanese press considered that the government had responded slowly to the foreign demands precisely because it had not expected the issue to go to these levels. The short decision-time element was present in the Chinese and Korean governments' demands for immediate corrections and the mounting pressure in the form of media campaigns spreading throughout East Asia and touching off an anti-Japanese movement. The threat to decision-makers' values or goals could be seen in the response of the Education Ministry which resolutely opposed all pressures to change the offending passages in

the textbooks on the grounds that such action would undermine the textbook authorization system - a system that, as we saw earlier, the Education Ministry was in fact in the process of trying to strengthen. In more general terms there was widespread fear in the LDP that if the Japanese were seen to give in to foreign interference in what was essentially a domestic issue, their international credibility would be affected at a time when they were trying to raise their status in world affairs.

A critical issue is resolved by a small number of high-level political leaders whose decisions are easily identifiable. The decision-making core on the Japanese side was made up of Education and Foreign Ministry bureau chiefs, vice-ministers and ministers, the Chief Cabinet Secretary and the Prime Minister. The final decision was that of the Prime Minister, who given the failure of diplomatic moves was called upon to reach a political judgement. Of course, none of these decision-makers operated in a vacuum and their decisions were affected by a number of other "actors" - the LDP factions, the education "tribe" or *bunkyo-zoku*, the bureaucracy, the opposition parties, the media and public opinion. One of the most striking characteristics that the "Textbook Issue" revealed was the number of conflicts not only between ministries but within the LDP and within the *bunkyo-zoku*. Yet most of these conflicts were concerned not with how best to appease the Chinese and Korean governments but with how to defend respective corners and maintain the *status quo*.

The main conflict was between the Foreign Ministry, which recommended going along with the requests regardless of how this would affect the education system in order to avoid further diplomatic problems, and the Education Ministry, which opposed changing the textbooks regardless of the diplomatic consequences. The LDP was also split on the issue, four "hawks" (Matsuno Yukiyasu, Fujio Masayuki, Nakagawa Ichiro and Minowa Noboru) expressing the view that the demands by China and Korea represented interference in internal affairs and that Japan should not give in, and LDP "doves" (Kosaka Tokusaburo) recommending moderation. There was also a conflict within the education *zoku*, some members (Mitsuzuka Hiroshi, Ishibashi Kazuya and Aoki Masahisa) defending the textbook authorization system, and others (Fujinami Takao) recommending caution.³⁵

Factional conflict was not a salient feature of the issue; this can be explained by Fukui's argument that because factions are not issue-oriented, factional conflict does not always play a significant role in a "critical" issue.³⁶ Furthermore, factional conflict was probably eased in this case because the non-mainstream factions, being largely pro-Korean, did not want to see a deterioration in Japan-Korea relations and so did not raise as much objection as they might have done had Korea not been involved.³⁷ Nevertheless, it is possible that some non-mainstream faction members (for

example, Nakagawa) saw the issue as an opportunity to make comments that would humiliate Prime Minister Suzuki and prevent his re-election.

The opposition parties, the JTU, the media and public opinion were very much united in their criticism of the government's handling of the issue, although each had a slightly different reason. The financial world, worried about the possible adverse effects on trade with China, Korea and Asia as a whole, exerted pressure on the government to resolve the issue as quickly as possible. Indeed one analysis states that, as the issue developed, one of the major concerns of the LDP leadership was the extent to which trade with Asia would be affected.³⁸

Faced with this plethora of conflicting attitudes and pressures, the Prime Minister had to reach a "political judgement" which would accommodate the foreign demands without abandoning domestic policies and losing domestic support. It appears that in the decision-making process domestic issues played a greater role than concerns over whether or not the Japanese view of history was correct. The Chinese and Korean governments were appeased by the Japanese government's promise to correct the errors in the textbooks and by the inclusion of a clause in the criteria for textbook authorization which pledged "consideration of international harmony in the treatment of history involving neighbouring countries". On the other hand refusal to stipulate a time schedule and method of correction pacified the Education Ministry and those opposed to changing the textbooks.

Schoppa suggests that as a result of the internationalization of the "Textbook Issue", textbook screening did become less strict. Certainly the following year the Education Ministry made no recommendations that passages containing "invasion" be altered to "advance". However, the recurrence of the "Textbook Issue" in 1984 and 1986 suggests that the issue did not bring about a permanent or decisive change in textbook content.

Conclusion

The aim of this paper was to establish whether Sino-Japanese political relations are better explained in terms of their unique cultural and historical interaction or in terms of general theories of inter-state behaviour. As the analysis has shown, the "Textbook Issue", although sparked off by Japanese media and Chinese government indignation at apparent attempts to tone down descriptions of the war in textbooks, was concerned with the interpretation of Sino-Japanese history only at a very superficial level. As such the "Textbook Issue" should not be considered solely within the framework of historical interaction of China and Japan and their resultant "special" relationship.

It is necessary therefore to take a wider view of the relationship and to look to some of the foreign policy-making theories for an explanation of Sino-Japanese relations. As described, domestic factors in each country played a particularly influential role in the outcome of the issue. On the Chinese side the "domestic factor" explanations are good illustrations of the phenomenon described by Robert Jervis:

"when decision makers are faced with internal discontent they will tend to look for foreign adventures to divert the energies of their people and to create a unifying spirit".³⁹

On the Japanese side bureaucratic politics - or the conflicting interests of bureaucracies - clearly affected the decision-making process.

When attempting to analyse Sino-Japanese political interaction the interplay of domestic and external considerations must be taken into account, and systematic application of foreign policy decision-making theories to this and other issues in Sino-Japanese relations is necessary for a greater understanding of the workings of this bilateral relationship.

Notes

1 Walter Arnold, "Japan and China" in *Japan's Foreign Relations*, Robert S. Ozaki and Walter Arnold (eds), Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1985, p.106.

2 Tanaka Akihiko, *Nitchu Kankei 1945-1990*, Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1991, pp. 137-145; and Allen Whiting, *China Eyes Japan*, Berkeley, LA, London: University of California Press, 1989, pp. 53-54, 67-70

3 Tanaka, 1991, pp. 150-152; Laura Newby, *Sino-Japanese Relations*, London, New York: Routledge, 1988, p. 53, and Whiting, 1989, pp. 62-65.

4 Tanaka, 1991, pp. 155-62; Whiting, 1989, pp. 152-162, and Newby, 1988, pp. 59-60.

5 Tanaka, 1991, pp. 168-169 and Whiting, 1989, p. 200.

6 Tanaka, 1991, p. 169.

7 In 1992 however the PRC decided to reassert its sovereignty over the islands, causing outcry in Japan's ultra-nationalist circles. *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 1 November 1990, pp. 19-20 and 28 May 1992, p. 23.

8 *ibid.*, 5 September 1991, p. 16.

9 *ibid.*, 22 August 1991, p. 10.

10 For the debate on the Emperor's trip see *Japan Echo*, Vol. XIX, No. 4 Winter 1992, pp. 6-26.

11 *ibid.*, Vol. XX, 1993, p. 46.

12 *ibid.*, Vol. XX, 1993, pp. 45-51.

13 Later in 1994 problems soon resurfaced when two Japanese Cabinet ministers were forced to resign for their insensitive remarks about the war. In May Justice Minister

Nagano Shigeto remarked that the Nanjing Massacre never happened, and that Japan's invasion of China and other Asian nations was not an act of aggression but was aimed at liberating these countries from colonialism. In August Director General of the Environment Agency Sakurai Shin said that Japan did not fight with the intention to wage a war of aggression, and added that Japan liberated Asia from Western colonialism. The comments of both politicians drew condemnation from China, North and South Korea and throughout Asia, and consequently they were both forced to resign. Once again, however, the PRC chose not to let it develop into a diplomatic incident. Jiang Zemin reportedly said: "The bonds of friendship between China and Japan must be developed while keeping in mind the past as an admonishment for the future." *Japan Times Weekly*, 16-22 May 1994, pp.1, 5, and 29 August-4 September 1994, p. 8.

14 Whiting, 1989, p. 41.

15 For examples of this type of approach see: Ijiri Hidenori, "Sino-Japanese controversy since the 1972 diplomatic normalization" in *China Quarterly*, 1990, Vol.124; Chalmers Johnson, "The patterns of Japanese relations with China 1952-1982" in *Pacific Affairs*, 1986, Vol. 59; Iriye Akira, "Chinese-Japanese relations 1945-1990" in *China Quarterly*, 1990, Vol.124; Robert Taylor, *The Sino-Japanese Axis*, London: Athlone, 1985, pp. 96-116.

16 *Beijing Review*, 14 June 1982, pp. 5-6.

17 The following account is based on the reports of *Asahi Shimbun* and *Renmin Ribao* June to September 1982.

18 It appears that the newspapers which first printed the erroneous reports were well aware of the mistakes but continued to give the impression that "invasion" had been changed to "advance". Furthermore, the Education Ministry was also aware of the errors but failed to take any action against the press. See Watanabe Shoichi, 1982, "Banken kyo ni hoeta kyokasho mondai" in *Shokun*, October, pp. 26-27, and Sugiyama Takao, 1982, "Naze Monbusho wa kono 'ogoho' o hochi shita no ka" in *Shukan Bunshun*, No.37, p. 159.

19 See *Asahi Shimbun* 27 July 1982, p. 1 and *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts* FE/7090/A3/1.

20 According to the Japanese newspapers, the Education Ministry had recommended that the word "riot" be used in descriptions of the Korean Independence Movement

21 Examples of Matsuno's remarks: "Changing the wording in textbooks according to a foreign request is interference in Japan's domestic affairs. To change advance into invade would be a distortion of facts and children would lose respect for their forefathers." - *Asahi Shimbun* (pm edition) 29 July, p. 1. "At the time that Japan advanced into China it had the view that the whole nation was united into one and no one thought of it as aggression. It should be set forth, specifically, that we did not think of it as aggression, in the past, and, specifically, that today, it is this way." - *Nihon Keizai*, 27 August, p. 1.

22 *Beijing Review*, 11 October 1982, pp. 7-9.

23 Carol Gluck, "The Idea of Showa" in Carol Gluck and Stephen R. Grambard (eds), *Showa: The Japan of Hirohito*, 1992, p. 15.

24 Tanaka Akihiko, "Kyokasho Mondai o meguru Chugoku no seisaku kettei" in Okabe Tatsumi, *Chugoku Gaiko*, Tokyo: Nihon Kokusai Mondai Kenkyujo, 1983, pp. 198-202; see also Doi Masayuki, "Kyokasho hihan no uragawa ni aru mono" in *Asahi Jinaru*, 13 August 1982, p. 7.

25 Okada Hidehiro, "Kyokasho kentei wa chugoku no naisei mondai da" in *Chuō Kōron*, October 1982, pp. 90-92.

26 Akasaka Taro, "Kyokasho ni mo 'Kakuei' ari" in *Bungei Shunjū*, October 1982, p. 163, "China was not satisfied with the China policy under the Suzuki administration"; see also Chalmers Johnson, "Patterns of Japanese relations with China 1952-1982" in *Pacific Affairs*, 1986, Vol. 59, pp. 420-421.

27 See Walter Arnold, "Political and economic influences in Japan's relations with China since 1978" in K. Newland, *The International Relations of Japan*, London: Macmillan, 1990, p. 139.

28 Okada, 1982, p. 84; Doi, 1982, p. 9.

29 Okada, 1982, pp. 91-3; Ijiri, 1990, pp. 645-646

30 Tanaka, 1983, pp. 200-206

31 Nakajima Mineo in *Sankei Shimbun*, 20 August 1982, p. 11, translated in *Daily Summary of Japanese Press*, 25 August 1982, p. 12.

32 Hu Yaobang, "Create a new situation" in *Beijing Review*, 13 September 1982, p. 29, and *Sekai Shūbō*, 19 October 1982, p. 21.

33 Fujiwara Akira, "Nankin Daigyakusatsu", *Iwanami Pamphlets Showa History Series*, 1988, No.5, p. 22.

34 Fukui Haruhiro, "Tanaka goes to Peking: A case study in foreign policy-making" in T.J. Pempel, *Policy-making in Contemporary Japan*, Ithaca: Cornell, 1977.

35 Leonard J. Schoppa, 1991, *Education Reform in Japan*, London: Routledge, 1991, pp. 61-2.

36 Fukui, 1977, p.101.

37 *Japan Times Weekly*, 11 September 1982, p. 4.

38 Paul S. Kim, "Japan's bureaucratic decision-making on the textbooks" in *Public Administration*, 1983, 61, p. 293.

39 Robert Jervis, *The Logic of Images in International Relations*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1989, Morningside Edition, p.34.

Mapping the Japanese Empire: Colonial science in Shanghai and Manchuria

Morris F. Low

Introduction

Is there a Japanese style of colonialism? In *Colonialism's Culture* Nicholas Thomas argues the need for more localized theories and historically specific accounts in the study of colonizing practices.¹ This paper attempts to analyse colonialism as a cultural process, focussing on how science provided a host of signs, metaphors and narratives.² This paper is divided into two major parts in order to show that the Japanese attempted to project scientific discourses in a number of regions under their influence at the same time, using similar institutions, practices and representations to control the people. The first part of the paper examines colonial/neo-colonial science in Manchuria and the second focuses on Shanghai - two "places" which were (1) collecting sites for data, (2) locations which would be mapped and ordered as part of Japan's growing sphere of influence, and (3) sites for the display of the phenomena that were gathered and exhibited in libraries, museums and research institutes and reported on in journals.³

Some twenty years ago George Basalla proposed a model for describing the introduction of Western science into non-European countries. Basalla's model consists of three overlapping stages. The first is when the country in question acts as a source for European science through scientific expeditions. In the second a colonial science is developed which is still based on the institutions and traditions of a scientifically advanced nation. The third and final stage is the development of a national science.⁴

The term "colonial science" refers to the overt use of a scientific "cover" for territorial expansion and also, as suggested above, to the use of a colony or territory as a source of scientific and often commercially useful material and data by the home country. There is also a linkage between

colonial science and scientific colonialism, a systematic approach to the domination of a colony.

Japanese historians of science have not developed Basalla's model. This is partly because the historiography of expansion in Japan has tended to be nationalistic in flavour and used before the Second World War as a way of justifying Japan's "right" to expand overseas. Marxist historians who have written on the subject have tended to see Japanese expansion as a result of pre-war Japanese fascism. Recently, however, renewed interest has been shown in Japanese imperialism in Asia, partly as a result of research by American scholars.⁵

The Japanese government during the Meiji period was able to establish modern science in Japan without having to enter into a "colonial-type" dependency relationship with an outside Western power. Japan's colonial empire, however, provides a case in which Basalla's three stages may find interesting application. China provides an example of how a number of industrialized nations sought to gain a foothold in order to ensure that their own interests in Asia would be safeguarded.

Colonial science in Manchuria

Early attempts to establish Manchuria as a source for Western science can be traced back to 1896, when the Russian botanist Vladimir Komarov, together with two other naturalists, carried out a scientific expedition to explore Manchuria and especially the regions where the lines for the new Manchurian railway were to be marked out.⁶ This connection between science and imperial expansion is all too clear from the end of the 19th century onwards.

By the end of the Russo-Japanese War in 1905 the Japanese had won dominance over southern Manchuria and the railway lines from Mukden to the port of Dairen.⁷ The South Manchuria Railway Company (SMR) was established by Japan in 1906, half of the company's original capital being provided by the Japanese government. This company dominated the Manchurian economy, with control over railways, coalmines and industrial plants. The railways provided Japan with the means by which to exploit Manchuria's natural resources and territory beyond its borders. The next few decades saw a period of intense railway rivalry between China, Russia and Japan in which economic and territorial rights were at stake.⁸

The first president of the SMR was Goō Shinpei, who had been chief civil administrator in Taiwan during the period 1898-1906. Goō advocated a scientific approach to colonialism which stressed the need for research for colonial development and which included the use of railways as a force for

"progress".⁹ Gotō advocated a "scientific" approach to colonial governance and development and what he referred to as "biological politics":

Any scheme of colonial administration, given the present advances in science, should be based on principles of biology. What are these principles? They are to promote science and develop agriculture, industry, sanitation, education, communications and the police force. If these are satisfactorily accomplished, we shall be able to persevere in the struggle for survival and win the contest of "the survival of the fittest". Animals survive by overcoming heat and cold and by enduring thirst and hunger. This is possible for them because they adapt to their environment. Thus, depending upon time and place, we too should adopt suitable measures and try to overcome the various difficulties which confront us. In our administration of Taiwan we shall then be assured of a future of brilliance and glory.¹⁰

In Gotō's eyes, colonial policy must restructure the social and physical environment in order for certain social changes and evolution to occur. Gotō invited Japanese scholars to examine and compile information on Chinese legal history and customs in order for Gotō and his administrators to implement certain reforms.¹¹

The Japanese colonial administrations showed a concern for the history and cultural traditions of the territories. Research and publications on the cultural heritage and historical preservation resulted in a positive contribution to their subject peoples by Japanese colonial rule. This included multi-volume histories, biographical dictionaries and huge compendia of fauna and flora of various places.¹² Colonial universities and colleges were established in Seoul, Taipei, Lushun and Manchuria during the 1920s, but the majority of students were Japanese. Scientific research which was conducted in the colonies tended to be limited to studies which were deemed "necessary for local development", while pure research was confined to the imperial universities back in mainland Japan.

During the 1920s and 1930s Americans too went to China to help reform agricultural practices. This confidence in American know-how was also reflected in the plans of the Rockefeller Foundation to help bring about change in rural China. The Chinese, it seems, were eager to obtain American advice regarding new agricultural programmes for Manchuria in order to strengthen China's hold there, especially in view of Russia's and Japan's designs on the territory. According to Edward C. Parker, a 27-year-old agriculturalist who worked in Manchuria around 1908, Manchuria was "the ideal experiment ground of all Asia for the testing of Western methods of economic progress on Eastern people".¹³ Manchuria was thus perceived by the Americans as a laboratory, a space in which social and scientific experiments could be carried out.

The Rockefeller Foundation's role in Western scientific and medical education in China is well-known. The foundation created the China Medical Board in 1914 to oversee its activities in medical education in

China. It in turn was responsible for the establishment of the Peking Union Medical College which was formally dedicated in 1921.¹⁴ The foundation's interest in building up goodwill in China was not entirely selfless. It should be noted that by the 1930s the biggest American-owned business in China was the Standard-Vacuum Oil Company, owned partly by Standard Oil of New Jersey. The operation represented an investment which has been estimated at US\$43 million, the largest such American commitment in all of East Asia. (John D. Rockefeller and his brother William had formed the original Standard Oil Trust back in 1882.)¹⁵ Kathleen Dugan has written of the involvement of the foundation in funding Davidson Black's research on the prehistoric Peking Man which had been discovered in 1926.¹⁶

In the years leading up to the 1930s there was the potential for Japan, Russia and other countries to use the plague as a pretext for moving into Manchuria if China were seen as not being able to cope.¹⁷ There is a large number of scientific papers published in English by research staff of Japanese institutions in Manchuria and China which reflect how epidemics provided opportunities for scientific research and promote the notion that the Japanese presence is necessary and desirable.¹⁸ If disease was to be controlled not only in the laboratory but throughout Manchuria and China, the people and the features of the laboratories would themselves have to be imposed upon the landscape.

The veritable "mapping", that is recording and description, of China by American interests showed the Japanese and others that here was space open to scientific appropriation. Further examination of Japanese scientific activities in its colonies and territories of influence will enable us to understand how they conceptualized the space of their activity. Manchuria, it can be argued, provided a space for the Japanese "mapped out" by railway lines and their collections of scientific data. However, it was essentially a Western concept which helped the Japanese on their mission to make the space of "Manchukuo", the Japanese puppet state born in March 1932, their own. The new name was a means by which the Japanese-led Kwantung Army and the SMR were able to impose a new concept on Manchuria, a way by which the Japanese established their domain. By 1939 the Japanese army had gained control of the major Chinese cities and railways. The railways were more than just "trains". They served as agents for Japanese expansion. Besides the trains the Japanese brought their own geography (Japanese place-names) and architecture,¹⁹ which helped to create a break with tradition and loudly proclaimed a new history for the region.

Japanese-staffed laboratories were an important part of the colonial enterprise, for without the transfer of the necessary personnel and features of the physical setting from the home country it would not be possible for experimental procedures to be reconstructed, standards to be maintained or data to be analysed.²⁰ With the construction of laboratories Japanese researchers became authorized inhabitants of the space and the local

inhabitants whom they gazed upon would in turn become visitors, objects of study or support staff.²¹

The objectification of the population was taken to an extreme with the bacteriological experiments on human subjects conducted in Manchuria during the Second World War. Manchuria offered opportunities for experiments and funding which were not available in Japan and a moral space where anything was permitted. Tsuneishi has looked at the role of social factors in the formation of the biological warfare unit led by the Japanese army surgeon Lieutenant Ishii Shiro in the 1930s and 1940s. The activities of the unit, Unit 731, were partly an attempt by medical doctors in the War Ministry to raise their own status.²²

The most prominent Japanese organization supporting scientific research in Manchuria was undoubtedly the SMR, Japan's engine of progress in Manchuria.²³ In recent years a spate of books on the SMR, mainly reminiscences, has been published in Japan.²⁴ The company established a number of research institutions, the Central Laboratory and the Geological Institute in Dairen being two of them. These institutions employed scientists who were given the task of finding exploitable resources and developing manufacturing processes which would lead to the creation of new industries. The Central Laboratory consisted of eight divisions: analytical chemistry, applied chemistry, textiles and dyeing, ceramics, fermentation, sanitation chemistry, electro-chemistry and a section called "detail".²⁵ The laboratories authenticated knowledge and lent legitimacy to colonial policy.

One of the primary activities of the SMR Hygiene Institute, established by the company in 1925 in Dairen, was to fight the epidemics which were rampant in Manchuria at the time. The Hygiene Institute was given the responsibility of advancing public health and overseeing sanitation in Manchuria and [Inner] Mongolia. In 1937 there were over one hundred employees spread over seven sections: bacteriology, serology, vaccines, pathology, chemistry, hygiene and general affairs. In addition to research activities the Institute was active in the manufacture of vaccines and pharmaceuticals.²⁶

Such activities or "public services" were, it seems, funded from the earnings of the SMR railway operations and the mines that it operated. They were considered as being part of the industrial and cultural development of Manchuria. For the financial year ending in March 1927 the following amounts were reported as having been spent by the SMR on "public services" (yen):

Hospitals	4,617,541
Schools	2,731,238
Libraries	178,320
Sanitation	183,123
Central laboratory	304,382
Agricultural experimental stations	296,886
Sanitation laboratory	134,229
Infectious animal diseases	101,743
Afforestation	65,561
Specimen halls	51,449
Administration	735,077
Local administration	951,389
Education	613,552
Encouragement of industrial enterprise	397,430
Water	469,292

There were additional costs involved in running the above operations. Museums, for example, are not included in the above.²⁷ The different categories in effect give the various institutions of colonial authority and convey a sense of order.

Institutions such as the Manchukuo Institute of Scientific Research and Manchurian museums produced English-language research reports which served to disseminate throughout the world the achievements of Japanese colonial science in Manchuria. The museums reminded readers of the reductive nature of the scientific enterprise, housing within their walls and publishing in their journal pages the gems of knowledge that they had collected.²⁸ They provided the public face of "objective", "non-political" science. Manchuria would provide knowledge for the rest of the world, and a space in the Asian continent for the Japanese.

While the scientific journals published by the institutions appear to be highly technical, they display many characteristics of colonial science which might be of interest to the historian. Ryūji Endō's paper on fossils published in 1937 by the SMR's Manchurian Science Museum does refer briefly to changes in the peace and order. He outlines how bandits and anti-foreign feeling in the Hsiao-shih area in 1928 prevented much fieldwork from being

carried out whereas in the 1930s (with occupation by the Japanese) he was able to re-examine some of the localities.²⁹

Many papers suggest an emphasis on studies which could be of commercial benefit. They show how the mapping of Manchuria depended on economic as well as strategic factors. Perhaps more importantly the very many papers produced established, by their sheer volume and continued publication, a type of authority derived from scientific discourse, from "knowing" Manchuria, which legitimated the presence there of the Japanese and enabled them to survey the landscape.

What is also clear from the papers is the existence of research networks between Manchurian institutions and universities back in Japan. These links facilitated data collection, provided channels for the flow of specimens to the home country and helped make local knowledge global. There were, for example, amateur scientists who, while normally pre-occupied with commercial work for Japanese companies in Manchuria, would come across interesting fossils that they would report about to scholars in universities in Japan. For them, Japan was the centre and Manchuria was the periphery. Publications also show information flowing back to scholars in Japan and research funding emanating from the centre flowing to the periphery. In the process Manchuria and its occupants were reduced to fossil-like specimens which could be counted, described, classified and rendered harmless.

Colonial science in Shanghai

In the 1920s the Japanese increasingly dominated Shanghai's economic life. They also sought to influence the city's cultural and intellectual life as well. Science enabled the Japanese to root themselves in a foreign landscape. By categorizing and historicizing the Chinese people and their environment they were able to map out their territory, fashioning boundaries and making differences where it suited their interests. This enabled the Japanese to create order where they felt none existed.

The Shanghai Science Institute was one part of the imperial architecture which helped the Japanese to stake their claim in the Shanghai cityscape. Shanghai was an international space in terms of the foreigners who flocked there and also when viewed as part of the network of science which existed between nations. Nature was seen as transcending national boundaries and its pursuit (all the way to Shanghai!) provided a useful excuse for colonial expansion. Laboratories were established in order to spread Western science and rationality, enabling the scientific data which were gathered to be reported in a manner suitable for journals.³⁰ An understanding of the activities of the institute should help us better come to

grips with the process of formation of empire and the attempt by the Japanese to reorganize China spatially, architecturally and scientifically.

Japan was not the only imperial power to take an interest in Shanghai. Peter Buck has written:

Missionary physicians and educators in late 19th-century China assumed that the principles of sound social order were concurrent with the laws of nature. They attributed the chief differences between China and the United States to the failure of the Chinese to structure their lives in accord with those principles and laws.³¹

The French, too, were of like mind. By the end of the First World War Shanghai boasted a French trade school, a French Jesuit university and Jesuit-run geophysical and astronomical observatories. Funding came from the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Jesuits in France, French commercial concerns and other sources. (The Japanese-run Shanghai Science Institute was in fact located in the French concession.) Such educational activities enabled military movements or commercial activities to be recast as scientific research. Research institutions were also structures designed to accumulate information.

The Shanghai Science Institute was one of the major components of Japan's "cultural" activities, an attempt to emulate the cultural diplomacy of Western nations. It was established in 1925 from Boxer indemnity funds and later funded by the cultural projects section of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The institute consisted of eight divisions: physics, chemistry, geology, biology, pathology, bacteriology, hygiene and pharmaceutical research (especially herbal medicine).³²

The institute was part of the Japanese presence in China, which served to ensure that Japan's economic and interests were looked after. It arose allegedly from "the necessity of endeavouring to raise the scientific ability of Chinese scholars", but almost all the researchers were Japanese.³³ The establishment of the institute can be considered rather an attempt to gain international scientific recognition.

The exploitative side of the institute was apparent to the Chinese from early on. Initially the research institution sought allies or "collaborators" in Chinese society. A board was formed called the "Tōhō Bunka Jigyō Shanhai Iinkai" ("Eastern Cultural Project Shanghai Committee") with ten Japanese members and ten Chinese. The Japanese included Okōchi Masatoshi, who was the Director of the Institute of Physical and Chemical Research in Tokyo. The first general meeting of the committee met in Shanghai in 1926 to plan the structure of the institute and to discuss research activities. In July 1927 a secretariat was formed, called the "Shanghai Rinji Jimu Iinkai".³⁴ Okōchi was later to become the chief planner of the "Tairiku Kagakuin" ("Continental Academy of Science") in the puppet state of Manchukuo. As

Eikoh Shimaō has suggested, "All this was a rehearsal of the mobilization of science by the state, which was not so easily feasible in the homeland."³⁵

In 1928, even before construction had started, the Chinese members of the Shanghai committee resigned because of the Tsinan Incident. The lack of Sino-Japanese co-operation served to reinforce the notion of the backwardness of the Chinese. The Japanese would have to enlighten the Chinese all by themselves. To a large extent the reluctance of the Chinese to become involved in the venture was solved by the employment of Japanese personnel and the distribution of findings throughout the world to an international audience rather than to a local one.

Architectural plans for the imposing, neo-gothic main building were completed in 1928 by Prof Uchida Shōzō of Tokyo Imperial University. The Shanghai committee wasted no time. Even during construction scholars conducted research on Chinese herbs, gravitation and magnetism, fish, geology, inorganic compounds, fermentation and epidemics.³⁶ These activities constituted what the Shanghai SMR in 1929 described as the "necessity of scientifically systematizing and co-ordinating the study of China".³⁷ As Timothy Mitchell has written,

Colonialism was distinguished by its power of representation, whose paradigm was the architecture of the colonial city but whose effects extended themselves at every level. It was distinguished not just by representation's extent, however, but by the very technique.³⁸

The institution which represented China to the world was located in the south-western section of the French concession of Shanghai, on a site of about 17 acres. Construction ended in August 1931. The cost of land and buildings was 2,500,000 yen. Equipment in the main building was valued at 800,000 yen. With such an investment the Japanese were anxious to formally open the institution. The Shanghai Science Institute opened its doors on 1 April 1931. Although its professed aims of enlightening the Chinese may have been viewed as a joke by the Chinese, the Japanese went earnestly about their research activities. The first director in charge of the institute was Emeritus Prof. Yokote Chiyonosuke, formerly of the Faculty of Medicine at Tokyo Imperial University. He continued in that position until February 1935 when a former president of Kyoto Imperial University, professor of astronomy and member of the Shanghai committee Shinjō Shinzō, was appointed in his place. That year (fiscal 1935-36) running costs amounted to 440,000 yen. There were 133 staff members as of June 1936.

The institute published two scientific journals, *Shanghai Shizen Kagaku Kenkyūjo Ihō* and *The Journal of the Shanghai Science Institute* which were sold by Maruzen in Japan, Kelly and Walsh Ltd in Shanghai and the Kai Ming Book Company Ltd in Shanghai. (During the Pacific war the Uchiyama Book Co. acted as agent for the sale of institute publications in Shanghai.) In addition to these journals from just before the time of the

Marco Polo Bridge Incident in July 1937 the institute also began to publish a monthly report on the educational and cultural scene in China. The report, entitled *Chūgoku bunka jōhō*, contains a wealth of information on institutions and individuals involved in the arts and sciences.³⁹

Some 14 Chinese researchers/assistants worked at the institute, but as was the habit of colonial science at least eight of these were graduates of Japanese tertiary institutions and six of these had gone to Japanese high schools. In the eyes of the Chinese the allegiance of these Chinese researchers was no doubt suspect. Chinese students who had studied in Japan under Boxer Indemnity stipends had to pledge that, "after graduation, I shall remember this beneficence and strive to reciprocate this favour from His Majesty the Emperor".⁴⁰

Similarly, one can discern links with the young Japanese researchers and the professors who had been original members of the Shanghai committee. Some of the researchers went on to become prominent scholars in the "mother country" after the Second World War. Toyama Ichirō joined Emperor Hirohito in conducting research in the Imperial Household Agency biology institute. Hayami Shōichirō became a professor of physics at Kyoto University. Komiya Yoshitaka, a researcher in the hygiene section of the Faculty of Medicine, Tokyo Imperial University, joined the Shanghai Science Institute in order to avoid political persecution in Japan rather than become an agent of Japanese imperialism. He had joined the Communist Party of Japan in 1930 and was subsequently jailed for three months. He went to Shanghai on the advice of university professors and conducted research on parasites.⁴¹

We have seen that epidemics in Manchuria and China provided opportunities for scientific research. A paper by Kuroya Masahiko and Ono Hiroshi studied the Shanghai cholera epidemic of 1932. It reports on how other Japanese researchers had studied cholera in Manchuria, Shanghai, Kwangtung and Harbin, reporting the results at a bacteriology conference back in Japan. There appeared to be considerable similarity in the types of cholera *vibrio* in areas of Japanese influence, namely Manchuria, Formosa, Shanghai and Japan, which suggested that they may have been linked. Such fears had been the concern of Americans over twenty years before. In 1910 the *Journal of the American Asiatic Association* reported:

The present intolerable hygienic and sanitary condition throughout China is, in this day of increasing political and commercial relationship, of great importance to the Western world. The United States, especially in considering the millions of dollars that were expended on the California coast last year for the extinction of the plague that had come directly from an Asiatic port, should feel a grave interest in any steps that are taken to ultimately do away with the conditions that make possible this great source of infection.⁴²

The Japanese were able to obtain information on the distribution of two types of cholera *vibrio* throughout Shanghai, courtesy of the Greater Shanghai city authorities. The names, homes and period of illness of cholera patients enabled the Japanese to literally map out Shanghai and appropriate the bodies of the sick into their colonial enterprise.⁴³ The visual representation of the location of cholera sufferers shows the precision with which the Japanese ordered their world. What is also striking is the Japanese enthusiasm for data and their desire to enhance their international prestige through publicizing their findings. For example, a separate print of the paper in question was received by the University of Manchester library on 3 April 1934, a few months after its publication.

The flow of publications continued even after the Second World War had commenced. The fate of geophysics research by Higashinaka Hideo is instructive. His paper, entitled "Investigation of the magnetic anomalies relating to the geological structures of the Chin-lin-chên iron-ore field, North China", was published confidentially in May 1938 by the North China Research Institute of Agricultural and Industrial Sciences. Permission was obtained from the Department of Foreign Affairs and Shanghai Science Institute to publish openly in the institute's journal. The paper was published in November 1940 and a separate print found its way to Manchester on 5 May 1941. This would suggest that cultural diplomacy continued right up until the beginning of the Pacific war.⁴⁴ The paper was the result of a magnetic survey of an iron-ore field in Shantung Province, North China, another form of "mapping" of China if ever there was one. It was conducted in the summer of 1937, amidst growing anti-Japanese feeling. This was conveyed within the context of a scientific paper in the following way:

The field surveys in China hitherto undertaken by Japanese have been accompanied by many anxieties and personal difficulties even when government protection was given. At the time of this survey the relations between Japan and China had deteriorated very much. Our work was interrupted several times by villagers. On one occasion one of them threatened us with a revolver.⁴⁵

Conclusion

The enthusiasm of Japanese scientists, in the face of real danger, to persist with their work shows how determined they were to sort and organize China, to reduce it to manageable proportions suitable for the pages of academic journals. This can be partly understood by the way in which "objectivity" assumed a distance between the observer and the observed, between colonizers and the colonized. The "Chinese" were not so much the "other" to the Japanese but rather a race lower down in the hierarchy in terms of industrial development, hygiene, rationality and order. To show this the

Japanese used Western labels to specify and categorize, in effect mapping an Asian people with a Western tool of empire. The large number of scientific papers which emanated from the institute placed the Chinese under the scrutiny of its text. The attempt to establish a colonial science network with the home country can be traced to the desire to impose structures which would somehow promote stability. By so doing the Japanese, who had borrowed heavily from Chinese culture over the decades, could compare themselves and see how far they had developed using a European yardstick to gauge it.

Such cultural policies did not engender a great deal of respect from the Chinese. After all, the Japanese were offering to the Chinese science and technology that they themselves had borrowed from the West, a secondhand type of knowledge if ever there was one. A show of force would, however, overcome any type of cultural resistance. In July 1937 the Marco Polo Bridge Incident occurred and soon after, in August, fighting broke out in Shanghai.⁴⁶ The Japanese, according to *Milestones of Progress*, a monthly supplement of the SMR Co. magazine *Contemporary Manchuria*, began flooding into China at an average rate of 206 per day.⁴⁷ The magazine suggested that it represented a

highly selected group in view of the great aim, the construction of a new order in East Asia, and no one who is not considered to possess the qualifications is given a permit to enter China.⁴⁸

In 1939 ten Chinese cities had 5,000 or more of these superior-type Japanese, Shanghai topping the list with 47,289. The Japanese sought to recontextualize the Chinese into the "Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere", the people being subsumed by the grand narratives of Japanese colonialism and Western science. The establishment of numerous research institutions in China and Manchuria placed these territories within a new order, giving them a new history and place in time. The Shanghai Science Institute provided a model for colonial research institutes set up in territories under Japanese influence. The institute buildings are now used by research organizations affiliated with the Chinese Academy of Science. They form part of the "colonial legacy" of Japanese occupation and an example of the creation of an international space which transcended geography and architecture.⁴⁹ Through the use of Western science the Japanese sought to impose a modernity on the Chinese which was entwined with their own colonialist project.⁵⁰

Notes

- 1 Nicholas Thomas, *Colonialism's Culture: Anthropology, Travel and Government*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994.
- 2 For one excellent example see Warwick Anderson, "'Where every prospect pleases and only man is vile': Laboratory medicine as colonial discourse", *Critical Inquiry*, Vol. 18, Spring 1992, pp. 506-529.
- 3 See the discussion of "place" in Charles W.J. Withers, "Geography, natural history and the eighteenth-century enlightenment: Putting the world in place", *History Workshop Journal*, No 39, 1995, pp. 137-163.
- 4 G. Basalla, "The spread of Western science", *Science*, 5 May 1967, pp. 611-622.
- 5 L. Blussé, "Japanese historiography and European sources", in P.C. Emmer and H.L. Wesseling (eds.), *Reappraisals on Overseas History: Essays on Post-war Historiography about European Expansion*, The Hague: Martin Nijhoff for Leiden University Press, 1979, pp. 193-221. An example of American research is R.H. Myers and M.R. Peattie (eds.), *The Japanese Colonial Empire 1895-1945*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984.
- 6 E. Bretschneider, *History of European Botanical Discoveries in China*, London: Sampson Low, Marston and Co., 1898; Mitsuzo Noda, *Chūgoku tōhoku (Manshū) no shokubutsushi* (The Flora of North-Eastern China/Manchuria), Tokyo: Kazema Shobō, 1971.
- 7 Michael A. Barnhart, *Japan Prepares for Total War: The Search for Economic Security*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987, p. 17.
- 8 See Chao Wei, "Foreign Railroad Interests in Manchuria: An Irritant in Chinese-Japanese Relations (1903-37)", unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, St. John's University, 1980.
- 9 John Young, *The Research Activities of the South Manchurian Railway Company 1907-1945: A History and Bibliography*, New York: The East Asian Institute, Columbia University, p. 3-4.
- 10 Yusuke Tsurumi, *Gotō Shimpei den* (Biography of Gotō Shimpei), 2 vols, Tokyo, 1937, Vol. 2, pp. 26-27; cited in Ramon H. Myers, 1973, p. 435.
- 11 Ramon H. Myers, "Taiwan as an imperial colony of Japan 1895-1945", *Journal of the Institute of Chinese Studies* 6 (1973), pp. 425-451, esp. p. 435.
- 12 Mark R. Peattie, "Japanese colonialism: Discarding the stereotypes", in H. Wray and H. Conroy (eds), *Japan Examined: Perspectives on Modern Japanese History*, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1983, pp. 208-213, esp. p. 211.
- 13 Randall E. Stross, *The Stubborn Earth: American Agriculturalists on Chinese Soil, 1898-1937*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986, p. 52.
- 14 See James C. Thomson Jr., *While China Faced West: American Reformers in Nationalist China, 1928-1937*, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1969, esp. ch. 6, "From models to training programs: The Rockefeller effort", pp. 122-150; and Mary Brown Bullock, *An American Transplant: The Rockefeller Foundation and Peking Union Medical College*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980.
- 15 Sherman Cochran, "Business, governments and war in China 1931-49", in Akira Iriye and Warren Cohen (eds), *American, Chinese and Japanese Perspectives on Wartime Asia 1931-49*, Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1990, pp. 117-145. For further details of the company and its role in US foreign policy see Irvine H. Anderson,

- The Standard-Vacuum Oil Company and the United States East Asian Policy 1931-41*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975.
- 16 Kathleen Dugan and Weiwen Huang, "American Science in Republican China: The Search for Fossil Man", paper delivered at the Joint British Society for the History of Science and the History of Science Society Conference, Manchester, England, 11-15 July 1988.
 - 17 See Carsten Flohr, "Wu Lien-teh: The Beginning of the Chinese Public Health", unpublished M.Phil. paper, Wellcome Unit for the History of Medicine, University of Cambridge, April 1995.
 - 18 Carl F. Nathan, *Plague Prevention and Politics in Manchuria, 1910-1931*, Cambridge, Mass.: East Asian Research Centre, Harvard University, 1967.
 - 19 See this commented on in Peter Duus, Ramon H. Myers and Mark R. Peattie (eds.), *The Japanese Informal Empire in China 1895-1937*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989, p. 161.
 - 20 See a discussion of the localized nature of laboratory science in Joseph Rouse, *Knowledge and Power: Toward a Political Philosophy of Science*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987, p. 111.
 - 21 This interpretation can be found in Adi Ophir and Steven Shapin, "The place of knowledge: A methodological survey", *Science in Context*, No. 1, 1991, pp. 3-21.
 - 22 See for example K. Tsuneishi, *Kieta saikinsen butai: Kanōgun dai 731 butai* (The Germ Warfare Unit that Disappeared: Unit 731 of the Kwantung Army), Tokyo: Kaimeisha, 1981; Tsuneishi and T. Asano, *Saikinsen butai to jiketsu shita futari no igakusha* (The Germ Warfare Unit and the Two Doctors Who Killed Themselves), Tokyo: Shinchōsha, 1982; and Tsuneishi, *Hyōteki, Ishii: 731 butai to Beigun chōhō katsudō* (Target, Ishii: Unit 731 and US Army Intelligence Activities), Tokyo: Otsuki Shoten, 1984. In English, see Peter Williams and David Wallace, *Unit 731: The Japanese Army's Secret of Secrets*, London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1989; Sheldon H. Harris, *Factories of Death: Japanese Biological Warfare 1932-45 and the American Cover-Up*, London: Routledge, 1994.
 - 23 One recent general study has been Ramon H. Myers, "Japanese imperialism in Manchuria: The South Manchuria Railway Company 1906-33", in Peter Duus, Ramon H. Myers and Mark R. Peattie (eds.), *The Japanese Informal Empire in China 1895-1937*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989, pp. 101-132.
 - 24 One such volume has been translated into English and provides a useful introduction, albeit a personal one, to the scientific activities of the Japanese in Manchuria. See Takeo Ito, trans. Joshua A. Fogel, *Life Along the South Manchurian Railway: The Memoirs of Ito Takeo*, Armonk: M.E. Sharpe Inc., 1988. In Japanese see for example Kakuten Hara, *Mantetsu chōsabu to Ajia* (SMR Research Department and Asia), Tokyo: Sekai Shoin, 1986; Kozo Hirota, *Mantetsu no shuen to sono go: Aru Chūō Shikenjoin no hōkoku* (The Decline of SMR and Its Aftermath: A Report by a Member of the Central Laboratory), Tokyo: Seigensha, 1990; Kiyotomo Ishido, Kiyoshi Noma, Kazuo Nonomura and Shōichi Kobayashi, *Jugonen sensō to Mantetsu chōsabu* (The Fifteen-Year War and the SMR Research Department), Tokyo: Hara Shobō, 1986; Daizo Kusayanagi, *Jitsuroku: Mantetsu chōsabu* (A True Account: The SMR Research Department), 2 vols., Tokyo: Asahi Shinbunsha, 1979; Kazuo Nonomura, *Kaisō: Mantetsu chōsabu* (Recollections of the SMR Research Department), Tokyo: Keisō Shobō, 1986.
 - 25 Henry W. Kinney, *Modern Manchuria and the South Manchuria Railway Company*, Dairen, 1928, printed by Japan Advertiser Press, Tokyo, pp. 64-66. For an

- account in Japanese see Nozomu Sugita, *Mantetsu chuo shikenjo* (The SMR Central Laboratory), Tokyo: Kōdansha, 1990.
- 26 "The SMR Hygienic Institute", *Contemporary Manchuria: A Bi-Monthly Review of Manchuria*, South Manchuria Railway Company, No. 2, July 1937, pp. 82-91.
- 27 Kinney, pp. 76-77.
- 28 For a useful study of museums see Paula Findlen, "The museum: Its classical etymology and renaissance genealogy", *Journal of the History of Collections*, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1989, pp. 59-78.
- 29 Riuji Endo (Ryūji Endō) and Charles E. Resser, "The Sinian and Cambrian formations and fossils of southern Manchukuo", *Manchurian Science Museum Bulletin*, Mukden Educational Institute, South Manchuria Railway Company, No. 1, 30 November 1937.
- 30 See Karin Knorr Cetina, "Laboratory studies: The cultural approach to the study of science" in Sheila Jasanoff, Gerald E. Markle, James C. Petersen and Trevor Pinch (eds.), *Handbook of Science and Technology Studies*, Thousand Oaks, Calif: Sage Publications, 1995, pp. 140-66.
- 31 Peter Buck, *American Science and Modern China 1876-1936*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980, p. 2.
- 32 History of Science Society of Japan (ed.), *Nihon kagaku gijutsu shi taikai*, 7: *Kokusai* (An Outline of the History of Japanese Science and Technology, Vol. 7: International Volume), Tokyo: Daiichi Hōki, 1968, p. 365.
- 33 "The Shanghai Science Institute: Its history, organization and activities", p. 3. English language section of *Shanghai Shizen Kagaku Kenkyūjo Yōran* (Guide to the Shanghai Science Institute), Shanghai, June 1936.
- 34 Guide to the Shanghai Science Institute, Japanese language text, pp. 2-4.
- 35 Eikoh Shimaō, "Some Aspects of Japanese Science 1868-1945", *Annals of Science*, Vol. 46, 1989, pp. 69-91, esp. p. 89.
- 36 "The Shanghai Science Institute: Its History, Organization and Activities", pp. 2-4.
- 37 "Necessity of scientifically systematizing and co-ordinating the study of China", *Mantetsu Shina gesshi* (The South Manchuria Railway Company Monthly), 6, No. 2, November 1929, pp. 1-7, in Japanese. Produced by the Research Bureau of the SMR Co., Shanghai.
- 38 Timothy Mitchell, *Colonising Egypt*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988, p. 171.
- 39 See especially *Chū goku bunka jōhō*, Nos. 19-21, November and December 1939, January 1940.
- 40 Peter Duus, Ramon H. Myers and Mark R. Peattie, *The Japanese Informal Empire in China 1895-1937*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989, p. 165.
- 41 Sophia Lee, "The Foreign Ministry's cultural agenda for China: The Boxer indemnity", in Peter Duus, Ramon H. Myers and Mark R. Peattie, *The Japanese Informal Empire in China 1895-1937*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989, pp. 272-306.
- 42 "A Harvard Medical School for Shanghai", *Journal of the American Asiatic Association*, 10, No. 6, July 1910, p. 176.

- 43 Masahiko Kuroya and Hiroshi Ono, "On the types of cholera vibrio of the Shanghai epidemic of 1932", *Journal of the Shanghai Science Institute*, Section 4, Vol. 1, December 1933, pp. 41-68.
- 44 Hideo Higasinaka, "Investigation of the magnetic anomalies relating to the geological structures of the Chin-lin-chên iron-ore field, North China", *Journal of the Shanghai Science Institute*, Section 1, Vol. 2, November 1940, pp. 7-38.
- 45 Higasinaka, "Investigation of the magnetic anomalies", esp. p. 8.
- 46 See the discussion of the Japanese in Shanghai in Emily Honig, *Sisters and Strangers: Women in the Shanghai Cotton Mills 1919-49*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1986, esp. pp. 27-36.
- 47 *Milestones of Progress*, December 1939, pp. 8-9.
- 48 *ibid.*, pp. 8-9, esp. p. 8.
- 49 Lee, p. 292. Some of the researchers maintained their connection with Japan. Komiya, for example, led a medical delegation to China around 1955 to advise the Chinese government on strategies to combat the parasitic disease schistosomiasis. (Kenneth S. Warren, "Farewell to the Plague Spirit: Chairman Mao's crusade against schistosomiasis" in John Z. Bowers, J. William Hess and Nathan Sivin (eds.), *Science and Medicine in Twentieth-Century China: Research and Education*, Ann Arbor: Centre for Chinese Studies, University of Michigan, 1988, pp. 123-40.
- 50 For the case of the Philippines around this time, see Warwick Anderson, "Colonial Pathologies: American Medicine in the Philippines, 1898-1921", unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 1992.

Yanaihara Tadao and the question of nationalism and colonialism in the Japanese Empire (1926-45)

Susan C. Newman

Yanaihara Tadao occupied the Chair of Colonial Policy at Tokyo Imperial University from 1924 until 1937. Born in 1893, a Christian and pacifist, he developed a liberal critique of Japanese colonialism and imperialism in Taiwan, Korea, Manchuria, China and the South Sea Islands based on personal observations during his study tours. He also drew analogies between Japanese colonialism in Taiwan and Korea and British colonialism in India and Ireland.

Yanaihara consistently revealed the gap between the "idea" of colonial development and the "reality". In the increasingly authoritarian and repressive atmosphere of 1930s Japan he voiced concern about Japanese expansionist adventures on the Asian continent. In 1937, after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war, he called for the Japanese people to lay down their arms, on the grounds that the war against China was unjust and threatened the very existence of the Japanese nation.¹ This action precipitated his forced resignation in December 1937. He was reinstated in the university in 1946, becoming its president in 1951. He died ten years later.

This paper is concerned with his writings on the question of nationalism within the Japanese Empire and it explores some of the strategies Yanaihara adopted in order to communicate his opinions within ever-tightening constraints as Japan moved towards a military-bureaucratic regime.

In 1923, on return to Japan via the US from a year's study tour of Britain and Germany, Yanaihara began work on a series of theoretical essays on imperialism and colonialism which were published in two volumes in 1926 and 1928. Some of these essays contained outspoken attacks on the government-general of Korea. Yanaihara carried out his first study tours of Korea and Manchuria in 1924, and in a short essay entitled "The Direction

of Korean Rule" he condemned the central administration in Korea for exercising almost unparalleled "arbitrary and despotic" rule.² What, he asked, was the Japanese government's excuse for not granting Korea a parliament? It surely could not be that the Koreans had no desire for the right to engage in politics. "Go to Korea and look!" he wrote:

Every pebble by the roadside cries out for freedom. Because no matter how loudly a pebble may cry out, it will not be noticed by the police. In short, there is no positive reason for not granting the people of Korea political rights, other than that the government simply does not want to.³

Yanaihara also launched a bitter attack on the policy of assimilation (*dōkashugi*) which had been implemented in Korea partly in response to the 1919 March 1 Movement. He warned that destructive intervention in the indigenous society's legal system, language, customs and religion would only succeed in provoking rebellion and consequently necessitate the use of military force to suppress an understandably belligerent population. Thus, he claimed, assimilation policy and military suppression were two sides of the same coin. He pointed out that Korea was an ancient society historically separate from Japan and that assimilation forced by government policy was unworkable and fallacious.⁴

In an essay written after the achievement of Irish independence, "The History of the Irish Question", Yanaihara drew an analogy between Ireland and Korea. "In the eyes of the world," he wrote, "Korea is... our Ireland." Historically, he explained, the relationship between Korea and Japan echoed the relationship between Britain and Ireland, geographically, culturally, politically and economically.⁵ He implied that assimilation had been part of British policy in Ireland and yet even after hundreds of years that policy had patently failed. Did these similar histories, he speculated, mean that the direction of Japanese colonial policies in Korea would lead to the same result - the birth of nationalism and the violent separation of the colony from the metropolis? The Irish question, he argued, was of interest to the Japanese because of their involvement not only in Korea but also in Manchuria and Taiwan.⁶

In April 1927 Yanaihara visited Taiwan, entering by what he called the "back door", under the auspices of a friend working for the Taiwan government-general.⁷ He gave a series of lectures round the island at the request of Ts'ai Pei-huo and Chang Wei-shui, who were the moderate leaders of the Taiwanese Cultural Association at the time. However, Yanaihara arrived in Taiwan in the middle of an ideological battle between hard-line Left-wingers and moderates which eventually split the Taiwanese national movement. In several places he met with considerable opposition from Left-wingers and at one meeting pamphlets were distributed, saying that those who did not attack capitalist exploitation favoured compromise. Yanaihara was heckled and the meeting ended in commotion.⁸ Yanaihara was not sympathetic to hard-line Left-wing nationalists. He believed that the

most important factor for the development of an independent nation-state was national consciousness rather than class consciousness.⁹

This would seem to have been the opinion of the colonial authorities in Taiwan, as they showed far more concern about speakers who supported the nationalist cause than those who supported the Marxist cause. Thus while the lectures of Fuse Tatsuji, who was closely associated with the Japanese labour movement, went unobserved, Yanaihara's lectures were carefully monitored by the police.¹⁰ Yanaihara supported the Taiwanese quest for autonomy, although he was naturally cautious about advocating immediate self-determination. In his book *Taiwan under Imperialism* published in 1928, Yanaihara was severely critical of the Japanese-owned sugar industry. He called for a colonial assembly where the Taiwanese people would have a voice in their own government, thereby empowering them to protect their interests against monopoly capital. The granting of assemblies for Korea and Taiwan, he maintained, was a "requirement of justice", as a first step to their autonomous development.

The Manchurian Incident in September 1931, however, marked a watershed in the treatment of dissidents and Yanaihara was obliged to alter the tone of his criticism quite radically as the attitude of the authorities hardened.¹¹ The colonies of Taiwan and Korea, which constituted the major part of the formal empire, provided important food crops for Japan, but it was China which supplied the vital raw materials for industry and it was in the treaty ports and concessions in China that the large Japanese corporations had really taken off. Thus the Japanese were worried about their lack of political control in China and perceived a *Manshū mondai* and a *Shina mondai* - a Manchuria question and a China question.¹² In the 1920s, moreover, there was the added threat to Japan's perceived "special interests" in China posed by the development of Chinese nationalism and the possibility that China's resistance to foreign interference and intervention would be enhanced by its increasing unity.

There were few in Japan who were prepared to speak out against the militarists in China. Even the self-professed adherents of internationalism and pacifism in the Japanese Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR)¹³, who were perhaps most likely to oppose the militarists, supported Japanese expansion in Manchuria by the end of 1931.¹⁴ Yanaihara, who joined the IPR at the request of his former teacher, Nitobe Inazō, was the exception. In his autobiography published in 1958, Yanaihara stated that at the time of the Manchurian Incident he had strong doubts about the official story. After the puppet Manchukuo state was created he and several colleagues at the Imperial University received telegrams in early 1932 from the Kwantung Army, requesting their presence in Manchuria to act as advisers on economic matters. Yanaihara and a Marxist colleague, Ouchi Hyōe, rejected the invitation.

Yanaihara did go to Manchuria six months later, but at the request of the university. Yanaihara's articles about Manchuria and China written between 1931 and 1937 reflected his awareness of the need for restraint if he wanted them published. In an article on the Manchurian economy in the July 1932 edition of *Chūō Kōrōn*, for example, he said that colonialism was only domination by force whereby the acquisition of economic benefits and monopolies was secured politically through the power of the state.¹⁵ Without his article and the edition of *Chūō Kōrōn* being banned, this was probably as close as he could get to saying that Japan invaded China. In 1934 he published a book entitled *The Manchurian Question* which again cautiously and indirectly refuted much of the government's defence of expansion on the continent. He saw the incident, fundamentally, as a collision between Chinese nationalism and Japanese imperialism, but he maintained that:

The nationalist movement in Manchuria is the historically inevitable product of the economic and social development of China and Manchuria... If we add unjustified obstruction to its development we shall only succeed in perverting its course and making its form illegal... Japan may for a while succeed in obstructing nationalism, but in time nationalism will continue to develop and eventually Japan will be forced to acknowledge the historical relations which formed its basis and will have to forge new policies to accommodate it.¹⁶

In 1935 there was a further hardening of the authorities' attitude to dissent when the legal scholar Minobe Tatsukichi was hounded by militarists and eventually prosecuted for espousing the theory that the Emperor was an organ of the state and therefore a constitutional monarch. The Minobe affair had a profound effect on subsequent expression in the mass media and the case signalled the end of legal critical commentary in public.¹⁷

Meanwhile Yanaihara was becoming increasingly alarmed by new policies being implemented in the colonies in the mid-1930s. After the Manchurian Incident Japan attempted to integrate the economies of the colonies with that of the mother country. Culturally, this meant that any inclination towards moderation or liberalism in cultural assimilation policy disappeared under a wave of regimentation and militarism. Any pretence at gradualism was lost as simple assimilation (*dōkashugi*) gave way to the "imperialization" of subject peoples (*kōminka*).

After the Minobe affair, however, room for manoeuvre in making critical commentary was fast shrinking as the country moved closer to military-bureaucratic rule. Yanaihara responded to this state of affairs by the use of analogy. In 1936 he published a series of essays under the title *India under Imperialism* and the aforementioned essay on Ireland, "The History of the Irish Question". Many of the essays contained in this volume had appeared as articles in various magazines in the late 1920s but the timing of their release as a book was significant. In the preface to *India under Imperialism* he commented that this was the sister publication of *Taiwan*

under Imperialism and he recommended that they be read in conjunction with one another. In *India under Imperialism* Yanaihara attacked the economic relationship between Britain and India and demonstrated that in all its manifestations that relationship was conducted entirely for the benefit of Britain and at India's expense. He charted the rise of Indian nationalism in response to British policies and pointed out that although Britain had dominated India for hundreds of years, albeit with considerable skill and perseverance, eventually British dominion would be unable to resist the tide of nationalism. Unless Britain were prepared to make concessions to the Indian people and grant some form of autonomy, that domination would end¹⁸:

It is not a question of results but a question of principle. It is not a question of benefits but of justice. It is not a question of good government but a question of autonomy.¹⁹

Here he echoed his earlier argument for Taiwanese and Korean autonomy as a "requirement of justice".

From 1936 Yanaihara became increasingly concerned with the *Shina mondai* and in lectures and articles he sought to dispel myths and negative racial stereotypes with regard to China. Writing in 1936 and 1937, he firmly believed that Chiang Kai-shek's national government in Nanjing was capable of unifying China and protecting its interests against foreign aggressors, but he also realized that China's future was very much in the balance. Of course, Yanaihara was mistaken in his views, but then so were other foreign observers of the China question in the 1930s. He was correct, however, when in an essay entitled "Locating the China Question" he claimed that it would be impossible to destroy the recently formed national consciousness of the Chinese people. This nation-state consciousness, he said, was most vigorously stimulated by the need to protect state independence against foreign invasion.²⁰

This, he claimed, was where the China question was located, in recognizing the fact that China was in the process of achieving nation-state unity:

Only policies which meet this perception are scientifically correct... Only those policies which are based on this perception and which approve and aid the unification of the Chinese nation-state will aid China, aid Japan and aid peace and harmony in the Orient. When arbitrary policies which go against scientific perceptions are enforced, a calamity extending across generations to come will torment China, will plague the Japanese people and put a blight on peace and harmony in the Orient. We must base our country's policies towards China on scientific perceptions and put them back on the right road.²¹

After the Marco Polo Bridge Incident in July 1937 Yanaihara was faced with preserving his integrity not only as an academic but also as a Christian. He owed his Christian inheritance to Uchimura Kanzō, founder of the No Church Society (*Mukyōkai*), a Christian group which, rejecting the inter-

demoninational infighting of foreign missionary churches in Japan, established what could be termed an authentic Japanese Christianity.²² Yanaihara was a leading figure in the *Mukyōkai* and he published an article in the September edition of *Chūō Kōron* entitled "The ideals of the state" which was based on "ideals" expressed in the Book of Isaiah.²³ In his article he adroitly developed an anti-war critique while at the same time recognizing the need for restraint. Yanaihara implied that Japan had committed an act of invasion against China's sovereign rights on the pretext that such an act was necessary for its own survival. Such an act was contrary to the ideals of the state, signifying the abandoning of the objective mind which not only regulated the existence of the state but was its very foundation and hence threatening its destruction. It was, he said, a state gone mad. Then on 1 October 1937, in a lecture entitled "God's Country", he finally requested "please bury our country for a while so that its ideals may live".²⁴

Right-wingers in Tokyo Imperial University had already begun a campaign to oust Yanaihara from his post and the publication of "God's Country" gave them the opportunity they were looking for. Yanaihara's magazine *Tsūshin* was banned and he was forced to submit his resignation to the president of the university on 1 December 1937. Unlike some other academics, Yanaihara escaped arrest in the purges which followed, but in March 1938 he was prosecuted under the publication laws together with his publisher, Iwanami Shigeo of the well-known firm of publishers Iwanami Shoten. The editors of *Chūō Kōron* who published his articles were also prosecuted. His works *Nation and State* and *Nation and Peace* were banned and publication of *Taiwan under Imperialism* and *The Manchurian Question* suppressed.²⁵

After his dismissal Yanaihara gave lectures at his house to groups of young people²⁶ and toured Japan and Korea giving public lectures and holding Bible classes. He also concentrated on running his monthly evangelical publication *Kashin* (Auspicious News), successor to the proscribed *Tsūshin*. In *Kashin*, using Biblical concepts and terminology, he continued to voice opposition to the war and despite attempts by the authorities to suppress it Yanaihara, with the help of friends, doggedly continued publication. *Kashin* was finally closed "voluntarily" in 1944, but Yanaihara simply changed its name to *Kashin Kaihō* and continued publishing it as a pamphlet until the end of the war.²⁷

Yanaihara has been criticized by some Japanese and Korean academics for not advocating immediate self-determination. He advocated instead a policy of autonomy within a colonial framework. Yanaihara's vision for the future was inspired by the British concept of a commonwealth of self-governing nations which ideally were independent yet linked to the metropolis in an equal relationship based on ties of mutual benefit and friendship. To argue that Yanaihara should have gone farther down the road

towards advocating immediate self-determination is perhaps to look at the world of the 1930s through post-colonial coloured spectacles. In 1940, for example, even George Orwell, a vociferous critic of British imperialism, said in his essay "The Lion and the Unicorn" that it was a mistake to imagine that India would cut itself free from Britain at the first opportunity, arguing rather naively as it turned out that:

When a British government offers them unconditional independence they will refuse it. For as soon as they have the power to secede the chief reasons for doing so will have disappeared.²⁸

Yanaihara, like Orwell, may have been naive. He was certainly something of an idealist, but his views on the questions of colonialism and nationalism were by far the most liberal in Japan at the time. They might be summed up in the following quotation from the preface to *Taiwan under Imperialism* :

Should I be asked to express my feelings about the colonial question, I would say that with all my heart I look forward to the liberation of those who are down-trodden, the raising up of those who would sink, and the peaceful union of those who are independent.²⁹

Notes

- 1 Yanaihara, Tadao, "Kami no kuni" (God's country) in *Yanaihara Tadao Zenshū* (Collected Works of Tadao Yanaihara), Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1963, Vol. 18, p. 652.
- 2 Yanaihara, "Chōsen tōji no hōshin" (The direction of Korean rule) from *Shokumin Seisaku no Shinkisho* (The New Foundations of Colonial Policy) in *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, p. 725-744.
- 3 *ibid.*, p. 740.
- 4 *ibid.*, p. 741.
- 5 Yanaihara, "Airurando mondai no engaku" (History of the Irish Question), appendix to "Teikokushugi-ka no Indo" (India under Imperialism) in *op. cit.*, Vol. 3, p. 654.
- 6 *ibid.*, p. 655.
- 7 Originally published in 1958. Yanaihara, "Watakushi no ayundekita michi" (The road I have walked) in *op. cit.*, Vol. 26, p. 36.
- 8 Koh Se-kai, *Nihon Tōji-ka no Taiwan*, (Taiwan under Japanese Rule), Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1972, p. 284.
- 9 See Yanaihara, "Minzoku to Kokka" (Nation and State) in *op. cit.*, Vol. 18, p. 296.
- 10 Koh Se-kai, p. 285.
- 11 Wilson, Sandra, *Pro-Western Intellectuals and the Manchurian Crisis of 1931-33*, Nissan Occasional Paper Series No. 3, Oxford: Nissan Institute of Japanese Studies, 1987, p. 7.

12 The Chinese and Japanese word for China, pronounced in Japanese as *chūgoku*, is represented by two characters meaning "middle kingdom" which evokes China's perception of itself at the centre of world civilization. In 1930s Japanese, however, these characters were replaced by two characters representing the sounds *shi-na* in a corruption of the English "China". The character for *shi* also means "branch" - perhaps a deliberate usage which implied that China was a "branch" or extension of Japan. The use of *Shina* was discontinued after 1945 because of its derogatory connotations.

13 The Institute of Pacific Relations was organized in 1925 following a conference in Honolulu in an effort to promote peace at a time when it was felt that the Pacific nations had entered a critical period in their relations with one another. The Japanese Council of the IPR was organized in 1926. Inazō Nitobe, Yanaihara's mentor, became a director in 1929 and he and his followers became the most active members. See Wilson, pp. 9-12.

14 Wilson, p. 12.

15 Yanaihara, "Manshū keizai-ron" (Essay on the Manchurian economy) in *op. cit.*, Vol. 2, p. 621.

16 Yanaihara, "Manshū mondai" (The Manchurian question) in *op. cit.*, Vol. 2, p. 538.

17 Kasza [sic], p. 134-136.

18 Yanaihara, "Teikokushugi-ka no Indo" (India under Imperialism) in *op. cit.*, Vol. 3, p. 558.

19 *ibid.*, p. 557

20 This article was first printed in the February 1937 edition of *Chūō Kōron*. Yanaihara, Tadao, "Shina mondai no sōzai" (Locating the China question) in *op. cit.*, Vol. 4, p. 339.

21 *ibid.*, p. 340.

22 For the most authoritative account of the *Mukyōkai* in English see Caldarola, Carlo, *Christianity: The Japanese Way* (Monographs and Theoretical Studies in Sociology and Anthropology in Honour of Lels Anderson), Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1979.

23 Yanaihara, "Kokka no risō" (The ideals of the state) in *op. cit.*, Vol. 18.

24 Yanaihara, "Kami no kuni", p. 652.

25 The details of his prosecution are printed in *Masu Media Tōsei*, Vol. 2, document 12, pp. 118-123 in *Gendai Shi Shiryō*, Tokyo: Misuzu Shobō, 1973, Vol. 41.

26 Yanaihara, "Watakushi no ayundekita michi", p. 54.

27 *ibid.*, p. 58.

28 Orwell, George, "The Lion and the Unicorn: Socialism and the English Genius" in *The Penguin Essays of George Orwell*, London: Penguin, 1984, p. 144.

29 Yanaihara, *Teikokushugi-ka no Taiwan* (Taiwan under Imperialism), Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1988, preface.

Marriages between Japanese and foreigners Meiji 6 - Meiji 30 (1873-1897)

Noboru Koyama

The revision of unequal treaties (*jōyaku kaisei*) was the most important diplomatic issue for Japan before the Second World War. One of the principal arguments over the revision of unequal treaties was whether or not Japan should allow foreigners to reside outside foreign settlements, i.e., authorize mixed residence in the interior (*naichi zakkyō*), in order to abolish foreigners' extraterritorial rights. One of the main arguments against mixed residence in the interior was that the Japanese would not be able to compete in Japan with foreigners, particularly "superior" Caucasians. For example, Inoue Tssetsujirō, one of the opponents of mixed residence, thought that since Japanese were inferior to Westerners in intellectual, financial and physical powers and many other aspects, it was inevitable that the Japanese would be defeated by Westerners.¹

Professor Inoue Tssetsujirō of the Tokyo Imperial University was a conservative and nationalistic philosopher, like another principal opponent of mixed residence, Professor Katō Hiroyuki, Chancellor of the Imperial University. Katō described how dangerous it was to compete with Westerners inside Japan, saying the Japanese lacked experience in commercial competitiveness.² Interestingly, the arguments of both Inoue Tssetsujirō and Katō Hiroyuki were based on Darwinism and Herbert Spencer's theory of social evolution. The issue of mixed residence in the interior was mainly disputed towards the end of the 1880s.

In order to achieve revision of the unequal treaties, the Japanese government pursued quick Westernization in the 1880s, symbolized as a building called the "Deer Cry Pavilion" (*Rokumeikan*), and this period is sometimes referred to as the Rokumeikan era. During the Rokumeikan era there was a dispute over mixed marriage (*zakkon*). In Meiji 17 (1884) Takahashi Yoshio published an "Essay on How to Improve the Japanese

Race" with preface by Fukuzawa Yukichi, the most important representative of the Enlightenment and founder of Keiō University. Although the preface might have been written by Takahashi himself,³ Fukuzawa seemed to support Takahashi.⁴ First Takahashi divided methods of improving the Japanese race into two - training and self-improvement such as physical training, and genetic improvement. Takahashi dealt mainly with *zakkon*. He argued that the "inferior" race could be improved by intermarriage with the "superior" one, and that the Japanese should not hesitate to seek marriage to Westerners.⁵

On the other hand, opposing Takahashi Yoshio's argument, Katō Hiroyuki made the point that it would be honourable for the Japanese to civilize and enrich Japan by themselves, but dishonourable if they could achieve this only by borrowing the blood of Caucasians through mixed marriages.⁶ Katō did not want to civilize Japan through marriages with Europeans and Americans. As Katō Hiroyuki appeared to be an opponent of both *zakkon* and *naichi zakkyō*, it seemed that both mixed marriage and mixed residence in the interior were connected. Katō Hiroyuki explained that those who supported *naichi zakkyō* often approved of the methods of *zakkon*.⁷ Katō Hiroyuki regarded himself as a rival of Fukuzawa Yukichi. Both were known as scholars of the Enlightenment. While Fukuzawa was the founder of the *Keiō Gijuku*, a private school, and Fukuzawa and Takahashi expressed their views through the newspaper *Jiji shimpō*, Katō Hiroyuki was the head of the government-supported Imperial University and first published his counter-argument against Takahashi Yoshio's book in *Tōkyō nichinichi shimbun*, a government-patronized newspaper.⁸

The race issue was a very sensitive one, even in the first half of the Meiji period, so the issue of mixed marriage was sensitive, too, being related directly to the issue of nationality and indirectly to that of nationalism. Relations between nations obviously reflect relations between the people of the nations. Conversely, to a certain extent we can see relations between nations through relations between the people of the nations. Since marriage is the most important human relationship, relations between Japan and foreign countries can be examined through the study of marriages between Japanese and foreigners. In Japan acquisition and loss of nationality were directly related to marriages between Japanese and foreigner, at least until the first Nationality Law (*kokusekihō*) was introduced in Meiji 32 (1890). With the exception of residents of the Bonin Islands (*Ogasawara Shotō*) and a few Chinese, only the contracting parties in mixed marriages and their children were allowed to change nationality. According to *Nihon Teikoku minseki kokōhyō*, 59 foreigners acquired Japanese nationality and 298 Japanese lost their Japanese nationality in the 12 years from Meiji 19 (1886) to Meiji 30 (1897).⁹

As far as changing nationality is concerned, the first law on nationality in Japan was Decree No 103 (*Dajōkan fukoku 103*) of Meiji 6

(1873) which allowed Japanese to marry foreigners after obtaining permission from the Japanese government.¹⁰ Under this decree Japanese women who married foreigners [and lived abroad] had to give up their Japanese nationality and take their husband's nationality; foreign women who married Japanese men, and foreign men who married Japanese women [and lived in Japan] had to give up their own nationality and become Japanese nationals.¹¹ Two different Japanese terms were used for marriages between foreign men and Japanese women in which the foreign men became Japanese nationals: if the wife was the daughter of the head of the family, the marriage (or husband) was called *mukoyōshi*, and if the wife was herself the head of the family they were called *nyūfu*. Until Decree No 103 was overtaken by the Law Concerning the Application of Law, Private International Law (Hōrei) in Meiji 31 (1898), intermarriage required the Japanese government's permission.¹² That is why records of mixed marriages have been kept by the Japanese central government.

Decree No 103 was introduced in direct response to an enquiry from a British consul in Meiji 5 (1872) regarding the marriage of a Japanese and a foreigner. Since the Tokugawa Shogunate government had received a similar enquiry from a British consul in Keiō 4 (1867), the new Japanese government (the Meiji government) issued the decree.¹³ The first enquiry of 1867 from a British consul may have been related to the *Report of the Royal Commission on the Laws of Marriage*, which was published in 1868, rather than to an actual mixed marriage. The second enquiry from a British consul, in 1872, concerned two matters - the Japanese government's regulation of mixed marriages and married women's property rights.¹⁴ Probably the second enquiry was connected with married women's property in Britain. In any case by then there had already been marriages between Japanese and foreigners.

Decree No 103 raised a number of issues. One was the change of nationality of the foreigner who married a Japanese. Foreign envoys were concerned about this because they could not protect their citizens in "uncivilized" Japan after the change of nationality. For example, Nicholas Hannen, Britain's assistant judge at Yokohama, raised this issue, but the law officers in London confirmed that Decree No 103 was in line with similar regulations in European countries.¹⁵ Another issue was the complicated one of family or census registration (*koseki*).

There were two ways to get permission from the Japanese government for a mixed marriage: in Japan, by application via the local government to the Ministry of Home Affairs (*Naimushō*); and abroad, through Japanese consulates or embassies to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (*Gaimushō*). The documents on mixed marriages throughout the period (1873-97) which have been kept at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are accessible to the public at the ministry's Diplomatic Record Office (*Gaimushō Gaikō Shiryōkan*).¹⁶ The records of mixed marriages up to Meiji 18 (1885) kept at the Ministry of

Home Affairs are accessible to the public at the National Archives (*Kokuritsu Kōbunshokan*),¹⁷ but more recent records are not available. However, the documents of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs include those relating to mixed marriages approved by the Ministry of Home Affairs after Meiji 25 (1892). Although the records of mixed marriages approved by the Ministry of Home Affairs between Meiji 19 and Meiji 24 (1886-91) are not available, I have tried to obtain the records of mixed marriages in the period from other sources like the Tokyo Metropolitan Archives (*Tōkyōto Kōbunshokan*).¹⁸ So far I have been able to collect records of 231 marriages approved by the Japanese government between Meiji 6 and Meiji 30. I am not claiming that 231 is the total number, but probably they represent the majority. I am able to estimate the number of missing records of mixed marriages approved by the Ministry of Home Affairs between Meiji 19 and Meiji 24 (1886-91) at about 35, using data from the *Official Gazette* (*Kampō*),¹⁹ so that the total number of mixed marriages from Meiji 6 to Meiji 30 is in the region of 270.

Some patterns may be observed among these 231 mixed marriages. In cases of the marriage of Japanese men to foreign women, typically the Japanese man was sent to the West to study Western civilization and brought a foreign woman back with him. In cases of the marriage of foreign men to Japanese women, typically the foreigner lived in a foreign settlement in Japan and employed the Japanese woman as a servant or mistress, and they married some years after they had begun living together. They often had children before marriage.

Mixed marriages reflected Japan's historical and international circumstances. For example, if we examine the nationality of the foreign partners in these 231 mixed marriages, we find: British 69 (59 men and 10 women), Chinese (Qing Empire) 57 (all men), German 32 (14 men and 18 women), US 26 (13 men and 13 women), French 15 (10 men and 5 women), Russian 5 (all men), Netherlands 5 (all men) and so on. If British colonies are included in the British number it reaches 75 (32.5 per cent). The arrival in Japan of Chinese, the second largest group, was closely related to the arrival of Westerners, particularly the British, because some Chinese were taken to Japan as servants, cooks, employees, etc., of the British.

If we examine the relative numbers of men and women we can see that the number of men is related to the number of foreigners in Japan by nationality and the number of women reflects the number of Japanese sent abroad to study by country. The foreigners in Japan from Meiji 9 to Meiji 30 were as follows: Chinese, 54.2 per cent; British, 19.6 per cent; Americans, 9.6 per cent; Germans, 5.2 per cent; French, 3.9 percent, etc.²⁰ The Japanese sent abroad by the Ministry of Education (*Mombushō*) from Meiji 8 to Meiji 30 numbered 95 to Germany, 44 to Britain, 29 to France and 27 to the US. The ministry was only one of several institutions which despatched Japanese

to the West during the period.²¹ The data match the patterns of the aforementioned 231 mixed marriages.

I mentioned earlier that both the conservative and nationalistic philosophers Inoue Tetsujirō and Katō Hiroyuki were deeply influenced by Darwinism and Herbert Spencer's social evolution theory. The theory of evolution was thought to be so important in connection with mixed residence in the interior and mixed marriage that a Japanese government official actually asked Spencer about them.²² Probably because of the influence of the theory of evolution, both Inoue Tetsujirō and Katō Hiroyuki stated that the Japanese were racially inferior to Caucasians. This opinion was expressed clearly by Inoue Tetsujirō and less directly by Katō Hiroyuki, who all the same let slip comments such as "There is no doubt that the Japanese are slightly inferior to Westerners," and so on.²³

The rapid Westernization of Japan in the middle of the Meiji period (1890s) was opposed by ultra-nationalism (*kokusuishugi*) through the journal *Nihonjin* (The Japanese) and the newspaper *Nippon* (Japan). Yet one of the representative thinkers of this movement, Shiga Shigetaka, referring to Japanese immigration, mentioned that the Japanese could not expect always to win in competition with Westerners because of the Japanese people's low brain-power and feeble body.²⁴ It may come as a surprise to present generations to discover how deeply rooted the inferiority complex of race was among the Japanese intellectuals of the Meiji period, including nationalists.

Notes

- 1 Inoue Tetsujirō, *Naichi zakkyo ron* (Meiji bunka zenshū 11), Nihon Hyōronsha, 1956, p. 475.
- 2 Katō Hiroyuki, *Zakkyo shōsō*, Tetsugaku Shoin, 1893, pp. 20-21.
- 3 Fukuzawa Yukichi zenshū 21, Iwanami Shoten, 1964, pp. 342-343.
- 4 Fukuzawa Yukichi, *Tsūzoku gaikō ron* (Fukuzawa Yukichi zenshū 5), Iwanami Shoten, 1959, p. 444, 447. Fukuzawa Yukichi, *Katō Hiroyuki kun e shitsumon* (Fukuzawa Yukichi zenshū 10), Iwanami Shoten, 1960, pp. 537-538.
- 5 Takahashi Yoshio, *Nihon jinshu kairyō ron* (Meiji bunka shiryō soshō 6), Kazama Shobō, 1961, pp. 45-46.
- 6 Katō Hiroyuki, *Zakkyo shōsō*, pp. 45-46. Katō Hiroyuki, *Nihon jinshu kairyō no ben* (Katō Hiroyuki monjo 3), Dōhōsha, 1990, pp. 43-44.
- 7 Katō Hiroyuki, *Zakkyo shōsō*, pp. 49-50.
- 8 Itō Masao, *Fukuzawa Yukichi ronkō*, Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 1969, pp. 348-349.
- 9 *Kokusei chōsa izen Nihon jinkō tōkei shūsei* 2-4, Tōyō Shoin, 1992.

- 10 Egawa Hidefumi et al., *Kokusekihō*, Yūhikaku, 1989, p. 34.
- 11 *Dajōkan nisshi* 6, Tōkyōdō, 1981, pp. 290-291.
- 12 Ishii Ryōsuke, *Nihon kon'inhō shi*, Sōbunsha, 1977, pp. 336-337.
- 13 *Dainihon gaikō bunsho* 6, Nihon Kokusai Kyōkai, 1939, pp. 695-698. *Kanagawa-ken shi shiryō-hen* 15 (Kindai, gendai 5: shōgai), Kanagawa-ken, 1973, pp. 454-463.
- 14 *Dainihon gaikō bunsho* 6, Nihon Kokusai Kyōkai, 1939, pp. 695-698.
- 15 *Dainihon gaikō bunsho* 6, Nihon Kokusai Kyōkai, 1939, pp. 701-707. FO 97/503 7280 (the draft of the law officers 28 August 1873).
- 16 *Naigai jimmin kekkon zakken* 1 (Meiji 6-12), 2 (Meiji 13-20), 3 (Meiji 21-30).
- 17 *Dajō ruiten* 2 (Meiji 4-10), 3 (Meiji 11-12), 4 (Meiji 13), 5 (Meiji 14), *Kōbunroku* (Meiji 8-18).
- 18 *Kaigiroku kekkon no bu* (Meiji 14-18), *Naigaijin kekkonbo* (Meiji 19-20), *Naigaijin kekkon* (Meiji 21), (Meiji 23-25).
- 19 *Kampō* 1669 (24.1.1889), 1676 (2.2.1889), 1746 (29.4.1889), 1964 (18.1.1890), 1985 (14.2.1890), 2261 (15.1.1891), 2564 (20.1.1892), 2598 (2.3.1892), *Jogaku zasshi* No 95 (4.2.1888).
- 20 *Nihon chōki tōkei sōran* 1, Nihon Tōkei Kyōkai, 1987, p. 52.
- 21 Watanabe Minoru, *Kindai Nihon kaigai ryūgakusei shi* 1, Kōdansha, 1977, furoku.
- 22 Ichijima Kenkichi, *Meiji bunka hasshō no kaiko* (Meiji bunka hasshō kinenshi), Dainihon Bummēi Kyōkai, 1914, pp. 12-13.
- 23 Katō Hiroyuki, *Nihon jinshu kairyō no ben* (Katō Hiroyuki monjo 3), Dōhōsha, 1990, p. 33.
- 24 *Shiga Shigetaka zenshū* 1, Shiga Shigetaka Zenshū Kankōkai, 1928, p. 75.

Japanese overseas broadcasting: The Manchuria crisis and after (1931-1937)

Jane Robbins

Early research

Radio broadcasting in Japan began on 23 March 1925, and in August 1926 the electric laboratory of the Japanese Ministry of Communications picked up its first foreign broadcast from Oakland, California, on 312 metres medium wave.¹ The first short-wave broadcasts were heard in Japan in 1928 when NHK began to pick up early Dutch experimental broadcasts to the Netherlands East Indies (Indonesia).

The first successful Japanese broadcast to the United States was in February 1930, and thereafter Japanese-American exchange broadcasts flowered. On Christmas Day 1930 songs and greetings from San Francisco were broadcast to Japan, and these were returned in a Japanese transmission starting at 12.30 pm on Boxing Day.² This type of broadcast was repeated several times during 1931. The development of Japanese-American broadcasting relations, however, changed significantly after 18 September, when Japan invaded Manchuria in search of *Lebensraum*.

The Manchurian Incident

The Manchurian Incident (*Manshū Jiken*) changed the direction of Japanese development in other areas besides broadcasting, and the decisions taken after it determined the direction of Japanese broadcasting for the following 15 years. Radio was considered essential for the effort to create the puppet state of Manchukuo, and NHK staff and transmission equipment were sent to the Kanto Army soon after it had occupied Manchuria. Using the name Kanto Army Special Communications Section, the army established radio exchanges between Tokyo and the capital of Manchuria,

Hsinking, in order to encourage the Japanese colonisation of Manchuria. Broadcasts from Hsinking defending the Japanese presence in Manchuria were also made to the United States, Europe, the Soviet Union and Shanghai.

In his New Year 1932 speech, the Director of NHK, Iwahara Kenzō, stressed the importance of clear short-wave broadcasts to Manchuria, Korea and Taiwan in binding them to Japan as a single cohesive unit. However, following the declaration of the Stimson Doctrine by the United States on 7 January,³ and the establishment by the League of Nations of the Lytton Commission to investigate the situation in Manchuria on 14 January, an American journalist, Floyd Gibbons, was permitted to broadcast to the United States on short wave from the Kanto Army headquarters in Manchuria on 21 January. This broadcast was an example of the use of short-wave radio for an entirely different purpose than binding the Japanese colonies more closely. In the course of the broadcast Gibbons said:

I ate and slept with the Japanese Army for three weeks prior to its triumphal entry into the Kum region, and I respect and admire the rigour of its military discipline and the strength of its sense of righteousness. Having seen the plunder, rape and insatiable atrocities of the rebels, I consider it natural that the Japanese Army should subjugate them.⁴

This led the *New York Times* to describe the report as the first clear war broadcast from Manchuria.⁵

One of the early indications of increasing government control was the issuing of a ban on political criticism by the press. This ban was extended to broadcasting in May 1932, when a journalist for the American magazine *Cosmopolitan*, Frieda Hind, attempted to transmit a report for NBC. The report contained some criticism of the ruling group in Japan and it was seized before transmission. The authorities allowed Hind to make the broadcast a month later, in June, after the offending sections had been altered or removed.⁶

The Manchuria crisis remained the main topic of radio reports in the spring of 1932. The establishment on 1 March of the puppet state of Manchukuo was celebrated by a "Manchurian Night" on Japanese radio, including exchange broadcasts between Tokyo and Hsinking. These broadcasts, and later broadcasts to America and Britain, were highly critical of the Lytton Report. The League of Nations refused to recognize Manchukuo as an independent state and continually appealed to the Japanese to withdraw. This criticism of the Japanese occupation finally resulted in Japan leaving the League on 26 November 1933.

Radio diplomacy

It was decided that as radio was becoming increasingly important to the Japanese in the dissemination of propaganda, priority should be given to tighter government control over broadcasting. In September 1932 an "Information Committee" (*Jōhō Iinkai*) was formed to "guide" the output of radio propaganda. All radio output was scrutinized by this committee, which met weekly as part of the Japanese drive to increase transmissions for abroad. The committee found unsatisfactory the news reports that radio and newspapers received from Reuters, Associated Press and United Press as these agencies, naturally, gave the news from a British or American perspective. The Japanese government therefore formed its own news agency to provide general news from a Japanese perspective, not just for the Japanese press and radio. The news agency responsible for voicing official Japanese opinion was called *Dōmei*.⁷ It started operations on 1 June 1936.

From their own isolated position the Japanese leaders observed with interest the rise of Hitler in Germany. In 1933 the Germans, too, withdrew from the League of Nations, and Germany seemed to the Japanese to be a natural ally to be fostered. In November the Central Tokyo Station began exchange broadcasts with Germany. These were usually musical exchanges, such as live broadcasts of concerts, and they proved to be popular in Japan. In contrast, the Japanese government refused to allow the Central Tokyo Station to broadcast over the domestic network an international musical celebration for the opening of the new NBC Radio Centre. However, as Japan did not want to tarnish its international image, the Japanese station was permitted to participate in the celebration by transmitting music to the Rockefeller Centre in New York on 18 November 1933.⁸ This was the first indication of a policy, which grew firmer as war approached, whereby German culture received governmental approval and was even encouraged, while that of the "decadent West" (particularly America) was prohibited in Japan.

During this period of increasing overseas broadcasting activity there were several changes in political attitudes towards broadcasting in Japan. In October 1934 the Army Ministry published a pamphlet on its new national defence policy which stated that "a battlefield is the Father of Creation and the Mother of Culture".⁹ This dealt principally with the propaganda to be disseminated abroad about the role of Manchuria's role in Japanese policies and Japan's role in improving Manchuria.

The start of regular overseas broadcasting

On 3 March 1935 NHK applied to the government for permission to broadcast a regular overseas service on short wave, setting the aim of the service as "to communicate truly authentic news and all cultural truth to concerned Japanese abroad and to other peoples".¹⁰

The tenth anniversary of NHK broadcasting fell on 23 March and its director announced the establishment of an overseas service to celebrate the event. Following detailed planning and consultations with representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (although there were none with representatives of the Ministry of Communications, which became responsible for radio output) official government permission for the overseas service was given on 4 May.

The initial overseas broadcasts of an hour a day began on 1 June 1935 and were directed to the Pacific coast of America and Hawaii, where there were large Japanese communities. On 21 June the daily transmission to this region was moved to a more convenient time for listeners, 6.00-7.00 pm in Hawaii and 9.00-10.00 pm on the American Pacific coast.

Also on 21 June other transmissions were started, including broadcasts to the eastern United States and South America.¹¹ A European service was begun on 4 September.

On 12 June 1936 NHK received government permission to expand its overseas broadcasts, particularly to Australia, although the expansion did not go ahead until the new year. A transmission to Java and the Straits Settlements (Singapore and Malaya) was added to the schedules at the beginning of 1937.

Censorship and development of overseas broadcasting

Censorship was an integral part of overseas broadcasting from its beginning, as much of the impetus to start short-wave broadcasting derived from the need to improve Japan's image after the Manchurian Incident. Kitayama Setsurō says that "as our country (Japan) was in a state of isolation following its withdrawal from the League of Nations, the establishment of overseas broadcasting was strongly demanded from all sides, in order to strengthen publicity abroad".¹² Thus the government had a role in scrutinizing broadcast output from a very early stage. Before the licence to broadcast regular overseas programmes was issued on 4 May there were no specific rules for censorship of short-wave broadcasting, although all broadcasts which were to be relayed abroad did pass through the Ministry of Communications for checking.

Official permission to broadcast, issued on 4 May, included clauses relating to government censorship of the broadcasts. All programme outlines were to be passed to the department of communications in the Ministry of Communications for approval seven days prior to transmission, and the contents of scripts not under the direct jurisdiction of the department of communications were then to be resubmitted to the heads of the departments of communications and electrical affairs two days before going on air. In addition, NHK was required to submit a monthly report to the heads of the two departments.¹³

As well as removing and altering offending passages, the censors also added passages to scripts to reinforce traditional values and present the Japanese view of situations if it was considered that the broadcasts did not advocate them with sufficient emphasis. Several broadcasts made by prominent academics were censored at this time. A passage which criticized Mussolini, Hitler, the Soviets, the British, French and Americans was removed from a broadcast entitled "The Japanese spirit and world peace" by a leading professor of Tokyo Imperial University, Shioya Atsushi, on 26 June 1935. Presumably the government was unwilling to offend all the leading nations simultaneously. A broadcast by a leading female academic, Inoue Hideko, entitled "Enquiry into women's issues", was cut from the schedules on 20 September because it advocated women's active involvement in politics and science whilst the government was at the time promoting the traditional role of women in Japanese society.

A programme of goodwill messages and greetings to Japan from the "Fatherland Study Group of the North and South America Japanese School Association", a Japanese language association with branches across the United States and South America, took place on 15 August. Even this was subjected to censorship and suffered the removal of some passages before being broadcast on the Japanese network.

Increasing government control

Japanese broadcasters admired what they saw as the impartiality of the BBC's Empire Service since its establishment in 1932 and had hoped to emulate it in their own short-wave broadcasts. However, the importance of censorship and propaganda to Japanese international broadcasting was incompatible with that kind of broadcasting, and from the start NHK had a completely different task to perform.

The value of broadcasting was increasingly recognised after the attempted military coup of 26 February 1936, when the rebels put out their news over the Central Tokyo Station and paralysed the other communications systems. Overseas broadcasting operations continued

almost without change, but NHK was criticized for being too liberal and on 2 May the Cabinet agreed to establish a new body to oversee the media, the Cabinet Information Committee (*Naikaku Jōhō I'inkai*). Between then and 1 July, when the Cabinet Information Committee was formed, two laws were passed which sought to control the media and media personnel, the "Inflammatory Pamphlet Emergency Control Law" (*Fuonbunsho rinji torishimari-hō*), and the "Protection of General Mobilization Secrets Measure" (*Sōdōin himitsu hōkō hōan*). These ensured that the censors could prevent the publication of any articles which could be construed as being to the left of the political spectrum or which could be seen as damaging to the security of Japan or the Japanese government. In addition, newspaper editors and NHK script-writers were warned not to step outside the strict constraints of previously approved plans regarding what was suitable material.

The prelude to war

The unstable situation in China worsened in the summer of 1936 and in August two Japanese journalists were killed in Chengdu. There were other anti-Japanese incidents throughout China, and on 28 September, as the tension and number of incidents mounted, the Cabinet Information Committee published a report on the situation. It condemned the actions of the Chinese in attacking Japanese nationals and issued a policy statement which called for propaganda to promote the Japanese view of events, particularly within China. As NHK's overseas section was in the best position to promote the Japanese point of view abroad it was given the task. The strict radio censorship which began in the autumn of 1936 was the forerunner of the censorship system which became standard in foreign propaganda after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident. As NHK used Dōmei for much of its news information, Dōmei, too, was censored more strongly than previously.

On 27 January 1937 the "News of the Japanese Homeland" to the United States reported the fall of the Japanese Cabinet on the 23rd. On 11 February the new Prime Minister Hayashi, who had formed his Cabinet nine days before, faced NHK's microphones to speak to the overseas audience. His speech emphasized that the "completion of military preparations for national defence (was) necessary for the realization of national policy".¹⁴ The March issue of *Hōsō* magazine¹⁵ said that this was the first time a new Prime Minister had publicized the policies of his Cabinet primarily over the radio.¹⁶ At the end of March the Minister of Culture published a report on the "Truths of national structure" that were to be stressed by the media at home and abroad. These "truths" reiterated that the Emperor was directly descended from the Sun Goddess in an unbroken 2,000-year line.

However, the Hayashi Cabinet, which had retained power despite heavy losses in the April elections, fell on 31 May 1937, and Prince Konoe's first Cabinet took office. In the confusion of the precarious political situation there were no broadcasts from NHK to celebrate the second anniversary of overseas broadcasting on 1 June. In fact, as June progressed, the amount of jazz music given air time in overseas broadcasts was gradually reduced, as Cabinet complaints about the adoption of American culture by the radio and the rejection of Japanese culture became increasingly vociferous.

During the spring and summer of 1937 the political situation in Manchuria became increasingly tense. Japanese and Soviet troops had several skirmishes along the Manchurian-Soviet and Manchurian-Mongolian borders. On 19 June Soviet troops landed on an island in the border river Amur (Heilongjiang) at Kanchasu. NHK was given permission to report on the incident ten days later, and the day after that the first report from the scene was broadcast in Japanese and English in the transmission to the Straits Settlements, Java and Australia. The news was considered too important to wait until the Tuesday French-language news, so reports on the situation in English, German and French were made in the Monday transmission to Europe, although Monday was the German news day. Once NHK had received permission to report on the incident, information about the situation in Kanchasu dominated the news in overseas broadcasting, and 48 reports about it were broadcast between 30 June and 3 July.¹⁷

On the evening of 7 July, whilst the Japanese were celebrating a national festival, troops in the outskirts of Peking fanned out and seized control of the Marco Polo Bridge. The Marco Polo Bridge Incident ("7.7. Jiken") signalled the end of skirmishes in China and the outbreak of full-scale war with the Chinese.

Conclusion

In the ten years after the start of domestic radio broadcasting Japanese interest in international broadcasting grew. However, as the political situation in Japan changed, particularly after the Manchurian Incident in September 1931 and Japan's subsequent withdrawal from the League of Nations in November 1933, the government's vision of the role of international broadcasting also changed.

The BBC-style impartiality to which NHK broadcasters had aspired was sacrificed in favour of the presentation to the international community of the Japanese interpretation of events. Thus, when regular overseas broadcasting began in June 1935, the opening programme was in Japanese and English, and within a year plans were formulated to add French and German broadcasts to the schedules. This was in contrast to the BBC's

overseas broadcasts, which did not include foreign language services until 1938. Censorship increased with the establishment of regular overseas broadcasting. The censor had the technical means to halt a broadcast at any point should it stray from the approved script.

As the world political situation changed, the regular schedules, which consisted of four daily transmissions, which became the most important form of short-wave broadcasting for presenting Japanese official thinking to the world. At the outbreak of the war with China, Japanese short-wave broadcasting was technically comparable with that of the other major world powers and Japan was in a position to participate fully in the world "radio war" which developed over the next eight years.

Notes

1 Kitayama Setsurō, *Rajio Tōkyō: Shinjū Wan e no Michi* (Radio Tokyo: The Road to Pearl Harbour), p. 16.

2 *ibid.*, p. 30.

3 The Stimson Declaration stated that the USA would not recognize any changes in the situation in the Far East brought about by force or which would impair US treaty rights or Chinese administrative integrity. Naturally, this was a criticism of Japanese operations in Manchuria.

4 Kitayama, *op.cit.*, p. 43. Although this broadcast would have been in English, what is quoted here is a direct translation of the Japanese source; I do not know what the actual words spoken were.

5 Kitayama, *op. cit.*, p. 42.

6 Kitayama, *op. cit.*, p. 45.

7 In the past Japanese news had always been handled by Reuters as part of Asia. There had been previous attempts by the Japanese authorities to break the Reuters hold on news in Japan, such as the establishment of the *Kokusai* agency in 1914 and its successor, *Rengō*, formed in 1926 in conjunction with AP, but Reuters maintained a strong influence. *Dōmei* was formed by merging *Rengō* (the Japan Newspaper Association) and its counterpart for telegraphic messages, *Dentsu*, in 1936, so becoming the first real Japanese news agency. The influence of Reuters had been greatly diminished in a long battle with AP. For a fuller discussion of the formation of *Dōmei* see Roger W. Purdy, "Nationalism and news: 'Information imperialism' and Japan 1910-36" in the *Journal of American-East Asian Relations*, Vol. 1, No. 3, autumn 1992.

8 Kitayama, *op. cit.*, p. 67.

9 Kitayama, *op. cit.*, p. 95.

10 Kitayama, "Kaigai hōsō shōshi (ichi)" (A brief history of overseas broadcasting, Part one), in Kaigai Hōsō Gurupu (eds.), *NHK Senji Kaigai Hōsō* (NHK's Wartime Overseas Broadcasting), p. 115.

11 Kitayama says that transmissions to Eastern America and South America began on 21 June and were broadcast on Tuesdays and Fridays. However, NHK's *Hōsō Gojū*

Nen-shi claims that this transmission began on 25 June. It is unclear whether this is the date when it was decided to make it a daily service or whether there is some confusion regarding the starting date.

- 12 Kitayama, "Kaigai hōsō shōshi (ichi)", p. 114.
- 13 Kitayama, *Rajio Tōkyō: Shinjū Wan e no Michi*, p. 110.
- 14 Kitayama, *op. cit.*, p. 178.
- 15 *Hōsō* was NHK's monthly magazine.
- 16 Kitayama, *op. cit.*, p. 178.
- 17 Kitayama, *op. cit.*, p. 193.

Vocational education and training in the Republic of Korea: Trends and contrasts

Stephen Creigh-Tyte

Introduction

As the Republic of Korea prepares for membership of the OECD élite "club" of developed industrial nations, an intense debate is under way on the adequacy of the nation's education and training system. Alleged deficiencies include a lack of vocational as opposed to academic orientation, too much emphasis on higher education; a mismatch between the levels of skilled manpower demanded by the market and that produced by the education and training system; and too great an emphasis on "quantity" rather than "quality" of trained manpower, especially that produced by the higher education system.

Korea's vocational education and training (VET) system is often assumed to be very different from those found within the (current) 12 nations of the European Union. Yet some features of the existing Korean system have been deliberately based on European models, and many of Korea's current problems echo those found in Europe and indeed the wider "industrialized" world of OECD which Korea is about to join. While institutional environments differ, this paper will stress the importance of underlying economic factors in explaining the challenges facing national VET systems and the need to use economic incentives to reinforce VET patterns and practices.

International comparisons of VET are fraught with difficulties to an even greater degree than, say, comparisons of unemployment rates. Nevertheless, such comparisons are made and have become increasingly common in the last decade. This reflects the increasing globalization of markets for goods, services and capital, the accumulating evidence that workforce skills and training are a key factor in promoting productivity, and the fact that government policies to enhance national skills bases are one of

the few remaining "legitimate" means of improving national competitiveness within the changing regional (European Union or North American Free Trade Area) or global (GATT/WTO) free trade networks.

The Korean system

The process of the modern Korean education system's development may conveniently be divided into four stages. The foundation stage, from 1945 into the 1950s, paralleled the general construction of the Republic of Korea's governmental infrastructure. The second stage began in the 1960s, when Korea's per capita GNP stood at around US\$100, a level similar to that of the newly emerging nations of sub-Saharan Africa. The second stage continued throughout the 1970s, including the realization of general elementary education, the labour force being formed mostly from primary school-leavers. There was rapid quantitative growth with non-competitive entrance to middle school. By the 1970s, when per capita GNP had reached US\$1,000, there was general secondary education and the labour force consisted basically of secondary school graduates. The 1980s, which saw per capita GNP grow from US\$1,600 in 1980 to US\$5,700 in 1990, have been characterized as a third stage, one of qualitative enhancement. Commentators argue that the 1990s should form a fourth stage, in which advanced education standards will need to be realized.

Today Korea's formal education system is essentially a single US-style 6-3-3-4 year ladder, which delivers a standard national curriculum. However, it is interesting to note that by 1991 the kindergarten enrolment ratio had reached 61%. Six years of primary or elementary school begin at age 6, followed by three years of middle school from age 12; compulsory education still formally ends with year 9 at the age of 14-15. The middle-school stratum includes "trade" schools and "miscellaneous" schools, but these appear to play a relatively small role.

Formal vocational education emerges strongly at the high school level, with distinct higher trade school (and miscellaneous school) streams supplementing the academic high school system from year 10 (age 15-16) to year 12. In 1988 academic high schools accounted for 68% of all students and in 1992 the high school enrolment rate stood at over 89%. From 1997 a fourth high school year is planned to provide improved vocational preparation for academic programmes. Thereafter students join the various strands of Korea's higher education system.

While Korea's system is characterized by strong directive government control on curriculum, examinations, etc., much of the provision is actually by the (regulated) private sector. Private-sector provision increases with education level, from 29% of high schools to 76% of universities. Since it is

known that spending per student is much lower in private schools, the quality of private provision is an area of continuing concern.

However, the size of the private system coupled with (admittedly relatively modest) fees paid even within the public system is indicative of the priority Korean parents give to their children's education. Thus in 1985 an official estimate put the share of educational expenditure in total household consumption at 12% for rural areas and 7.8% for urban ones.

Overcrowding - at least by European/US standards - is another feature of Korea's current system. Thus, in 1991 the nationwide average number of pupils per classroom was almost 41 in primary schools and just under 50 in secondary schools; the ratio of students per teacher stood at 34 in primary schools and 24 in secondary schools. However, for the six largest Korean cities the average numbers of students per class and per teacher were appreciably above the national average.

In 1988 the gross advancement ratio (the ratio for entrants to higher education, including repeaters, over the number of high school graduates) was 52%. Gross enrolment rates in Korea's higher education system expressed as a percentage of the relevant age group rose from 16% in 1980 to 33% in 1984 and 37% by 1988.

Over the whole period 1961-1989 the average annual growth rate in students enrolled at universities and colleges for four-year courses was 10.7%. Some 79% of Korea's higher education students were reading for a four-year degree and 21% studying for a two-year junior college diploma. Across all four-year degree enrolments the "hard" science/technologies areas (engineering, natural sciences and medical sciences/pharmacy) accounted for almost 35% of the total. Teacher training accounted for over 7% of enrolments. Social sciences, languages and humanities together comprised over 44% and other subjects almost 13% of the enrolment total.

Outside the formal education system, VET falls within the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Labour, which is responsible for the network of public-sector vocational training centres spread across the country. The current framework stems from the Korea Technical Qualification Law of 1973 and was developed in the mid-1970s. From 1977 the Korea Technical Qualifications Testing Agency acquired the right to national qualifications testing, and in addition the Korea Vocational Training Management Agency (renamed Korea Manpower Agency from 1991) was established to co-ordinate vocational training, youth skills olympics and national qualifications testing.

While over 730 occupational titles exist, covering vocational levels from assistant to professional/master craftsman, and the overall average test pass rate stood at 78% in 1991, the system remains small in relation to the economy as a whole. In 1991 just over 62,000 applicants successfully

completed the Korea Manpower Agency tests at all levels, which is hardly a large figure for an economy with a GNP of almost US\$282 billion, GNP growth of 8.4% in 1991 alone, and a population of 43 million.

The *chaebol* business conglomerates and other large enterprises have extensive and impressive training facilities for their employees, who enjoy considerable job security along the Japanese model within "internal" corporate labour markets. In some cases these arrangements include corporate "universities". However, the role of national occupational qualifications in the general labour market is unclear, except in the public sector where formal VET qualifications attract enhanced remuneration and promotion prospects.

European and Korean parallels

Like two well-known European examples (France and the Netherlands), Korea has developed a distinct formal stream of vocational education within its secondary schools - the vocational/technical high schools - offering three years of vocationally orientated education as an alternative to the academic high school route with its higher education entry focus.

Interestingly, the share of such vocational schools - at around one third of the age cohort - is broadly similar in both Korea and France. In the Netherlands junior vocational schools cater for around 35% of 15 year olds. Moreover, Korean dissatisfaction with this vocational secondary education system has many echoes in France, where the three-year full-time school based VET stream is often criticized for being out of touch with the "real" industrial environment; using old fashioned equipment; and only attracting those pupils with lower ability who are unable to follow the majority's academically focused curriculum.

French commentators frequently (and adversely) compare their country's approach to the "dual" apprenticeship system used in Germany, although it is important to note that traditionally around one quarter of French school leavers have actually entered enterprise based apprenticeships (*apprentissage*). This is a significant figure, but well below the approximately two-thirds of German youth who enter into the "dual" system on leaving school at 15/16 and the three-quarters or more of the German age cohort who pass through the system at some stage, including 18 year-old school leavers and even university graduates.

One key problem underlying the existing French vocational secondary school system is the quality of the qualifications produced - typically the *certificat d'aptitude professionnelle* (CAP) commonly held to represent the weakest, most traditional and lowest level craft certificate. It is extremely difficult to persuade young people and their parents to invest time and

money (often in the form of foregone earnings) in vocational qualifications which are not perceived as of high quality and likely to command enhanced future earnings - one of the key strengths of Germany's "dual" apprenticeship regime.

It was in a deliberate attempt to overcome this problem that a new high level vocational qualification - the *baccalauréat professionnelle* aimed at 18 year-old school leavers and conferring university entrance rights - was introduced in France in the second half of the 1980s. However, as yet most French high school pupils have continued to pursue the traditional "academic" *baccalauréat* route.

Over one quarter of all the young people attaining craftsman-level qualifications under Germany's "dual" system eventually go on to achieve "master craftsman" (*Meister*) qualifications, typically in their late twenties. Such *Meister* combining technical and first-line management skills have often been cited as an important competitive strength of the German economy.

Korea has, of course, experimented with the adoption of such a *Meister* system - notably at the two industrial masters' colleges (Ch'angwŏn and Inch'ŏn). However, to date the total output of "masters" has been small. In part this reflects the obvious problems involved in "transplanting" a foreign training system to Korea, in spite of the acknowledged contribution the *Meister* system has made to Germany's industrial success - notably by combining technical knowledge with training and first-line supervisory skills.

Supporting mechanisms for Germany's *Meister* system which are not found in Korea include the massive "dual" craftsman training apprenticeship system from which the *Meister* are drawn; the clear and substantial pay differentials available to an individual progressing to craftsman and *Meister* status; the legal obligation to have *Meister* status in order to set up an enterprise, at least in the traditional handicraft trades; and the requirement to have at least one *Meister* in all enterprises undertaking the training of apprentices.

Korean contrasts

The most obvious contrast between Korea and Europe is the existence of a longer established "mass" higher education system in Korea. In 1980, for example, only around one in eight of young people in the United Kingdom entered higher education, although in recent years the share has passed 30% and is currently projected to be around one in three by the year 2000. Furthermore, the United Kingdom's main employers' association, the

Confederation of British Industry, has called for a new target of over 40% by the end of the century.

Nevertheless concern is already mounting as European countries consider how to fund their growing higher education systems - especially since private-sector provision in higher education is small, compared with Korea. Moreover, the appropriateness of the subject mix being taught within higher education is questioned with particular focus upon the slower rate of expansion in the "hard" mathematics, physical sciences and technology-based disciplines.

In 1992/93 the UK saw the long-established polytechnics, which unlike the universities had traditionally emphasized technical and vocational subjects and local industry linkages, were redesignated as "universities" -- creating a so-called "single tier" higher education system covering over 100 institutions, i.e. all the former universities, polytechnics and the more specialized colleges of higher education. While this may well be justified to avoid confusion, especially in the increasing international dealings of the former British "polytechnics", it is to be hoped that it will not signal a further shift away from the traditional - more highly vocational - strengths of these institutions. This is happening exactly at the the time Korea is planning to establish vocational and technically based "polytechnic" institutions to supplement its existing "open" universities.

Small and medium-sized enterprises

Across the European Union small enterprises have created three million additional jobs in the five years since 1988, enterprises having fewer than 100 employees providing a total of 53 million jobs in 1993. Meanwhile employment in large enterprises actually declined over the period. Moreover, despite the *chaebol*, small and medium-sized enterprises are significant within the Korean economy. Even among relatively high-technology computer-related companies some 99.9 per cent are small concerns with fewer than 300 employees. In terms of employment, production and value added, these small companies account for 79, 43 and 44 per cent of the sector respectively.

Smaller Korean enterprises clearly face major challenges in terms of recruiting and retaining labour. In 1992 the average wage in companies with 500 workers or more was 38 per cent above that in companies with 10 to 20 workers, while monthly welfare fees per worker in small companies were only 81 per cent of those for larger ones. Labour turnover rates in 1990 averaged 7.4 per cent in companies with fewer than 30 workers, compared with only 1.7 per cent in companies with 500 workers or more.

On the training front the record of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs with under 500 employees, using the European Union's definition) is far less impressive. Indeed, it is precisely at this level that significant international differences are most likely to be apparent. The workforce skills deployed by Imperial Chemical Industries in the UK and BASF in Germany (or indeed LG in Korea) are likely to be far more similar than those found in, say, small independent retail outlets or motor vehicle repair shops in London and Bonn, or Seoul.

Case study evidence suggests that the more highly-trained skilled labour forces can significantly raise output per person (labour productivity) in otherwise "matched" plants within sectors which are dominated by small and medium-sized enterprises - for example, clothing manufacture and small private hotels. Nevertheless, the planning of, budgeting for and participation in training declines sharply with decreasing enterprise size across several European Union countries. Thus for example in Denmark in 1990 the proportion of enterprises with a training budget rose from just over one-third in enterprises with fewer than 10 employees to more than three-quarters in those with 250 or more employees.

All enterprises are necessarily reluctant to invest their own resources in training of use to other employers, i.e. in creating "general", "occupation" or "transferable" skills rather than "specific" skills of use only to the enterprise concerned. However, SMEs face particular problems due to their much greater difficulty in retaining skilled personnel. For example, in French industry in 1991 annual percentage labour leaving rates in enterprises with 50 to 199 employees were twice those of large enterprises with 500 or more employees. They are also more reluctant than larger undertakings to invest in training .

It is in relation to SMEs that the various national non-market (institutional) frameworks found across the European Union's 12 member states are most likely to have their impact. Certainly legal requirements to train, as in France where the percentage of total wage bill which must be spent on training activity has parallels in Korea, and "peer" group pressures, as under the "dual" apprenticeship system run by Germany's Chamber of Commerce and Industry, do appear to set some floor under training activity for SMEs, although the operation of the various national systems remains difficult to assess and explain. A European Vocational Training Platform to spread "best practice" was recently recommended to the Enterprise Policy Directorate (DG XXIII) of the European Commission.

The Future

It is widely considered that Germany has Europe's most impressive and systematic approach to VET, its strengths being particularly marked below higher education levels. However, even Germany faces challenges, notably in terms of the time taken to restructure and modernize the apprenticeship "curriculum" and methods; and mismatches between the output of and labour demand for apprentices trained in particular trades and occupations. These were apparent even before the additional strains involved in absorbing the new *Länder* of the former German Democratic Republic. Nevertheless, if Germany is taken to constitute the closest single model for "best practice" within the European Union context, certain key elements can be discerned.

In institutional terms, balance appears to be a key message from Germany, notably:

- (i) the combination of theory and practice through a blend of college-based and in-plant work, under the "dual" apprenticeship system, with the latter building knowledge of the "world of work" and work discipline as well as specific occupational skills; (ii) the mixture of academic and vocational disciplines so as to produce a rounded apprentice-trained craftsman who has been "trained how to learn"; and (iii) the presence of clear promotion routes in terms of both pay and status (to *Meister* level) following completion of the initial apprenticeship and in the case of *Meister* training itself a blend of enhanced technical and managerial/supervisory skills.

No one would deny the importance of the "training culture" found within the German-speaking world - not simply in Germany itself, but also in Austria and Switzerland and indeed in much of Central Europe that until 1918 was the Austro-Hungarian Empire. However, while acknowledging the "cultural" factors it is important to note how economic incentives can - to use a wooden furniture-making analogy - work with rather than against the underlying "grain" of cultural values.

Thus, for example, German "dual" apprentice trainees receive relatively low pay during their training, allowing training-minded German employers to take on trainees in large numbers and let them focus on training rather than production. In essence, much of the cost of the "dual" apprentice system of "transferable" skills training is borne not by the German employers but by the young trainees themselves and their families, mainly through foregone earnings during their training, and the public sector which funds the colleges used for the "off-the-job" element in the "dual" system. This is, of course, exactly what economic principles would predict if a system of VET aimed at creating "occupational" and "general" skills which are "transferable" between employers and hence which no single employer will have an economic interest in funding. All employers will of course have an interest in, and hence tend to fund, "specific" training of use solely to their own enterprise, but that is a separate issue.

Education generally, and VET in particular, can be viewed as an economic investment decision. In Korea the share of this investment made by the private sector (in practice mainly by parents) rises with the age of young people, while that of the government declines. The willingness of young people and their parents to invest in the future is, of course, an enormously valuable base on which to develop national systems for the "initial" education and training of young people in "transferable", "occupational" and "general" skills. Although continuing training and retraining for adults is likely to become more important in the future as technical change accelerates, it seems that for the foreseeable future the "initial" investments in young people will remain critical. It is while they are young that foregone earnings are lowest, the future pay-back period maximized and other social commitments minimized. Thus sound "initial" training is the bed-rock for future development.

Conclusion

It is my view that Korea should consider shifting the emphasis in initial education and training towards more vocational areas during the fourth era of its educational development in the 1990s. At the same time, the nation's Confucian "learning culture" could profitably be expanded to encompass non-academic excellence. Technology will help, as the number of jobs subject to the "3Ds" ("dirty", "difficult" and "dangerous") declines even in the industrial sector. However, economic incentives (and disincentives) must also be carefully designed to reinforce curriculum changes, etc., if an affordable, sustainable and successful VET system is to be developed, capable of delivering the skills Koreans will need to earn their living in the 21st century. This, rather than any specific institutional or policy feature, is perhaps the key lesson from Europe's experience.

References

- Casey, B, "The dual apprenticeship system and the recruitment and retention of young persons in West Germany" in *British Journal of Industrial Relations* Vol. 24, No. 1, March 1986, pp. 63-81.
- Chong T.J, "Regulating access to higher education in South Korea and Taiwan", in Krause, L.B. and Park F.K, (eds.) *Social Issues in Korea: Korean and American Perspectives*, Seoul: Korea Development Institute, 1993, pp. 219-262.
- Department for Education, *Statistical Bulletin*, No. 19/03 August 1993, London: DFE.
- European Network for SME Research (ENSR), *First Annual Report 1993: The European Observatory for SMEs*, Zoetermeer, The Netherlands: EIM, 1993; *Second Annual Report 1994*, Zoetermeer: EIM, 1994.

European Commission Task Force for Human Resources, *Commission Memorandum on Vocational Training in the European Community in the 1990s*, Brussels: European Commission, 1992.

Employment Department, *Training Statistics*, London: HMSO, 1993.

Korea Education Development Institute, *1992 Annual Report*, Seoul: KEDI, 1993.

Ministry of Education, *Education in Korea 1989-90*, Seoul: Ministry of Education of the ROK, 1990.

Ministry of Education, *Statistical Yearbook of Education 1993*, Seoul: Ministry of Education of the ROK, 1993.

Ouh Y.B. (1993) "Development policy of small and medium enterprises in Seoul", *Industrial Seminar on Changing Structure and Development Policies of Industries for Seoul*, Seoul: Seoul Development Institute, 1993.

Yun C.I. "Educational reforms and issues in Korea" in Krause, L.B. and Park F.K. (eds.) *Social Issues in Korea: Korean and American Perspectives*, Seoul: Korea Development Institute, 1993, pp. 177-218.

The ethnic and political borders of Mongolia and the resurgence of Mongolian nationalism

Alan J.K. Sanders

Introduction

The disintegration of the Mongol empire and the growth of Russian and Manchu imperialism superimposed new political borders across traditional tribal boundaries, separating Mongol communities from one another and from Khalkha, the Mongol heartland, and subjecting them to alien administrative, cultural, religious and commercial pressures. When the princes of Khalkha accepted Manchu sovereignty in 1691, the boundary between the Russian and Manchu spheres of interest in North-East Asia had already been established by the 1689 Treaty of Nerchinsk. While Mongolia's northern border was determined by the 1727 Treaty of Kyakhta between Russia and Qing China and its protocols, Mongolia's southern border emerged gradually during the formation of the independent Mongolian state, at the Qing boundary between Outer Mongolia (Khalkha) and Inner Mongolia.

As part of the Qing empire Mongolia had long been isolated from the outside world and bypassed by modern socio-economic development. With the collapse of the Qing from 1911 Mongolia entered a brief period of self-proclaimed independence but actual autonomy, during which a treaty was concluded with Tibet, but its hopes of reuniting the Mongol people were quickly destroyed. After 1921 Mongolia was Sovietized and entered a new era of nominal independence but even greater isolation, recognized only by Soviet Russia and Tuva - once part of Outer Mongolia. Having earlier become separated from the Buryats, Kalmyks and other Mongol and Mongolized nations in Russia, the Khalkha people now found themselves also cut off from the Mongols of Inner Mongolia and other regions of China.

Mongolia's national independence endured against Chinese and Japanese pressure under Soviet protection and eventually was recognized by

the international community in the 1960s. As Soviet power went into terminal decline and the birth of freedom and democracy in Mongolia in 1990 ended the monopoly of communist rule, the outside world willingly helped Mongolia begin the difficult transition to multiparty politics and a market economy.

Mongolia has indicated its wish for a settlement with Russia over its aid debt to the Soviet Union amidst calls for compensation for the political, economic and environmental damage done to Mongolia by Soviet power, including the restoration of territory lost by revision of the Mongol-Russian border. Mongolia is seeking Russian and Chinese cooperation in patrolling the long borders to discourage smuggling, rustling and illegal immigration. Mongolia is concerned about the human rights of the Mongols and other minorities in China, for Mongolian Buddhists acknowledge the Dalai Lama as their leader.

Amidst the current political and economic turmoil the Mongols of Mongolia, Russia and China have been rediscovering their common roots in the empire of Genghis Khan. Mongolia's political and economic ties with Mongol communities in Russia and China have been renewed and their sense of cultural identity is being restored, although the prospects for pan-Mongolian unity are as poor as ever. Both Moscow and Peking remain utterly opposed to the separation of any part of Russia or China. Mongolia is consolidating its independence through relations with its "third neighbour", the international community. Meanwhile, as the Mongol heartland and the only independent Mongol state, Mongolia has taken the lead in establishing organizations to unite and represent the world's Mongols.

Historical overview

The 17th century was a period of intensive Russian exploration of Siberia, but in 1685 Manchu forces forced a temporary halt by attacking the Russian fort at Albazin on the Amur (Heilongjiang), upstream from present-day Khabarovsk. Representatives of the Russian and Manchu empires met in 1689 at Nerchinsk, in present-day Chita *oblast'* (region), at the confluence of the Nercha and Shilka rivers, to sign a treaty agreeing their border along the river Argun' (Ergun) and the Stanovoy ("Outer Hinggan") mountains to the Pacific coast. Albazin was demolished and the Russians withdrew, their line of exploration pushed to the far north-east for almost 200 years.

The Buryat territories around Lake Baikal were incorporated into the Mongol empire in 1207 and later ruled by the Jungarian (Oirat or Western Mongol) khanate. Russian Cossacks advancing through Siberia overran the Buryats and built a fort on the river Ude in 1665.

In 1691 the princes of Khalkha sought Manchu protection against the invading Jungarians, and the Mongol heartland became a Manchu colony (Outer Mongolia). The southern Mongols (Inner Mongolia) had already been placed under Manchu rule in 1636.

In 1727 the Russian and Manchu empires concluded the Treaty of Kyakhta and two protocols on the alignment of their border: the Abagatuy (Avgayt) protocol, on the section (63 markers) from the river Argun' to the river Kyakhta; and the Bur (Buurn Gol) protocol, on the section (24 markers) from Kyakhta to Shabin Dabaga. This pass (Shavinayn Davaa in modern Mongol) is on the boundary between the present-day Tuva Republic and Krasnoyarsk *krai* (territory). Mongolia's present border with Russia more or less follows the historical border, except where it embraced Tuva.

The Treaty of Kyakhta also established a trading warehouse on the border at Troitskosavsk (Kyakhta) and gave the Russians the right to send a tax-free trade caravan to Peking every three years. As well as the caravan route through Kyakhta, there were traditional packhorse routes into western Mongolia from Minusinsk and Biysk via the Usinskiy *trakt* (trail) and the Chuyskiy *trakt*, which followed the Usa and Chuya valleys.

The Treaty of Kyakhta placed the Buryats firmly inside the Russian empire and separated them from the Khalkha Mongols to the south, who with the partially Mongolized Turkic Tuvans of Urianhay had been brought into the Manchu sphere of influence. Russian settlement and the introduction of Orthodoxy in the 18th and 19th centuries were opposed by the Buryats unsuccessfully.

The Russian-Chinese border was extended southwards from Shabin Dabaga to Kokand (present-day Uzbekistan) under the Treaty of Peking of 1860 and delimited under the Tarbagatay (Chuguchak) protocol of 1864.

Outer Mongolia declared its independence in 1911, as Manchu rule collapsed, but it was not recognized and a new Treaty of Kyakhta, between Russia, China and Mongolia, in 1915 imposed autonomy on Mongolia under Chinese suzerainty. After a briefly successful attempt by China to reimpose its rule in Mongolia by force the country was invaded by troops of the Russian tsar and their Bolshevik enemies. In 1921 a combined force of Mongolian nationalist revolutionaries and the Soviet Red Army took the Mongolian capital Urga (Ih Hüree) and a "people's government" was installed. This was quickly consolidated by a treaty of mutual recognition with Soviet Russia and the beginning of the process of Sovietization under the ruling Mongolian People's (Revolutionary) Party (MPRP). The Mongolian People's Republic was proclaimed in 1924. Following the collapse of Soviet-style communism in Mongolia in 1990, the 1992 Constitution declared the country's name to be Mongolia (*Mongol Uls*) - not the "Mongolian State" or "Mongolian Republic", as some interpreted it.

The Buryat-Mongol Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR) was established on the amalgamation of the two Buryat-Mongol Autonomous *oblast'* of the RSFSR and Far Eastern Republic in 1923. Its boundaries were revised in 1937, a time of anti-nationalist and anti-religious persecution. Buryat-inhabited areas west of Lake Baikal and south of Chita were made into separate *okrugs* (districts) based on the towns of Ust'-Ordynskiy and Aginskoye within Irkutsk *oblast'* and Chita *oblast'* respectively. The ASSR was renamed the Buryat ASSR in 1958. The capital is Ulan-Ude, formerly Verkhneudinsk. The post-Soviet self-proclaimed Buryat Republic (Buryatia) is a subject of the Russian Federation.

Tuva (Urianhay) lies north of the Tannu-Ola (Tangdy-Uula) mountains at the headwaters of the Yenisey, and like the Buryats its people were subjects of the Jungarian khanate. Once confirmed part of the Manchu sphere of influence by the Treaty of Kyakhta, Urianhay was administered by the Qing *amban* (governors) in Outer Mongolia, although from 1760 the Khalkha border guardposts (*karaul*) ran along the Tannu-Ola mountains between Mongolia and Urianhay. In the early 20th century Urianhay came under strong Russian imperial and then Bolshevik influence, and its recent history in many ways mirrored events in Mongolia itself.

In 1913 Russia and China issued a joint declaration that "Autonomous Outer Mongolia comprises the regions under the jurisdiction of the Chinese *ambans* at Urga and Kobdo and the Chinese military governor at Uliassutai (Uliastay)", provided that the exact boundaries of Outer Mongolia should be the subject of a subsequent conference. Urianhay was then governed by the Kobdo *amban*. In 1914 however, Russia declared a protectorate in Urianhay. When China sought to put Urianhay on the agenda of the 1915 Kyakhta tripartite conference, to obtain Russian confirmation of its northern border, the Russians refused to discuss it.

Tuva's independence was proclaimed in 1921, but in 1924 many of its inhabitants still offered their allegiance to Mongolia. The congress of the ruling Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party in that year stated Mongolia's wish for Tuva to remain part of Mongolia. Despite objections from the Soviet representative at the congress, it resolved to set up a joint commission to regulate Tuva's position. An official Soviet history of Tuva refers to "counter-revolutionary uprisings" and ploys "to split Tuva from the USSR" and "eliminate the republic's independence". Thus a conference in Kyzyl of representatives of the USSR, Mongolia and Tuva "to discuss the Mongol feudalists' aim of uniting Tuva and Mongolia" concluded that the "elimination of Tuva's independence and its unification with Mongolia does not reflect the view of the basic mass of the Tuvan population".

The Mongols were obliged to accept this and they signed a friendship and mutual recognition treaty with Tuva in August 1926. As the quasi-independent People's Republic of (Tannu) Tuva, ruled by the Tuvan

People's Revolutionary Party (TPRP), Tuva survived until 1944, when it was swallowed up by the Soviet Union. At first an autonomous *oblast'*, Tuva attained ASSR status in 1961. As the Tuva (Tyva) Republic, it is a subject of the Russian Federation. Its capital is Kyzyl, formerly Belotsarsk.

Kalmykia is inhabited by Torguts and Derbets (Western Mongols or Oirats). Their ancestors numbering some 280,000 migrated from Jungaria through Central Asia to the lower Volga and Russia recognised the Kalmyk khanate in 1661. A hundred years later, after the suppression of the Jungarian anti-Manchu uprising, many Kalmyks returned to Jungaria, and in 1771 the Russians abolished the khanate and its territory was administered from Astrakhan'. Some Torguts and Derbets live today in western Mongolia and northern Xinjiang.

In the Soviet period a Kalmyk Autonomous *oblast'* was established in 1920, upgraded to ASSR in 1935, and abolished in 1943 on grounds of the population's alleged collaboration with the invading German army. The Kalmyks were exiled to the Altai *krai* and other parts of Siberia and their territory divided between Astrakhan', Stalingrad and Rostov *oblast'* and Stavropol *krai*. The Kalmyk Autonomous *oblast'* was restored in 1956, and the ASSR in 1958. The self-proclaimed Kalmyk Republic (Kalmykia) or "Khalmg Tangkhch" is a subject of the Russian Federation. The capital is Elista, formerly Stepnoy.

The Oirats gave their name to the native people of the Altai Republic, the former Gornyy Altai *oblast'* of the RSFSR Altai *krai*. These Turkicized Mongols, also known as Oirots and Altaitsy, have preserved some Mongol customs and vocabulary, although their language is Turkic. They were part of the Jungarian khanate in the 17th-18th centuries but entered the service of the Russian tsar in 1756. Russian control of their territory was confirmed under the 1860 Treaty of Peking. In the Soviet period up until 1948 it was called the Autonomous Oirat *oblast'*. The Altai Republic is also a subject of the Russian Federation. Its capital is Gorno-Altaysk, formerly Ulala and Oirat-Tura.

The Kazakhs, the largest non-Mongol ethnic group in Mongolia, are a Turkic tribe which accounted for some six per cent of the population at the last census. About 100,000 lived in Bayan-Ölgiy province (*aymag*) in western Mongolia, forming 80 per cent of the local population, and another 30,000 in neighbouring Hovd (Kobdo) province. The Kazakhs migrated into Mongolia from East Turkestan (Xinjiang) towards the end of the last century. In the 20th century many found work in the mining industry in central Mongolia. Although they share no common border, the Kazakhs of Mongolia and the Republic of Kazakstan (the former Kazakh SSR) maintain close contacts. Surface access to Kazakstan from Bayan-Ölgiy is via the Altai Republic. Since 1990 perhaps 20,000 of Mongolia's Kazakh workforce (and 30,000 dependants) have emigrated to Kazakstan.

There are some 5.5 million Mongols in China, including 3.4 million in Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region (AR), where they account however for only 14 per cent of the region's now overwhelmingly Han population. During the Chinese "cultural revolution" 60,000 Mongols were murdered and over 200,000 severely injured, and many thousands more were forcibly resettled far away from China's border with Mongolia. Mongolian tribes also live in Xinjiang Uighur AR's Bayangol and Bortai Mongolian "autonomous prefectures" and Hoboksar Mongolian "autonomous county" - as well as Mongolian "autonomous counties" in the provinces of Jilin (Qian Gorlos), Heilongjiang (Dorbod), Liaoning (Fuxin and Harqin Left Wing), Gansu (Subei) and Qinghai (Henan and Haixi), and without "autonomy" in five other provinces (see tables).

Mongolia's cultural and economic contacts have been growing with Inner Mongolia's Khalkha, Tumet, Ordos and Chakhar Mongols through exchanges of delegations and publications and development of cross-border trade. These contacts are closely monitored by Han officials, who want to limit the spread of Mongol nationalism in Inner Mongolia.


Mongolia's borders

The total length of Mongolia's borders with the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China is currently 8,161.8 km.

From west to east the 3,485 km line of the northern border with Russia runs from the unnamed Height 4104.0 in the Tavan Bogd Uul (49 deg 8 min N lat and 87 deg 45 min E long) through the Altai and Sayan mountains (borders of the Altai and Tuva Republics) and across the Hentiy mountains (borders of the Buryat Republic and Chita oblast').

The 4,676.8 km southern border with China runs from Height 4104.0 along the Mongol Altai mountains and south of the Gobi Altai range (borders of Xinjiang Uighur AR and Gansu Province) and then turns north-east through the Gobi towards Lake Buir (border of Inner Mongolia AR).

Mongolia's eastern borders with Russia and China meet at Height 646.7 on Tarvagan Dah (49 deg 52 min N lat and 116 deg 45 min E long). The two border junction points were not agreed trilaterally until January 1994, when representatives of Mongolia, Russia and China signed an agreement to this effect in Ulan Bator after visits to Tavan Bogd (July 1993) and Tarvagan Dah.



For administrative purposes Mongolia's border with Russia is divided into three sections. From west to east they are: the Uvs section from Height 4104.0 to Asgat, in Zavhan province; the Selenge section, from Asgat to Height 970.6 on the river Minj or Menza (marker 988); and the Eastern section from Minj to Tarvagan Dah.

On the Russian side the border is also divided into three sections. From west to east they are: the Kyzyl section, from Height 4104.0 to Height 2855.8 (marker 332) in the Greater Sayan Mountains; the Kyakhta section, from Height 2855.8 to Height 1326.3 (marker 1019) at the river Yolt or Yelatuy; and the Mangut (Dauriya) section, from Height 1326.3 to Tarvagan Dah.

According to the Mongol-Chinese border protocol of June 1964, the border is 4,672.7153 km long. There are 639 markers (*bagana temdeg*), although those in very mountainous areas (Nos. 1-9 and 19-35) have not been checked since demarcation. Maj.-Gen. Palamyn Sündev, the Chief of Staff (now Commander) of the Mongolian Border Troops, in December 1992 gave a length of 4,676.895 km, but he named the western starting point as Hüytyn or Hüytyniy orgil, instead of Height 4104.0. Hüytyn (4,374 metres) is Mongolia's highest mountain. Tsenden-Ish and Bat-Ochir in December 1992 gave a length of 4,677 km and added that there were 1,113 *ovoo* (cairns). It is not clear whether there is any essential difference between a "cairn" and a "marker". Subsequently it was reported that on the Mongol-Russian border from "Hüytyn to Tarvagan Dah" there were 2,992 "markers".

According to the Mongolian statistical yearbook published in 1991, the northernmost point of Mongolia is Mongol Sharyn Davaa (52 deg 9 min N lat and 98 deg 57 min E long); southernmost Orvog Gashuuny Bor Tolgoi (41 deg 35 min N and 105 deg 0 min E); westernmost Maan't Uul (48 deg 53 min N and 87 deg 44 min E); and easternmost Modtoy Hamar (46 deg 43 min N and 119 deg 56 min E).

Administrative maps of Mongolian *aimag* and *hoshuu* (provinces and districts) were produced in Autonomous Outer Mongolia and a map of Mongolia was published in 1925. Some Mongolian writers consider that the names of border points have been changed or the markers moved over the years, for example, that the easternmost point is really Modotyng Uhaa Hamar Uul (a variant name) or Soyolz Uul or Nömrög Ovoo, and the southernmost Ingen Usny Gov'. Others consider that the whole of Baytag Bogd mountain on the border with China should be inside Mongolia.

The Mongolian statistical yearbook for 1991 gives Mongolia's "territory length" from north to south as 1,259 km and from east to west 2,392 km. Contemporary statistics collected in 1968 gave 1,260 km and 2,368 km respectively.

Uncertainty about the length of Mongolia's borders has led to uncertainty about the country's total surface area. While one has to make allowances for updated measurement, human error or a tendency to round figures off, it is all quite strange for a country where publication of national statistics has been so important. In 1957 the country's borders were considered to be 7,000 km long and its area 1,531,000 sq km. By 1969 the borders were 7,670 km and Mongolia's area 1,560,000 sq km. Statistics collected in 1968 gave 7,030 km and 1,565,000 sq km. Some Western publishers favoured 1,564,660 sq km. Statistical handbooks for 1986 and 1991 say 1,566,500 sq km. Mongolian President Ochirbal is reported in his speeches to have cited three different figures for Mongolia's area: 1,330,000 (1990), 1,360,000 sq km (early 1991) and 1,563,000 sq km (late 1991).

It was reported that, as part of a project to photograph and video the whole length of Mongolia's borders, the section from Tes to Orvog Gashuuny Ovoo had been overflown by a helicopter during the summer of 1994.

At the beginning of the Soviet period Mongolia bordered not only on Soviet Russia (the RSFSR) but also, to the north-east, on the Far Eastern Republic, until it amalgamated with Soviet Russia in December 1922 to form the USSR. Mongolia's north-western border was shared with the People's Republic of (Tannu) Tuva, until it was swallowed by the USSR in 1944.

In the period 1932-45 the Japanese puppet state of Manchukuo was Mongolia's eastern neighbour. Mongolia's border with Japanese-held territory extended to 1,700 km after Japan's seizure of Chahar and Suiyuan (previously parts of Inner Mongolia). Following the victory of Mongolian-Soviet forces over the Japanese army in the Battle of Halhyn Gol (Nomonhan) in August 1939, agreement on Mongolia's border with Manchukuo was reached in June 1940 - between the Soviet Union and Japan. The agreement indicated that the MPR and Manchukuo governments were to demarcate the new border and then conclude their own agreement confirming this.

Since 1945 Mongolia has had borders only with Russia (USSR) and China (Republic, then People's Republic). During the Chinese "cultural revolution" the northern and south-western *aymags* of Inner Mongolia AR were taken away from the region and administered by neighbouring provinces, so that for some years Mongolia also bordered on Heilongjiang and Jilin provinces and Ningxia Hui AR.

There are 40 official crossing points on the Mongolian-Russian border, 20 of which are "permanent" and 20 "seasonal" (see tables). The most important permanent crossing points into the Russian Federation are, from west to east:

- In Bayan-Ölgiy Province, by road from Tsagaannuur to Tashanta and Kosh-Agach in the Altai Republic, giving road access to the railhead at Biysk (Altai *krai*); a new road is planned from Ust'-Kan in the Altai Republic to Leninogorsk, providing a good link with Kazakhstan.

- In Uvs Province, by road from Teel to Khandagayty, Chadan and Kyzyl in the Tuva Republic, giving road access to the railhead at Abaza and Abakan (Khakass Republic, Krasnoyarsk *krai*).

- In Hövsgöl Province, by road from Hanh, a port on the northern shore of Lake Hövsgöl, to Mondy in the Buryat Republic, giving road access to Irkutsk and the Trans-Siberian Railway. Use of this route has declined with the closure of lake shipping services.

- In Selenge Province, by rail from Sühbaatar to Naushki in the Buryat Republic, giving rail access via Ulan-Ude to the Trans-Siberian Railway.

- A few kilometres farther east, by road from Altanbulag to Kyakhta and Ulan-Ude.

- In Dornod Province, by rail from Ereentsav (Chuluunhoroot) to Solov'yevsk and Borzya (Chita *oblast'*), eastern Mongolia's link with the Trans-Siberian Railway.

Except for the rail and road link from Zamyn-Üüd to Ereen (Erenhot or Ehrlien) in Inner Mongolia AR, the nine crossing points on the border with China are of local significance and open only at specific times and dates (see table). There are sidings at Ereen and Zamyn-Üüd for changing from the Russian and Mongolian broad gauge to China's standard gauge. The railway line runs southeastwards to Jining for Höhhot or Datong (for Peking).

The Border Troops

The Mongolian Border Law adopted in October 1993 says that the border may be crossed only at designated crossing points. Non-citizens are banned from the 30 km border zone, non-residents require a permit to visit it, and residents must have an official stamp in their "citizen's passport". The Border Troops (*khiliyn tsereg*) control all activity in the 5 km border strip. Local government organizations ensure that border regulations are observed and recruit border defence volunteers, who can check people's identity documents in the border zone and detain illegal border crossers.

The law is in keeping with Article 4 of Mongolia's 1992 Constitution which says: "(1) The integrity of Mongolia's territory and borders shall be inviolable. (2) Mongolia's borders shall be guaranteed by law. (3) Stationing

of foreign forces on Mongolia's territory or their transit through its territory and across the state borders shall be prohibited unless provided for by law."

The border guardpost (*karaul*) service run by the Bogd Khan government was withdrawn from the northern border after the victory of the 1921 revolution. The Mongolian revolutionary government set up a border affairs department in 1924. In September 1928 the Mongolian government adopted regulations on the protection of the southern border. The Mongolian Border Troops were formed in 1933, and during the Manchukuo crisis in 1937 they were ordered to the eastern border. They are reported to have been disbanded in the 1950-60 period, when the border with China became "a border of peace and friendship", but then reformed in mid-1960 under the Ministry of Public Security. The period 1976-90 was a time of growth of the Border Troops, who were provided with dogs, buildings, monitoring devices, motor vehicles and other modern equipment made in the USSR. In the government changes in 1990 the Border Troops were placed under the Chief Directorate of State Security. In November 1993 they were made into a separate Directorate of Border Troops. Since 1990 they have suffered from a shortage of money, fuel, vehicles, mounts, communications equipment and winter clothing.

According to Maj.-Gen. Palamyn Sündev, Commander of Mongolian Border Troops, under the treaty on the border regime signed with Russia in 1980 delegations exchange visits and meetings are held to report border violations and exchange border violators. The top leadership of the Border Troops in Mongolia and Russia meet once every two years, and the border district commanders meet once a year. The treaty with Russia, valid for ten years then renewable every five years, provides for joint inspection of the border, regulates responsibility for markers and requires the clearing of all vegetation from the border in a five-metre strip on each side the line over its whole length. Meetings of the Mongolian-Russian inter-state joint border inspection commission took place in 1992 and 1995. Similar arrangements have been made with China under a border regime treaty signed in 1989.

Regular meetings of bilateral border co-operation committees are held to discuss measures to prevent illegal crossings, livestock rustling, smuggling, illegal hunting and fishing, activity harmful to the natural environment, and crime against people living in the border areas. Maj.-Gen. Sündev attended such a meeting in Russia with Lt.-Gen. Yeryomin, Commander of the South Baikal Border Troops District, in November 1994. They concluded an inter-governmental agreement and two protocols on stepping up co-operation and dealing jointly with border problems. Yeryomin had visited Ulan Bator in June 1994. At a meeting held in Tuva in May 1994, representatives of the Mongolian Ministry of Foreign Relations, Central Intelligence Directorate and Uvs and Zavhan provincial leaders reached agreement with the President of Tuva on improving the situation on both sides of the border. There were further meetings in Khandagayty and

with Lt.-Gen. Yeryomin in Kyakhta in February 1995. The Head of the Russian Border Service, Col.-Gen. Nikolayev, visited Mongolia in October 1995.

The Mongol-Russian border control commission deals with such matters as inspection of the border and erection of markers. According to the chairman of the Mongol side of the commission, Luvsandorjiyn Mundagbaatar, a new inspection of the whole length of the Mongol-Russian border began in 1993 and should be completed in 1996. The location of the markers will be recorded, and a good many of them replaced with new ones bearing the new Mongol state emblem. Undergrowth around them will be cleared away. Mundagbaatar said that the border section agreed under the 1958 treaty with Russia was inspected 1959-60, and the 1976 section in 1977-79. All archive material about the border has been handed over to the Ministry of Foreign Relations for safekeeping.

In 1992 Mongolia's land and air borders were crossed legally by 806,729 travellers from 110 countries, 86,991 train and aircraft crew members, and 308,749 vehicles. Ulan Bator's Buyant-Uhaa airport is a key international border point - 105,117 people passed through it in 1993. Total border crossings by land and air in 1993 reached 1,194,000 individuals, of which 77,000 were in transit. The rapid rate of growth has begun to fall off, with the imposition in 1995 of a visa regime on travellers to and from Russia. The number of foreigners entering Mongolia in 1993 exceeded 40,000, of whom 16,930 registered for a short stay on business. Another 7,278 foreigners and 2,981 dependants were staying in Mongolia on fixed-term contracts.

Small-scale illegal crossing of the border has long been a routine problem for Mongolia and its neighbours, which regularly detain smugglers and poachers and expel visitors who fail to register, outstay their permits, or set up illegal businesses. Most illegal crossings are associated with hunting and fishing, smuggling or livestock theft. In recent years cattle rustling has been particularly rife on the Mongolia-Tuva border, and several attempts have been made by the authorities on each side of the border to put a stop to it. The measures include increased patrolling by Mongolia's Border Troops.

In 1990 some 400 or so illegal border crossings were intercepted. In 1991 illegal crossings of the border with Russia rose by 60 per cent and the border with China by 30 per cent. During a visit to Mongolia in 1991 by the Chairman of the Tuvan Supreme Soviet, Bicheldey, "special attention was paid to Tuva's border with Uvs Province," according to Mongolian Vice-Minister of Foreign Relations Choynhor.

From January to November 1992 the total of illegal crossings intercepted was: from China 202 people, from Russia 348 and from Mongolia (i.e. outgoing) 200 or so. The 1992 totals of illegals apprehended were incoming, 220 on the northern border and 421 on the southern border, a

9.6 per cent increase on 1991; and outgoing 237 on the northern border and 21 on the southern, an 8.6 per cent increase.

From January to May 1993 intercepted illegal crossings were up on the same period of 1992 by 10 per cent on the southern border and 16.3 per cent on the northern border. In the first half of 1993, Tuvans rustled 2,342 head of Mongolian livestock while 114 head wandered into Tuva and 539 wandered out. In the first nine months of 1993 the Mongolian Border Troops caught 95 people leaving Mongolia for Tuva illegally and 113 people coming in from Tuva. The chairman of the Mongolian Great Hural's legal affairs committee, Tömör, visited Khandagayty for talks about the situation with Kazhin-Ool, the first deputy chairman of the Tuvan Supreme Soviet. Forty percent of the illegal crossings on the Mongolian-Russian border occur on the Tuvan section.

In 1992-94 the total of illegal border crossings intercepted reached 1,147 from the Russian side; 2,135 head of Mongolian livestock were reported stolen and taken to Tuva, of which only 1,038 head were returned. In August 1993 five Russians from Tuva stole all the carpets from the hotel in Bayantes.

Rustling of horses and livestock across the border with Tuva is common, but seasonal. Commenting in April 1994 on the Mongolia-Tuva border situation, *Rossiyskaya Gazeta* said the Tuvans and Mongols alike ignored the border markers "as if they were telegraph poles". "They simply cross the border at any time and steal each other's cows, horses and sheep."

People also enter Mongolia illegally in Hövsgöl, Selenge and Hentii Provinces from the Buryat Republic, to hunt wild animals. Citizens from both countries try to smuggle contraband. The Mongols smuggle petrol, tea, tyres and American butter. Mongol citizens who have lost their passports also try to return to Mongolia without using approved crossing points.

The Russian side is reinforcing its Border Troops and an "operational group" has been set up in Abakan (capital of the Khakass Republic, part of Krasnoyarsk *krai*) to supervise their operations in the area. A border unit has been set up at Aktash (northwest of Kosh-Agach in the Altai Republic) and detachments elsewhere. Meanwhile, Mongolian Deputy Procurator Enhnasan had a meeting in Kyzyl in March with Tuvan Procurator Damba-Khuurak to discuss anti-crime measures. This spurt of activity was no doubt connected with the killing of three men of the Mongolian Border Troops on the Tuvan border in June 1993. Russian communications with Tuva are quite difficult, since there are no railways or good roads.

According to Maj.-Gen. Püreviyn Dash, Chief of Staff of the Mongolian Border Troops, the situation on Mongolia's border with Russia is "not serious". No organised crime has been detected, although some local

people commit crimes regularly: "The local government of Uvs Province has decided to resettle suspicious elements away from border villages..."

Border claims and disputes

Mongolia has always been sensitive about any suggestion of disagreement with its neighbours about the borders or border territory. The public relations department of the Mongolian Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement in March 1990, for example, saying: "Our country has treaties and agreements with the USSR and PRC concerning the border and there is no question of any territorial conflict. The border is constantly checked in co-operation with the two countries."

Nonetheless, a brief history of the formation of Mongolia's borders, published by Lt.-Col. Bat-Ochir of the Border Troops in 1992, was unusual for its consolidated listing of territory "lost" by Mongolia as a result of border "adjustments" in this century. As a result of an "ultimatum" from Russia and China, he said, under the 1915 Treaty of Kyakhta the western part of the Hovd border region and Bulgan Torgut lands became Altai district of Xinjiang. After giving some details about the various border agreements with Tuva between 1930 and 1958, Bat-Ochir said that Mongolia lost not only the Davst *uul* area of Uvs Province but also large pieces of border territory elsewhere. He went on to name geographical features of land east of the present border with China lost to Manchukuo in 1940, and land between the "existing" and "historical" borders lost to China in 1962. Further border areas of Mongolia (unspecified) were lost to the USSR in 1975. "History teaches us that the reliable defence of the border and border areas is more necessary than ever before," Bat-Ochir remarked.

The Movement for the Integrity of the Sacred Border is an organisation which has fought hard for the protection of Mongolia's border and territory. It drafted its own version of a border law well before the Great Hural (Mongolian assembly) adopted the Mongolian Border Law in 1993. The movement's leader, Pürev-Oydovyn Davaanyam, has said that Mongols "were told and made to believe" that there were no serious border problems in the past 70 years. Russia and China repeatedly said that they had no border disputes with Mongolia. However, Mongolian territory had been lost to Russia (part of Lake Uvs) and China (parts of Lake Buir and Baitag Bogd), he pointed out. "Of course, we will not get back the territories which we have already lost. It is now important not to lose more new territories." Mongolia had quite a few outstanding border issues with Russia and China, but they could not be resolved by force, and the stabilization of Mongolia's relations with its neighbours was to be welcomed.

It was only in the post-Soviet period that Russia's extraterritorial rights on the Marday uranium mine in Mongolia were disclosed. Marday and Erdes miners' settlement are in Dornod province's Dashbalbar district, to which a secret railway branch has been built from the Ereentsav-Choybalsan line. The mine and settlement banned local Mongols, who were forbidden even to use the local shop.

Moscow has always been sensitive to any calls for the revision of the external or internal borders of the USSR or Russia, whether they relate to Japan's "northern territories" (in the Southern Kuril islands) or Estonia's Petserimaa (in Pskov *oblast'*). Moreover, Moscow is also concerned to preserve the unity of the Russian Federation, although the Tuva Republic for one, in view of its independence from 1921-44, could have as good grounds as the Baltic states for restoration of its independence. As Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev has remarked, however, "Russia is not a Swiss cheese."

The Head of the Russian Border Service, Col.-Gen. Nikolayev, warned in January 1994 that "nationalist organisations" in Mongolia, Tuva, Finland and the Baltic states were persistently raising the issue of "revising" their borders with Russia. Warning to this theme, the Deputy Chairman of the Russian Federation Council, Abdulatipov, declared in the Russian *Nezavisimaya Gazeta* in March 1994 that "officials" in Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Finland, Ukraine, Georgia, Mongolia, China and Japan had been "laying claim" to Russian territory. The Russian *Kommersant Daily* echoed: "Japan, Estonia and Mongolia have long ago laid their claims on the territory of Russia."

Mongolian Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs Choynhor called in the Russian ambassador, Sergey Razov, who said Abdulatipov's remarks did not represent Russian government policy and were deeply regretted. The Russian-Mongolian Treaty of Friendly Relations and Cooperation (January 1993) stated that both parties respected the inviolability of the two countries' state borders, Razov went on. Russia and Mongolia had a border treaty and border regime agreement, and joint demarcation was approaching successful completion.

The director of press and information at the Russian Foreign Ministry, Karasin, emphasized: "There are no territorial questions in Russian-Mongolian relations, no Mongolian official has made such a statement, and the Mongolian Ministry of Foreign Relations has confirmed this." The Russian co-chairman of the Russian-Mongolian joint border commission, Pavlov, commented: "There is not one section of the whole state border between Russia and Mongolia - over 3,000 km - which is disputed. Russia and Mongolia have no territorial claims on one another."

Mongolia's border with Tuva

The Soviet negotiators of the Mongolia-Tuva treaty of 1926 transferred to Mongolia 16,000 sq km of Darhat lands west of Lake Hövsgöl belonging to Tuva, whose border had reached the shores of the lake.

In 1930 MPRP Central Committee Secretaries Badrah and Eldev-Ochir agreed with TPRP Central Committee Secretary Toka to set up a joint border affairs commission to discuss allocation of land according to the nationality and distribution of the population and economic considerations. The Mongols wanted the border to run along the Tannu-Ola mountains. The Tuvans wanted the border moved to the line of former Mongol pickets (*karaul*) on the slopes.

In 1932 the Mongolian-Tuvan border commission realigned the border along the southern slopes, up to 25 km inside Mongolian territory in the *Tes gol* basin. The salt mine at *Davst uul* (Height 1809 north of Lake Uvs) was transferred to Tuva and Mongolian nomads on the border were offered free salt.

The Mongols were not satisfied but another border commission meeting in 1940 failed to resolve the differences between the two sides. The Tuvans told the Mongol negotiator Yanjmaa their people lived on the slopes of the mountains.

Tuva lost its independence in 1944, and control of the border with Mongolia passed to the USSR authorities.

Not long after Vyacheslav Molotov arrived in Mongolia to take up the post of Soviet ambassador in 1957, Mongolian Foreign Minister Avarzad claimed at border talks that the agreement on *Davst uul* was invalid because it was unratified and had been annulled at the talks with the Tuvans in 1940. Molotov had Avarzad removed and the new Mongolian delegation leader, Tsend, agreed to confirmation of the 1932 border. A new border treaty was signed in March 1958 which not only confirmed that *Davst uul* was in Tuva, but also redrew the Soviet-Mongolian border in a 6,985.2 metre strip across the north-eastern corner of Lake Uvs, cutting off from one another two rural districts of Uvs province (*Davst* and *Tes sum*) which had previously shared a 20 km boundary. Mongolia lost 1,247 sq km from *Davst* district and 4,560 sq km from *Tes* and *Züüingov'* districts.

The 1958 Mongolian-Soviet border treaty covered the 1,305 km border section from *Asgatyn Davaa* to "Ih Sayaan Nuruu" (the Greater Sayan Chain), or more particularly to Height 2855, Mongol *Sharyn Davaa*, with marker 332. Tsend-Ish claims that the "Sharyn Davaa" marker is 3.2 km out of its true position and in an unnamed pass of the *Tengis Gol*. Col. Altangerel, Director of the Border Troops Research Centre, has also pointed out that the marker is not at *Shar Davaa* but *Tengis Davaa*, depriving Mongolia of 1,150 sq km of territory.

The 1976 Mongolian-Soviet border treaty covered the sections of the border from *Tavan Bogd Uul* to *Asgatyn Davaa* and from "Ih Sayaan" to *Tarvagan Dah*. Tsend-Ish points out that under this treaty marker 880 was moved about 200 metres south.

While Mongolian officials were denying the existence of border disputes or even border talks with Russia or China, the *Kyzyl* newspaper *Respublika Tuva* reported in April 1993 that a session of the Russian-Mongolian mixed commission on border disputes, attended by the representative of Tuva, Vice-Premier *Shyyrap*, had finally reached agreement on a disputed section of the river *Naryn* in *Tes-Khem* district (*rayon*), where 130 hectares of pasture had finished up in Mongolia after the river changed course. It also reported that new proposals had come forward for resolution of the problem of a 14 km stretch of the *Khandagayty-Torgalyg* road passing through Mongolian territory. The Mongols rejected the idea of a corridor, but proposed in compensation the use of a similar "bulge" in the border elsewhere, where Mongolian herdsmen could pass freely. The Russian government was looking into this.

Tuvan President *Oorzhak* recalled that the Mongols' "territorial claims of 1988-89" had not been met. They had claimed eight sections of the border on the basis of the pre-1927 situation, i.e. they wanted the border to run along the crest of the *Tannu-Ola*. The Russian-Tuvan side rejected this, but repeated its own claims to 14 sections of the Mongolian border. The main dispute was about the river *Naryn*. The Mongols wanted compensation on a section of their border in Tuva's easternmost *Bay-Tayga rayon*, next to the *Altai Republic*. The Tuvan President had set up a special commission to study and collect material about disputed sections of the "Tuva-Mongolia line of the state border" and publish its findings "so as to prevent unnecessary tension in the republic's foreign relations" and encourage development of external economic relations.

Mongolia's border with China

Powerless as it was to enforce its claim in the face of Soviet Russian entrenchment in Mongolia, the Republic of China did not surrender its sovereignty until after the Second World War. At the Yalta conference in February 1945 the UK and US agreed to Stalin's call for preservation of the *status quo* in Mongolia. He said the USSR would recognise the independence and territorial integrity of the "People's Republic of Mongolia". China eventually agreed to recognise "Outer Mongolia within its existing borders" if a plebiscite confirmed the people's will to be independent. The plebiscite took place under UN auspices on 20 October, and the Mongols voted virtually unanimously for independence. The

Republic of China recognised Mongolia on 6 January 1946 and established diplomatic relations in February.

After the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949 Mongolia was recognised by the new regime in Peking, which signed an economic and cultural co-operation agreement with Mongolia in 1952, a treaty of friendship and mutual assistance in 1960, and a border treaty in 1962. After joint demarcation of the border a protocol listing all 639 markers was signed in June 1964 by the foreign ministers of the two countries. The protocol also specified border maintenance measures and joint inspections every five years. Under the terms of the treaty 30 disputed border sections totalling 17,295 sq km of territory were allocated: 12,302 sq km to Mongolia and 4,991 sq km to China.

During the worst years of the Chinese "cultural revolution" and Sino-Soviet dispute Mongolia had a serious border security problem in the form of repeated incursions by armed men and military vehicles, besides the more casual intrusions by hunters and poachers. An electrified double fence was installed on the border with China during the 1970s-80s.

Mongolian leaders have visited the border with China and Border Troops posts on a number of occasions in recent years. Great Hural Chairman Bagabandi and the then Commander of Border Troops, Sandr, went to Sulinheer, Han, Gashuun Suhayt, Ovoot, Hatansuudal, Shivee Hüren, Burgastay, Altay, Yarant and elsewhere in Dornogov', Ömnögov', Gov'-Altay and Hovd provinces in December 1993. A year later President Ochirbat and the new Border Troops Commander visited Dornod (Eastern) province. These border inspection visits were linked not only with the reorganisation of the Border Troops but also perhaps with the men's living conditions - there had been reports of starvation at remote military installations.

Mongolia's worries about China's intentions turn about wholesale annexation rather than the mere nibbling of borders. Mongolian publications cite a number of occasions when the PRC leaders have threatened Mongolia's independence, usually starting with Mao Zedong's remark to Edgar Snow in 1936, that after the victory of the Chinese revolution Mongolia would return to China. Mao's similar remark in 1949 to Mikoyan (then Soviet Minister of Foreign Trade) was relayed to Stalin, who reportedly said: "All the regions inhabited by Mongols should unite in one autonomous [sic] nation, the MPR, so the question will not arise unless the MPR raises the issue itself." It is said that Mao, with Liu Shaochi, Chu De and Zhou Enlai, "took fright" in 1950, when the newly appointed Mongolian ambassador asked about establishing direct contacts between the MPR and Inner Mongolia AR. Soviet party leaders Khrushchev and Bulganin were asked by Chou in 1954 what they thought about Mongolia being united with China; Khrushchev replied that it was up to Mongolia and China to decide.

During a visit to Mongolia in 1960 Chou suggested sending 300,000 Chinese to settle in Mongolia.

There were repeated Chinese media claims on all or parts of the "Soviet colony" of Mongolia during the Chinese "cultural revolution" and as the ideological and territorial dispute between Moscow and Peking developed. In the 1970s China published maps showing Mongolia as Chinese territory. Claims were made for example in Liu Peihua's *The New Short History of China* and the *World Atlas* (Peking, 1972). In 1980, Deng Xiaoping told foreign journalists that Mongolia should return to China by 2000, as the third step in fully "reuniting the motherland" after the recovery of Hong Kong and Taiwan.

Since the birth of democracy in Mongolia in 1990 Mongolia's view of China has tended to focus on human rights and the plight of the Mongols of Inner Mongolia. After the publication of a Chinese internal document calling for the suppression of Inner Mongolian "secessionists" and reports of the arrest of Inner Mongolian intellectuals, Mongolian students picketed the Chinese embassy in Ulan Bator in October 1991 to protest against "communist repression in Inner Mongolia". The students demanded the release of political prisoners, an end to human rights abuse and a halt to the Chinese policy of "ethnic assimilation" in Inner Mongolia. The Mongolian government rejected a demand for the banning of the demonstration from the Chinese ambassador, who described those arrested in Inner Mongolia as "bandits and extremists".

In 1992 a leaked document from the Inner Mongolia branch of the PRC State Security Bureau was reported in the Western media to have accused the Dalai Lama, Japanese academics and the US government of supporting attempts by "separatists" to "unify the three Mongolias in a Greater Mongolia". It went on to claim that the "three Mongolias" (Mongolia, Inner Mongolia and the Buryat Republic) really belonged to China. The document said that the Inner Mongolian "dissidents" arrested the year before had been incited by literature smuggled into Inner Mongolia from Ulan Bator. The Mongolian Ministry of Foreign Relations issued a statement in May about Mongolia's wish for good relations with China. The Mongolian Democrats' *Ardchilal* printed a feature about Tsengel, a refugee from Xilingol in Inner Mongolia, who founded the "Inner Mongolia Independence Movement" in Mongolia and later the "Free Mongols Movement" in the USA.

The publication of *The Secret of Mongolia's Independence* in Peking in April 1993 caused a storm in Mongolia. It claimed that the country was not independent but a Soviet creation and really part of China. The Mongolian press, from the government paper *Ardyn erh* to the MPRP's *Ünen* and the Democratic *Ardchilal*, published lengthy translated passages from the Chinese book, giving prominence to such quotations as "Outer

Mongolia is our Chinese northern border territory." The report in *Il tovchoo* quoted in a headline the words "Mongolia is China's sacred territory" and reproduced on its front page the book's map, showing Mongolia as part of China, under the heading "China's devilish intentions". Other Mongolian articles drew attention to China's border wars with India, the USSR and Vietnam. When challenged about the book, a Chinese government spokesman claimed that it did not represent official policy.

A passage from *Proof That The Border of Chinese Territory Has Been Changed*, a publication of the PRC Tourism and Education Publishing Committee printed by the Academy of Military Sciences Press in January 1993, was quoted in the Mongolian *Ünen* in December 1993: "Outer Mongolia is Chinese territory. It is a matter of history that the Qing government appointed a governor to rule Outer Mongolia. Outer Mongolia's border was regulated by China and Russia under the Buur and Kyakhta treaties back in 1727. But Tsarist Russia did not at all give up its greedy intentions of aggression and conquest against our Outer Mongolia."

PRC Premier Li Peng said during his visit to Mongolia in 1994 that China respected Mongolia's independence and territorial integrity, and this was confirmed in a new Mongolian-Chinese Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation.

Mongolia's relations with China have been complicated on several occasions in recent years by the Dalai Lama's visits to Ulan Bator, most recently in September 1995. As the Mongol Buddhists' spiritual leader the Dalai Lama is always given a big welcome. His visits are strictly on a non-governmental basis, but Peking grumbles about them anyway.

National resurgence

Independent Mongolia has set out firmly on the path towards multiparty democracy and a market economy, but amidst the new flourishing of culture the hard realities of the economic transition have hit most Mongols hard. Perhaps most shocking has been Moscow's submission of a "bill" for Soviet aid: Roubles 10.3 billion for the period 1949-90. The Russian government has agreed only to defer part of the payment. For several years Mongolia and Russia have fiercely disputed the debt's true size and dollar equivalent. In response President Davaanyam of Mongolia's Movement for the Integrity of the Sacred Border published in 1993 his version of Mongolia's "bill" for the damage done to it by Soviet policies from 1921-91. He estimated this at US\$ 392 billion under 12 headings, including destruction of temples (\$30 billion), theft of mineral wealth (\$30 billion), environmental damage done by Soviet troops (\$22 billion) and to the border areas (\$10 billion), as well as compensation for territory taken away from Mongolia (\$75 billion). In the

latter case there was a nice play on words: the Russians had long been taking from Mongolia a "little land" here and there, "Little Land" being the title of Leonid Brezhnev's book about his wartime "exploits".

The democratization of the "autonomous republics" of Russia in the post-Soviet period has also been overshadowed by their own economic difficulties, largely due to supply and payments problems as the bankrupt state enterprises ground to a halt.

In the Buryat Republic the Supreme Soviet and local soviets were abolished and a new constitution adopted, declaring the Buryat Republic to be a "constituent part of the Russian Federation". On the other hand the Buryat-Mongol People's Party wants union of the Buryat Republic with Mongolia. In August 1992 the BMPP issued an appeal for the withdrawal of 250,000 Russian troops from the Buryat republic to improve the ethnic balance. In March 1994 Mongolian demonstrators presented a petition with 20,000 signatures to the Russian embassy in Ulan Bator, calling for the release from prison of the BMPP leader, Nikolay Pinoyev.

The Dalai Lama attended the funeral service at Ivolginsk *datsan* of Tsibikov, the Bandido Hamba Lama of Buryat Buddhists, in July 1992. Tsibikov's successor, Shagdarov, was trained in Mongolia and Nepal.

President Potapov of the Buryat Republic visited Mongolia in 1995 for talks which concentrated largely on economic relations, including plans for a free economic zone on the border. Potapov called for "order" at the Kyakhta-Altanbulag crossing point and "normal conditions" for the people using it. Mongolia expressed concern about the impact on Mongolian livestock exports of Russian duties and taxes amounting to 75 per cent of their value.

Kalmyk President Ilyumzhinov, elected in April 1993 at the age of 31, said he saw a prosperous future for Kalmykia in the free market with foreign investment but "only within the Russian Federation". The same year the Kalmyk Supreme Soviet and local soviets were dissolved. However, during the debate on the new Russian Constitution the Chairman of the Kalmyk Parliament, Maksimov, distanced himself from the more independent position adopted by Tatarstan and Tuva. In 1994 Ilyumzhinov introduced the Kalmyk "Steppe Code" as a form of republican constitution.

Ilyumzhinov, who has been a promoter of Buddhism and links between the various Mongol nations and has hosted international Mongol rallies, visited Ulan-Ude for talks with Buryat Prime Minister Saganov on cooperation between the Kalmyk and Buryat Republics.

In Tuva the period 1992-94 was dominated by the political debate over possible independence and reports that many Russians were leaving because of Tuvan hostility. Kaadyr-ool Bicheldey, Chairman of the Tuvan Supreme Soviet, favoured secession, but Tuvan President Sherig-ool

Oorzhak, who opposed it, was elected chairman of the commission for drafting the new Tuvan constitution. Following the insertion into the draft of an article on the "right to self-determination up to and including secession from Russia" the campaign by the People's Front and Free Tuva movement for a referendum on independence was suspended. Free Tuva claimed support from the People's Party of Sovereign Tuva, the Organisation of Buddhists, Society of Kyzyl Homeless and Society of Ex-Prisoners (the latter said to speak for the one-third of the population who were Soviet convicts).

In the constitutional referendum (December 1993) more people voted for the Tuvan Constitution (53.9 per cent) than for the Russian Constitution (30.5 per cent). Tuva's new parliament, the Supreme Khural, was elected the same month. (The Altai Republic also decided in 1993 to set up a new state assembly called the El Kurultai with 27 elected deputies.) Bicheldey was elected chairman of the Tuvan Supreme Khural in January 1994. President Oorzhak continued to say that Tuva's right of secession from the Russian Federation was "only theoretical".

Mongolia signed bilateral treaties with the Buryat, Kalmyk and Tuvan Republics in 1991-92 on economic and cultural cooperation. The Russian Federation government however has reminded Ulan Bator from time to time, and most recently in early 1995, that Mongolia is dealing with "subjects of the federation" and not with independent countries.

Despite propaganda to the contrary, Mongolia has not made any serious or official attempt to "restore the Mongol empire", although some Mongols would like that. There is some popular discussion of the "rebirth of Pan-Mongolism", but there is little likelihood of it becoming a reality beyond closer ties of the kind envisaged by the 1992 treaties and similar arrangements agreed with Inner Mongolia and the Altai Republic.

Each year now there are international Mongol rallies and conferences in one republic or another. The rally of Mongol students held in the Buryat Republic in 1992 showed some of the difficulties on the path to unity:

The Buryats said: "We need a new Genghis Khan!" The Mongols said: "Link Mongol national identity with democracy, the free market and human rights!" The Kalmyks said: "Nobody has ever heard of us!" The Tuvans said: "Our language is not Mongol. Why were we invited?" And the delegation from Inner Mongolia was left completely in the dark, because everybody else spoke Russian.

The Association of the World's Mongols, founded in Ulan Bator in 1993 with Mongolian ex-Prime Minister Dashiyn Byambasuren as its President, pursues a programme of essentially cultural, ecological and humanitarian aims and trade promotion. Soon after the association was set up, however, an Inner Mongolian research institute warned that "Pan-Mongolism" with US and Japanese backing could lead to the "partitioning" of China.

Outside Mongolia, the only independent Mongol state, the Mongols scattered all across Eurasia are struggling to preserve their ethnic identity. All Mongols share the heritage of Genghis Khan, Mongol traditions and the classical Mongol script, but after decades of atheistic education and urbanisation the Buddhist religion and nomadic lifestyle are no longer the unifying factors they once were. The Mongols as one nation have a glorious history, but the post-Soviet Mongol communities face serious socio-economic problems that can be solved only in the broader international community.

Note

Throughout the text, the following conventions have been followed: No distinction is made between "Mongol" and "Mongolian". "Mongolia" is the historical homeland of the Mongols. "Outer Mongolia" is northern (Khalkha) Mongolia, which after the collapse of the Mongol empire submitted to Manchu (Qing) rule 1691-1911. It was known as Autonomous Outer Mongolia or Bogd Khan Mongolia in the period 1911-24 and the Mongolian People's Republic (MPR) 1924-92. Since 1992 the country's name has been just "Mongolia". "Inner Mongolia" is southern Mongolia, which submitted to Qing rule 1636-1911 and subsequently was broken up into several provinces. In 1947-49 Inner Mongolia was reconstituted as an "autonomous region" within China. "China" means the Manchu (Qing) empire until 1911, the Republic of China from 1911-1949, and the People's Republic of China (mainland China) since 1949. "Russia" means the tsarist empire until the proclamation of the Soviet state in 1917, Soviet Russia or the RSFSR until 1922, the RSFSR as a union republic of the Soviet Union (USSR) 1922-91, and the post-Soviet Russian Federation.

References

- Agvaandorj, Chadraabalyn, "Bayngyn sanaarhal idevhjiv üüi?" (Have the regular claims been activated?), *Ünen* (Truth), MPRP, Ulan Bator, 4 December 1993.
- Alatalu, Toomas, "Tuva - a state reawakens", *Soviet Studies*, Vol. 44, No. 5, 1992.
- An, Tai-sung, *The Sino-Soviet Territorial Dispute*, Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1973. The appendix contains extracts from key treaties between Russia and China.
- Badamdorj, B., "Darhan nertey humsluulsan hil min' " (My so-called inviolable border nibbled away), *Il tovchoo* (Open Report), Ulan Bator, 20-30 June 1993.
- Badamsambuu, G., "Hil deer buu duugardag" (Gunfire on the border), *Ardyn erh* (People's Power), Ulan Bator, 10 December 1993. The author writes about cattle rustling and banditry on the Mongol-Tuvan border.
- Batmönh, Sh., "Mongol Uls Orosyn nutagt sanaarhaagüy" (Mongolia has no claims on Russian territory), *Ardyn erh* (People's Power), Ulan Bator, 2 April 1994.
- Bat-Ochir, S., "Mongol Ulsyn hil batalgaajin togtoson n' " (How the Mongolian border was established), *Ardyn erh* (People's Power), Ulan Bator, 12 June 1992.
- Boldbaatar, Namsrayjavyn, "Mongol tuurgatan hed hichneen be? Ted haana aj törj bayna?" (How many Mongols are there? Where do they live?), *Il tovchoo* (Open Report),

Ulan Bator, 10-20 May 1993. The words *Mongol tuurgatan* imply that other "dwellers in (felt) tents" may be included. See Nyamaa, A.

Darisuren, Lha., "Who exterminated the Buriats?", *The Mongol Messenger*, Ulan Bator, 21 April 1995.

Dashbaldan, T., "Myanga sonsohoor neg üz gedeg..." (A picture is worth a thousand words), *Ardyn erh* (People's Power), Ulan Bator, 13 October 1993. Feature on the photographing of the whole of Mongolia's border from a helicopter.

Davaanyam, Pürev-Oydovyn, "Ör: Būdūüleg kolonichlogchdyn ulamjlalt zarlan mön!" (Debt: Traditional message of crude colonialists) *Ardchilal-Tayms* (Democracy-Times), Ulan Bator, No 2, September 1993.

—, "The statehood begins from the border", *The Mongol Messenger*, Ulan Bator, 17 March 1995.

Gol'man, M.I., and Slesarchuk, G.I., *Sovetsko-Mongol'skiye otnosheniya 1921-1966* (Soviet-Mongolian Relations 1921-66), Moscow: Nauka, 1966. Extracts from treaties and agreements.

Gürbadam, Ts., "Mongol, Orosyn hariltsaany tūühend holbogdoh chuhal asuudal" (An important question concerning the history of Mongolian-Russian relations), *Zasgiyn gazryn medee* (Government Information), Ulan Bator, 8 June 1995. Gürbadam, former Mongolian ambassador to the USSR, reviews a new book by Ch. Battsetseg and A. Nyamaa, *Oros dah' Mongol ugsaany ulsuud* (Nations of Mongol Origin in Russia).

Ichinnorov, S., "Mongol ulsdaa dagan oroh hemeesen" (They intended to give themselves to Mongolia), *Il tovchoo* (Open Report), Ulan Bator, 1-10 September 1991. This article is about Tuvan attempts to reunite with Mongolia in 1925.

"Mongol Ulsyn hiliyn tuhay huul" (Mongolian Law on the Border), *Ardyn erh* (People's Power), Ulan Bator, 3 November 1993.

"Mongolchuudyn ulamjlalt gazryn zurag" (The Mongols' traditional cartography) in Shagdarsüren, Tseveliy, *Mongolchuudyn utga soyolyn tovchoon* (Sketch of the Mongols' Spiritual Culture), Ulan Bator: Erdem Scientific Publishers, 1991.

Mongush, Mergen, "The annexation of Tannu-Tuva and the formation of the Tuva ASSR", *Central Asian Survey*, Vol. 12, 1993.

Moseley, C. and Asher, R. (eds), *Atlas of the World's Languages*, London: Routledge, 1994.

Mundagbaatar, Luvsandorjiyn, "Hiliyn shugamyg 20 jil tutamd shalgadag" (The border line is checked every 20 years), *Ardyn erh* (People's Power), Ulan Bator, 16 March 1995.

National Economy of the MPR for 70 Years (1921-1991), Ulan Bator: State Statistical Office, 1991.

Namhaynorov, L., "Ta hiliyn jurmyg medeg üü?" (Do you know the border regulations?), *Zasgiyn gazryn medee* (Government Information), Ulan Bator, week 3, November 1992.

Nyamaa, A., "Mongol-Tuvagiyn hiliyn talaar miniy sudalsan züil" (My studies of the Mongolia-Tuva border), *Tusgaar togtnol* (Independence), Ministry of Defence, Ulan Bator, 1-10 June 1993. Nyamaa discusses the Mongols and Tuvans as *esgiy tuurgatan*, "dwellers in felt tents". See Boldbaatar, N.

Nyamaa, A., and Erdenebayar, Ch., "Hiliyn chanad dah' eleg negten mongolchuud" (Mongol blood relatives across the border), *Zasgiyn gazryn medee* (Government Information), Ulan Bator, 7-10 September 1993.

Nyambuu, H., *Mongolyn ugsaatny züy - udirtgal* (Mongolian Ethnography - an Introduction), Ulan Bator: Children's Textbook Publishers, 1992. Statistics from the 1979 census, but much useful information about the ethnic groups of Mongolia and elsewhere.

Operational Navigation Charts 1:1,000,000, Defense Mapping Agency Aerospace Center, St Louis, Missouri, 1987. Charts ONC E-6, 7 and 8 and F-7, 8 and 9 provide full coverage of Mongolia.

Pavlova, I., "Pogranichnyy vopros: Prezident - za vzaimopriyemlemoye resheniye spora" (Border issue: The President is for a mutually acceptable solution to the dispute), *Respublika Tuva* (Republic of Tuva), Kyzyl, No. 9, March 1993.

Quested, R.K.I., *Sino-Russian Relations: A Short History*, London: George Allen and Unwin, 1984.

Sanders, A.J.K., "Mongolia" in *Asia Yearbook*, Hong Kong: Far Eastern Economic Review, 1992-95.

—, *Mongolia - Politics, Economics and Society*, London, Pinter, 1987.

—, "Mongolia's Border with Russia", *Russia and the Successor States Briefing Service*, No. 4, 1995.

Sharavsambuu, B., "Mongol Ulsyn gaaliyn yerönhiy gazar" (Mongolian Customs Directorate), *Zasgiyn gazryn medee* (Government Information), Ulan Bator, 9 February 1995.

"Sino-Mongolian Border Protocol", *Translations on Communist China*, JPRS, Washington DC, No. 131, 21 January 1971.

Surenjav, D., "O solyanoy gore i ozere Uvs" (About the salt mountain and Lake Uvs), *Novosti Mongolii* (News from Mongolia), Ulan Bator, 29 July 1990.

Sündev, Palamyn, "It's calm on the borders", *The Mongol Messenger*, Ulan Bator, 3 May 1994.

Tang, Peter S.H., *Russian and Soviet Policy in Manchuria and Outer Mongolia 1911-1931*, Duke University Press, 1959.

Tikhvinskiy, S.L. (ed.), "Chapters from the History of Russo-Chinese Relations 17-19th Centuries", Moscow: Progress, 1985.

Toka, S. K. (ed.), *Istoriya Tuvy* (History of Tuva), Moscow: Nauka, 1964.

Tseden-Ish, Bazaryn, "Hiliyn tūühee medehgüygees aldsan tal biy" (Land has been lost through not knowing our border history), *Ardyn erh* (People's Power), Ulan Bator, 3 February 1995.

—, "Övgön hilchniy öchil" (An old border guard's testimony), *Zasgiyn gazryn medee* (Government Information), Ulan Bator, 15 July 1994.

—, "Ulsyn hil hyazgaaryn tuhay miniy medeh züylüüd" (My thoughts about the state border), *nen* (Truth), MPRP, Ulan Bator, 27 April 1993.

Tseden-Ish, B., and Bat-Ochir, S., "Odoogiyn hiliyg ingej togtooson" (This is how the present-day border was established), *Ardyn erh* (People's Power), Ulan Bator, 25 December 1992. Discussion of the concept of the "existing" ("present-day") border in the negotiation of the border treaty with China.

Tserendorj, "Urianhay gazar bolbaas yazguuraas Mongol Ulsyn har'yaat gazar" (Urianhay territory has long been territory under Mongol rule), *Il tovchoo* (Open Report), Ulan Bator, 20-30 December 1993.

TABLE 1

The World's Mongols

<u>Country</u>	<u>Mongols</u>	<u>% of all Mongols</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
Mongolia	1,918,900	23.2	census 1989
China	5,518,800	66.7	census 1990
Russia	805,000	9.7	USSR census 1989
Others	22,500		estimate; Taiwan, Afghanistan, etc.
Total	8,265,200		

TABLE 2

Mongolia's Ethnic Groups

<u>Ethnic Group</u>	<u>Number (census 1989)</u>	<u>% of total</u>
Khalkha (Halh)	1,610,200	78.8
Kazakh (Hasag)	120,500	5.9
Derbet (Dörvöd)	55,200	2.7
Bayat (Bayad)	38,800	1.9
Buryat (Buriad)	34,700	1.7
Dariganga	28,600	1.4
Zakhchin	22,500	1.1
Urianhay (Altai)	20,400	1.0
Darkhat (Darhad)	14,300	0.7
Torgut (Torguud)	10,200	0.5
Eleuth (Ööld)	8,100	0.4
Khoton (Hoton)	4,000	0.2
Mingat (Myangad)	4,000	0.2
Barga	2,000	0.1
Others*	69,900	3.4
Total	2,043,400	100.0

* Other ethnic groups include Üzemchin, Chakhar (Tsahar), Khotogoit (Hotgoyd), Uzbeks (Chantuu), Horchin and Tuvan (Soyot Urianhay, Hövsgöl Urianhay and Tsaatan or "reindeer herders"), but not Russians or Chinese. The Khoton and Kazakh are Turkic. Some 50,000 Kazakhs have emigrated from Mongolia to Kazakstan since 1992.

TABLE 3

Russia's Mongols

	<u>Mongols (1989 census)</u>	<u>% Local Population</u>
Buryats (USSR)	453,000	
Buryat Republic	331,000	23 (30)
Irkutsk <i>oblast'</i> Ust-Ordynskiy <i>okrug</i>	50,000	33
Chita <i>oblast'</i> Aga <i>okrug</i>	40,000	45
Kalmyks (USSR)	200,000	
Kalmyk Republic	174,000	41.5 (62.3)

Note:

For percentages in brackets see Gürbadam, who estimated the Altai population of the Altai Republic at 60,000 (30% of the total), and the Tuvan population of the Tuva (Tyva) Republic at 207,000 (60.5%); the figures may reflect recent Russian emigration. Some Mongolians consider the Yakuts (Sakha) to be Mongols, calling them *zahaduud*, although their language is Turkic. There were 2,946 "Mongolians" (Khalkha speakers) living in the USSR in 1979.

TABLE 4

China's Mongols

Territory/Group	Mongols	Remarks
Total	5,518,800	1990
including:		
Inner Mongolia	3,400,000	14%
of which:		
Barga	70,000	1982
Chakhar	300,000	estimate
Dagur	61,000	
Ejine	34,000	1982
Khalkha (Halh)	1,100,000	estimate
Harachin	400,000	1982
Horchin	1,300,000	
Ordos	123,000	1982
Rest of China	2,118,800	
including:		
Gansu	403,700	
of which:		
Bao'an	12,200	1990
Monguor	100,000	
Sant (Dongxiang)	373,900	1990
Shar Uygur	12,900	1990
Gansu and Qinghai	354,000	
of which:		
Tsagaan Mongols (Tu)	191,600	1990
Guizhou	2,500	
Heilongjiang	40,000	
of which:		
Dagur	35,000	
Jilin	100,000	
Liaoning	243,000	
of which:		
Harachin	200,000	1982
Sichuan	20,000	
Xinjiang	135,000	
of which:		
Dagur	25,400	1990
Torgut	106,000	1982
territories including:		
Bayingolin Prefecture	40,000	5%
Hoboksar County	13,400	4%
Bortala Prefecture	23,000	7%
Altay Prefecture	5,000	
Yunnan	10,000	

Note:

Oirats (Torgut and Kok Nur) numbering some 144,000 (1990) live in Qinghai, Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang and Tibet. The percentages are for the nationality compared with the total population of the territory concerned where known.

TABLE 5

Mongol-Chinese Border: Crossing Points (E-W)

Mongolia	China	Opening times
Dornod Province: Havirga	Ar Hashaat (Inner Mongolia) for Hailar	0900-1700 1-15 January, April, July and October
Sühbaatar Province: Bichigt	Züün Hatavch (Inner Mongolia) for Xilinhot	ditto
Dornogov' Province: Zamyn-Üüd	Ereen (Erenhot) (Inner Mongolia) for Peking (rail)	0900-1700 daily
Ömnögov' Province: Gashuun Suhayt	Gants Mod (Inner Mongolia) for Baotou	0900-1700 1-15 January, April, July and October
Gov'-Altay province: Burgastay	Daoyemiao (Xinjiang) for Hami	1100-1800 15-30 March, June, August and November
Hovd Province: Baytag	Uliastay (Xinjiang) for Ürümqi	1100-1800 1-15 March, June, August and November
Bulgan	Takashikene (Xinjiang) for Ürümqi	1100-1800 20-30 April to December
Bayan-Ölgii Province: Dayan	Hongshanju (Xinjiang) for Altay	1100-1800 1-10 July to September
Naransevstey (see Note)	Mazushan	0900-1700 1-15 March, June, August and November

Note:

List according to Namhaynorov. He seems to have listed Naransevstey in the wrong province, since other evidence indicates that the post is at the southern extremity of Tsogt district of Gov'-Altay Province, on the border with China's Gansu Province. Naransevstey is not listed by Sharavsambuu as having a customs post and therefore does not appear on his map. The map however shows a customs post called "Shiree Hüren" (Shivee Hüren) on the western section of Ömnögov' Province's border with Inner Mongolia AR. A Chinese map suggests that Naransevstey is in Gansu. If so, Shivee Hüren may be the Mongol post opposite it. The Zamyn-Üüd - Ereen rail route is an international railway crossing, and will become a proper international road crossing when the road has been upgraded.

TABLE 6

Mongol-Russian Border: Permanent Crossing Points (W-E)

<u>Mongolia</u>	<u>Russia</u>	<u>Route</u>
Bayan-Ölgiy Province: Tsagaannuur Asgatyn Gol	Tashanta Aspayty	Altay Rep. - Kosh-Agach ditto
Uvs Province: Böhmörön Harigiyn Gol Borshoo	Kyzyl-Khaya Mugur-Aksy Khandagayty (Handgayt) ditto	Tuva Republic ditto Tuva Rep.-Chadan, Kyzyl ditto
Teel Teel Tes	Torgalyg Chaa-Suur (Shar Suur')	Tuva Rep. - Erzin, Kyzyl ditto
Zavhan Province: Artssuur'	Tsagaantolgoy	Tuva Rep. - Naryn, Erzin
Hövsögöl Province: Hanh (Turt)	Mondy	Buryat Rep. - Irkutsk
Bulgan Province: Ilenhgol (Ih Ilenge)		Buryat Republic
Selenge Province: Zelter Hongor Ovoo Sühbaatar Altanbulag Hutag-Öndör Hüder	Zheltura Botsiy Naushki Kyakhta (Hiagt) Kiran Tsagaanchuluutay	Buryat Rep. - Ulan-Ude ditto ditto - Trans-Siberian Buryat Rep. - Ulan-Ude Buryat Rep. - Chikoy Chita - Kr. Chikoy
Hentiy Province: Heriyin Gol Agatsyn Gol	Gavan' Altan	Chita Oblast' Chita Ob.-Kyra, Narasun
Dornod Province: Ulhan (Ulhanmayhan) Yamalh (Yalamhyn Gol) Ereentsav (Chuluunhoroot)	Ul'khun (Deed Ul'han) Novyy Durulguy Solov'yevsk	Chita Ob. - Narasun ditto Chita Ob.-Trans-Siberian

Note:

List according to Namhaynorov. Kosh-Agach gives road access to Biysk, and Kyzyl to Abaza and Abakan. The Tsagaannuur-Tashanta and Altanbulag-Kyakhta road routes and the Sühbaatar-Naushki and Ereentsav-Solov'yevsk railway routes were designated by the Mongolian and Russian governments as international border crossings under an agreement signed by Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Panov in Ulan Bator in August 1994. There are another 20 seasonal approved crossing points for bilateral use.

BOOK REVIEWS

AIDAN FOSTER-CARTER, *North Korea after Kim Il-sung: Controlled Collapse?* The Economist Intelligence Unit, London, 1994. vii + 58 pages. ISBN 0 85058 827 8.

Kim Il-sung, the "Great Leader", died, at the age of 82, in July 1994. *North Korea after Kim Il-sung* appeared two months later. Hasty, some would say, but then Foster-Carter has for some years closely scrutinised events in this most isolated socialist state, notably as the main writer for the *Korea Countdown* journal. The price charged for this slender essay (unrepeatable amongst British academics) is outrageous, and appears designed to woo only the few who are considering investing in North Korea. Foster-Carter's basic themes, though, have little to do with commerce. He considers the options for leadership and nation, and the way that these might be influenced by external action. In this, the volume closely shadows the same author's 1992 account, *Korea's Coming Unification: Another East Asian Superpower?* (Economist Intelligence Unit, London, 1992—reviewed in *Papers of the British Association for Korean Studies*, vol.4). The basic conclusion, implied in the question of the title, is that the North Korean regime cannot be sustained.

Generally, the volume is excellently produced. Considerable information is stitched together, from the policies of rival states to descriptions of mass mourning on TV following Kim's death, through accounts of North Korean traders in Macau expelled for making counterfeit money, to the Japanese suit manufacturer who went on TV in December 1993 to decry how the authorities sold his suits, already contracted to Japan, to Hong Kong. Sometimes, though, insufficient background is offered to allow this volume to stand on its own. This is particularly apparent when considering the decline and current status of North Korea. What should we make of the "rollicall of problems" which, not surprisingly, present quite the opposite picture to that offered by North Korea's media: mostly unmodernised railways, roads and cars that hardly exist, primitive telephones, endemic power shortages, acute environmental problems, agriculture damaged by the overuse of chemicals, and so on.

The volume is divided into nine slimline chapters, starting with a summary and a background, and concluding with a vision of the way things could hopefully turn out. In between, Foster-Carter looks at Kim Jong-il, the chosen successor. He asks whether the younger Kim has the ability to survive, and if he can react to and reform policies developed during his father's almost half century of authoritarian rule. The nuclear issue, a recurring concern for the international community and a potential catastrophe in-the-making for North Korea's neighbours, gets the most extensive section. Two further chapters consider the role of the rival state, South Korea, and its curious back-tracking away from dialogue and détente since the arrival in power of Kim Young Sam early in 1993, and the attitudes of the surrounding powers—Japan, China, the former Soviet Union and America.

The core of the volume is chapter 6, "Four scenarios: stasis, gradualism, collapse, war". The first two visions require stability. Stasis implies that North Korea can carry on the way it is, while gradualism allows the regime to "embrace reform at home and reconciliation abroad." Stasis is considered unsustainable, though the reader needs to return to the 1992 volume to find out why the expected hunger and rebellion are inevitable. The justification—remember this was written in 1994, not Autumn 1995—comes partly from *rumours* of food riots and coup plots and the nicely filtered stories of defectors to South Korea. More significantly, the problems of domestic food shortages are exacerbated by a crippled infrastructure unable to pay with hard currency for imports of grain and other necessities.

Gradualism is, the author notes, the preferred path of both Korean governments. However, it is one complicated by local interpretations of what happened in Germany. To the South, the German experience suggests that absorbing the North will prove hideously expensive. To the Northern regime, absorption risks the loss of personal power and privilege, as well as statehood and identity (page 35). Hence, the actions and rhetoric that might signal a gradualist approach are seen as both paradoxical and illogical. The basic paradox is that, after forty years of denying the legitimacy of the North, the South now actively pursues policies to ensure that the existing regime is not undermined. Foster-Carter notes the many rational advantages of the gradualist scenario, in which the weaker state (the North) is gradually absorbed by the stronger (the South) to create a unified Korea.

The other two options deny stability. War, the author believes, is not an option in the long-run, though he notes two contemporary risks. One comes from the northern regime itself. It gambled in 1950 when it initiated the civil war, and might do the same again, possibly as a last resort. But northern planners will be only too aware that the odds are stacked against them, both because South Korea is now an advanced state with a well prepared and well equipped military, and because the Chinese and Soviet help of the 1950s is unlikely to be mobilized. The other risk comes from the United States, where hawks have argued for sanctions and "pre-emptive" strikes against North Korea's nuclear facilities. Foster-Carter notes any such action would likely lead to war. I would suggest that this has to be the inevitable consequence, since the northern ideology of *juche*, self-reliance, preaches the personal responsibility of every person, and by extension every military unit, to act to ensure continued independence.

Collapse remains Foster-Carter's favoured option and, indeed, he was labelled a "collapsist" for his earlier volume. Here he defends his approach but begins to modify it. It is clear that his previously-held expectation of a rapid collapse by 1994 sorely needed reconsideration: the 1992 volume stated that "Korea will be unified; certainly by 2000; probably by 1995; possibly sooner" (1992: 96). Now, the dates are taken out to leave the following:

With Kim Il-sung dead, North Korea cannot carry on the way it is; indeed, it possibly cannot carry on at all. The task, then, is to accomplish the inevitable transition to something better with as little chaos and bloodshed as circumstances will allow (page 58)

All other options, Foster-Carter argues, have to be discarded. This is not difficult in the case of stasis and war. Gradualism, though, remains attractive to many; it is still the hope of American and European strategists, and South Koreans would (in 1994, but not necessarily now) accept little else.

Here, gradualism is rejected on four grounds. It would require the North Korean regime to reform, it underestimates the destabilizing effects of change, it fails to address issues of legitimation, and overestimates the passivity of ordinary North Korean citizens. Foster-Carter notes that North Korea has yet to start to change, though the opposite can be argued given joint venture laws and the UNDP-sponsored

developments in the Najin-Sonbong zone to the east. Foster-Carter then marshals metaphors, and details the possible risks, to show that gradual absorption will not succeed. In all of this, he looks increasingly isolated. Though he may yet be proved correct, there are simply too many other strategists around the globe, with motives ranging from wishful thinking through economic advantage to political stability, who will not allow us to abandon the hope of what amounts to a "soft landing".

Indeed, the final chapter, "Over the mountains: how to control collapse", begins to take the gradualist scenario more seriously. Control implies collapse over time, which seems little different from the gradual absorption of the North by the South. Investment in the North by South Korea's industrial conglomerates, were it allowed, could bolster the economy and develop the industrial infrastructure while opening communication channels and abandoning negative political rhetoric, could also play a significant part in allowing the North to realign itself. The conclusion, then, after noting that stranger things have happened elsewhere, leaves all options open:

The task... is to accomplish the inevitable transition to something better with as little chaos and bloodshed as circumstances will allow. Pyongyang's dialogue partners do have some power to try to ensure that the inevitable collapse is so far as possible a controlled one. This, however, requires a sense of strategic vision and imagination in formulating policy towards and about North Korea. At the moment, unfortunately, it is not clear that such considerations are uppermost in either Seoul or Washington, let alone anywhere else... (page 58).

Keith Howard

CLIVE LEATHERDALE, *To Dream of Pigs: Travels in South and North Korea*. Desert Island Books, Brighton, 1994. 256 pages. ISBN 1-874287-02-3.

Pigs dream in Korea. So says a proverb, echoing a widespread belief that pigs are lucky beasts. But, this isn't the same as saying Koreans dream of pigs. There is an old folk story that tells how a girl imbibed a pig's hair, and was forced to become a shaman. Pork smells, and it is still considered inappropriate for Korean women of classy upbringing to eat it. And the taste of Cheju pigs is famous, as many a South Korean will tell you (they may not tell you the reason; it has to do with what the pigs eat). "Do you ever dream of pigs?" the author asks a North Korean on the final page. "I dream only of *juche*," comes the retort, referring to the Northern self-reliance ideology. Touché, but was the significance of the question understood?

If the title of Leatherdale's travel account seems curious, many of the observations are well observed and sharply focused. They begin to conjure up a picture of a distant land struggling to cope with internationalism. It is based on trips in 1987 and 1990, plus a writing-up trip in 1992. In some ways the volume is similar to Simon Winchester's *Korea: A Walk Through the Land of Miracles* (Grafton, 1988). Indeed, there are footprints on the cover map. Possibly, both authors saw the coming 1988 Olympics as a chance to write about one of Asia's less known nations. As Winchester begins with the decline of shipbuilding on the Tyne, one of Leatherdale's points of reference is the North Korean football team who played in the World Cup finals of 1966.

I have been critical of Winchester's book elsewhere (in *Cahiers d'Extrême-Asie* 6: 329-331). Korea, to be fair, is a difficult place to talk about. The language is

complex and takes dedication to achieve any degree of fluency. Customs and lifestyles are distinct and easily misinterpreted, particularly when one has no access to people through the vernacular language. Those who write on North Korea are often attracted for political reasons, while those who focus on the South may well be inspired by economic advance. But the latter brings a host of additional problems, for Korea is changing so rapidly that most books and articles have a remarkably short shelf-life: reliance on the scant materials written in English any more than a few years ago is likely doomed.

Leatherdale suffers from a lack of language and an apparent inability to check his information with reliable sources. Perhaps this is acceptable in more journalistic than academic circles, but the author frequently mixes the present with the near past, and makes occasional erroneous assumptions. The romanisation system is unorthodox and seems unique to the author. This is surely unnecessary, given the relative prevalence of either what was until 1984 the South Korean Ministry of Education system amongst South Koreans or the McCune-Reischauer system in the majority of academic texts, and something fairly close to McCune-Reischauer without the pesky diacriticals in the North. In this account, some words are full of hyphens, but some join syllables together, with no degree of consistency (*sam-gae-tang*, *kyong-un-ki* and *yong-guk* but *boricha*, *poktanju* and *chidokha*). Some words would better have a hyphen or apostrophe to separate syllables (*han'gŭl*, for the Korean alphabet for example, where the author gives *hangul*). Other spellings are curious in the extreme, sometimes unwittingly reflecting local dialect rather than the normative form, and others are simply wrong (*adjima* for aunt or older woman, not Leatherdale's *ajuma*; *maedip* not *maedip* for the art of knots).

A few errors from the first few chapters. A 100-wŏn piece is said to be worth less than one penny but, even with rampant inflation in South Korea, it still hovers around eight pence (page 20). Meals are said to be had for 50p, which will be of interest to any foreigner suffering under the burden of costs. Such a figure was not true in 1981, when I first visited Seoul (page 27). Some of the errors are more frustrating than these. For example, the claimed 'elevated subway' to Incheon [Inch'ŏn] (page 30) has only had a subway section since 1974 (from Seoul Station to Ch'ŏngnyangni), while the rest of the line was actually the first railway in Korea, dating from close on 100 years ago, with extra bits added over the years. Given the low technical expertise current at the time of its construction, very little can be considered elevated. Again, the subway information maps are said to be "misleading, for most are entirely in Korean" (page 31). Not surprising, we might assume, since this is Korea, but certainly not misleading. And also untrue. The stations are numbered and each map gives the numbers; the stations all have their names duly romanised, and maps give the romanised names of major stations. This, and the many maps available at hotels and tourist information kiosks must make the subway system one of the easiest to find your way around.

Other erroneous comments appear to stem from the juxtaposition of information dating from different periods. An account of taking a taxi starts by talking about erratic driving, something any Koreaphile will know, but then goes on to say how the author was "grateful it was not approaching midnight, when taxi-drivers drive even more maniacally in their urge to drop you off before the stroke of 12" (page 43). Yes, if this was written before 1981, but certainly not true after the midnight curfew was lifted, some six years before the author first arrived. Indeed, with taxi fares going up in price on the stroke of midnight, any driver wanting money would not be too bothered about racing against the clock. Some information has been absorbed in an incomplete manner, which leads to a loss of sense in the retelling. For example, page 22 gives a description of the Korean horsehair hat, *kar*. Leatherdale describes both the wide-brimmed outer hat and the inner cap, then says "the whole apparatus served no functional purpose that [he] could discern." Now, if he has found out about both parts, he should surely know the traditional purpose; in traditional

Korea the hat supported and was placed over a man's topknot, the cap holding the hair in place.

I could go on. Perhaps I should not be so critical. So many of the comments, about self wealth (*kibun*), preserved vegetables (*kimch'i*), about taking buses and boats, and so on, are excellent. Yet it seems sad that this book never actually gives an accurate picture of Korea nor touches the Korean psyche. The points I have touched on would, in the main, depress Koreans themselves. They are relatively simple errors, which could so easily have been ironed out. If the author returned to Korea to write the manuscript in 1992, he could surely have approached Koreans to check the accuracy of what he wrote. Alternatively, the text could have been proofed by somebody with a longstanding relation and deep knowledge of Korea. It does little credit to the academic community, and to Koreans abroad, if they accept such inaccuracies; it surely does little for a writer's reputation if he is satisfied with such an imperfect account.

Keith Howard

BOUDEWIJN WALRAVEN, *Songs of the Shaman: The Ritual Chants of the Korean Mudang*. Kegan Paul International, London, 1994. x + 307 pages. ISBN 0-7103-0403-X.

Muga, the ritual chants of *mudang* (Korean shamans and quasi-shamans), have been one of the favourite objects of research by scholars of Korean shamanism. Systematic collection was first carried out in the 1930s by two Japanese scholars, Akiba and Akamatsu; in the 1970s and 1980s much more authentic, extensive and detailed recordings of *muga* sung by various *mudang* in different areas were made and published by Kim T'ae-gon. In the absence of any standardised formal scriptures, *muga* are an important means by which scholars can gain access to the ideology and technicality of shamanistic practices.

Most existing material is 'thin' description, mostly transcriptions of *muga* that lack systematic analysis or interpretations. Moreover, so far, these have been inaccessible to non-Korean or Japanese speakers. Walraven's account is one of the first books written in English to deal exclusively with *muga*. His is a momentous task, fraught with difficulties that mainly arise from the excruciating language barrier. Since *muga* are mainly orally transmitted by shamans with little formal education, the songs are full of ambiguities, colloquialisms and phonetic and grammatical corruptions. Moreover, since shamans are creative, they tend to make impromptu alterations to suit particular situations. Also, to augment the ritual mystique, linguistic and ideological anachronisms are rampant. Therefore, large parts of *muga* are incomprehensible even to the native Koreans.

Considering all this, Walraven has coped well and presents us with an erudite analysis of certain *muga*. One cannot but admire his attempt to translate Akamatsu and Akiba's full text of *Sŏngju p'uri/Hwangji p'uri* (House Site Spirit/Yellow Emperor). It is not surprising to find a great deal of slipping in his translations, which are frequently unsatisfactory and at times erroneous. For example, "*manura*", which is a term for a female deity although in modern usage is derogatory, is simply translated as "respected" (p199). *P'alman*, 80,000, is translated as 800,000 (p158). Other similar mistakes abound. Walraven's comparative study of texts as sung by various shamans, such as the Song of the Dutiful Daughter Shim Ch'ŏng, is a well-

conceived attempt to clarify the influence and direction of borrowing between old literature, *p'ansori* opera, folk-song and *muga*. Using this particular *muga* and its variations, Walraven concludes that, contrary to the prevalent theory that *p'ansori* derived from *muga*, some *muga* were directly influenced by old literature and *p'ansori*.

Walraven's focus is whether popular vernacular literature and folk performances derived from *muga* or *vice versa*. This, though, is an issue impossible to address in any scientific way, in the absence of any systematic relevant records. Moreover, comparing the texts of different genres is highly problematic in terms of methodology. Although *kut* is translated into English as "ritual", it is not purely ritual in the established sense of the word. Ritual is characterised by repetition, a constant form over time and exact specification of what participants should do or say, with reference to religious or mystical notions, whereas shamanism is an open book, capable of absorbing all sorts of elements. Another problem concerns the choice of the *Shim Ch'ong muga*. It is relatively recent, and is limited to a very small area. It appears neither in Seoul *kut*, nor any *kut* performed by the dominant type of shaman, *kangshin mu*. Therefore, anthropological methodology does not work because of the problems regarding the choice of the particular. Had Walraven used the more universal *Malmi*, the biographical epic song of *Pari kongju* (the Abandoned Princess), the theory would have been more convincing.

Songju p'uri, a text dedicated to the House Site Spirit, is widely performed. Here again, Walraven uses the 1930s text of Akamatsu and Akiba. Since the past 60 years have wrought considerable changes to the text, it might have been interesting to present a comparison between old and modern versions. Elsewhere, his unfamiliarity with general shamanistic practices today leads to some misguided information. For example, we hear: "At the end of the *köri* [section] the *mudang* invokes the blessing of the god" (p6). *Mudang* do not invoke such a blessing in this way, but give the blessing directly to the sponsors through oracles, at least in the case of *kangshin mu*. Walraven also identifies *Samshin/Sambul* with *Samshin Halmöni*, ascribing it to the general Korean muddling of the singular and the plural (p11). But, *Samshin Halmöni* refers to the mother of *Samshin*, *Tangüm agassi/aegissi*, who features in many *muga*. Similarly, he identifies *Taeshin Halmöni* with *Pari kongju* and *Sönang* with the Mountain God (p12), which is debatable. The first two are different spirits, and *Sönang* is more likely to have been derived from *Sönghwang*, meaning a moat around a castle, which is also the guardian spirit of Taiwanese villages. *Pujöng* is not a deity, as Walraven misconstrues (p7), but represents all pollution.

At one point the author writes:

The ideas of the *mudang* about their deities are not infrequently so vague that it is difficult to give a concise description of a god or even a class of gods (p8).

The above shows a lack of knowledge and confusion concerning the Korean shamanistic pantheon, which is not so chaotic. A deeper understanding of the Korean tendency to represent the whole/mass through an idea/person, witnessed in the shaman's tendency to anthropomorphize incorporeal matters, would clarify much of the supposed confusion.

But, despite all that I have said, this remains a valuable addition to the literature on Korean shamanism in English.

Hyun-key Kim Hogarth